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Abstract 
This thesis discusses changes in conjugality in China through the lens of cross-border 
marriages between Vietnamese women and Chinese men in China’s Guangxi and 
Yunnan provinces. It draws on over fifty mixed couples’ narratives and conversations 
with numerous residents of borderlands localities in which such alliances occur. They 
were collected during nine months of fieldwork, conducted between 2006 and 2010, 
in four twin cities of the Sino-Vietnamese border and some neighbouring villages.  
Against a backdrop of ongoing population movement between the two countries since 
the re-opening of their border and the development of their economic exchanges, 
cross-border marriages have become more critical in the local social landscape and 
constitute a challenge to contemporary migration policies. Many observers relate 
these marriages to human trafficking, ignoring intimate yearnings and the complex 
structure of human relationships in these borderlands. They also address these 
alliances through the lens of Chinese and Vietnamese post-reform era upheavals, i.e. 
as a direct consequence of structural dynamics such as demographic imbalance or 
economic migration.  
This thesis, grounded in peoples’ experiences and perceptions, chooses a different 
perspective. It questions the determinism of state policies and the reductive view of 
human trafficking by arguing that the phenomenon of cross-border marriage is 
ultimately embedded in the articulation of various social issues that have recently 
emerged in both China and Vietnam. Competition over wealth amongst the Chinese 
population and internal migrations have increased social inequality. In the meantime, 
commodification of social relationships, and changes in conjugality values and 
expectations have altered gender positions. These various factors have excluded some 
individuals from the marriage market and relegate them to the fringes of both 
societies. To some extent, such a new social context has driven them to develop 
survival strategies, and consequently to adjust their marital practices in order to fit 
their challenging environment. The thesis shows how contemporary social values 
shared by mixed couples’ hosting communities and revealed in a stereotyping social 
discourse on Otherness eventually lead many of involved individuals to face new 
challenges and stigmatisation once married, regardless of the circumstances within 
which they initially met.  
  ix 
The key argument of this thesis is that cross-border marriages in this region are 
practiced as an alternative pattern to normative conjugality that intend to serve as a 
springboard for excluded people who pursue social recognition. This objective is 
rarely achieved for new forms of stigmatization emerge from this marriage pattern. 
This thesis contributes to existing scholarship on cross-border marriages by 
highlighting how social marginality may impact the development of alternative 
patterns of conjugality, particularly in spaces that are perceived as chaotic. 
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De marges van het huwelijk 
Over fantasieën, tactieken en beeldvorming van Sino-Vietnamese 
ontmoetingen in grensgebieden 
 
Samenvatting  
Dit proefschrift bespreekt de veranderingen van het huwelijk in China gezien vanuit 
het perspectief van grensoverschrijdende huwelijken tussen Vietnamese vrouwen en 
Chinese mannen in de Chinese provincies Guangxi en Yunnan. Het werk is gebaseerd 
op verhalen en conversaties met meer dan 50 stellen en op talloze gesprekken met de 
bewoners van de grensgebieden waar deze allianties plaatsvinden. Deze zijn 
verzameld gedurende 9 maanden veldwerk tussen 2006 en 2010 in vier vergelijkbare 
steden aan de Chinees-Vietnamese grens en een aantal dorpen in de regio.  
Sinds de heropening van de Chinees-Vietnamese grens en de ontwikkeling van het 
economische verkeer tussen deze twee landen is er ook een constante stroom van 
bevolkingsverkeer tussen de twee landen op gang gekomen. Chinees-Vietnamese 
huwelijks allianties zijn belangrijker geworden binnen lokale sociale landschappen en 
vormen een uitdaging voor het hedendaagse migratie beleid.  
Veel observatoren relateren deze huwelijken aan mensenhandel. Ze gaan daarmee 
voorbij aan de intieme verlangens en de complexe structuren van menselijke relaties 
in deze grensgebieden. Zij zien deze allianties vooral binnen het kader van een 
tijdperk van grote hervormingen in China en Vietnam. Grensoverschrijdende 
huwelijken zijn binnen deze visie een directe consequentie van structurele, 
dynamische processen zoals een verstoord demografisch evenwicht en economische 
migratie.  
Op basis van de ervaringen en percepties van mensen in deze gebieden kiest dit 
proefschrift voor een ander perspectief. Het stelt het determinisme van het staatsbeleid 
en het versimpelde beeld van dit soort huwelijken als een vorm van mensenhandel ter 
discussie. Het beargumenteert dat het fenomeen van grensoverschrijdende huwelijken 
verklaard moet worden vanuit de recente sociale problemen in zowel China als 
  xi 
Vietnam. Competitie en interne migratie hebben geleid tot vergrote sociale 
ongelijkheid onder de Chinese bevolking. Veranderingen over de verwachtingen en 
normen van het huwelijk hebben geresulteerd tot nieuwe gender verhoudingen. Als 
gevolg van zulke diverse sociale factoren zijn sommige individuen uitgesloten van de 
huwelijksmarkt en verbannen naar de rand van beide maatschappijen. Tot op zekere 
hoogte heeft de nieuwe sociale context hen ertoe gedreven om overlevingsstrategieën 
te ontwikkelen en hun huwelijkspraktijken aan te passen. 
Dit onderzoek laat zien hoe hedendaagse sociale waarden van de gastgemeentes van 
de gemengde stellen in stereotype sociale vertogen over “anders zijn” er uiteindelijk 
toe leidden dat veel van de betrokken individuen in deze huwelijken opnieuw allerlei 
moeilijkheden en stigma ervaren onafhankelijk van de manier waarop ze elkaar 
hebben ontmoet.  
Het centrale argument van dit proefschrift is dat grensoverschrijdende huwelijken in 
deze regio gezien worden als een alternatief voor de gangbare huwelijkse normen en 
als een uitweg voor gemarginaliseerde mensen die sociale erkenning zoeken. Dit doel 
wordt zelden gehaald omdat deze huwelijken nieuwe vormen van stigma oproepen. 
Dit proefschrift draagt bij aan de bestaande kennis over grensoverschrijdende 
huwelijken door het belichten van de invloed van sociale marginaliteit op de 
ontwikkeling van alternatieve patronen van het huwelijk.  
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  1 
Introduction 
 “Serendipity and anthropology are inextricably linked, because culture itself is an 
unending serendipitous process” (Pieke 2000: 148, original emphasis) 
 
Crossing borders 
My interest in China was triggered by the international coverage of the 1989 
democracy movement, the Tian’anmen Square massacre, and a few weeks later by 
life-changing encounters with a Chinese anthropologist who fled to France after his 
involvement. These moments sparked my interest in Chinese independent thought and 
in communities on the fringes of the country, whether political, social or cultural. Five 
years later I had an undergraduate degree of Chinese Studies and I travelled for the 
first time to China to study at Shandong University in Jinan. In December that year, 
during the semester’s winter break, I first crossed the Sino-Vietnamese border. With a 
friend, I took buses all the way from Guangzhou (Canton) to Dongxing, at the very 
end of the eastern part of Guangxi province. Dongxing did not leave me any 
impression but the crossing of its bridge over the Beilun River that took us to the 
small Vietnamese town of Móng Cái did. It was a busy space where no one would 
consider to wander long but I took the time to stop and observe what was going on 
under the bridge: there were a few long and narrow boats still seen today, filled with 
cages where dozens of captured dogs awaited quietly their transfer from one bank to 
the other. Trucks were parked on the bank and young men were hurrying to load them 
with their lively freight. Nothing really proved that this was smuggling but I had a 
strong feeling that selling live animals under the bridge was not exactly part of the 
regular border trade. At that time, Móng Cái was nothing but a little Vietnamese town 
set along the river bank, with countless little wooden houses and mud paths leading to 
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small food-stalls where we ended for a cup of tea and a bowl of rice noodles. That 
night, we were invited to stay in the back of a little restaurant by a charming woman 
who warmly took care of us, giving us her bed to share – a wood bed only covered by 
a bamboo mat. She helped me with my laundry and even assisted me during a shower 
by pouring water on me from her big sandstone jar with a plastic bowl. I cannot recall 
any of the conversations we might have tried to have with her, I do however 
remember her generosity, hospitality and large smiles in a time when it was forbidden 
to host a foreigner in one’s home. 
A month later, my friend and I were crossed the border on our way back from 
Hmong villages in Lào Cai’s mountains. This time, we crossed at the Lào Cai gate, 
next to Yunnan province in China, in the north-western part of Vietnam. We arrived 
late in the evening from Hanoi and had to wait until the morning to proceed with the 
border formalities. Unable to find a suitable place to stay, having been ripped off by 
the owners of the only guesthouses in town, we wandered hopelessly at the bus station 
while the locals looked on. Night fell quickly and we decided to spend the night at the 
market and see what happened there. There we found an empty space on the floor 
between closed shops and covered stalls, spread out a plastic cover that we had been 
carrying to protect our bags from the rain and managed to create a sort of bed with our 
sleeping bags. The few sellers who slept on the top of their stalls at night and drivers 
who did the same in their pedicabs asked why we would do such a foolish thing. 
Apart from the usual curiosity, they warned us that the market was a dangerous place 
at night, and that we were likely going to be robbed. They also warned us of the dirt, 
possible rain, rats and cockroaches that own the market at night. We did not speak 
Vietnamese well enough to understand to what extent what we planed was a risky 
adventure though. We were determined and found this challenging enough to stay and 
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observe as much as we could. The market was not quiet even during the night and 
movements of people and goods kept going on all night long. We slept in turns and 
made it through dawn without incident. An hour later we crossed the old bridge over 
the Red River, following the narrow path along the railway, up to Hekou and the rest 
of China. 
Years of Chinese life later, I trailed after my memories, crossing borders and 
visiting in the same order the small cities of Dongxing, Móng Cái and then Lào Cai 
and Hekou. And so did I, again, several times the following years. I never managed to 
connect the initial images of my memories to the new landscapes. Neither the wooden 
houses of Móng Cái nor this particular market in Lào Cai exist anymore. At least I 
was not able to locate them when I returned there. Concrete and sometimes 
impressive buildings have replaced them, border trade has reached another scale, and 
the bridges that officially link the two countries changed as well. No evidence of what 
these places looked like fifteen years ago remained but I felt there was definitely an 
invisible identity of these places that needed to be explored. 
 
Where are the victims? 
In 2005, I worked several months in Phnom Penh, building a research library 
on human trafficking in Southeast Asia in the research unit of a Non-Governmental 
Organization. I started to relate some documents I was reading with a few intriguing 
stories heard during my last journey in Vietnam. In remote little towns, casual 
acquaintances mentioned local Vietnamese young women who suddenly went to 
China or Taiwan to get married. In early summer 2006, determined to question the 
significance of marriages across Chinese borders, and their possible link with human 
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trade, I went in Hekou, the first of the four border twin-cities on the Sino-Vietnamese 
frontier I had decided to visit, in order to conduct preliminary research on the 
phenomenon of women trade for the specific purpose of marriage. I knew it would not 
be easy to find informants but I was confident that many cases existed in the area, and 
that patience would reward me with enough data to sketch a realistic picture. My 
notebook was wide open to collect life-stories, likely of the dramatic kind. I 
interrogated my first contact there: 
— I heard there was a lot of mixed couples in this border, is that true? 
—  Yes, a lot! I know a few of them. 
—  Could you tell me what you know about coerced marriage in the area? 
— What coerced marriages? Do you mean Vietnamese women? You’re 
wasting your time, they won’t talk to you! 
—  Why? Is it too painful or risky for them to talk?  
—  No, but they will make up stories for you to cry, most of these women are 
cheaters. 
The answer confused me. I tried with another person without meeting much 
enthusiasm or concern, and then I insisted with a third one. But I received similar 
dubious comments. Day after day, I realized that the reality might not be as I expected 
it to be. If in local Chinese residents’ eyes, Vietnamese women were not the victims I 
was told they would be, who were they? Why did nobody seem to really care about 
them? 
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This is how, from an original research question framed around coerced 
marriages involving ‘victims,’ ‘perpetrators’ and ‘traffickers’, contested categories I 
became familiar with through previous readings I had been through during my pre-
fieldwork literature review (Doezema 2002; Lyons 1999; Molland 2011), I gradually 
switched to a new approach, guided by my informants’ voices on the matter. These 
various voices have conducted me to abandon institutionalized stereotypes, and to 
apprehend a distinct social reality through, unexpectedly and almost ironically, 
another set of representations. 
 
The in-betweens of research on cross-border marriages 
Engaging with research on a cross-border social phenomenon has inevitably 
put me in a delicate intellectual position, reflecting the in-between position my 
informants often cope with on a more pragmatic level. Situated between well-known 
scholarship and unexplored perspectives, I have constantly tried to find the right 
balance between disciplines as well. Addressing a social phenomenon that involves 
both Vietnamese and Chinese people imposed to step equally in Chinese Studies and 
in Vietnamese Studies in an attempt to set up complementary perspectives. But it also 
meant positioning myself as a researcher between area studies and social 
anthropology, as well as finding my way between various field such as demography, 
migration, gender, and family studies. Eventually, along my own path of research on 
marginalized groups, I had to become familiar with a new borderline population, just 
after having focused years on the sub-culture of Chinese rock-musicians (Grillot 
2001), child prostitution (Grillot 2005), and before heading towards future research on 
Chinese itinerant bee-keepers. This was a difficult although fascinating task. 
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Balancing between all these disciplines and areas of research was even more 
challenging since the subject of my research and its related topics developed faster 
than the writing of the findings. As I am writing the last sentences of this thesis, I 
realize how typical it is of Chinese studies today, to be updated but already outdated, 
needed but already lacking. This is one fascinating aspect of Chinese Studies. Things 
are changing so fast that unexpected upheavals regularly come to light in every corner 
of Chinese society, requiring our appreciation of these moving realities to constant re-
interpretation and new grounds. Almost every month throughout the last five years, 
new publications have emerged on one or more topics to which I refer in this study, 
hence constantly challenging the relevance of my conclusions. 
But despite a local situation that also rapidly evolves, this research still stands 
between early academic works that examined Sino-Vietnamese cross-border 
marriages without focusing on the Mainland border or without mentioning their 
sociological aspects on one hand, and media reports describing the emerging trends in 
Mainland Chinese social landscapes, namely Sino-Vietnamese marriage arranged by 
broker agencies. Therefore, my approach intends to fill an existing gap in the 
scholarship, and to initiate a closer attention on these alliances by pushing further the 
general assumptions of cross-border marriages phenomenon and examining closer its 
recent manifestation. 
 
Core ideas 
My approach to cross-border marriages has originally drawn inspiration from 
the dichotomies found in various sources: academic literature, activist agenda, 
journalistic investigations, local beliefs and practices, and preliminary fieldwork 
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findings that gradually revealed an existing and cultivated misunderstanding on 
certain forms of border relationships. Dichotomies exist at several levels, though they 
start in portraying the marriage protagonists. A widely spread picture portrays 
Vietnamese women as victims needing rescue, deceiving women or regular migrants 
building their economic life along with her personal life. Facing them are 
disadvantaged peasants in need, cruel Chinese husbands, pragmatic businessmen or 
pitiful cheated partner. And the voices of women (or the voice given to women) rarely 
meet the voices of men (or their silence), which add the confusion on each party’s 
role. When it comes to identifying the forms of the phenomenon, one can only choose 
between data on proper international marriage involving a bureaucratic procedure and 
rural forced marriage. Contextualizing these marriage is also an issue: Are they part of 
an ongoing historical trend or are they an emerging phenomenon? To elucidate the 
question, one may find responding elements in demographical imbalance and 
economic disparities that motivates marriage migration, including international 
marriages. But if one also wonders about the impact of cultural compatibility, 
personal strategy and communities’ role, answers are uneven. In the past decade, even 
though some works on either the ‘human trafficking’ phenomenon at the border 
(Wang 2005; Linh 2005; ActionAid International Vietnam 2005; Molland 2010; Child 
Exploitation and Online Protection Centre 2011), including deception for marriage 
(Anh 2003; Sun & Li 2006), or local romance and pragmatic relationships (Chan 
2005a, Zhou 2002, Luo & Long 2008) were published, few of them have effectively 
resolved the above dichotomies. Rare were the attempts to bring together the two 
groups of people and to analyse what they might have in common despite differences 
grounded on the socioeconomic context that underlie their migration. 
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My purpose here is to fill this gap and to contribute to addressing a more 
perceptive picture of a phenomenon that has often been studied in frameworks that 
did not reflect its entire complexity. Cross-border marriages at the Sino-Vietnamese 
frontiers are not necessarily the result of human trafficking, are not necessarily similar 
to other international marriages involving either Vietnamese or Chinese singles, are 
not necessarily the consequences of demography imbalance and economic dichotomy 
(Duong, Bélanger & Hong 2007), hence poverty, and are not even necessarily known 
as ‘marriage’ at the local level. Once this distinction is assessed, I will identify 
explanations of mixed alliances that were underestimated, to show what makes them 
emerge as the results of social changes in both countries, and to stress the strategies of 
certain fringes of their respective populations revealed by these marriages. The final 
picture of such unions and their various perspectives will challenge the widely held 
view that contemporary cross-border marriages on the Sino-Vietnamese border 
mainly stem from poverty and demographic crisis. 
 
What facts are we talking about? 
The majority of the Vietnamese women I have met in Chinese borderlands 
arrived in China during the 1990s and the 2000s, though a minority arrived earlier. In 
the 1990s, Vietnamese women came and tended to stay in borderlands, Yunnan, 
Guangxi and even Guangdong provinces, while later, another generation of 
Vietnamese women slowly immigrated further up to inner China. Some of these 
women have moved back and forth over the borders before and after they settled with 
a husband in China. Chinese men can be divided into two main groups: the local men 
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who were already living in these borderlands before the frontier re-opened in 1991, 
and the migrants who came by for a period, and stayed, or left with a new wife.  
Before even considering the precise circumstances under which these 
individuals actually met, there are different ways to approach these marriages. One 
can see them as a historical phenomenon occurring for decades, even centuries in 
border areas without attracting much attention until recently with the new 
qualification, ‘human trafficking,’ and an agenda spearheaded by international 
agencies brought them to light. One can see them as a sign of border control 
dysfunction that emphasises the illegality of many of these marriages: the women 
involved are illegal migrants, their alliances are not registered and their offspring 
become non-citizens. Simultaneously, one can also consider them as a political issue 
that preoccupies policy makers and local communities: illegal migration jeopardises 
the stability of Chinese and Vietnamese border areas in countries that signed 
cooperation agreements and has implemented serious immigration/emigration 
policies. Consequently, one can think of these marriages as a legal case study, and 
focus on the question related to integration of mixed couples and families into China, 
and to Vietnamese policies on international marriages. But one can also regard them 
as a rather recent popular local response to some crucial contemporary social issues in 
both China and Vietnam, and analyse the emergence of a new frame of interpretation. 
Finally, one could focus on the emotion, psychology, life commitment and personal 
strategy that these alliances are based on, whatever their articulation/interpretation at 
the macro level might be, and see them as a distinguishing and particular aspect of 
matrimony/conjugality in Asian societies on the move. Although I will review most of 
these different perspectives in the course of this work, I will predominantly engage 
with the two last approaches as these perspectives have been largely neglected by the 
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academic scholarship. I also aim to inscribe in the broader anthropological literature 
on conjugality in transnational context (Kelsky 2001; Rofel 2007; Povinelli 2006; 
Constable 2003, 2004; Padilla et al. 2007; Hirsh 2003). 
 
Theoretical framework 
My intention is not to engage with the debate on human trafficking but to step 
away from it, returning to actors and individuals involved in cross-border 
relationships, and analyse the phenomenon through their own lenses. Rather than 
contributing to an already existing large body of academic literature on mail-order 
brides, human trafficking or international migration for marriage in Asia, in which 
Vietnamese women occupy a rather privileged position among researched target 
groups, I would like to position this work within two fields of scholarship. The first 
one is kinship, understood as “an active process of becoming that is always situated 
within wider, historical-political, economic and sociocultural relations – in other 
words, a metamorphosis” (Brandtstädter & Santos, 2009: 10, emphasis added). 
Following the examples of the essays published in Brandtstädter and Santos’ 2009 
volume on Chinese kinship, my intention is also to explore one aspect of Chinese 
kinship “through a focus on … what has been ‘traditionally’ perceived as marginal in 
the ‘official’ kinship ideologies: women, children, non-standard families and same-
sex relations, or class, violence and work” (Brandtstädter & Santos 2009: 10-11). The 
recent upheavals that have changed the face of Chinese and Vietnamese societies 
engaged into modernity being a source of kinship transformations, my work will be 
grounded into scholarship on social and identity construction in this region, notably 
within the framework of migration. Secondly, I wish to situate this study in the field 
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of liminality/marginality versus normality, both in a concrete and a symbolic sense. I 
will explore how borderlands represent a liminal space that transgress rules and 
provide a social space to marginal groups, and I will demonstrate how the position of 
subalterns or stigmatised individuals on whom this research focuses, leads them to 
adopt non-conventional marriage patterns as a tactic of the marginalized. This will 
illustrate, in the words of Coutin, how “borders between existence and nonexistence 
nonetheless remain fuzzy and permeable” (Coutin 2003: 186). 
 
Field, sources, methods and implications 
Although my focus concerns marriage, I have never witnessed any wedding 
celebration and will not base my analysis on accounts of ceremonies. Marriage here is 
understood as the relationship shaped by conjugal experience rather than the 
institution, and thus encompasses not only formalised unions but also what in other 
contexts might be labelled ‘common law’ marriages. Indeed, the various meanings of 
marriage for men and women will be the core of this dissertation. In order to capture 
the micro/local perspective on cross-border marriages in Sino-Vietnamese 
borderlands, this thesis will confront two corpuses of narratives: life-stories of couples 
and individuals, and the accounts of their surrounding communities. 
By exploring these different points of views I aim to re-establish a balance 
between what is believed to be and what is actually practiced and experienced. By 
listening to local voices, this work intends to keep some distance from the gender 
paradigm, the human trafficking concept, or the economic determinism interpretation, 
and it will provide new insights such as social representations, marital expectations, 
individual stigma and marginalisation on cross-border marriages. 
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Besides extensive fieldwork data, my analysis relies heavily on Western 
academic publications that sketch the general framework within which this 
phenomenon is inscribed, and specific studies that support my findings. This includes 
the work of many Chinese and Vietnamese scholars published in English. I also 
consulted Chinese languages sources that directly relate to my research focus and 
provide additional data and perspectives. Media reports and non-academic literature 
also constituted relevant sources for this study. 
On a pragmatic level, choosing to study a community scattered on two sides of 
a frontier represented another significant challenge. To reach the optimal conditions 
of objectivity during such fieldwork, the ethnographer should ideally observe what 
forms a given phenomenon takes in each borderland, master and take notes in two 
languages, interview an equivalent number of informants here and there, and make 
sure to spend enough time among each community to capture their specificities. But 
aside from some methodological issues that I will address in the first chapter of this 
thesis, an unavoidable reality prevented me from providing a comprehensive picture 
of cross-border marriages in two countries. The majority of Sino-Vietnamese mixed 
couples meet, live and work in China: women move towards men. Therefore, even 
though I managed to collect relevant data in Vietnam as well as China, my approach 
and the local perceptions translated here mostly stands on the Chinese side of the 
border. Being obviously bound to reflect women as men’s perspective in the matter 
however, I also made a point to collect life-stories and opinions within each sex group 
as fairly as possible. 
Approximately fifty Sino-Vietnamese couples figure among my informants. 
When it was possible, I met husbands and wives separately, but sometimes I 
interviewed them together. In many cases, only one spouse was available or agreed to 
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talk to me. Hence, I did not collect complete data on each couple. Also missing are 
perspectives of family members such as children, parents and in-laws since many of 
the latter were living too far away to be interviewed. Work, school and family 
schedule as well as the mobility of these families did not always allow several 
meetings and a follow-up during the three years of my fieldwork was only available 
for some individuals or couples. Besides couples, I also talked to countless 
community members, whether related or not to the mixed couples, like neighbours, 
shop-keepers, business associates, friends, local personalities and casual 
acquaintances. The stories collected ranged from in-depth confidences to timid 
account of personal stories, mixed familial life, voluntary and non-voluntary 
marriages, temporary alliances or long-term relationship, happy or sad memories, on-
going relationships that highlight different moments of a life. 
Fieldwork took place between June 2006 and September 2010, mainly 
concentrated in summer 2006 and in fall-winter 2008-2009. I spent an average of two 
to three weeks at a time in four border towns that I will describe in Chapter 2.  
As an itinerant ethnographer travelling from town to town, often leaving my 
family behind in China, I gained a sense of the emotional context of such travel that 
led to a greater degree of connection with the people whose subjectivity I sought to 
understand. The initial experience of spending a night on Lào Cai’s market floor 
impressed me because it made me realized how a place like this could generate 
feelings of insecurity, whether or not they were justified. Years later, constant 
warning from my local acquaintances on both side of the border twin-cities, and 
evening sights of social activities on the banks of the frontier’s rivers, raised the 
awareness of local dangers. In a similar manner, being separated from my baby during 
long periods of fieldworks increased my sensitivity to the narratives of women often 
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separated from their own children, and whose life’s material and emotional 
precariousness was sometimes so difficult to articulate. Hence, fieldwork conditions 
provided an unexpected insight into the anxiety of some of the women I was going to 
meet and who, during the course of their complicated life, had been caught in a 
difficult and disturbing situation, without being able to rely on a responsible husband, 
a helpful mother or compassionate acquaintances to cope with challenging 
predicaments. This leads to the issue of the ethnographer’s position in certain 
circumstances, the unlikely distance with those whose feelings we ought to translate. 
We cannot (nor would we want to, I think) deceive ourselves into believing that our 
presence leaves no trace, no impact on those on whose life we dare to intrude. We 
are, after all, human, and we can hardly help becoming involved in the lives of the 
people we have chosen to be our teachers … So although I reject as ‘unreasonable,’ 
perhaps, the monastic demand that ethnographers leave the sands on which they trod 
without a trace of their sandals, what may never be compromised are our personal 
accountability and answerability to the other (Scheper-Hughes 1992: 24). 
During fieldwork, I was to a certain extent shaped by a psychologically 
vulnerable position due to frequent exposure to the emotional torments of my 
informants. Hence, out of empathy, I have sometimes overstepped the role of an 
observer and data collector by helping people to solve issues related to their 
vulnerable positions. For example,1 by upsetting a fragile person who stirred up old 
stories meant to remain in the past. Hence, the research findings will reflect the 
ambivalent position of the ethnographer in a field where emotions constitute a core 
material, i.e., an acknowledged sympathy for the plight of the silenced (Spencer & 
Davies 2010). 
                                                
1 For instance, I committed myself in helping Tam (cf. Appendix 6) finding her biological father, a 
French-Moroccan soldier who left her 35 years earlier in Vietnam. The whole and complex process of 
this search has been one of the most moving human adventures of my fieldwork that I will elaborate in 
a forthcoming publication.  
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Problematic and organization of the thesis 
This work aims to explore the way in which marginalized subjects create or 
recreate their own social space. This space is materialized by conjugal relationship 
interpreted as the site through which they can live out the daily life they yearned. 
Most specifically, in the particular context of two trade-related border societies in 
constant transformation, how do changing values and social environment affect local 
individual’s expectations in their private life and how do Vietnamese women and 
Chinese men on the margins act to fulfil ideals of conjugality, while searching for an 
alternative to conventional marital conditions? 
This dissertation will be organized accordingly to the above problematic. After 
addressing the questions of methods (Chapter 1), each chapter will focus on one 
thematic according to the following framework. In a border setting already 
conditioned by historical background and defined by unconventional activities 
(Chapter 2), one can observe some specific marriage patterns that seem to translate 
into some remarkable social and kinship changes in Chinese and Vietnamese societies 
(Chapter 3). Therefore, these alliances become the site of fantasies, yearnings and 
pragmatic demands. However, due to the social representations to which these 
alliances are subjected (Chapter 4), the involved partners face degrees of 
stigmatization that prevent most of them from completely getting out of their original 
predicament. Indeed, the recent socioeconomic upheavals have lead to the emergence 
of an increasing number of ostracized individuals who adopt alternative forms of 
conjugality in order to obtain a recognized social position, resulting from of strategies 
that they use to cope with the remaining obstacles to reach normality (Chapter 5). 
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Chapter I 
The ‘hows’ of a delicate approach 
From the perspective[s] of the people who give or deny us access to the field in 
China, the facts of everyday life, no matter how trivial, therefore matter a great deal. 
That normal life is such a powerful secret in China ought to make anthropology 
particularly dangerous. Anthropology, more than any other discipline, makes it its business to 
understand in detail what happens at the grass-roots level. That we do not meet more 
suspicion than we already do is probably because most people in China either do not know 
what anthropology is, or have an understanding of the discipline at odds with the self-
perception of Western anthropologists. In China (as in many other parts of the world) 
anthropology either draws a blank, or conjures up images of colonial exploitation and the 
investigation of the physique or queer customs of primitives by members of a dominant group 
or culture (Pieke 2000: 132). 
 
1 Dealing with Big Brother in China and Vietnam 
My intention in this chapter is to reflect upon my fieldwork experience and to 
clarify through empirical examples the reasons why I opted to directly search for and 
contact those among the local population I intended to study, rather than proceed 
through the official channels requested by institutions and host countries to conduct 
research in China and Vietnam. As well, I explore the ethics of undertaking research 
in this way, and, in the process, draw out some recurring issues that many local and 
foreign ethnographers have likewise encountered at some point during their fieldwork 
in China and Vietnam, issues which have recently been summarised elsewhere (e.g., 
Heimer & Thøgersen 2006; Scott et al. 2006) but which appear even more salient 
when it comes to inquiry into a sensitive issue. 
I initially set out the arguments developed in this chapter during the 
bureaucratic ethics application procedure at Macquarie University at the time I started 
to plan my overseas research. Before receiving approval of the manner in which I 
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intended to conduct my research several exchanges took place between members of 
Macquarie University’s Human Research Ethics Committee and myself regarding 
issues that the conditions of this project raised. After a long discussion, it was 
eventually accepted1 that some adjustments and compromises to the formal way of 
approaching the research environment in the above two countries were, in my 
opinion, both necessary and inevitable. 
During our exchanges, the main issue discussed concerned my official status 
during my research. I explained to the Committee that I had no intention of applying 
for research visas in both countries and that I would not insist upon obtaining 
institutional affiliation in the event that my informal personal request failed. This 
means that it was agreed, in accordance with normal procedure, that I would contact 
some relevant departments in the main social sciences institutions of the areas I 
intended to stay in and request assistance. But, in the possibility that I received no 
encouragement to pursue my project in collaboration with them, I would opt to 
conduct my research informally without any local supervision. This pragmatic 
decision was based both upon my previous experience and upon an assumption that 
not only would it save me time and trouble, but it would also benefit the quality of my 
data collection. In China, as well as in Vietnam, conducting academic research 
requires official affiliation with a local institution, a procedure ostensibly designed to 
help foreign researchers with logistical matters such as providing letters of invitation, 
obtaining ‘research visas’, acquiring recommendation letters for local contacts, 
obtaining permission to conduct interviews, and accessing internal documents. 
Proceeding through these official channels may be considered by some to be the 
                                                
1 I am very grateful to members of the Ethics Committee, who listened to and acknowledged my 
arguments and allowed me the relative freedom to deal with local issues relying on earlier practices. 
  19 
‘proper way’ of approaching informants; that is, the host institution is in charge of 
supervising the researcher. And, while this procedure may prove very useful when the 
topic or field of research raises few, if any, sensitive issues, it can become very 
restrictive when one seeks direct and non-monitored interaction with the target 
population.  
Given the sensitivity of my research subject, I knew that this would be a very 
difficult strategy to implement in China and Vietnam, i.e., that it would take time and 
could prove a frustrating experience even if ultimately successful. I was reluctant to 
consent to perceived impositions such as escorted research trips, a research assistant, 
the submission of questionnaire samples and research plans for approval, the 
disclosure of lists of interviewees and names of places to be visited, regular field 
reports to the host institutions and registration with local authorities that academic 
engagement of this type usually implies.  
Several previous empirical examples made me hesitate. In 2006, prior to 
commencing this doctoral project, I spent a few months as a Research Fellow with the 
Institute of Research on Contemporary Southeast Asia (IRASEC) in Bangkok. During 
this time, I started to conduct preliminary investigations into some Sino-Vietnamese 
border towns. At the time, in an attempt to organise my research properly and hoping 
that research conditions had improved since my last experience in the area (1998-
2000),1 I decided to contact a few scholars in Hanoi and Kunming. But, my position 
                                                
1 I conducted my first fieldwork research in China in 1998-1999 in a Miao village (Xijiang, Guizhou 
province). Between 1999 and 2000, I undertook a second period of research, this time into a musicians’ 
community (Chengdu city, Sichuan province), for my Master’s degree in Ethnology (Nanterre 
University, France) and for an academic essay on underground Chinese artists, respectively (Grillot 
2001). I remained institutionally independent during both periods of fieldwork. 
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as an independent researcher gave rise to some confusion and unease and I soon 
detected signs of discomfort among those whom I hoped to consider colleagues (both 
Chinese and Vietnamese scholars). From the replies that I received via phone calls, 
email exchanges and/or informal meetings, it became clear that to date no one had 
undertaken any specific research into cross-border marriages in Sino-Vietnamese 
border towns, that it was “difficult to advise any specialist to contact,” that “the 
border zone is not safe but rather chaotic,” that “locals will not talk to you,” that 
“human trafficking was not a front-line topic phenomenon,” that “research cannot be 
conducted without official permission,” and that “the topic is too sensitive.” 
Participant observation was also problematic given that it implied spending a certain 
amount of time in the border area and required organised supervision. In sum, local 
academics – or those who spoke on their behalf – stressed the difficulty of my project 
and the challenges it would represent in a politicized context and scrutinised area. As 
I did not want to attract unwanted attention to my project, I did not insist upon others’ 
co-operation. I ended up conducting my investigation alone on the Chinese side of the 
border, and in the company of a friend from Hanoi on the Vietnamese side. 
As Frank Pieke maintains: 
[E]xplaining anthropology in terms that make sense to Chinese social scientists and 
officials is nevertheless essential to gain access to informants and field-sites. When 
doing this, one is often faced with suspicions born from the secrecy of everyday life. 
There is little one can do about this apart from stating one’s methods and objectives 
in very general terms. This suspicion is, after all, not a matter of some 
misunderstanding of what anthropologists are up to but, quite on the contrary, an 
acutely accurate understanding of our work. The problem is rather that what to us 
seems unexceptional comes across as subversive to gatekeepers steeped in the game 
of information hoarding (Pieke 2000: 132). 
Herein lays an ethical issue that was not only of concern to the investigated 
countries but also to Macquarie University, which is responsible for the safety and 
wellbeing of all of its PhD candidates during their periods of overseas research. Not 
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only was I putting myself in the position of a researcher who, according to Chinese 
and Vietnamese regulations, conducted research informally (i.e., without informing 
the local authorities and without any referential local institution as recommended), but 
I was also disregarding the usual ethics requirements of Macquarie University. 
Adopting this approach meant that I risked being discovered conducting ‘illegal 
activities’ in my host countries:1 I could be deported, fined or charged. I could also 
jeopardise the research projects of potential future colleagues in the area, something I 
was fully aware of. 
However, by not revealing any official documentation explaining what my 
purpose really was, there was less likelihood of my informants – that is, people I 
looked upon as friends and from whom I never requested identification – becoming 
concerned. To the onlooker, they were simply friends having ‘chats’ with me. 
Conversely, choosing to identify, interview and focus upon informants under some 
form of supervision by an official assistant may have meant exposing others to 
unwanted scrutiny. Their names may have been disclosed and recorded and interested 
parties may have investigated them further after my departure, seeking to clarify their 
status according to the law. In other words, my official presence among them may 
have jeopardised the already precarious existences of some. This was indeed delicate 
to handle and required discussion with members of Macquarie University’s Ethics 
Committee. 
I was preparing to study people, some of whom may have been in an illegal 
position regarding national and international laws. Being openly affiliated to 
                                                
1  It is illegal for foreigners to conduct research in China and Vietnam without first gaining official 
permission. 
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authorities or institutions could prove a hindrance to gaining future informants’ trust. 
This had the potential to prove especially difficult in Vietnam, for example, where 
informing is still part of the political culture and remains stark in the memories of 
those Chinese who experienced Maoism. Attempts to build intimate relationships with 
couples and households would only succeed if my activities remained outside of 
official surveillance. Certain words have the same effect upon people as voice-
recorders: after an uncomfortable smile, a potential informant may quietly slip away. 
Faced with the choice between two ethically valid but somewhat contradictory 
attitudes, I opted to minimise risk, thus lessening the likelihood of potential trouble 
for my informants. Any imprudent choice could lead to lack of accuracy of data or 
lack of information.  
However, it is not only one’s connections with institutions and authorities that 
can drive a wedge between researchers and informants. Being seen as a journalist, in 
some contexts, may also arouse suspicion. “At the beginning, because of my vague 
claim of interest in rural life, people conceived of me as a journalist or someone 
whose purpose was deliberately hidden for some reason” (Liu 2000: 18). And, the fact 
that my interest did not concern ethnic groups or local customs could very easily 
generate misunderstanding.  
Numerous social sciences scholars have undertaken research in China’s 
Yunnan and Guangxi provinces, areas famous for their ethnic diversity and 
relationships with the rest of Southeast Asia. Anthropologists, human geographers and 
historians alike have favoured this region. Clearly, my research did not fit into the 
usual framework of ethnographic research in Yunnan as locals understand it. I 
explained to them that I had no plans to study any ethnic minority groups, neither 
there nor in Guangxi. In fact, I had no particular scholarly interest in the peoples of 
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the area at all. I did not plan to study a particular group of Han Chinese, nor did my 
interest lie in any of the region’s rural communities. Rather, I sought to explore the 
lives of foreign women, who are officially regarded as ‘illegal immigrants’, and the 
social positions of their families. This was of some concern to my interlocutors, i.e., 
scholars and others, who did not consider such enquiry the usual task of an 
anthropologist. In the words of Dru Gladney:  
Anthropology (ren lei xue) in China, until very recently, has been almost exclusively 
limited to physical anthropology. Ethnography (minzu xue) was devoted to the study 
of minorities and was generally carried out in the nationalities institutes (shaoshu 
minzu) and nationalities research centres, rather than in the universities. … 
Ethnography and anthropology, though later criticized, were in general more 
protected than sociology as a tool of the state in dominating the minorities. In China, 
anthropology became the “people’s anthropology” because it concerned itself 
exclusively with the cultural study of the monitory peoples, generally ignoring such 
issues as political economy, social structure, religious authority, and socioeconomic 
change (Gladney 2001: 109-110). 
In China, as well as in Vietnam, restrictions and constraints are still the lot of 
researchers. Improvement is unevenly palpable in the field and, in the main, depends 
upon uncontrollable factors such as connections, policy changes, political sensitivity 
and the institutions involved (Nojonen 2004; Guiheux 2009). As Heimer and 
Thøgersen note in their recently edited volume on fieldwork practice in China, the 
three themes that have emerged in the social sciences disciplines over the last two 
decades go beyond the extant “official control data collection and … general lack of 
autonomy” (Thøgersen & Heimer 2006: 11). These themes include: the less visible 
but still efficient presence of the party-state despite signs of openness; the still limited 
access to the field that requires data collection from alternative sources and the 
practice of short-term investigation and multiple field sites;1 and, on a more optimistic 
                                                
1 When permission to conduct research in one place is accorded for a limited time, the practice of 
multiple sites helps to cope with any resultant lack of data and can also provide a comparative 
perspective. 
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note, the rise of collaborative research projects between Chinese and foreign scholars 
(Thøgersen & Heimer 2006). This evolution has culminated in a new intellectual 
attitude that emphasises the unexpected and encourages improvised strategies into the 
project design. In other words, we must change as China changes, adapt our empirical 
research methodologies according to our host practices when needed, and learn from 
our informants, who are continuously required to cope with their own obstacles within 
a system in which complexities still disclose various interstices and which tolerates 
action taken between rules and control.  ‘Surfing the wave’ but remaining cautious, I 
came to rely in the main upon a rather flexible version of the ‘guerrilla interviewing’ 
method that Thomas Gold practiced in the 1980s in China (Gold 1989), at least in the 
initial stages of the fieldwork I undertook in both China and Vietnam. Under the 
circumstances of unauthorised or unaffiliated research, this ‘method’ simply consists 
of collecting data by picking potential informants. By ostensibly engaging in idle 
conversation in any possible environment, one sets the stage “to create the conditions 
to encounter the unexpected, and when it happens, to pursue it (Pieke 2000: 145, 
original emphasis). 
From the Chinese and Vietnamese scholarly viewpoint, my project looked 
more like a sociological study: a task for investigative journalism perhaps, as national 
media reports had regularly focused on the issue of human trafficking and cross-
border migration. The perplexity extended to my local acquaintances, some of whom 
had an idea of what constituted the work of an ethnographer but had difficulty 
connecting my subject of interest to the conventional work of a national researcher, 
not to mention the methods employed. As regards the local institutions and 
authorities, my interest in cross-border marriages translated as research into illegal 
migration and human trafficking. Due to an assumed connection between a particular 
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social phenomenon and legal and human rights concerns, the topic was simply too 
controversial to invite systematic exploration without risking possibly adverse 
consequences for my informants. I will now illustrate this difficult positioning 
between a non-existent official status and proximity with informants with two 
examples. 
 
Handling the connections 
I visited Wanwei in May 2009, nearly three years after my first stay in this 
little village located by the seaside in Guangxi province. Wanwei is mainly inhabited 
by a few thousand residents officially labelled Jingzu,1 one of China’s fifty-six 
officially recognised Chinese minority ethnic groups. According to the official 
history, the Jing are descendants of Vietnamese fishermen, who arrived on the 
Chinese coast around the fifteenth century AD (Ma 1994). Once back in the village, 
my intention was to meet some of my former informants and to update their situations 
(depending, of course, upon whether I could find their homes again). However, unlike 
in the other border areas I had re-visited after a long absence, nothing seemed to have 
changed much in Wanwei. Because it was the off-season, the beach was not very 
crowded and movement in the only main commercial street was quiet. Business was 
not good, everyone kept saying. My local female acquaintance A Fang’s business 
entails renting tables and chairs for use under the roofs of the shopping area or on the 
beach itself; as well, she sells refreshments and fruit. A Fang explained to me how she 
had to extend her economic activity from her beach refreshment stall – which her 
                                                
1 Jing, the Vietnamese translation of the ‘Kinh’ term, designates the dominant ethnic group in Vietnam:  
the term ‘zu’ means ethnic group. 
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husband was still taking care of – to evening barbecues to help raise a little more 
income for her household.  
In Wanwei, I also planned to meet the local Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
secretary: a Chinese researcher back in Nanning (the capital of Guangxi province) had 
earlier given me a contact number. Following a phone call I made during my stay in 
Dongxing, the main local town in which I was staying, the official agreed to receive 
me. By chance, when I mentioned his name to A Fang, I discovered that the secretary 
was her cousin. In order to make this meeting more successful, I asked her to 
accompany me to the CCP office, presuming that her presence would ease the 
interaction. The whole building, the headquarters of various government offices, 
appeared sleepy and quiet. The secretary welcomed me politely; then, he invited A 
Fang and me to sit on the modest wooden bench that served as seating. According to 
regulations, he asked for my references. Unfortunately, I could only tell him the 
name, the official title he used at work, and the phone number of the Nanning 
researcher who had referred me. I realised I had made a grave mistake, arriving to 
meet him without a formal name card – written in Chinese – showing my official 
status as a foreign Ph.D. student. Vaguely dubious, he carefully wrote down the 
information in a large notebook, saying that he did not recall the researcher’s name. 
Had it not been for the presence of his relative in the office, he could easily have 
declined to meet me due to my lack of official documents or any kind of formal 
introduction. But, my private relationship with his cousin urged him to consider my 
request even though I lacked the appropriate ‘keys’ for accessing the field. I simply 
hoped he could introduce me to a few mixed couples living in his village so I could 
interview them. I did not expect a great deal of support from him, not that I doubted 
that he could provide me with cases to inquire about; but, I realised that as an official 
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he had to limit his involvement and attract the least official attention possible. He did, 
however, provide me with the address and name of the Vietnamese wife of a local 
resident – A Hua – and a ride on his motorbike to her house albeit his demeanour 
suggested that he would rather have distanced himself from everything concerning my 
research. He half-heartedly attempted to prevent me from carrying out any further 
investigations by stating that the cases I was looking for were rare in his village. At 
the same time, he was faced with taking the responsibility for what he had done for 
me. I assumed that it was for this reason that he situated himself alongside the young 
woman when I started to interview her in a more formal way than I usually adopt. The 
interview proceeded in the way I expected it would: the informant was told (in the 
local dialect so that I could not understand)1 “to say what has to be said and to remain 
silent about what needs to remain unknown,” which is what she did, restricting her 
information to general and positive comments about herself, her family background 
and marriage.  
It may be that the CCP secretary found this interview either innocent or boring 
or both because he left before the end, wishing me a nice day as he departed. I 
managed to meet A Hua on several other occasions. Li, my Vietnamese friend and 
main informant from Dongxing, who often helped me with language issues, 
accompanied me. On these occasions, A Hua talked to us informally while she was 
                                                
1 A Hua told this to the Vietnamese friend who accompanied me from Dongxing to Wanwei during my 
second trip to Wanwei. She asked her not to translate his words for me… a promise my friend opted 
not to keep as she was well aware of my research context and wished to help me. We both interpreted 
the female informant’s reaction as fear that I might seek to learn more about her later, or that I would 
return to the CCP secretary asking for an explanation as to why he limited my research, which would 
have put at risk A Hua’s delicate and tolerated position within the community (as an illegal foreign 
immigrant). 
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busy working by the roadside at her little sewing shop. It was only then, when our 
relationship had become sufficiently friendly and trusting, that she started to disclose 
some events and aspects of her life that she had previously not mentioned. I believe 
that she opened up for two other reasons apart from the absence of an official or local 
supervision.1 One was my close friendship with Li, who was also Vietnamese, 
married to a Chinese, and not only very well-informed vis-à-vis the cross-border 
marriage issue herself but also loquacious and happy to share her experience with her 
fellow ‘sisters;’ and, above all, with an outsider. Li’s experience, compared to those 
of many other women, had been very positive. The second reason was that I 
personally knew a Vietnamese researcher from the Vietnamese Academy of Social 
Sciences, who had spent months in Wanwei a few years earlier, was interested in 
mixed marriages as well, and happened to have interviewed this very same person. 
These two personal, familiar Vietnamese people acted as guarantors for the sincerity 
of my approach. The secretary passed me by several times in the area, always greeting 
me with a smile and showing no obvious concern over the fact that I was still chatting 
with A Hua. 
 
Positioning the researcher: to be or not to be affiliated 
As long as I felt free to build a network of acquaintances without being 
controlled, there was hope to conduct effective research. But, in China, there was 
another pragmatic reason why I preferred to avoid connections with bureaucrats. At 
                                                
1 I should mention here that my local friend helped me as a translator during our first meeting. A Hua 
can only speak Vietnamese and the local baihua dialect (the Guangxi dialect of the Cantonese 
language). 
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the beginning of my fieldwork in Hekou, one of my research colleagues from 
Macquarie University’s Department of Anthropology introduced me to Qiuxia, a 
local, well-connected cadre. I went to her office where this dynamic, middle-aged 
woman was happy to receive my visit. After she asked a lot of questions about me 
(from my family situation to my research interests), she admitted that she knew very 
little about cross-border marriages although she would try her best to find me some 
acquaintances and contacts who might help me to find relevant informants. But, over 
the next weeks, her efforts did not produce the expected results. She was variously 
trying to please me as an obligation towards a common friend, as a way of gaining my 
sympathy, and as occasional entertaining company. Indeed, as I was a foreigner and 
perceived locally as a ‘prestigious friend’, she very quickly started to invite me to 
dinners, night drinks and shopping sessions, irrespective of whether these activities 
were carried out during her business hours or free time. The way in which she 
presented herself in the street whenever I was with her reflected the importance she 
attached to being seen with me. She insisted upon taking me into every shop of which 
she was an old customer, to walk in the main streets arm-in-arm, constantly looking 
around to check if there were any acquaintances she could introduce me to. I soon 
realised that this performance of friendship, although based on a sincere will to 
become close to me, was also meant to benefit her reputation. On several occasions, 
she phoned me to say that “she had found someone for me to interview” and urged me 
to join her for an introduction, no matter what activity I had already planned. Feeling 
obliged, since it was I who had requested her help, I usually consented and was duly 
taken to various meetings, which invariably involved not just Qiuxia, myself and a 
third person, but a dozen of her acquaintances, colleagues or high school classmates 
to whom she was proud to introduce me. Qiuxia insisted on introducing me as ‘Doctor 
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Ke’1 despite my repeated denials. This was immediately and publicly interpreted as a 
mark of modesty, which was actually adding value to the ‘attributes’ of the Faguo 
meinü [pretty French woman],2 who was researching ‘border love affairs.’ Through 
her actions, Qiuxia actually provided me with a particular space wherein I could enjoy 
performance of the art of guanxi [social connections/relationships] by extension 
ascertaining the position and characteristics of each person in the community, i.e., 
work position, power and nature of activity, for example. However, since I was not in 
Hekou to engage in this type of study, I quickly became very bored with these 
meetings. By now, I could see that I was not amusing my hosts as much as they 
expected. I was not drinking alcohol, and I did not have much to say about 
romanticism3 or about my own country, which I had left years ago. I was interested in 
issues that were considered either too commonplace to be questioned, too boring, or 
too cumbersome to elaborate upon while enjoying a good meal.  
These rituals were organised to give Qiuxia ‘face’, to enhance her social 
position much more than to introduce me into a debating space or to broaden my own 
network.  At that stage, after years of experience of being considered ‘added value’ to 
social gatherings in many different contexts – like most foreigners’ experimentation 
                                                
1 Ke is my Chinese family name. 
2 Here, I only wish to emphasise the way women are categorised according to their nationality in China 
in general: the stereotype of the ‘pretty and romantic’ French woman (Faguo meinü) is as widespread 
as that of the ‘dutiful’ Japanese woman or, at the local level, the combined ‘beautiful and dutiful’ but 
somehow ‘ambiguous’ Vietnamese woman. This form of stereotyping will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
3 ‘Romanticism’ is the first concept that comes to Chinese people’s minds when the subject of France is 
evoked. The term has a wide range of meanings about which there would be much to write. It becomes 
a subject of enquiry and a fruitful recurrent ground for discussion whenever a French person enters into 
conversation with a Chinese person. 
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in China – I was prepared for the content of such meetings. However, although it 
brought me the opportunity to informally meet some of the very people I was trying to 
avoid by remaining unobtrusive in Hekou, I propitiously chose to depart these 
relationships while they were still in their embryonic stage. This proved an easy task 
because some of the seemingly enthusiastic persons Qiuxia initially introduced me to 
were either too busy – or too cautious? – to keep their promises to expand my 
informant network. 
I believe that Qiuxia gradually realised that I was not very fond of these 
regular ‘colleagues and friends’ dinners, nor was I interested in luxury shopping. She 
gradually stopped calling me. Instead, she sometimes invited me to meet a few of her 
close friends in a more intimate space such as in the evening tea stalls along the Red 
River. There, we could talk openly, free from the hidden burden of polite obligations, 
performative actions and financial input, areas in which she had become expert over 
the years but which “made her so tired.” Only then did she confess to a few intimate 
issues that she was facing in her own marriage that implied her general ‘woman’s 
position’ in this border society. 
My concern was not only with the close attention I risked attracting from the 
local authorities, which would have been outside of my friend’s control: I cared much 
more about the perceptions of the local people, who could easily see me fraternising 
with such company, and about the misunderstandings surrounding my real status and 
purpose these activities could generate. Hekou is a small town: the variety of spaces 
in which these dinners were held was limited. I knew I would be seen in these local 
up-market places where public money was freely spent on food and alcohol. The sort 
of social life that Qiuxia was trying to draw me into was not compatible with the 
image of the social status I sought to project. My purpose was to build a good 
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relationship with local acquaintances, based on my own disclosure, a modest attitude, 
and the expression of my true concern for the socially marginalised. Since I was not 
officially associated with any of these local power and institutions’ officers, I felt free 
to extract myself from these binding obligations. Qiuxia eventually stopped calling 
me: I believe she understood my position. 
The two above examples illustrate how personal connections can change the 
ways in which Chinese officials handle the presence of a foreign researcher in a field 
where sensitive issues are assumed to attract curiosity and unwanted attention. It also 
reveals another concern related to a particular subject that I have encountered in both 
the Hekou and Dongxing areas. Only rarely have Chinese researchers (He 2003) and a 
few journalists investigated human trafficking as a social issue in these areas. But, on 
occasions when they have, they have had to gain some form of official support. This 
meant involving local administrators as part of the official procedure they had to first 
request – then cope with – in order to carry out their investigations. Unfortunately, 
according to the locals, the resultant reports have revealed a very unpleasant picture of 
the two cities and ambiguous evocation of the authorities’ behaviour regarding certain 
social issues such as Vietnamese forced brides or open prostitution. Subsequent to 
these embarrassing incidents, the local authorities have remained very suspicious of 
any outsider whose inquisitiveness regarding local ‘specialities’ has lowered the 
images of those involved. This includes, a fortiori, foreigners. It also shows how 
uncomfortable relying on official introductions to informants can become, not only 
for the researcher in search of comprehensive data, but for local informants, who may 
not welcome the authorities’ unwanted focus on their private lives. Even though in 
some cases there may exist a sincere will to help on their part, this would be very 
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unlikely with topics such as illegal migration and human trafficking of which cross-
border marriages are locally understood to be a part. 
The problem with contemporary anthropological ethics is not merely that the 
boundaries of what is defined as ethical are too narrowly drawn, but more 
importantly, that ethics can be subject to rigid, righteous interpretations which place 
them at loggerheads with overarching human rights concerns. How does one 
investigate power relations and fulfil the researcher’s obligation to obtain informed 
consent from the powerful? … It is much more difficult – if not impossible – to 
satisfy the discipline-bound anthropological/methodological code of ethics if we 
attempt to research marginalization and oppression, than if we focus on the 
philosophical aesthetics of cosmology. Can we address the urgent problems faced by 
our research subjects and still obey our discipline’s interpretation of methodological 
ethics? (Bourgois 1990: 45).  
And, this may be the most important point: this experience – among others of 
its kind – confirmed the doubt surrounding the obtaining of accurate data for this 
specific subject through formal channels. It needed a very personal approach to 
potential informants to be able to comprehend the reality, not in the form that the 
community leaders sought to express and expose it, but in a form which the concerned 
individuals, in circumstances of being given an open choice, hoped and agreed to 
share. Having lived in China for years and often encountered this type of dilemma 
during earlier periods of research, and having talked to scholars who too have found 
themselves in the same delicate situation, I decided to avoid any formal contact with 
officials. I was sometimes reluctant even to talk to them when opportunities came by 
chance, preferring to remain cautious and to adopt an anonymous position in the 
interests of objectivity and access to fieldwork research. Nevertheless, I must 
acknowledge that some relationships with the authorities, well backed-up, could have 
provided me with interesting access to data and may have given me a different insight 
into the phenomenon. The field reality demanded that I make a choice between 
following a formal trajectory or risk encountering other sorts of difficulties due to my 
lack of guidance in this project.  
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Discussion 
In a long tradition going from Claude Levi-Strauss and Alain Touraine to Marc Augé 
and Pierre Bourdieu, ethics was considered to be embodied in the anthropologist or 
sociologist, whose moral integrity and scientific rigor were sufficient guarantees of 
respect for ethics. Social scientists were the best judges of the rules and limits they 
had to impose themselves. This self-defined and self-referential accountability was 
their ethical code, which did not have to be written, certified, and assessed (Fassin 
2006: 522-523). 
Because I was trained in France where ethical issues are – still – rarely openly 
formulated in the practice of ethnography (at least in the lecture rooms), and where 
intuition and a ‘common sense’ of moral integrity act as sentinels during the research 
process albeit perhaps insufficiently, it may be that the ‘ethics application’ at 
Macquarie University was a new procedure to me. But as Didier Fassin suggests: “… 
Participant-observation … is characterized by its informality. It blurs the boundaries 
between research and life. Fieldwork is everywhere” (Fassin 2006: 523). In this 
regard, I felt that my daily life was made of observations. In China, I was both an 
‘insider-outsider’ and an ‘outsider-insider’ since I had been living there with a 
Chinese husband and Chinese friends for long enough to feel part of the local social 
life and to have become familiar with most aspects of the Chinese daily lived reality. 
Was this not this enough to enable me to flexibly move the line between the ethically 
correct and the actual possible? Was it really feasible to expose a clear outline of the 
limits of fieldwork interaction involvement? Bosk and de Vries attempt to address the 
dilemma that most ethnographers face when they feel compelled to defend their 
discipline’s methodology regarding the risks it may pose for informants before 
members of institutional review boards, who retain the power of veto over their 
research projects: 
We cannot inform our subjects of the risks and benefits of cooperating with us for a 
number of reasons. First, the risks and benefits for subjects are not so different from 
those of normal interaction with a stranger who will become a close acquaintance, an 
everyday feature of a lifeworld, and then disappear, after observing intimate 
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moments, exploring deep feelings, and asking embarrassing questions. There is the 
risk inherent in any fleeting human relationship –the risk of bruised feelings that 
come from being used, the loss when a fixture in a social world disappears, or the 
hurt of realizing that however differently it felt in the moment, one was used as a 
means to an end. This risk is magnified by a certain unavoidable deception in every 
ethnographic investigation, a certain pretence that comes from trying to have both 
researcher and informant forget that what is going on is not a normal, natural 
exchange but research – not just everyday life as it naturally occurs but work, a job, a 
project – “No really, I'm interested in what you have to say, think, feel, and believe 
for more than my own narrow instrumental academic purposes.” To some degree, we 
cannot specify risks because we do not know what we will find, what interpretive 
frameworks we will develop for reporting what we do observe, and how the world 
around us will change to make those findings seem more or less significant. Finally, 
we cannot define risk because few of us believe that being an ethnographic informant 
is a risky business. We believe this despite considerable anthropological and 
sociological evidence to the contrary (Bosk & De Vries 2004: 253). 
On a more pragmatic level, Scott, Miller and Lloyd (2006) reflect on how 
engaging with state-sponsored research in Vietnam requires the handling of various 
challenges such as monetary compensation for the participants (including officials), 
over-control of information access, or negotiation in the field-site. Because the 
Vietnamese centralised and authoritarian system is almost identical to that of China, 
similar methodological concerns surround social sciences research there as well. 
Another issue alluded to in the above authors’ account is a certain disregard for 
qualitative research and autonomous management of fieldwork practices. Cooperation 
with local institutions not only involves constant monitoring, but often means coping 
with local colleagues’ own limitations such as tight schedules, limited budgets and the 
need for fast and efficient results, all of which combine to obstruct the conduct of 
proper ethnography in its classical sense. The search for a compatible research 
assistant is another example of this complicated situation. Most of the candidates to 
whom Vietnamese scholars introduced me experienced difficulty understanding my 
particular approach to my research topic and my fieldwork methodology. Obviously, 
none of them was trained to simply ‘sit in a market’, that is, to spend the whole day 
conversing with shop owners and clients, observing the Chinese and Vietnamese 
passers-by and debating daily life concerns. Likewise, not one of them would have 
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thought of spending a few days with some Vietnamese women married to Chinese 
men, to participate in their daily lives, observe their daily practices, listen to their 
grief and play with their children. I had no prepared questionnaire, no special contacts 
among the local cadres, and no idea how long it would take me to obtain interesting 
insights. And, perhaps worst of all, I had no real expectations as to what the results of 
my observations and interviews would be nor of the outcomes they would have apart 
from contributing to a better knowledge of the subject. In a country where applied 
anthropology remains dominant for it should serve the institutions, my approach 
sounded somehow challenging. The field was wide and unlimited; but, the topic of 
my research was blurred as far as the three candidates I met were concerned. They 
were all intrigued: they all found the research project “very interesting;” but, a couple 
of days later they all said “Sorry, but I won’t have time to accompany you.” It may be 
that they were disturbed by my unusual, unconventional and deliberately independent 
way of practicing field research, i.e., without following any conventional protocols 
and without providing any safety-net (Turner 2010). 
Moreover, I noted a certain lack of interest in my topic. Discussion was often 
arrogated by saying that many reports on human trafficking were already available, 
that these women were “poor, uneducated women most of the time,” and that there 
was not much to say about them. In addition, my topic concerned rural women and I 
could sense a sort of urban disregard for rural population concerns, especially in the 
realm of intimacy. This gave me the feeling that because it was unquestioningly 
accepted that women had a hard life, there was not much else to say about it. At best I 
raised some interest in the approach I was trying to explain; at worst, I amused my 
interlocutors, who preferred to ask questions about how on earth I (and my institution) 
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had become interested in such a ‘taken for granted’ matter. A male informant, 
surprised to see me again after my two years of absence in Hekou, commented: 
— Long time no see! Why did you come back? What are you studying this 
time? What? Still these marriages? What else do you need to know? It’s very 
simple. These Vietnamese women are poor, their men are useless, and so they 
come here to make life easier. Some men here think they can make a deal with 
them. What else do you want to know? Ha! ha! Welcome back anyway!  
In China, this feeling was emphasised by the empathetic tone some men 
employed when they mentioned Vietnamese women. “They have a hard life there,” 
they would say, in a tone of voice that not only lacked sympathy but, somewhat more 
straightforwardly, expressed explicit contempt for Vietnamese men.1  
 
2 Disclosing oneself to the communities 
But, negotiating potentially free access to a research site is not sufficient to 
gain access to its people. 
Before taking the standpoint of those with a particular stigma, the normal person who 
is becoming wise may first have to pass through a heart-changing personal experience 
…. And after the sympathetic normal makes himself available to the stigmatized, he 
often must wait their validation of him as a courtesy member. The self must not be 
offered, it must be accepted (Goffman 1986: 28-29). 
Having lived in China for more than a decade, and having been familiar with 
the language and social practices for even longer, approaching a Chinese community 
does not require tremendous effort from me. As in many other parts of China, the 
Hekou and Dongxing peoples are always curious about foreigners, who, in their 
                                                
1 I will develop this aspect in Chapter 4. 
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opinion, travel to apparently insignificant localities instead of following the numerous 
and famous tourist tracks that their fascinated countries advocate. Although the 
objects of their fascination might be vastly different for each visitor, and the degree of 
interest may depend upon what the locals agree to impart about them, unusual choices 
often lead to interesting debates. Hence, casual conversations are generally easy to 
start; as soon as the language barrier is eclipsed, questioning starts. But, visitors to 
China sometimes feel uncomfortable answering personal questions that may not be 
considered appropriate to ask in so-called ‘open-minded’ western societies. However, 
for foreigners who live in China, this has become common practice: they no longer 
attempt to hide anything personal as this is part of a ‘first-time-interaction’ ritual that 
allows each interlocutor to establish her/his appropriate position; and, this is also 
common practice among Chinese and Vietnamese people. In my own experience over 
the years, I have become used to disclosing ten times a day my identity, age, marital 
status, residential location, activities, income and my general opinion of China or 
whatever place I happened to be in at the moment. Occurring as it does in public, i.e., 
in buses, shops, streets, neighbourhoods and social gatherings, this tiring ritual 
represents the first step of a routine that often requires back and forth questioning that 
hopefully leads to more balanced interaction albeit not always. Some people’s 
requirement to satisfy their curiosity does not necessarily extend to engaging in real 
dialogue, allowing strangers to learn as much as possible about them. In brief, my 
personal experience has shown me that in China and Vietnam one cannot learn 
anything crucial during a conversation before revealing significant personal 
information. However, there are some circumstances in which performance of this 
ritual becomes a methodological strategy employed by fieldworkers, who seek to 
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discern certain sensitive issues such as private matters, details of which are usually 
left undisclosed. 
In the case of Chinese and Vietnamese people who engage in conversations 
with foreigners, particularly in places where this is not the customary thing to do, 
topics such as a mixed marriage with a native of the country, parenthood, and the 
proposed length of stay of the foreigner in the country arouse considerable curiosity 
and interest. In my case, the answers and comments I provided to my interlocutors 
generally created a sense of familiarity and ease with each other. My life experiences 
in their societies meant that I had become used to certain cultural and social practices, 
and, that unlike newcomers, I would no longer be surprised or become disoriented 
when confronted by unfamiliar surroundings and practices. This relative but assumed 
adaptation to the local environmental conditions was similar, in some respects, to the 
ways in which locals accept an outsider’s presence, including outsiders from the same 
country. This is often the case with internal migrants, who come from very different 
backgrounds and find themselves having to cope with even more difficulties than a 
foreigner would with a new climate, new food, new dialect and/or new setting. 
The sensitivity of the topic I was planning to research, learn about and 
comprehend in any possible way gave me little choice but to compromise with my 
interlocutors’ inquisitiveness. Since I could not approach mixed-marriage couples in a 
formal way, I had to attempt to identify and approach them by myself. During my first 
encounters, I had to reveal the reasons why I had such an interest in these seemingly 
unusual life choices. But, I quickly came to realise that in the local perception, the 
cross-border marriages phenomenon was linked to human trafficking. Thus, it became 
necessary to make these marriages appear a non-sensitive, interesting and familiar 
social reality, at least as far as I was concerned. And, since my personal details were 
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constantly solicited, the simplest way to achieve a result was to disclose my personal 
private situation in even more detail than usual. What could be more legitimate than 
an enquiry about something I was experiencing myself?  
After a few days in Hekou and Dongxing, my narrative soon became well-
known among the little circle of acquaintances with whom I had started to interact. 
However, the few differences that distinguished my first stay in those cities from my 
second stay three years later revealed the importance of being straightforward about 
my personal situation, even more so than providing details of my professional status. 
In 2006, I “had lived in China for eight years with my Chinese boy-friend in 
Kunming, had a good relationship with his family and was a writer while he was 
enjoying his musical career.” In 2007, we welcomed our first child and then we got 
married.1 So, when I returned to Hekou and Dongxing in late 2008, I could claim that 
I “had spent one decade of my life in China, still lived in Kunming, was officially 
married to a Chinese husband, had a young child, still had a good relationship with 
my in-laws, had become a Ph.D. student in an Australian university, and was 
conducting fieldwork research while my husband took care of our son on an almost 
full-time basis – meaning he did not work.” Even though many details of this new 
account required long explanations since they may have sounded somewhat unusual, 
these basic circumstances made people feel more comfortable talking to me, debating 
issues about which they were happy to exchange opinions. Nowadays, I enjoy a more 
stable, clarified and recognised status in Chinese society. I am a Zhongguo xifu 
[Chinese wife]. 
                                                
1 In the case of Chinese people, I had to introduce these two events in a more logical order to my 
informants (marriage followed by child-birth), who otherwise may have had difficulty understanding 
this unconventional way of settling a couple’s relationship.  
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I should add here that I used slightly different introductions in Vietnam and 
China respectively, especially in 2006. ‘Living together’ or cohabitation is now quite 
common in urban China; and, even though it is not accepted by everyone – not by 
new couples’ families, for example – it has become a form of tolerated emancipation 
for some young people, a test of compatibility before a couple actually becomes 
engaged and marries. For them, taking the decisive step to marry tends to occur when 
a woman falls pregnant. As I have witnessed so many times among my Chinese 
acquaintances, the arrival of a baby (if it is subsequently kept) requires its registration 
by the parents in order to satisfy both sides’ families and to comply with the law.1 
Apropos of my own case, whenever I explained that ‘I was cohabiting with my 
partner’, Chinese people in general assumed that besides following new urban trends 
pertinent to conjugal practices, I was also a foreigner from whom unconventional 
actions – according to Chinese standards – could be expected. However, in Vietnam, 
cohabitation remains far from being ordinary, far from being socially tolerated.  
Candid explanation of my situation, a line I pursued in China, could be perceived as 
provocative and would not necessarily work in my favour. In Vietnam, ‘older’ 
unmarried women2 lose community respect; and, cohabitation with a single man is 
socially unacceptable (Thi 2008). Hence, by 2006, I found myself referring to my 
partner as my ‘husband’, which automatically explained why we were living together. 
However, the intriguing thing for Vietnamese people was that we had been married 
                                                
1 According to the current laws in China, a child born out-of-wedlock has very limited rights. Without 
household registration, the child will face difficulties accessing state-provided benefits and services 
such as public education and health care. In order to gain his/her household registration, the unmarried 
parents have to pay a social compensation fee. 
2 In the northern rural areas of Vietnam, for example, 23 years of age is considered ‘too old’ for an 
unmarried woman. 
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long enough to have a baby, which we were still missing. Three years later, when I 
updated the same informants on the birth of my son, this appeared to be the key event. 
I had eventually become a mother!  
To give birth to and raise children is the right of women and also an ability they are 
blessed with. A child is a mother’s joy and hope, and a support when she gets old. 
When a woman has a child, she has to overcome many hardships in raising her child 
and she is ready to do so. For her to have a child is to have everything; that’s her joy 
and her raison d’être (Thi 2008: 81). 
Lê Thi observes that according to local beliefs and practices, a couple only 
become unified in order to produce children, who are meant to provide comfort and 
affective satisfaction to women. Such unquestioned statements in Lê Thi’s academic 
work may appear as a conventional and politicised appraisal of women’s function and 
expectations in an ideal Vietnamese socialist society, i.e., as a glorification of 
womanhood and motherhood. The author appears not to reconsider the assumption 
that womanhood ‘naturally’ implies motherhood, nor does she challenge the 
association between motherhood, joy and sacrifice. To the detriment of a broader 
anthropological perspective on the position of Vietnamese women, Lê Thi – as one 
among them – reflects in her analysis upon how deeply this discourse is rooted in the 
Vietnamese people’s beliefs. 
My translator, Loan, was engaged to be married when she accompanied me on 
the Vietnamese part of my fieldwork in 2006. A well-educated young Hanoian 
woman raised in a Buddhist family, she dated Binh, a man from Hanoi who was well 
liked by her family. She confessed to me once that they had never kissed, not even 
held hands. Their relationship was totally platonic. Given youth romance and the 
sexual trends in Hanoi today, one could not take this behaviour for granted (Nguyen 
2007). Yet, Loan and her fiancé had already decided that they were meant for each 
other and had received their families’ approval. Since she and I talked all day long 
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about marriage during the fieldwork, I once asked her to elaborate upon the subject of 
pre-marital and marital relations. 
― I know my fiancé Binh for a long time. We like to go out together 
sometimes. We respect each other and want to get married. I think he is a 
good, sincere and reliable man. We will probably marry this year and have a 
baby. My father is very sick and he also wishes that I get married before 
anything happens to him.1 
― Don’t you want to spend some time with Binh and enjoy your newly-wed 
couple’s life before that? 
― [looking surprised] No, why? 
― Well, you could wish to enjoy some romance and happiness or you could 
wish to continue your work, even travel a little with him? 
― But we want to get married because we want to raise a family. That will 
make us happy. I don’t see why we would get married otherwise. 
What this lengthy introduction has tried to emphasise is how disclosure of 
privacy attracts comparisons. As soon as I became situated within a meaningful frame 
as far as people of potential interest/value to my work were concerned, the search for 
relevant informants could start. My personal life served as a stepping-stone to 
                                                
1 In 2006, I compensated Loan financially for the time she spent with me, and for her impressive help 
and the translation work she did for me that contributed to the success of this fieldwork. The amount I 
paid her, which was part of a research budget I received from IRASEC, the institute for which I was 
then preparing a book, was substantial according to the local salary standard for an educated woman. 
Loan intended to use all of this money to pay for her sick father’s expensive treatment.  
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approaching others like me. Here, people did not spend their time discussing how 
western couples were living and the huge differences that supposedly exist between 
western and Chinese couples. They instead related my personal experience of 
international marriage to those of the Sino-Vietnamese people they knew at the local 
level. Yet, I was far from the model of a conventional local marriage. While I was 
constructing my personal introduction narrative according to people’s initial reactions 
– quickly structured since I had to repeat it several times a day – I soon learnt to 
deliberately highlight, even to elaborate upon, a few significant details that had 
proven relevant to my interlocutors. In the main, my narrative drew immediate 
comments and discussion, and contrasting perspectives. No matter how I articulated 
it, my personal life challenged the local standard of conjugality; e.g., marriage at a 
young age, husband or both parties as breadwinners, child/children taken care of by 
grand-parents or relatives, and possession of properties, fields or business. I once had 
the following conversation with a Vietnamese woman married to a Chinese man. 
― [informant] You say you have a baby at home: who takes care of him when 
you are away? 
― [me] My husband. 
― Your husband? Are your in-laws there to help? 
― No, they live too far away: he manages to do it by himself; this is not so 
complicated. 
― You could send your child to your in-laws, so you both can have time to 
work. How can your husband work if he takes care of your child? 
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― Well, he does work, but at home. That’s why he can look after the baby. 
And, we want to raise him ourselves. 
― How lucky you are! My husband doesn’t even dare to take our baby in his 
arms, so I can’t imagine leaving him alone with her. Men don’t know how to 
take care of a baby. He wouldn’t accept that I go away and leave him with 
such a burden… But, at least my husband works. Generally Vietnamese men 
don’t even work. They just expect their wives to raise the children, work hard 
and care for the house, while they are having a good time with their friends. 
How much does your husband earn a month? 
― He doesn’t have a regular income, so it is difficult to say. 
― But you said he works? 
― Yes, but as a musician, an independent artist, which means he’s quite poor 
[a usual and still true assumption]. 
― So, what do you rely on to make a living? 
― I am a student; I receive a scholarship, that’s enough for us. 
― So you are also responsible for your family, you have to work too if your 
husband plays music? 
― True, but at least, he takes care of our baby… 
Even though I anticipated that some of the more unusual aspects of my life 
would limit the possibility of comparison, I realised how fascinating or disturbing 
they could appear to some persons and how this led them to express their own general 
points of views and specific empirical understandings of the meaning of marriage. 
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This will be one main point I discuss in this dissertation. However, as the dialogue 
also shows, when viewed in a certain way, there was space for possible empathy (the 
husband playing versus the wife working). Herein were several issues that women as 
well as men liked to debate with me: my late-age student status, my husband’s 
activities, and our personal way of handling family life which saw us at odds with 
common practice. Most of the conversations I had with local people (casual 
encounters, friends or informants) centred upon issues initially raised by the 
explanations I provided regarding my situation: they were especially required since 
my marital situation did not make much sense in the usual frame of thought of these 
people. If I had initially not been sure that this was the right methodological choice, 
the results that such a degree of self-disclosure brought were convincing enough to 
dispel any reluctance I still harboured to deliberately open my private life to curious 
or inquisitive ears. I was prepared to be truthful about my personal life with people 
whose privacy I wished to intrude upon; and, in order to achieve this goal, I needed to 
use private information as an attractive lure for others (a shop owner, my favourite 
noodle shop waitress, a local guide I met in the street, the friend of a friend who stops 
by for a cup of tea, for example) who could potentially introduce me to their 
acquaintances. Looking back, I am convinced that I would not have met the people I 
interviewed, and I would not have heard so much about conjugality expectations and 
ideals, had I remained strictly discreet regarding my own personal conjugal relations. 
This is probably true in other fieldwork contexts as well; but, I found the process 
significant enough to be mentioned here as a methodological strategy, especially 
among communities whose cultural mores inhibit discussion of personal and intimate 
matters, not to mention sentimental and marital choices and lives (Yan 2003; 
Cauquelin 2000). My informants appreciated the fact that I freely shared my 
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experience: they reciprocated by offering their own accounts of the challenges posed 
by mixed conjugality. In the end, it proved extremely productive to openly discuss 
personal issues. 
Yet, disclosing and debating my own subjectivity was certainly not enough to 
identify the individuals whose lives I sought to explore. The sensitivity surrounding 
cross-border marriages was real: everyone was clearly aware of this. My own 
international marriage experience would not pass the comparison test when issues like 
coercion, illegality or stigma were raised. I personally had no objection to satisfying 
others’ curiosity as long as I deemed it appropriate; but, it became obvious from the 
first days I spent in these border towns that local mixed couples were generally not 
willing to expose themselves more than they already were. Deep ethnographic 
understanding would require much more than simply providing a stage for discussion. 
 
3 Approaching the invisible 
My access to the field-sites was achieved without official involvement and 
without attracting undue attention. The local communities became used to my 
presence among them on a daily basis, and I disclosed only enough of myself to 
assuage their curiosity. I wanted them to accept me (at the very least as an 
entertaining acquaintance). But, it was then that my major challenge emerged. How 
would I be able to identify the men and women whose lives I sought to observe, hear 
about, learn about and understand from among these large and eclectic crowds of 
busy, moving people when nothing, a priori, would distinguish them visually from 
their fellow individuals? And, without any form of guidance? It would be like trying 
to find a needle in the proverbial haystack. What options did I have when people’s 
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help and connections did not always prove reliable and lacked the grounding required 
to reach a scientific research standard? I needed a fair and representative sample of 
informants; but, how was I going to convince them to share their life experiences, 
their secrets with me? Here I will cite a few cases to illustrate the difficulties I 
encountered during my attempts to identify informants, to their stories, and to prevent 
putting at risk their fragile neutral position in a community where they are often 
known for what they are or what they represent but are ignored and tolerated as long 
as they do not create trouble. 
 
Identification in the crowd 
The invisibility of informants arose first from their self-perception. In some 
cases, individuals did not know how to identify themselves in regard to their past 
conjugal experience or current situation. Generally, some considered that they did not 
belong to the target group I was looking for because they were not officially 
registered as married couples. Conversely, others considered themselves to be 
legitimate couples, despite the absence of documentation. Everything depended upon 
the length and stability of the relationship, the degree of acceptance and recognition 
by the community, the couple’s adaptation to local informal rules, their living 
practices, and on what people assumed vis-à-vis my definition of marriage. It also 
depended upon how legitimate the individuals themselves (men and women) 
perceived their relationships to be. In sum, gaining access to such mixed couples 
required specific conditions. In the case of Vietnamese women living in China, for 
example, they had to be recognised as ‘Vietnamese’ where they lived, as I mostly 
relied upon their acquaintances or neighbourhood to identify them. They needed to 
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acknowledge their own identity or their family history publicly to be identified as 
potential informants. 
 Chau and Tuan: “suan bu suan [do they count]?” 
I met Chau and Tuan one afternoon in Lào Cai. This meeting happened after 
days of wandering around, during one of several periods when I felt hopeless. 
Everyone who learned about my research tried to convince me that there was nothing 
to find in Lào Cai, that all of the mixed couples lived in China, that none of the 
Vietnamese fiancées’ families lived in this little town because the women originally 
came from remote rural places where I could not go, and that I should go back to the 
Chinese side of the border to find them. These claims were so pervasive that I had 
started to believe them. Maybe it was pointless to search for people who were not 
actually domiciled in Lào Cai. However, although I had only a short experience of 
fieldwork research in Vietnam, I had stayed long enough in the country to know that 
discouragement could well stem from fear that my scrutiny could cause trouble for – 
rather than benefit – the community. But, that afternoon brought some hope. As we 
had to maintain low-profiles during our inquiries within the communities and 
consequently had to rely upon personal networking, Loan and I had to call upon 
almost all of my Vietnamese connections in and out of Lào Cai, all of Loan’s direct 
acquaintances, and all of my Hekou contacts in town in order to identify some local 
informants. There was only one left to contact. Binh, Loan’s husband-to-be, had a 
cousin named Hue, who worked for a trading company in Lào Cai. Although she had 
never met her, Loan considered Hue a family member; therefore, when Loan solicited 
her help, Hue felt it her duty to provide us with any modest knowledge or clue she 
may have pertinent to our research. We invited Hue for a drink one evening: she came 
along with her colleague Mai. Luckily, the meeting was fruitful. Hue agreed to 
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introduce me to Yen, whose story I will recount later. Mai also had some possible 
connections. I had become used to hearing this type of encouraging response from 
well-intentioned persons; but, the next day invariably brought disillusionment when 
they suddenly changed their minds. However, this time, somewhat unexpectedly, Mai 
took us for a short motorbike ride up a narrow, muddy street behind the train station 
area’s market to meet a couple she knew. But, she worried for fear that Chau and 
Tuan were not exactly the informants I was looking for.  
Luckily, not only did we manage to identify one couple, but they agreed to 
talk to me, despite the fact that the immediate neighbourhood had already started to 
observe us from their doorways or windows. Apparently, the couple felt they had 
nothing to hide or be ashamed of. Tuan, a middle-aged man who spoke Chinese and 
had worked for many years as a tourist guide, offered us some strong green tea and 
what seemed to be a complete account of his family background and marriage 
circumstances. But, we were interrupted several times during our conversation so had 
to arrange a second meeting the following day. 
― I was born in 1956 in China. My grandfather and father migrated from 
Vietnam to Yunnan before the war [i.e.,before 1945 but during the French 
colonization] to participate in the building of the Yunnan railway1 and they 
settled there. My father met my [Chinese] mother in Yunnan and stayed. She 
was doing some business. In 1972, when the Vietnamese government called 
the overseas Vietnamese back to defend their country, I ‘came back’ to 
Vietnam with my mother to combat the Americans. I was sent to the south of 
Vietnam to fight. I was injured and came back in 1974 to Lào Cai with my 
                                                
1 The French built the Kunming-Hanoi railway between 1904 and 1910. 
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mother and my two elder brothers. I also have a young sister.  Meanwhile, my 
father and my younger brother stayed in Kunming where they still live. My 
family has always maintained a Chinese life style. Before 1978, my family had 
a house in Lào Cai but we had to leave because of the Sino-Vietnamese war 
and we moved to Yên Bái until 1990. From 1979 to 1991, while established in 
Yên Bái, we did not speak much Chinese because it was not advised to 
express our Chinese identity at that time. When I moved back to Lào Cai in 
1991, the family house had been destroyed but the government has allocated 
us new land. 
While we were waiting for Tuan the next day, his wife Chau gave me an 
account of her marriage. 
― My family comes from Vĩnh Phúc province but I was born in Yên Bái in 
1962 since my father was working there that year. Because I have some 
cardiac problem, I had to leave school early; my bad health prevented me from 
pursuing my studies. I met Tuan in Yên Bái at a friend’s wedding when I was 
20 years old. At first, I didn’t like Tuan because I found him too old. He asked 
me out for six months before I accepted to date him, and it took him six more 
months’ efforts before I eventually agreed to marry him a year later, in 1983. I 
am the youngest girl in my family. My father didn’t ask for a bride price and 
we celebrated our wedding according to Vietnamese tradition. After our 
marriage, Tuan worked as a mechanic while I was selling vegetables at the 
market. In 1991, when the province split into two provinces,1 we moved to 
                                                
1 Before 1991, Lào Cai and Yên Bái formed one unique province: Hoang Liên Son. 
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Lào Cai. In Yên Bái, he attracted more attention within the community but 
here and now, he’s considered as a Vietnamese man. 
He never insults our children, or even me; he’s not violent and never 
screams at us. In that sense, he’s very different from most Vietnamese men. 
He never shows his feelings for me in public; we love each other discreetly. 
For our 21st marriage anniversary, we took a series of romantic pictures. Tuan 
has dreams and ambition for a better life. Before, we were poor but we wanted 
to improve our life, and to raise our incomes. We haven’t suffered from 
discrimination because we are just an ordinary family. At home, we cook 
Vietnamese food but there are some Chinese influences and ingredients. 
We have a 23 year old son and a 16 year old daughter. She is 
asthmatic. Our children don’t talk much about China. They went to visit their 
grandfather and youngest uncle in Kunming. Our daughter learned some 
Chinese language but not long enough to be able to speak. I don’t speak 
Chinese myself, but Tuan is bilingual.  
This example highlights the sensitive position of some individuals, who live in 
the border areas and whose complex family backgrounds impose an identity upon 
them to which they do not necessarily feel closely connected but which their 
community will refer to. Should Tuan be considered a Chinese husband or a 
Vietnamese husband? What aspect of him should be representative of his relationship 
with both countries? Were Chau and Tuan representative of the quintessential couple I 
was looking for? Yes and No. ‘Yes’ because they – both and together – experience a 
dual identity and probably, despite what they have chosen to emphasise, forms of 
ostracism in Vietnam. This may be due to Tuan’s ambiguous position that renders him 
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‘Chinese’ when this ethnic group’s presence in Vietnamese society has been 
periodically threatened over the last decades. As well, Tuan remains connected with 
Mainland China through his family, some of whom live in Yunnan, and through his 
work as an interpreter and a go-between between the communities. This puts him in a 
similar position to some Việt Kiều  (overseas Vietnamese) from Europe and North 
America, who have resettled in Vietnam to conduct their business or reconsolidate 
their family links (Thai 2008). But a ‘no’ response may be accurate as well given that 
Tuan has fought for and lived in Vietnam since he was young, has adopted a 
Vietnamese life-style in his adult years, and is considered Vietnamese by his 
community. In reality, there is no clear perspective of couples, of two individuals who 
change their identity claims according to political circumstances and economic 
priorities. 
As regards identifying informants, the issue was to distinguish individual self-
identification from the community perception, and to establish how a particular 
marriage experience either reflects or does not reflect this identity’s ambiguity. 
Further to the nationality or ethnic group standpoint – Han or Kinh – the question of 
self-identification was more relevant when it came to deciding whether a couple could 
be considered party to a cross-border marriage or not. From a multi-cultural 
perspective, these married couples provided an enlightening insight into 
understanding the extension of some representations these families encounter in their 
society. 
The process of identification of informants invariably depends upon how they 
are ‘labelled.’ The vernacular expression jiehun le [being married] encompassed 
various situations that demanded clarification from/for those who agreed to introduce 
me to mixed couples. The meaning of the term ‘marriage’ was also subject to some 
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ambiguities that needed to be constantly resolved during interaction. What does it 
mean to be married? If ‘marriage’ means being officially registered as a couple, I 
probably would not have met most of my informants. If marriage means living 
together as a married couple, with or without children, then most of them fitted this 
definition. And, if marriage means personal engagement (based on a sentimental 
affair or not, and involving sexual life or not) in a relationship that aims to become a 
documented union, then most of my informants met this criterion. But, ‘marriage’ can 
also mean a temporary relationship perceived and experienced as a conjugal form of 
association; or, ‘marriage’ can refer to a past relationship that does not show evidence 
of sustainability but remains a state to which some may refer when stating their 
personal status and position. The terms of address that an informant uses to refer to 
his/her spouse/partner/lover are as much indicative of the degree of involvement two 
persons experience as a document that could actually confirm its legality. Individuals 
directly involved in cross-border relationships do not necessarily define themselves in 
the same way that their acquaintances and social networks or communities define 
them, and this makes the overall picture of mixed marriage even blurrier than the 
simple legal/illegal alliance dichotomy initially suggested. For example, a Vietnamese 
woman can consider her partner as her husband if she is romantically involved with 
him, the two have a child, and she lives with him, irrespective of whether she is 
considered a second wife, a lover, a temporary partner by her ‘husband’, by one or 
both families, or by the community.1 The following are a few examples illustrating 
how different interpretations of ‘marriage’ at the local level complicate the 
identification process as well affect the researcher’s position and informants’ feelings 
of safety. 
                                                
1 By ‘community,’ I mean acquaintances, friends, neighbours and, to a larger extent, city dwellers. 
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 Van: the suspicion issue 
In 2006, when I conducted my initial fieldwork research in Dongxing, a young 
Vietnamese woman, who was engaged to a Chinese man (one of my informants) 
introduced me to Van. Before even talking to her, I had already learned that her 
maternal aunt sold Van to a farmer in China when she was 17 years old. Determined 
to escape her harsh life, she eventually managed to return to Vietnam with her son. 
When we met, Van was working in a shop in Móng Cái market. She was welcoming 
the first day and opted to tell me her story in detail. But, her behaviour slowly and 
unexpectedly changed. In an attempt to respect her privacy and allow her to speak to 
me quietly, several times I proposed meeting her outside the market as it was too 
noisy and busy. Although she initially agreed with this arrangement, over the next 
five days she kept asking me to come back and change the locations and times of 
appointments. She tested my patience to the limit. And, on the eve of my departure 
from Dongxing, she used some unexpected workload as an excuse to cancel our 
interview. This case could have resulted in a failure; but, she had already exposed 
enough of her past the first day to arouse my curiosity. So, I decided to find out what 
the real problem was. That day, I met one of Van’s friends by coincidence. This 
woman, who I had previously interviewed, eventually exclaimed: “Van believes that 
you are trying to buy her child!” After my initial surprise, I sought further 
explanation. In my first conversation with Van, we had exchanged general 
information about our respective personal situations: Van had found many intriguing 
facts about me. I had been ‘married’ to a Chinese man for several years, I was 
relatively ‘old,’ was still to produce a child1 and spent some of my holidays in the city 
                                                
1 I used the Vietnamese term Chưa, which literally means “not yet,” as the appropriate answer to the 
question “Do you have children?” It indicates that the question is actually not so much about the wish 
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– a fact that did not represent the interests of those not involved in commercial 
activities – if not at the nearby beach of Trà Cổ (which I had not visited). In addition, 
I sought to learn more about women like her, women who despite being beset by 
financial and family difficulties, were trying to rebuild their lives after their return 
from China. For Van, whatever my problem was, my hope to adopt a child could be 
the only genuine explanation for my long stay in a borderland where it is 
acknowledged that one could purchase anything – as she has learned to her cost.  
What the above story primarily reveals is Van’s loss of trust in others; in her 
friend, who had – indirectly – introduced us, her step-mother who had indicated her 
store, in my assistant Loan, who had struck up a friendship with her when she first 
gained her confidence and, lastly, in me, the person who tried to understand her life 
and regularly brought her fruits to express my concern and empathy. Her suspicion 
may have been attributable to the marked impact of her living environment where all 
daily activities revolved around trade and ensuing benefits that allowed some to eat 
and to live more comfortably – the Vietnamese – and others to bring home some 
capital  – the Chinese, whatever the object traded. Her youthful naivety had cost her 
too much: living in such surroundings had made her extremely cautious and protective 
of her one unique treasure: her child. In her shop that same day, reassured about my 
                                                                                                                                       
to have children but more specifically about his/her expectation according to the date of the marriage; 
as proof, it is often immediately followed by “How long have you been married” and general 
comments on the contradiction between the information disclosed. “How come? Several years of 
marriage and still no child?” Whether or not a woman genuinely desires to bear a child, to delay a 
pregnancy on purpose in order to prioritise other activities is not even considered. The purpose of a 
marriage is procreation. 
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intentions and despite her discomfort, Van told me her story. She never admitted to 
me personally that she had doubts about me.1 
In most cases, my own subjectivity helped me to attract the attention of my 
research/ target groups or individuals: it motivated some to engage (and not engage) 
in dialogue with me.  But, I underestimated how my presence in such an unusual 
context could be misunderstood in a society wherein people are accustomed to various 
forms of deceit. Here, my ‘foreign’ subjectivity proved its limits. My face and 
behaviour were no longer sufficiently convincing enough to validate a presumption of 
innocence from the perspectives of others. I left myself open to being suspected of 
having bad intentions, using tricks such as seduction, buying friendship and 
approaching family members in order to establish a familiarity that would empower 
me over vulnerable persons. In addition, I may have been suspected of working for a 
government agency seeking to identify illegal migrants. But, such misinterpretation of 
my actions was rarely expressed overtly. On the contrary, a conflicting figure 
emerged from the form of activity I pursued in the field: the social worker. In 
Vietnam in particular, where the presence of international NGOs is on-going, some 
interpreted my concern and research as part of a project related to migrants. I was 
sometimes asked how to improve a given situation or what sort of help and advice I 
could provide. The challenge here was to explain how I needed to distance myself, 
how unlikely it was that my academic research would prove of benefit to their 
personal issues, to a people struggling daily to make a living and to individuals who 
have a strong conception of fate. 
                                                
1 Since then, Van has become one of my most faithful informants. We have managed to see each other 
several times in subsequent years. 
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 A Hua: the safety priority 
I briefly met A Hua in 2006 at her apartment where I spent an evening in the 
company of our common friend Li, who was living in the same building. A Hua, who 
was in her bedroom busily playing mah-jong with some acquaintances, left us in her 
dark living room, paying little attention to us. There, a Vietnamese woman and her 
mother were resting on a large wooden couch covered with bamboo mats. They had 
just returned from Thanh Hóa province (northern Vietnam) and were waiting in A 
Hua’s apartment until the next morning when they would make their way back 
‘home’ to Guangdong province. These women did not seem to be close friends of A 
Hua; as with us, she paid them little attention. The place looked like a transit room. 
By coincidence, the Vietnamese woman was married to a Chinese man and agreed to 
tell me her story. I left the place content with what I had mistaken for serendipity. 
During dinner at Li’s place that evening, and after she started to better 
understand my interest in cross-border marriages, she asked if I would like to visit her 
neighbour A Hua without being particularly specific about the reason for her offer. I 
did not ask: I simply accepted and followed her; but, I could feel that Li had been 
hesitant about doing this earlier. I had only known her for about a week: we had both 
enjoyed spending time together chatting and building a new friendship. Li was very 
keen to talk about her Chinese husband, emphasising how their relationship was based 
on love “compared to other mixed couples.” I had asked her on various occasions if 
she would introduce me to the latter. Somewhat intriguingly, she always preferred to 
satisfy my curiosity with numerous accounts, explaining that she could tell me much 
more about these couples than what I would learn from interviewing them. But, that 
evening, she seemed to change her mind.  
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The next day, Li suggested to me that she was not sure whether or not it would 
be a good idea to introduce me to A Hua as she was involved in illegal activities. A 
Hua was a local key-person, who facilitated illegal border crossings and helped to 
organise extended travel within China. Consequently, the possibility of meeting 
migrant Vietnamese women in her apartment was rather high, including those married 
to Chinese men. Although Li admitted that she wanted to let me know about the 
place, she was reluctant to take me there on a regular basis. She was concerned about 
our visibility, any consequences for her own relationship with A Hua, my own 
position in the community, and the influence my presence could have on A Hua’s 
business if I started to interview people there. Obviously, there were some 
connections that I should avoid even though they might be relevant. I decided not to 
pursue the matter further. 
In March 2009, when I returned to Dongxing and met Li, she and her Chinese 
husband had moved out of the building to another place. She mentioned that A Hua 
had gone through some trouble the year before: she had not seen her for a few 
months. As I still wished to meet her and find out more about her social role in the 
cross-border community in Dongxing, Li agreed to take me to her place. By chance, 
A Hua was just returning home and was climbing the stairs of the dark building up to 
her apartment. She welcomed her former neighbour’s visit. When she unlocked and 
opened the door, the sight that the light exposed was intriguing. Three Vietnamese 
women were resting on a couch: they turned and considered the newcomers with 
some curiosity. A Hua was not looking at anyone; but, her face clearly revealed some 
recent burn-marks. We sat politely and Li started to chat with her while I observed the 
scene. Slowly, the reason for my presence became clear. A Yong, one of the three 
women, isolated herself on the balcony and slowly told me her complex story, one of 
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a wife divorced by a Chinese man. Later, I learned from Li, who enquired about the 
other two in Vietnamese and Cantonese, that they were all in the same situation: 
unofficially married – or divorced – mothers illegally settled in China. While A Yong 
was talking to me, a shaven-head man appeared on the balcony to remove the clothes 
that were drying there. Unexpectedly, he did not greet me or even look surprised to 
find me there although he clearly noticed me. Soon after, Li discreetly suggested to 
me that we should leave. While the man was in another room of the apartment, A Hua 
eventually said her first direct words to me: “I could tell you my story too, there’s a 
lot to say! Come another day!” On our way back to her place, Li confirmed that A 
Hua had been brutally attacked with acid a few months earlier and that she did not 
dare to socialise. Although feeling sorry for A Hua, I still felt curious about her story 
and her activities and was keen to meet her again, since I was welcome to go back. 
Unfortunately, despite our repeated phone calls over the following days and attempts 
to arrange another meeting, A Hua remained silent, reacting the opposite way to what 
we had expected of her. It was three days later, after A Ying – A Hua and Li’s 
common friend – told us the background story of the accident, that the real issue 
emerged.  
According to A Ying, A Hua1 had attracted the fury and jealousy of her 
Chinese partner’s wife. Her partner, the man we saw in her apartment, was from 
Guangzhou: he was married and the father of a son. Li said: “He is a former black 
person” indicating that he was formerly engaged in illegal activities and was once 
charged with falsifying identity cards and sent to prison. When he was released a few 
years later, he headed alone for the neighbouring Guangxi province and became 
established in Dalu village (which was also Li’s husband’s native village), close to 
                                                
1 A Hua’s full story will be depicted in another chapter. 
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Dongxing. It was here that he met A Hua and started a relationship with her although 
she soon learned that he was already married and a father. They soon had a son 
together; but, his Chinese wife learned about their relationship and tried to end it. Her 
husband calmed her down by sending her some of the money that A Hua was making 
and sharing with him. It was not long before the wife decided to come regularly to 
Dongxing where the couple lived together. She rented a place above their apartment 
and harassed A Hua for maintaining a relationship with her husband. The threat 
became dire when the cheated wife asked her nephew, a young man who occasionally 
stayed with the couple, to make a move on her behalf. The husband had given him a 
key to the apartment. One morning in July 2008, before dawn, and while the husband 
was out picking up some customers at the border, the nephew entered the couple’s 
room, threw acid on A Hua’s face, and ran away. Some customers, who were also 
sleeping in the living room, saw him come in so he was easily identified. Luckily, A 
Hua was sleeping and her eyes were not injured. She managed to go to the bathroom 
and wash her face; but, the damage to her skin was severe. When her partner returned, 
he took her to the river (the border) and sent her back to Vietnam where she spent 
months receiving treatment in Hanoi without any financial support or even a visit 
from her companion. Instead, he stole all of her personal savings from a metal box she 
had kept secret and gave it to his Chinese wife. The nephew burned all of A Hua’s 
belongings. Around the end of 2008, A Hua returned to Dongxing and resumed living 
with her Chinese partner, whose wife had eventually decided to go back to 
Guangzhou and whose nephew had vanished. According to A Ying, her only cautious 
act, considering her new vulnerability, was to send her son to live safely in Vietnam. 
When we met A Hua, Li did not know all of the details of what had happened to her 
former neighbour but, probably based on earlier observations – upon which she opted 
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not to elaborate – Li had already warned me: “This man is not good, I don’t like to be 
around him.” Li had been perceptive enough to feel that the Chinese man had a 
powerful influence over A Hua and that his cold behaviour was a clear sign that we 
should stay away from his intimate realm. He made it quite clear that we were not 
welcome. 
Approaching A Hua seemed easy at first: it provided me with a ‘chance’ to 
understand the migrating process of many Vietnamese women through the main 
actors’ insights. But, the consequences of this first step were intricate considering the 
drama A Hua had gone through and the personal position in which she found herself 
at the time of our meeting. Li stressed that insisting upon meeting her could render her 
even more vulnerable to her husband’s brutal behaviour. The man’s coldness during 
my previous visit was a signal, a warning that I should stay out of his life and home. 
He had probably asked A Hua who I was and what I wanted, since a visit from a 
foreigner staying in such a remote place, accompanied by an ‘insignificant’ local 
friend, was to say the least unusual. Li was neither an official nor even a tourist guide 
any longer; nor was she rich. Thus, our connection was surprising in itself. 
Considering his personal background, A Hua’s husband’s cautiousness was justified. 
He certainly did not want to put his position at risk by allowing his partner to enjoy a 
friendly relationship with a foreigner he had every reason to suspect. It could be that I 
was a journalist, who would publish details of A Hua’s plight, someone with 
influential connections among local organizations; or, an over curious tourist. In other 
words, I was a potential threat to his established business and his private power. 
Moreover, as we were aware of the violence that he – either directly or not – would be 
prepared to use to protect his interests, we needed to avoid putting A Hua into harm’s 
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way that is, putting her in a more difficult social position, at the same time threatening 
Li’s personal safety and even my own.  
A Hua welcomed me twice into her home, albeit in a somewhat apathetic 
manner. But, she was willing to disclose more about herself and I was persuaded that 
gaining the trust of such an informant would enable me to extend my knowledge of 
border migration. A Hua’s home could have been the perfect ‘fieldwork site.’ 
However, it became a potentially hazardous place to frequent due to the ominous 
presence of her male companion. This raised ethical considerations and required the 
making of an appropriate choice. Li and I decided to stop trying to get in contact with 
A Hua, and to avoid the area she was living in for a while. A few months later, during 
my last stay in Dongxing, we heard from A Ying that A Hua had returned to Vietnam; 
but, we failed to learn in what precise circumstances she left. Was it temporary? Was 
she forced to leave? Did she make a decision on her own? The questions remain 
unanswered. 
 
4 Collecting data despite impediments 
The angle of approach: negotiating the intimacy realm 
Yan (2003) and Jankowiak (1993) have both conducted extensive research 
into the realms of marriage, sexuality and intimacy in China. While Yan was a native 
of his fieldwork, Jankowiak was a welcome foreigner. Their challenge was to 
establish a trusting relationship that would enable informants to communicate with the 
researcher about subjects that would otherwise remain in the bedrooms and in 
domestic life’s space. The sites and peoples of the Sino-Chinese borderlands represent 
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a challenge as far as discussion of mixed marriages is concerned. But, an additional 
issue lies in the fact that the foundations of the involved couples remain controversial. 
Hence, in my case, in the interests of remaining inconspicuous and keeping social 
face, most of them found it difficult to open their doors to my inquiries. They needed 
to articulate their relationships in what they considered to be an acceptable form 
before even thinking of disclosing any ‘in-depth’ material about their intimate lives. 
Fortunately, several men and women agreed to provide – sometimes for the very first 
time – straightforward and/or detailed accounts of their experiences. There were rare 
cases where I was able to collect the narratives of both wife and husband, to compare 
them and distinguish each one’s perspective. However, I also heard different 
viewpoints regarding the one marriage, either from family members or acquaintances. 
Anticipation of this difficult process required me to compromise regarding the 
collection of accurate data on cross-border marriages. Since first-hand life-stories 
were rare and failed to provide a comprehensive picture of numerous aspects of the 
phenomenon, I opted to take a closer look at second-hand stories, which were 
essential for completing the primary information. In Hekou, Dongxing, Móng Cái and 
to a lesser extent Lào Cai, some regular informants provided me with accounts of 
friends, neighbours or acquaintances, who had related their experiences or whose 
stories were widely told and commented upon among the community. Analysis of 
these various sources required extreme caution and distancing, information exchange 
and a degree of perspicacity. But, as I demonstrate in Chapter 5, the aim of the study 
slowly varied from attempting to ascertain the exact circumstances of each marriage 
in order to understand the relevance of the human trafficking discourse to the whole 
phenomenon, to revealing forms of social exclusion through an understanding of the 
foundation and consequences of specific marital choices. In this regard, focusing on 
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first-hand stories, as well as on collective accounts of well-known stories, proved 
more complementary than contradictory. The case of A Hua, for example, showed 
how sensitively one must approach individuals involved in illegal activities and 
vulnerable to potential threat. Due in the main to her acquaintance’s account of a story 
she could not tell me herself, A Hua’s reality emerged so eloquently that I became 
interested in second-hand stories, rumour, and accounts of individuals who I 
sometimes never met, never interacted with nor even saw. Wynn (2007) has also 
reflected on the relevance of exploring multiple viewpoints of a social fact or specific 
story, including the most dubious ones, in order to identify any hidden aspects: 
I came to realize that I did not need to develop and administer some sort of 
quantitative survey that would reveal the actual activities that Gulf Arab tourists 
engaged in and break them down according to percentage of tourists who engaged in 
each act, thereby proving or disproving Egyptian stereotypes about the association 
between Gulf tourists and prostitution. Rumors, gossip, and urban myths do not have 
to be proved or disproved to qualify as social facts. It may be true that some Gulf 
Arabs come to Egypt for sex, drinking, and other activities prohibited in their own 
countries – though it is also certainly true that many do not come to Egypt for such 
purposes. But their actual activities are almost beside the point, since the vast 
majority of Egyptians who talk about Arabs coming to Egypt for sex and prostitution 
have not actually seen any proof of this themselves. So the question then becomes: in 
the absence of proof or even evidence that this is what Arabs come to Egypt for, why 
do these rumors circulate and why are they so widely believed? (Wynn 2007: 134, 
original emphasis). 
Drawing on Wynn’s findings vis-à-vis the role of imagination in the process of 
account production, I argue that while first-hand stories tend to present an acceptable 
or somewhat partial version of certain facts, second-hand stories may reveal social 
core issues, stigma and certain main elements that may be concealed by concerned 
individuals. These are social facts, irrespective of whether they come first hand, are 
second-hand, personal accounts or an amalgam of hearsay and interpretation. Yet, the 
methodology concern lies in the value that should be attributed to accounts reported 
by a third party on an individual to whom specific stories or circumstances call 
attention. Further discussion will follow in Chapter 4 where I will explore how these 
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endlessly transmitted tales translate hidden fears and the actual confusion surrounding 
the various changes of society. 
 
Playing cat and mouse: into the snowball game 
When I explained that I was conducting tianye kaocha (fieldwork research), 
the local people interpreted it as shehui diaocha (social investigation), an activity they 
were more familiar with since it remains a tool of the bureaucracy (Pieke 2000: 147). 
But, since I was unaccompanied by an official, I had to respond to inquiries by 
diminishing the bureaucratic activity that the above terms imply and emphasising the 
almost casual observation of daily life that it actually meant for me. Although this 
situation made some informants more disposed to talk, others became more reluctant 
because they were uncertain of what would happen to their confidences. Various 
attitudes depended upon each person’s legal position, on their degree of connection 
with the local authorities, their familiarity with the person who introduced us, and the 
extent of their trust in me. For all these reasons, the sample of informants as 
representative cannot be fully guaranteed, although I believe it remains significant 
enough to represent a community, a goal very difficult to reach for the very reason 
that it hardly constitutes a clearly connected community.  
Due to the sensitivity of my research topic from the perspectives of local 
authorities, communities and my own positionality, I found it convenient to adopt the 
snowball sampling method to identify mixed couples. Women’s connections proved 
the most reliable and effective, although in most cases this required the taking of 
many steps in the process of establishing trusting relationships, as indicated in the 
sample previously mentioned. However the difficulties encountered in establishing 
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the relevant network reflected the will of many to remain anonymous, disengaged 
from public debate and invisible as far as local scrutiny was concerned. This resulted 
in confounding attitudes. There were those among my contacts who initially claimed 
to know numerous cases and promised to introduce me accordingly but who gradually 
‘forgot’ the details, lost the people’s phone numbers, or felt awkward contacting 
them. There were also those who initially claimed not to know any couples of ‘this 
sort’ but who gradually recovered their lost memories and took me to interesting 
informants’ homes telling me numerous stories en route. These forms of behaviour 
may indicate how involved a person can become in others’ eyes when revealing 
community embarrassment or awkward issues. “You are stirring up local scandals!” a 
Chinese man from Daxin village, Guangxi once warned me: he started helping me but 
suddenly changed his mind, rejecting any further enquiry. 
Even though after almost a year of fieldwork research and life-stories 
collecting I had covered several crucial aspects of the phenomenon of local cross-
border marriages, there were still missing data that only other channels would allow 
me to access. Due to this limitation, I sought recourse to non-academic sources that 
provided me with additional stories with which to evaluate and compare ‘mine.’ 
Cases of human trade in the border region have regularly attracted Vietnamese and 
Chinese media attention over the last two decades, attention that continues to persist.1 
News agencies’ articles also afford some alternative insights into the phenomenon of 
cross-border marriages, even though the dramatic gaze that these stories emphasise 
often leaves social complexities out of the equation. Nevertheless, given that they 
                                                
1 One of the latest cases was reported by the Xinhua agency in August 2011: 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-08/21/c_131063406.htm; 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/102780/7575827.html   
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translate the official interpretation of these marriages and nourish their image with 
public discourse, I have included some of these accounts in my sources. Various 
reports issued by governmental and non-governmental agencies on the issue of human 
trafficking also provide significant insight into issues that various cross-border 
exchanges bring to the realm of human rights, legality and social stability. 
 
5 Taking off the mask: words and emotions 
Once I identified someone who had viewpoints on mixed marriage that she/he 
was willing to share or who agreed to articulate a lifetime narrative or a short 
experience, sometimes the emotion factor emerged making it challenging for both the 
informant/s and myself. In some cases, the revealing of details of a controversial 
intimate life brought an awkward feeling to the emergent dialogue. This was 
particularly the case with Chinese men when asked to talk about their marriages, 
partners or families. Conceptualising intimacy is not something that they do ordinarily 
in a society wherein expression of a man’s personality is projected through his 
qualities, work ability, economic power and social connections rather than through his 
familial position or personal fulfilment.  
In contemporary China, as far as masculinity is concerned, actions prevail over 
words. The disclosure of inner feelings and personal emotions does not really comply 
with such a normative model of manhood. When a man confides in someone, his 
disclosure tends to remain in the intimate realm: it is not talked about in 
acquaintances’ circles or in the public space. This model emphasises the articulation 
of masculinity in performative social settings wherein one’s sexual services 
consumption, drinking and smoking ability have become the means, and networking 
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skills – or the ability to manage both professional and familial responsibilities equally 
– the results.  
In other words, as far as my informants were concerned, their 
inconspicuousness and reluctance to elaborate on any topic related to intimacy – even 
though they were encouraged – revealed a general lack of the communication tools 
required to achieve this in a sincere way under unusual circumstances. Whereas 
young migrant women, e.g., those described in a recent article by Ma and Cheng 
(2005), learn new ways of talking about intimacy and sexuality in the experimental 
environment that cities and their practices provide them with, rural and newly 
urbanised men are not necessarily exposed to such explicit language. Thus, they 
experience difficulty learning, articulating personal yearnings, frustrations, pleasures 
and/or any other intimate feelings. Smiling, joking, changing the discussion topic, and 
sending me to their wives or friends were tactics employed by all of my male 
informants to avoid disclosing their personal lives, especially to a Western women, 
and, in many cases, in the presence of their fellow males. Sharing his innermost 
thoughts would have embarrassed the man whose face was already exposed by his 
conjugal choice. Hence, concerns such as social face, shame or modesty also interfere 
with the fluidity of emerging confidences vis-à-vis persons’ private lives (Yan 2003), 
things that people do not ordinarily and easily reflect upon. As a result, more often 
than not, my male informants remained either extremely vague or positive: 
“Everything is normal, just like other couples;” “My wife and I have a good 
relationship;” and, “We experience a few cultural differences but we adjust to each 
other.” Another reason for lack of detail or a more subjective articulation of feelings 
lay in the fact that my own identity gave me easier access to the women’s sphere, 
excluding me at the same time from the world of males where I was perceived as 
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more obtrusive. “My wife has told you everything about our marriage, what else can I 
add?” “You’d better talk to her, she has more to complain about” or “Women know 
how to talk about these things. I don’t know what to tell you.” Thus, while men were 
more inclined to provide facts, dates, places and information about the material 
aspects of a relationship, women were more discursive and tended to let the flow of 
words – to let their emotions dominate their narrative. A story telling could then 
become a long and chaotic process wherein bringing up memories or current issues 
involved self-censorship, disruption as well as suffering.   
Every day during my time in Dongxing I spent hours in a small street coffee 
shop owned by my local friend Xiao Fang. Her shop was located at the entrance of a 
shopping hall in which Vietnamese tourists purchased Chinese goods during their 
visits to Dongxing. This was a spot from which I could observe Vietnamese tourists’ 
behaviour, Chinese sellers’ responses, and the general interactions between the two 
groups while sipping on delicious handmade Vietnamese coffee. Xiao Fang, who 
defined herself as a huaqiao [overseas Chinese], can speak Vietnamese, the Eastern 
Guangxi Cantonese dialect baihua1 and the standard Chinese putonghua. Apart from 
knowing how to make proper Vietnamese coffee, she also knew about Vietnamese 
tourists’ tastes and financial limits: many found her shop an attractive place for their 
morning rest.2 Our exchanges were always very informative. One night, through Xiao 
Fang’s motivation to help me and share some of her numerous acquaintances with me, 
I met Nguyet, a middle-aged Vietnamese woman, who willingly recounted her 
                                                
1 Although sharing the same appellation, the spoken Cantonese dialect baihua is not to be confused 
with the written Chinese baihua, which is based on vernacular Chinese and was adopted in the early 
20th century to become modern standard Chinese. 
2 Xiao Fang’s shop and the shopping hall are no longer there. 
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marriage experience (cf. Appendix 1). In the evenings, when the shopping hall closed, 
evening life activities transformed the space. Street sellers, who were usually devoted 
to parking tourist mini-buses during the daytime, turned it into a shaokao [barbecue] 
night market specialising in seafood. Nguyet, and a female Vietnamese friend, worked 
for their local boss at one of the stalls. When the latter understood why Nguyet had 
been spending so much time talking to me, in a somewhat emotional way she 
spontaneously introduced herself when I arrived at Xiao Fang’s coffee shop the next 
evening. I was waiting for Nguyet to continue our earlier conversation, but we were 
constantly interrupted by clients’ arrivals. Nguyet’s friend said:    
― My name is Quy, I am Vietnamese and I was sold to China when I was 
young.  I want to write a book on my story [she apparently knew what I was 
doing]. I can tell you about my life, and I can also tell you about many other 
Vietnamese women in this case.  
Although I felt that there may have been a hidden motive behind this sudden 
expression of trust, such a spontaneous offer was indeed welcome after weeks of 
searching for informants in different places around the border which invariably 
proved fruitless. I asked her to go on.  I was – for once – openly taking notes. She was 
talking rapidly.  
― I was born in Haiphong; I was sold in Lạng Sơn, and then resold at 
Pingxiang, then again in Nanning. Eventually, a man from Guangdong bought 
me. It was in 1989, I was 23 years old. Now, I am 41.1 After high school 
                                                
1 Like most Vietnamese people, she added one year to her actual age. In Vietnam, the year of gestation 
counts: a child is already considered to be one year old when he/she is born. She was then 40 years old 
and was probably sold at the age of 22. 
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graduation, I joined the army and became a bộ đội [soldier] for three years. 
Then I married and had two children, a girl and a boy. But, my son died at the 
age of five from pneumonia. I then left my husband and spent ten years in 
Nanning. Today, I am remarried. 
She was recalling facts in the same order as they came to mind. Her code-
switching from Chinese to Vietnamese made it difficult to follow her narrative. 
Fortunately, my local friend Li (mentioned earlier in this chapter) accompanied me 
that night and was sitting at my side listening. She later completed Quy’s account of 
her life: 
― Quy had a fiancé in 1989. She came from a wealthy family in Vietnam and 
her family did not agree to her marriage: he was apparently too poor. So, she 
decided to come to the border to do some business.1  But, she had been 
cheated – she didn’t say how – and she became married with a Chinese man in 
Guangdong. The man was poor and couldn’t find a wife. She had two 
children. Her son died, so she abandoned her daughter and fled to Nanning 
where she worked ten years at her gugu’s2 restaurant. Then, she came back to 
Dongxing from where she returned to Hải Dương province for six months. 
There, people laughed at her, disregarded her. So, she left again for Saigon 
[Ho Chi Minh city] to trade before she came back to Dongxing to make some 
money. But, she missed her daughter left in Guangdong: she loves her a lot. 
Her husband wanted her back too. But, she found another husband. She said 
                                                
1 The year 1989 saw the reopening of the border between China and Vietnam (although the official 
agreement was signed in 1991) and border-trade start to recover from a few inactive decades. 
2 Gugu is the referral term for one’s father’s sister. This suggests that Quy had some Vietnamese family 
members settled in Nanning. 
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“Zhe shi wo de ming, suan le ba [this is my fate, whatever]!” This man is very 
jealous and she doesn’t like that. Her daughter is 16 years old now. 
Quy agreed to meet me again to provide me with more details of her story. 
But, a week later, when she saw me at Xiao Fang’s café, she opted not to come over 
to greet me. She obviously had no more interest in talking to me. Xiao Fang shared 
her opinion of Quy’s behaviour with me as follows: 
― Quy knows that Nguyet came to you several times to tell you her own 
story.  It was not easy…. she cried, you remember? But she didn’t ask for 
anything in return. Quy is different. She has understood that disclosing her 
past won’t bring her any money, so she just ignores you now. She’ll never find 
time to talk now! 
Sometimes, emotion seemed easier to express in the narrator’s native language 
(mother tongue) and in the context of an interview, which was so tense or emotional, 
it required letting the narrative flow in the native language. Nguyet and Quy, both in 
their own way, spoke rapidly, inferring a state of urgency; in other words, in ‘one go.’ 
Often, an interview would commence in Chinese, then continue in Vietnamese, a 
form of code-switching facilitating ease and intimacy that made translation easier. I 
had few opportunities to interrupt: and, I knew that there was no possibility of re-
creating the setting and atmosphere of an encounter. Hence, loss of information, the 
accuracy of some accounts, the detailed use of language, and the choice of vocabulary 
were difficult to collect and/or evaluate. The bias that accompanies these particular 
types of life-story accounts was unavoidable. Attaching an equal degree of importance 
to these portrayals as one would to those collected in a more participant-observation 
way over time proved sufficiently valuable for they revealed much more than simply 
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the actual background of a person. To various degrees, they all portrayed fear, stigma, 
sorrow, loneliness and a search for understanding. Therefore, many of the stories I 
gathered during my fieldwork lack numerous details that could have helped me better 
understand these individuals’ life building. What I wish to emphasise with this 
particular example is how some stories were difficult to explore since they relied so 
heavily upon the specific context in which they were told. However, the shady zones 
can also be taken into account as reflective of what the informant him/herself felt 
important to disclose or not to disclose; that is, what makes sense in a life process. 
Therefore, lack of accuracy, far from being an obstacle, becomes a source of 
information about the untold, the hidden, the sensitive and meaningless according to 
the local approach of the subject. 
The emotional aspect of this fieldwork places it in line with other works in the 
field of anthropology of emotion. In their introduction to a collective volume on 
marriage in Asia, Cauquelin and Choron-Baix (2000: 13) sketch its outlines by 
arguing that giving a voice to the intimate world of individuals and acknowledging 
the complexity of their articulation contribute to the construction of the anthropology 
of emotion, especially in this region of the world. Like the contributors to this 
volume, who coped with silence, restraint and ideological pressure when establishing 
dialogues with their informants, I too experienced that keeping alive certain degrees 
of emotional closeness between an informant and ethnographer helped surmount these 
obstacles. Importantly, such intimacy was easier to create with women due to cultural 
codes that limit inter-gender connection. In addition, as suggested earlier, language 
was an obvious limitation. The requirement to articulate feelings in Mandarin Chinese 
posed a considerable difficulty for some Vietnamese women and even for some 
Chinese men. In Hekou, Vietnamese women were more familiar with the local 
  75 
Yunnan dialect, while in Dongxing and its surrounds they mostly spoke baihua. 
Mandarin was only a secondary Chinese language for them. For those Chinese men 
who were not originally from the area, or whose mother tongue was baihua or an 
ethnic language such as Zhuang, communicating on such a level of privacy in 
Mandarin represented an additional challenge. Hence, even with the help of a 
Vietnamese translator or a local Chinese friend, limited vocabulary and lack of 
subtlety resulted in a simplified narrative, rather different from what the informants 
could have produced had they, in their own opinion, been able to talk in their native 
language. 
Apropos of the snowball networking that exposed a sensitive context and 
questioned social positionality, I argue that a combination of language, emotiveness 
and psychological obstacles revealed a mask that many of those involved in mixed 
marriages tend to wear. What looked like a cat and mouse game between the 
ethnographer and informants emerged as a particular form of reciprocation that 
limited one’s ability to conduct successful fieldwork; but, these strategies eventually 
served my analysis of the phenomenon by revealing the untold and the awkward, the 
things that people wanted to keep secret at the same time as they revealed other 
details about themselves. 
 
6 Dealing with hindrances: the ‘tools’ of the improvised tactics 
Finally on the subject of methodology, addressing the emotional aspect of this 
fieldwork experience leads me to the role of the interpreter. He/she represents a key-
person in the process of identifying informants and building reliable relationships 
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with them. Scott et al. highlight the relevance of the interpreter’s positionality when 
carrying out research in Vietnamese rural communities: 
The significance of positionality and status is sharply revealed in the researcher-
interpreter relationship. The literature on ethnographic fieldwork has become 
increasingly sensitive in recent years to issues of the researcher’s positionality. Yet, 
to the extent that an interpreter is used … most accounts of researchers working in 
cross-cultural contexts brush aside the positionality of the field assistant or 
interpreter. This is a serious omission, since factors such as age, gender, regional and 
class background, and prejudices such as attitudes towards women, the poor or ethnic 
minorities, can play a huge role in shaping interactions between the researcher, 
interpreter and research subjects, and the nature of the data obtained.  …When 
working in rural areas or with disadvantaged communities we realised the importance 
of having interpreters who have some understanding of, or empathy for, research 
participants (Scott et al. 2006: 36-37). 
I have mentioned earlier in this chapter the presence of my Vietnamese 
translator during parts of the fieldwork. Loan’s engagement with my research project 
was invaluable inasmuch as it allowed me to approach informants. She was not afraid 
of border areas, was interested in these women’s life experiences and had not received 
any training in the social sciences. She maintained a very neutral position and was 
very respectful of each person we met. Furthermore, she also built some trusting and 
friendly relationships with some of them, transforming this effort into a social 
experience that she admitted she would not have enjoyed otherwise. I was lucky to 
have known this young person, who possesses high human values and sensitivity 
which, in my opinion, are much more valuable than any formal ethnographic training. 
She paved the initial path that I was to follow alone during the additional fieldwork I 
undertook in the area. It was because most people remembered and trusted her that I 
was able to approach them again. Her presence and her way of establishing a 
connection between some of the women and the two of us helped to assuage the 
difficult positions we sometimes found ourselves in. But, when disclosure meant 
exposure to distress, when recalling memories led to tears – a disguised call for 
empathy/help – Loan acted as a buffer.  
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Here the interpreter became the necessary intermediary between the narrative 
structured by emotion and the need for objectivity and distance required by the 
researcher. As Spencer observes, emotion retrieved from the margins of the practices 
of ethnography might help scholars to better understand the experiences and emotions 
that they try to capture through empathetic listening. Anthropologists “explore 
emotions in terms of how we might develop an understanding, a sense of the people 
and the field and learn through them” (Spencer 2010: 16).  However, emotional 
engagement in the field affects the researcher: I personally found the presence of an 
interpreter shielded me from excessive and disturbing emotion that had already 
influenced my seeking of a fair balance between detachment and involvement. 
Informing a reality with emotional reflexivity was certainly inevitable; but, in some 
cases, an intermediary between the articulation of intimate pain and the ‘appreciation’ 
of it through words helped as a safeguard for analysis. Breaking the rhythm of word 
flow with necessary translation allowed some informants to momentarily step aside 
from their own emotions, to pause, and to ease their articulation of a coherent account 
from which interpretation could emerge. Informant-assistants and empathic 
interpreters often act as ‘sponges of emotion.’ In that sense, I argue that their 
involvement should not be merely acknowledged for the communication they allow 
us to establish with the subjects we plan to examine. Beside the linguistic and social 
skills they provide us with, and in cases of emotionally charged exchanges, they also 
prevent us from being affected because their personal commitment enables them to 
capture the nature of a narrative, to buffer emotions, and to release the narrative to our 
ears in a way ‘delivered’ from its affective envelope. A story, experience or feeling is 
not only a substance; the way it is eventually disclosed counts as much as what it 
says. 
  78 
The core methods I used when collecting the above life stories included 
crosschecking, external and participant observation of domestic and public 
interaction, guided interviews and/or informal discussions on a specific topic. But, on 
a more pragmatic level, it proved nigh impossible to take notes openly during 
conversations, except for a few exceptional cases in which there was either ‘nothing 
to hide’ or enough trust between the informant and myself to pursue this particular – 
and sometimes delicate – process. This seemingly haphazard method turned out to be 
less intrusive and more respectful of the familiarity people allowed us to enjoy, even 
though it led to the loss of certain elements when my memory failed to record all of 
the details of an exchange. Most of the discussions and interviews occurred in semi-
conducted mode. Due to the difficulty involved in talking about ‘intimate’ subjects – 
and my use of this term does not necessarily imply sexuality but simply feelings – I 
let each person choose to tell me what seemed important or relevant about the marital 
relationship in which he/she was involved or the one he/she had something to say 
about. This made our communication easier and less inquisitive: it induced some to 
confess much more than they initially intended to. But, this ‘presentation of self’ also 
revealed what should be hidden or avoided in relation to the image each wished to 
preserve. Hence, as mentioned earlier, the very core of the stigma and uneasiness 
engendered in the public’s imagination by these cross-border marriages arose from 
narratives including those not spoken aloud. Notwithstanding, in-depth data related to 
intimate practices, relationships between spouses and children or in-laws, and 
domestic life details are missing from these accounts and observations. Although my 
primary focus is not upon describing intimate spaces’ lives, I acknowledge that this 
would have brought some crucial elements of understanding to the discussion. In his 
recent studies of young migrants in Vietnam, Hy Van Luong (forthcoming) underlines 
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the implications of differences in the narratives of family members for research 
methodology. He emphasises that the ways in which a family or a young person 
explain the choice of migration often reveal how “… [The] hiding of moral failures or 
under-reporting of morally questionable behavior in the presentation of self to the 
public is common in numerous societies.” Parents may explain the choice of 
migration as a solution to their child’s idleness or to their economic difficulties while 
at the same time omitting the same child’s yearning for emancipation and his/her own 
private circumstances. In addition, these factors, which are ignored or dismissed by 
elders, may as well be understated by a youth, for example, who may prefer to 
emphasise filial piety/duty and the sacrifice he is prepared to make for the sake of the 
whole family’s wellbeing. Unfortunately, even though Hy Van Luong stresses that 
“research only with migrants or with their family members at home runs a high risk of 
oversimplifying reality,” accessing the whole range of individuals connected with a 
marriage decision, a couple’s life, or a family’s position was not a realistic option 
under the conditions surrounding my fieldwork. However, following Hy Van Luong’s 
approach, my work seeks to call attention to the diversity of discourses that surround 
one’s migration, marriage or decisions regarding one’s household. It will underline 
the distinction between individual narratives and community discourse and the 
importance of taking them both into consideration when attempting to achieve a fair 
analysis. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter provided insights into the constraints I found myself facing in 
two authoritarian countries both before and during my pursuance of this research 
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project, which focuses upon a particularly sensitive subject. Drawing on other 
researchers’ experiences when undertaking fieldwork research in China and Vietnam, 
I explicate how I took advantage of the perceived lack of interest and lack of expertise 
of the local research institutions to negotiate my access to the field through personal 
connections. While doing so, I also emphasise the possibility – and necessity – to 
avoid official protocols when studying a politically-charged social phenomenon. This 
chapter also stresses the approach of the research topic. This study of cross-border 
alliances focuses less upon the nature of mixed marriages, cross-cultural couples and 
their life experiences (domestic, intimate and sexual – given that my informants and 
their communities did not always ease my access to these very personal spheres of 
their private lives) and more upon the reflections and controversies these alliances 
generate. Thus, taking advantage of unavoidable obstacles, this thesis will describe 
this social phenomenon by including an innovative perspective; that is, focus is upon 
public discourse rather than on the facts themselves. These various voices will lead to 
representations/perceptions of mixed-couples’ lives and will enlighten/complete the 
narratives of individuals, who often reflect the frames of belief to which they adhere, 
either compulsorily or constructed. 
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Chapter 2 
Borderlands: A chaotic shore for castaways 
 
Introduction 
 
Map 1: The Sino-Vietnamese borderlands, and the Hekou/Lào Cai & Dongxing/Móng Cái border gates 
(United States Central Intelligence Agency 1988) 
 
The cities of Hekou and Dongxing, which represent two of the three main 
Chinese entrances to Vietnam, are both located on the Sino-Vietnamese border from 
where they face their respective twin cities of Lào Cai and Móng Cái. Because they 
function as international border gates, local residents have become accustomed to 
seeing foreigners on a daily basis. Since I became familiar with both places during 
earlier journeys, choosing these sites over others was deliberate on my part. 
Pingxiang, the third international gate of this border, had already attracted the 
attention of anti-human trafficking activists and journalistic investigation during the 
first decade of the 2000s. I was curious to explore the reported phenomena and related 
topics such as cross-border marriages: this meant extending my investigation further 
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east to the coast of Guangxi and further west to Yunnan. I intuitively believed that 
eschewing the infamous reputation of Pingxiang and focusing more upon the reality 
would help me to obtain a more realistic, less biased picture of human trafficking, a 
paradigm my research initially began with (cf. Introduction). 
Border towns have a particularly significant position in terms of migration and 
transition. People come, return, end up, exchange, pass by and/or settle in these 
places, irrespective of whether they originated from rural or urban regions or of the 
purpose of their initial projects. In order to understand how borderlands and border 
towns have become the theatre of specific human exchange and how they condition 
the perception of cross-border marriages, in this chapter I will first sketch the 
historical and sociological backgrounds of the four sites wherein the phenomenon 
evolved and gradually became visible. Then, I will outline how border towns are 
perceived as chaotic and challenging because of their changing nature. This portrait 
will highlight the trajectories of those yearning individuals who activate, participate in 
and contribute to such places’ reputations. 
 
1 Geographical background: the location 
Towards Hekou: 10 September 2008, ambiance and acquaintances  
There are two official ways of travelling to Hekou: one – from China – is by 
road and requires driving all the way from Kunming, through Mengzi, down to the 
Vietnamese border; the other – from Vietnam – is by foot, and requires crossing the 
bridge that separates Hekou from its Vietnamese twin city of Lào Cai. Either way 
provides the visitor with the same entry sights of this ancient, fluvial port, a very 
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active albeit somewhat small place clearly a hub of cross-border trade. Hekou 
includes various districts apparently delimited by their main activity, either devoted to 
international trade, local shopping, habitations, new development areas, 
administration or to a mélange of all of the above.  
 
Map 2: The international border gate Hekou-Lào Cai (Mellac & Pissoat 2011) 
Although I had visited the area two and a half years earlier, this was my first 
fieldwork trip to Hekou. I decided to make it a daylight trip so that I could observe 
any changes in the region as I travelled along the Kunming-Hekou road. It took ten 
hours of non-stop Hong-Kong movies, pop-music and a packed public bus to 
eventually arrive at dusk at the little bus station, following a long wait at the ‘Border 
Control Post’ located approximately ten kilometres from the city. There, border 
officers checked every passenger’s ID and registered every foreigner’s passport data. 
Relieved from the omnipresence of the loud fighting sounds and unbearable dialogue 
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of poor quality movies that managed to distract me from my initial aim of quietly 
enjoying the landscape, I collected my bag from the boot of the bus and walked with 
some relief through the bus station gate. The familiar main street, the warm, humid air 
and the electric lights brought back flows of memories of my previous stay. My sense 
of orientation has always been somewhat poor; but, my hours of wandering in the 
narrow streets of this little town two years earlier helped me to find my way to the 
guesthouse I used to stay in, which was located thirty metres away. The dynamic 
nature of China’s cities sees them change so rapidly that one can never take for 
granted finding a place again, even after a few months of absence. Still the first of its 
kind along the long Shangmao Street, the guesthouse offers small, very basic and very 
cheap accommodation for local travellers. Its neon sign standing on the pavement 
explicitly provided details of day-rent or hour-rent rooms tariffs. This is one among 
many similar private hotels available to local tourists and businessmen – “not suitable 
for foreigners, especially women” I was often warned – mostly occupied by men, and 
closely connected with local brothels. I had no idea if this guesthouse would still be 
there, given the constant changes occurring today in virtually everything in China, 
particularly business. But, it had remained open; nowadays, a mah-jong salon 
occupied the ground floor. The Sichuanese boss greeted me warmly and loudly and, 
without even asking, took me straight to ‘my room.’ It was in exactly the same 
condition as it was the last time I occupied it: maybe six square meters, a small bed, 
an old colour TV, an electric fan, an open window that does not close, vaguely 
covered by a dirty curtain that would not protect me from the mosquitoes, an even 
smaller bathroom, as clean as it could be, the same old broken tap and the occasional 
cockroach as a roommate. But, the sheets were clean; it was as much as I needed. As 
before, it was never quiet at night. And, as the guesthouse is located adjacent to the 
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customs building, it became even noisier in the mornings. Around daybreak, some 
Vietnamese women, who found the space just below my window convenient for 
loading all their goods onto their bikes, regularly woke me up. The only difference 
from my former stay was the atmosphere. A local drama had occurred on the spot: a 
Chinese man had killed a Vietnamese man. A neighbour told me later that: “The 
Vietnamese guy was stabbed because he tried to cheat his money-exchange 
customer.” These things happen in Hekou: it was not the only time I would hear about 
murders, fights or people disappearing. 
It was already late: I needed some exercise after such a long journey. So, 
embarking on a food-hunting trek, I decided to see if Lien, one of my former 
Vietnamese informants, was still in her shop. When I go back to a known place in 
China, it has become a sort of ritual to first check what has or has not changed. As 
expected, the main street along the local market was very lively; shops were still 
open, and guesthouse managers were waiting for customers’ glances at their prices 
advertised on the numerous neon signs. But, someone else now occupied Lien’s 
former shop. However, her neighbour recognised me and invited me into her shop for 
a chat. A Mei, a young woman from Guangxi province, had just delivered her baby 
when I met her in 2006. She briefly updated me regarding her personal situation: a 
very turbulent – sometimes violent – relationship with her husband from Zhejiang, a 
missed three year old daughter, who lived with her grand-parents far away, a not-so-
good garment business in Hekou, all-in-all a boring life. Obviously very happy to 
complain about all of her tribulations to fresh and compassionate ears, she asked if I 
was looking for Lien and gave her a phone call. While we were waiting for Lien to 
collect me, A Mei brought me up to date with the latest news: 
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— Lien doesn’t make any business next-door now; she opened a new shop in 
the market. It’s a business like another you know, everyone has to earn a 
living! She is still living with her boyfriend A Long, but I don’t know why 
they haven’t got married yet. With money, you can obtain whatever you want 
though; they have some, but their situation is still the same. She doesn’t have 
children either. 
 
Figure 1: The ground shops of the Vietnamese Market at night (Grillot 2010) 
The elegant Lien finally arrived, smiling as she sat astride her new electric-
bike. She was surprised but seemed happy to see me. I had lost contact with her, as 
was the case with many other informants. People in China often change their mobile 
phone numbers according to the latest phone company best deals, their migration and 
their own needs, especially in terms of ‘relevant connections.’ Thus, unless one 
adopts the popular habit of regularly calling each other for no particular reason but to 
keep in touch and to update contact numbers, it is hard to sustain a distant relationship 
with anyone long-term. When Lien asked me if I had already eaten – the customary 
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way of greeting an acquaintance – I politely lied to avoid an invitation to a nearby 
night restaurant, which would have delayed the satisfaction of sating my curiosity. 
Reassured, she took me for a very short ride to her ‘new shop’ inside the only space I 
had never before had the chance to explore: the notorious and infamous second floor 
of the Vietnamese market. Without any transition other than a long and tiring bus 
journey and a quick chat with a young frustrated business woman, I had translocated 
from a morning cuddle with my one year old son – who, for convenient reasons I 
opted to leave behind in Kunming with his father – to the very different kinds of 
embraces that I was to observe around me that night. Lien and A Long were now 
running a brothel. Pretending that I had not noticed – or at least was not surprised by – 
the difference between selling hair slides and young bodies’ sexual services, I sat on 
the wooden sofa inside the shop, had a discreet look around, and then started to chat 
with my friend, all the while being observed by several curious young, dressed-up 
ladies. I explained to Lien that my reasons for not keeping contact over last years 
were because I became a mother; as well, I had returned to my studies. I showed her a 
few pictures of my beloved son and said that this time I intended to stay longer in 
Hekou to learn more about mixed couples. Lien updated me on her life with A Long: 
— A Long and I are still together; this hasn’t changed. Only our business did. 
The former one was not doing so well and we opened this place two years ago. 
Business is not that good either but everyone has to try something, right? I 
would like to run another business though, sometime soon, we’ll see. Do you 
remember A Luo? He also got married with a Vietnamese woman; he runs a 
shop over there now [she pointed at another brothel ten meters away]. Now, 
you can interview him as well. 
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I had not forgotten A Luo, the couple’s ‘good fellow.’ Two years ago, he was 
still wondering what sort of business he could invest in. He told me then that he was 
not interested in managing a hotel or a brothel because “it’s too much trouble and not 
really moral;” but, he had a vague idea of selling solar panels. The point was that he 
had no funding. But then Lien became distracted. She was talking but at the same 
time keeping an eye on her ‘girls.’ I had arrived at the busiest time of the evening: the 
appearance of potential clients at the top of the stairs next to her shop constantly 
interrupted our conversation. Her brothel, like most of the others, consisted of a small 
salon, with an even smaller bedroom, a tiny kitchen, a narrow bathroom at the back of 
the shop, and an inner mezzanine room for receiving clients. The brothel was located 
on a privileged spot, right at the corner where visitors emerged from the ground floor, 
ready to be ‘captured’ and literally pushed inside a parlour, almost straight up the 
hidden stairs and into bed by one of the attractive and reckless Vietnamese women, 
who waited all day long in the inside balcony of the building. I noticed how at ease 
my friend was interacting with the male passers-by. She eventually asked: 
— Why don’t you come for lunch tomorrow? I’ll have free time then… 
As I left the place, promising I would come, I almost ran into customers who 
were being firmly pulled into the fake ‘hair-salon’ by one of Lien’s girls. 
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Figure 2: View of the second floor of Hekou’s Vietnamese market (Zhang Mi 2006) 
Aware that I sometimes visited her former neighbour and not-so-close-
anymore friend A Mei, Lien confided a few months later:  
— Did you hear about A Mei’s lover? Did she tell you? He was an old 
Chinese man1 who had a lot of money and who used to date her regularly in 
hotels. Well, he died from a heart attack recently, in mysterious circumstances. 
He was found in his hotel room with A Mei. Everybody knows about this. Her 
husband was so ashamed, he was afraid of gossip, so he escaped and returned 
to his hometown. Don’t believe what she says! Her husband has been very 
good to her but she openly disrespected him and… See what happens now? 
These forms of relationships, which are marked by fragility and confusing 
impermanence, are quickly palpable in such an atmosphere. These first encounters 
                                                
1 The man was in his forties, an age that Lien considered old given the fact that A Mei was only in her 
twenties. 
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illustrate several aspects of my fieldwork. It was not unusual that within a few 
months, even weeks, people who used to meet on a daily basis, to work together or to 
regularly share home meals, were no longer close acquaintances. Thus, in this context, 
it was ‘normal’ that the delicate Lien chose to manage a brothel to earn money, it was 
‘normal’ that A Luo contradicted his claimed values by his act, and it was ‘normal’ 
that friends became suspect neighbours. I often learned more about individuals’ 
personal stories from people on the side than from the informants themselves. This 
gradually induced me to reflect more upon social aspects such as face, dignity, pride 
and shame, which framed and limited any interaction I had with those who obviously 
occupied a rather marginal position within their communities. It also demonstrated 
how various types of public discourse – including gossip – reveal widespread 
assumptions, i.e., what social representations mean in such a unique setting of 
competition for social and economic position wherein individuals continuously 
manage life-style choices and temporary alliances that sometimes seem to occur 
regardless of what their society would consider as daode [moral] in a different setting. 
When I had a chance to talk to A Long after I visited Lien’s brothel, I asked him: 
— What do your parents think about your new activity? 
— Of course they don’t know! They would never accept that! We told them 
we changed our activity but we didn’t say what it was, just ‘business.’  
Two years later, when I visited my friends Lien and A Long, I realised that the 
latter’s mother was taking care of their newly-adopted child on a daily basis within 
the brothel: 
— Now that your mother understands what your business is about, what does 
she think? 
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—  Well, at first, we called her, we explained we had a baby, and she wanted 
to come. We said it would not be very suitable, and she asked why. When we 
explained about the girls, she was not very happy but she wanted to come 
anyway. We did not discuss this after she arrived, but she fits into the 
environment now, she accepts, she knows it’s temporary. She doesn’t know 
much about Vietnamese people anyway…  
A Long’s mother came from Eastern China, which today is a developed and 
opened-up area; but, she belonged to a generation who had experienced Maoism and 
sexual repression (Zhang 2005) and this had certainly not prepared her to accept 
seeing her only son managing a brothel. For A Long, however, this was easier than 
asking her to accept considering an even more sensitive issue: an adopted baby. A 
Long’s intention to hide this fact from his mother reflects the new hierarchy of values 
created in a marginal environment such as Hekou. To his family, A Long may sell 
foreign women’s sexual services to make a living; but, he may not adopt an 
abandoned child.1 The daode [social morality] value thus becomes flexible according 
to context.  
 
The realities of borderlands 
In her research, Turner provides an historical account of border trade in the 
mountainous areas surrounding Lào Cai and Yunnan. She emphasises how 
                                                
1 According to Lien, her ‘girls’ found the baby on the way to breakfast one morning. She had been 
wrapped in a blanket and left lying on the ground next to the Vietnamese Market’s garbage spot. The 
‘girls’ brought the baby to A Lien who, after long discussions with A Long to get his agreement, 
decided to adopt the baby. 
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“borderlands residents have relatives, friends, and acquaintances on either side of the 
borderline and regard the line itself as an artificial separation of their countries-old 
trade and social networks” (Turner 2010a: 267). One thus needs to consider Sino-
Vietnamese borderlands as spaces shared by peoples of relatively similar cultures, 
customs and practices, and relationships with their environment, all of which are 
embedded in a long and common history of exchange regularly interrupted by 
conflict. Today, the governments of both Vietnam and China look to the future. Focus 
is upon their Mainland border activities and economic development rather than on 
political disputes. They realise the importance of smooth relationships and 
cooperation to the implementation of the Great Mekong Sub-region. Local 
populations have chosen their own way to benefit from an a priori encouraging 
environment for trade and economic level enhancement, i.e., on various scales and 
levels. Besides trading centres such as the border towns in which this study is set, 
people, goods and ideas keep communicating between both sides, demonstrating how 
the unlimited ways of crossing a border reflect its concrete and abstract porosity. 
On the level of border-trade practices in particular, Turner observes that “a 
number of contemporary small-scale cross-border traders have continued to avoid the 
intensity of the state’s gaze. They work via minor crossings, smuggling goods if 
necessary, to surreptitiously take advantage of the Chinese and Vietnamese states’ 
lack of interest in such small-scale livelihood means, while these states 
simultaneously plough ahead with their own visions of modernization” (2010a: 287). 
Whereas local smuggling goes on, several authors have suggested that more 
consequent exchanges occur through other channels of trade (Hai 2000; Xie 2000; 
Hutton 2000; Chan 2005a, 2005b; Womack & Gu 2000). Drawing on such depictions 
of border realities and complex trade dynamics, Peter Hinton emphasises how, in this 
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particular region where Southern China meets Southeast Asia, the economist way to 
distinguish a ‘formal’ from an ‘informal’ economy lacks relevance: 
This conventional way of reckoning is deficient in two respects. Firstly, in developing 
countries the ‘informal sector’ may comprise a very large proportion of total 
productive activity: to omit it from calculations builds in significant distortions. 
Secondly, it is erroneous to make a sharp distinction between the two because they 
are intertwined in complex ways. (…) In our region, much of the cross-border trade 
would fall into the informal sector. At major crossing points there are customs 
stations and transactions are monitored by the authorities. However, borders are so 
long, and so porous, that many transactions are neither recorded nor taxed. But the 
conventional informal/formal dichotomy does not stand up because the two sectors 
are seamlessly integrated (Hinton 2000: 22). 
In this debate, van Schendel and Abraham, having noted the inconsistent 
definitions of terms such as ‘legal’ or ‘illegal’ across different countries, and the 
absence of a consensual definition of crimes across borders on the global scale, have 
chosen to remain closer to the national and local perceptions of the ways in which 
certain goods are exchanged and certain practices are embedded in local trade. They 
argue that “when we shift our nomenclature [from ‘legal’ or ‘illegal’] to the 
distinction between ‘licit’ and ‘illicit’, we refer less to the letter of the law than to 
social perception of activities defined as criminal” (van Schendel, Abraham 2005: 
18). Hence, the authors define borderlands as a “‘third space’ [that] becomes the site 
for activities that can only be called (il)licit: legally banned but socially sanctioned 
and protected” (2005: 22), a definition that perfectly fits Dongxing and Hekou’s 
economic activities. For example, numerous gambling-machines parlours and cards-
and-mah-jong game rooms have appeared in the back streets of both cities; in 
addition, there is a karaoke venue next to each hotel, not to mention the infamous 
buildings dedicated to prostitution and sex-toys in Hekou, and the Vietnamese street-
vendors of Dongxing, who sell smuggled products such as tobacco or medicine from 
Vietnam. In border towns wherein an informal economy is integrated as part of daily 
life, these are just a few examples of illicit activities that residents call feifa [illegal] 
  94 
but zhengchang [normal], an economy in which the various actors’ roles seems re-
distributed for the functioning of the whole system. A Long explained as follows: 
— What happens if a customer mistreats one of your girls? 
— My role is to protect them; so, if a client is forcing her to do what she 
doesn’t want to, I talk to him and arrange things. If he persists, I simply call 
the police. We [brothel’s owners] all have some connections and agreements 
with the police. We don’t need to worry. If things happen when the girl is at 
the customer’s hotel, the manager will also call me. When official visits are 
planned, the police inform us and ask us to close our shop for a few days. No 
problem. 
A Long’s explanation illustrates how intertwined invisible but effective 
connections ‘make things work.’ The tolerant – even supportive – attitude of the local 
authorities regarding the various illicit activities annihilates the official policies of the 
upper power sphere that ban prostitution, gambling and the smuggling trade. As one 
of Zhang’s informants suggested, there is a difference between fanfa [breaking the 
law] and weigui [violating the rules] that impels the dichotomy between illegal and 
illicit that van Schendel and Abraham emphasise (Zhang 2011: 225). This subtle 
distinction explains the perceived ambivalence of the authorities’ position regarding 
border activities. Nevertheless, just as the notion of daode [social morality] becomes 
challenged by activities such as open prostitution being suddenly considered part of 
the local ‘normality’ in the residents’ viewpoints (Zheng 2009), a certain flexibility is 
still required to allow the development of a border trade economy, flexibility that 
favours practices and arrangements over strict respect for laws and regulations. As 
long as this façade is maintained during crucial encounters between the inland-central 
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and borderland-local policy implementers – evident in the sudden erasure of wall 
inscriptions and temporary shut-downs of brothels – this balance between two 
conceptions of people and goods flows remains relatively stable. As Xiao Sun, one of 
my friendly hosts in Hekou put it: “Mei you ren guan, dajia dou you liyi [no one 
cares, everybody benefits from this].” 
One day, I noticed a group of traders – acquaintances of mine – sitting 
together drinking tea and playing Chinese chess. I was familiar with most of them and 
their daily activities but I noticed how lately they gathered together more than usual. 
Lao Liu, one trader from Jianshui (Yunnan) explained to me: 
— We cannot send our goods these days. In Vietnam, they [border guards] are 
becoming more severe lately because of the recent argument over the [Paracel 
and Spratlys] Islands. We have nothing to do with this, but what happens at 
the central government prevents us from trading. Everyone becomes tense. So 
we drink tea and wait for things to get back to normal. It’s such a waste of 
time… Business is more and more difficult to conduct these days. Not to 
mention the economic crisis.    
Lao Liu was referring to what others had already told me: the degree of laxity 
exercised by the border guards on both sides regarding activities related to smuggling 
goods not only depends upon their understanding of legality: it also reflects the 
political situation at the government level and how it is interpreted by local traders as 
a sign for either action or caution. Willem van Schendel confirms what Lao Liu was 
complaining about by emphasising how  
… the permeability of borders is forever changing. The power of 
neighbouring states waxes and wanes, and the relationship between them is 
always in flux. At the border, changing interstate relations combine with the 
varying demands of cross-border labor and commodity markets, as well as 
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with trade and migration policies, to produce complex patterns to which those 
involved in illegal flows need to be attuned (van Schendel 2005: 52-53).  
In the case of the Sino-Vietnamese border, political disputes over the control 
of the strategic Spratlys and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea have – according 
to my informants – considerably impacted upon the illicit flows of goods, which need 
to rely on the goodwill and flexibility of duty of the Chinese and Vietnamese border 
guards. And, because many traders refuse to comply with the formal channels’ rules 
and taxes pertinent to the importation and exportation of goods, this situation is 
conducive to frequent albeit often unexpected fluctuations of exchange, and a certain 
precariousness of business irrespective of whether it is petty or voluminous trade. In 
sum, although borderland residents, traders and power holders like to claim that 
conflict between China and Vietnam is part of their past history, and that they have all 
moved on towards cooperation in the interests of economic development, they still 
live under the shadow of high political level matters, manifest in the on-going 
arguments that regularly arise at the level of their daily lived reality. 
 
The Sino-Vietnamese twin cities 
 A land between South China and Southeast Asia 
According to historian Bruneau, the Vietnamese border with China has long 
been a simple administrative border within the Chinese Empire and stayed this way 
until 938 AD when it started to mark the line between two distinct states. When the 
French establish the Indochinese Union in 1887, they inherited an almost unaltered 
historical and geographical border despite centuries of conflict mainly due to the 
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territorial ambitions of the Chinese Empire.1 According to Bruneau, the area “has a 
unique character in Southeast Asia since it brings together two States issued from the 
same Confucian civilization, even though it is located in an area of multi-ethnic and 
‘non-civilized’ (man dân [in Vietnamese]) minority peoples” (2001: 39, translation by 
thesis author). For centuries, the dominant Han, Mongol and Manchu dynasties of the 
Chinese empire, the successive Kinh dynasties in Vietnam, and, in more recent times, 
the Communist Party in China and in Vietnam have always endeavoured to civilise 
the mountainous and marginal parts of their territories, areas mainly populated by 
minority ethnic groups. In China, this assimilation process started to become more 
systematic following the classification of the Chinese population in the early 1950s in 
order to administrate strategic but rather uncontrolled areas such as Yunnan and 
Guangxi. Nowadays, the ethnic dimension of the borderland societies still constitutes 
an important background when studying migration flux in the area. Members of 
ethnic groups who do not share the same nationality join members of other ethnic 
groups with whom they share the same nationality. For example, the Yao from Hekou 
County are as well connected with their relatives in Lào Cai province – regardless of 
the international border in between – as they are with the Yi and Hani,2 their 
immediate neighbours in the Honghe prefecture’s mountainous areas. When all these 
people tend to speak in various languages, one understands how easy it becomes to 
blend in with the borderland crowds, regardless of the administrative frontiers and 
actual citizenship. Today, the Sino-Vietnamese borderlands that stretch over 1300 
kilometres constitute a rather porous frontier through which thousands of people 
                                                
11 For a detailed account of the Sino-Vietnamese border history, see Lafont (ed.) (1989). 
2 The Yao, Yi and the Hani are three ethnic groups who compose an important part of the population of 
Honghe prefecture wherein Hekou is located. 
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continuously cross every day, even though modern state control monitors them more 
closely than in earlier times. During her research into Vietnamese border traders, and 
in line with the Chinese official documents she consulted, Sarah Turner identifies four 
types of border gates in the area: 
Chinese documents list four contemporary border-crossing categories: first, foreign 
economic and technical cooperation in the border region; second, border crossings 
purchased through tours; third, small-scale border trade; and fourth, those undertaken 
by border residents. The last of these categories relates directly to local residents 
crossing the border for small-scale trade and to visit relatives, or ‘trade by those 
living within twenty kilometers of the border, in government-approved border 
crossings or designated bazaars, not to exceed officially regulated values and 
quantities’ … (Turner 2010a: 281). 
Movement, fluidity and human diversity characterise these borderlands in 
constant metamorphosis since the Vietnamese and Chinese central governments 
systematically planned the economic development of their marginal zones – margins 
related to the rest of their territories. The formation of the Greater Mekong Subregion 
in 1992 included Lào Cai and Hekou. In the words of Hensengerth: “An area often 
characterized by the activities of military forces, revolutionaries and secret societies 
was beginning to be turned into one characterized largely by peaceful economic 
activity” (2010: 65). For two decades, government policies have encouraged new 
settlement along the border to enhance economic activities and development. Hence, 
the area attracts many migrants in search of work and business opportunities. 
 Dongxing and Móng Cái: the lively and the busy 
The border gate between the extreme southeast of China and northeastern 
Vietnam serves the twin cities of Dongxing (Chinese) and Móng Cái (Vietnamese). 
Dongxing, which is located at the southeast end of Guangxi close to seaside, now 
enjoys a special attention that has allowed it to become a local trade turntable for 
routes between international ports such as Haiphong or Beihai, Chinese and 
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Vietnamese islands (e.g., Hainan or Hạ Long Bay) and southeast China’s coast and 
land (Canton, Hong Kong and Guangxi province). Its position makes it significantly 
more important than the Yunnan-Lào Cai border given that: 
[T]he intercourse (invasions, incursions, trade) across the land border between China 
and Vietnam, recorded for over two thousand years, was only occasional and 
irregular. The real intercourse between China and its southern neighbours took place 
via maritime routes, not via a land border (Lary 2007: 183). 
However, its status as a preferred trading area is not new: it existed even 
before the French establish the Indochinese Union in 1887. During the colonial 
period, it may have been easy to observe the various trade and smuggling operations 
along the border. Historical accounts reveal that Dongxing had long been devoted to 
trade of all kinds, including human trade. A document written by historian Baudrit 
(Baudrit 2009), in which he makes reference to material from the French colonial 
period, throws some light on the specificity of this border gate. In former times – less 
than a century ago – handicrafts, manufactured goods and agricultural products were 
not the only objects of transaction between the Vietnamese and Chinese. ‘Human 
livestock’ was openly negotiated as well: 
It is interesting to indicate how these sales take place either in the border towns and 
villages or in the islands that border the two countries. Sales in Tong-hing 
[Dongxing] were and are perhaps still done according to very odd customs. … Before 
the Chinese Republic, the Tong-hing market where the Yellows [Asians] are traded, 
displayed a barbaric and grotesque spectacle. Girls, boys and women for sale were 
brought to the market the night before the sale to avoid being seen by the public. The 
next morning [at a time when the market was about to open] they were made to sit on 
a stool. One covered their entire upper body, up to their knees, by a sort of large 
conical basket, showing in an apparent manner the price, age and sex of the person to 
be sold. The buyer, therefore, only relied on the legs to get an idea of the ‘goods’ he 
wanted to buy. … It is conceivable that with such limited assessment, buyers could 
easily be mistaken about the quality of the man or woman they wanted to buy. … 
Mostly, these markets of Tong-hing are self-supplying at the deposits of Cat-ba [Cát 
Bà] and Ké-bao [Kê-Báo] islands. The Chinese come with their junks and choose the 
most beautiful subjects who are stored in the caves and in the forest dens. The price is 
negotiated after the selection (Baudrit 2009: 138-139, translation by thesis author). 
This account, although more factual than analytical, has nevertheless proven 
extremely valuable for examining the above phenomenon from an historical 
  100 
perspective. It allows some distancing and completion of the rather narrow 
perspective that pervades many of the contemporary documents dealing with issues of 
human trafficking and human rights in the region. Human interaction, including 
extreme forms of exchange such as slavery – as part of a conflicting relationship or as 
a relatively common trade activity – can be considered a pre-existing condition to 
what is nowadays referred to as human trafficking, an activity deeply rooted in the 
local trade history. 
 
Figure 3: The Assemble Esclave shop in Dongxing. Somewhat curiously, in 2009, the 
proprietors of a newly-opened garment shop (a self-proclaimed ‘famous French brand’) on Guizhou 
Road, one of the main shopping streets of Dongxing, seemingly unwittingly chose for its name 
Assemble Esclave, which in French literally means – regardless of syntax errors – ‘gather slave’ 
(Grillot 2009) 
Facing Dongxing, Móng Cái city is a very active trading city where Chinese 
and Vietnamese goods are exchanged, thus restoring to this small port damaged by 
history its role of intermediary. Destroyed during the 1979 Sino-Vietnam war, Móng 
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Cái recovered its original position as an economic centre after the reopening of the 
frontier. The soldiers left, and locals who had relocated to nearby localities during the 
war slowly came back to benefit from Móng Cái’s promising future (Hutton 2000: 
264). Following Vietnam and China’s signing of various agreements on economic 
exchange (Hensengerth 2010), local people, along with recent migrants, have enjoyed 
at best, albeit unevenly, the available business opportunities in the newly-established 
districts for economic cooperation. Today, Móng Cái and Dongxing together 
constitute one of the areas known as cross-border economic cooperation districts 
officially named the ‘Dongxing - Móng Cái-Free Trade Zone’, strategic keys of 
regional economic development and transnational integration common to several 
countries in the Greater Mekong Subregion. Womack summarises the new 
configuration of this sea and land intersection, a symbol of cooperation between two 
previously warring brothers: 
The first is the Beilun River economic cooperation district. This district would 
include Dongxing and Móng Cái, with an area of approximately 1,000 sq. km and a 
population of 160,000. Dongxing and Móng Cái are the largest and closest pair of 
border port cities, separated only by the relatively narrow Beilun River. The cities lie 
on the coast of the Gulf of Tonkin. The terrain is level, the district covers a vast area, 
transportation on both land and the water is convenient, and the proposed district is 
rich with fresh water resources. The conditions are right for the creation and 
development of a truly international metropolitan area. … China and Vietnam attach 
great importance to constructing and developing the two cities, both of which were 
upgraded from town-to city-level administrative status in the late 1990s. The 
economies of both cities are developing quickly and they are being transformed by 
construction projects (Gu & Womack 2000: 1051-1052).  
In this context of openness, that has enhanced the activity and success of these 
Sino-Vietnamese border areas, display and evocation of historical legacies have 
become discreet so as to provide expression space for the official and somewhat 
overdone optimism, and to encourage new investor/actor involvement in this 
promising development. For example, the Sino-Vietnam Trade Network1, a Chinese 
                                                
1 http://www.sinoviet.com/sinoviet/index.shtml  
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website that reflects the official Chinese orientation, offers an enthusiastic vision of 
the potential economic activities of the Dongxing region, including the tourism 
industry. Official figures, however, tend to minimalise the diversity of businesses that 
thrive in Móng Cái, which mainly concern Chinese goods transiting from Dongxing. 
According to many local traders, the reality on the ground renders implausible any 
attempt to assess the quantity and value of the traded goods. A De, a Guangxi trader 
settled in Dongxing, volunteered the following: 
— Taxes are high on exportation to Vietnam. It is not worth to export our 
goods to Móng Cái through customs, especially for individual traders who sell 
low quality manufactured goods. Big companies have means to negotiate or to 
deal with taxes, but we don’t. Otherwise nobody would do business here and 
the city would not develop. So, all in all, it’s worthier to bribe the border 
guards we know to let the boats deliver our goods on the other side. A little 
money from here means a lot over there, they know how to take advantages 
from this business. Go further east along the Gelong River, you can see by 
yourself how active the shores become in the evening. 
Like many of his fellow traders, A De acknowledges that the majority of the 
clothing and home appliances sold at the central market of Móng Cái – a large and 
lofty hexagonal architectural structure along the river – is the result of smuggling. 
There, traders are mostly Chinese: many of the employees in their shops are young, 
bilingual Vietnamese women. The clients are mostly Vietnamese tourists passing 
through Móng Cái to shop, or sellers from neighbouring towns, who come to stock up 
with new supplies, mainly ‘affordable items’, a term that translates readily into cheap 
and poor quality goods. Just behind this market – the largest but not the only one in 
the city – lies the small port with its incessant comings and goings of boats filled with 
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sacks of goods that move between the two shores of the Gelong River, a tributary of 
the Beilun River that marks the border. Surveillance seems very lax: people conduct 
their business as if everything is perfectly legitimate as indeed it is in their eyes; that 
is, until a foreigner comes to take a closer to look at the river activities. Then, 
uniformed officials show themselves conspicuously. The dockers move away after 
being advised to leave. 
Business practices do not always endorse the extant regulations and generally 
do not welcome outsiders’ questions. In the past, I have witnessed discussions 
between newcomers and older traders wherein the latter have deliberately provided 
vague answers to curious enquiries in a way that sounded protective of certain 
unconventional practices. In their attempts to justify the extent of illegal trade in an 
economic zone which benefits from advantageous measures, the economic actors of 
Móng Cái and Dongxing easily evoke the high official tax that makes border trade 
less profitable when it is already becoming increasingly difficult to conduct due to 
escalating competition. But, they also blame the complexity of customs formalities 
and controls that unnecessarily slow down transactions. 
Hence, despite the display of official optimism and the state’s encouragement 
of border trade development, inequalities – in terms of nature, quality and quantity of 
goods – in the economic exchanges between China and Vietnam persist.  The ‘good 
old days’ of border opening periods and the trader pioneers of the 1990s seem to have 
vanished.  
Trade, tourism, and investment on both sides of the border area produced a 
golden era of high-speed development in the 1990s. However, the gold has not been 
distributed evenly on both sides of the border nor within each region. In general, the 
Chinese side has been developing more rapidly than the Vietnamese, and urban 
centres with national transportation links likewise are advancing more rapidly than 
relatively poor and isolated places (Gu & Womack 2000: 1053). 
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For many local commentators as well, China is taking advantage of 
Vietnamese resources more than the other way round (Eng 2000, Hai 2000). The local 
people deplore the fact that the local economy is already ‘running out of steam’, 
Chinese merchants' complaints are multiplying, traders’ financial difficulties are real 
– especially since the economic crisis of 2009 – and malls and factories under 
construction are conspicuously left unfinished. However, the impressive casino that 
the Chinese built in Móng Cái remains successful, according to local guides who 
often take their clients there. Groups of Chinese visit the region – the Vietnamese are 
not allowed to enter – to gamble because gambling and casinos are officially 
prohibited in China. Here, as well as in many border areas of the Greater Mekong 
Subregion (Van Schendel & Abraham 2005; Evans et al. 2000), parallel economies 
and illegal activities are flourishing. 
In Móng Cái, small business offers Vietnamese migrants some work 
opportunities. Many are young and single, from the province of Quàng Ninh and other 
provinces in Northeast Vietnam. Young men become carriers or motorcycle taxi 
drivers while women work as vendors in shops, markets or streets. Through their 
work, they often sustain their family economies, a situation that reflects the 
continuation of the proletarianisation of rural society in Northern Vietnam (Gironde 
2004). It is within this segment of the population that one may find young women 
who are likely to cross the border to become partners of Chinese men, either on 
arrival or after a period of professional activity that familiarises them with the frontier 
community. 
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 Lào Cai and Hekou: the shy and the audacious 
Hekou and Lào Cai share a similar status to that of the twin cities of Dongxing 
and Móng Cái, the former two having combined to establish an area called the ‘Hekou 
– Lào Cai economic cooperation district.’ The capital of the homonymous province of 
Lào Cai, Lào Cai city is somewhat small and peaceful: few travellers stopping to 
enjoy its sights; most simply pass through its railway and bus stations. The main 
attraction of Lào Cai is Sapa, a favourite destination of national and international 
tourism, famous for its landscape and human change of scene. As well, there is the 
casino,1 which primarily attracts Chinese customers who come to risk their fortunes. 
Destroyed during the brief but bloody border Sino-Vietnamese war in the winter of 
1979, the city has slowly rebuilt, supported by recent investment; but, it still seems to 
suffer from the departure of the majority of its Chinese community in 1978-1979, and 
its relative geographic isolation. There seems no doubt that Lào Cai has benefited 
economically from the opening of the border with China; but whereas new districts 
evidence large-scale investment, Lào Cai has not undergone the same dazzling 
transformation as its neighbour Hekou. The malls being built in the immediate 
vicinity of the bridge that leads to Hekou showcase Vietnamese products among 
which the famous Bitis2 sandals have become a symbol. Connected to Hanoi by rail 
and to neighbouring provinces by regular bus lines, Lào Cai still supports a large 
moving population. Thousands of migrants come to this city in search of jobs, 
especially jobs related to border trade. 
                                                
1 While the official Lào Cai city casino, the Lào-Cai International Casino, does not admit Vietnamese 
customers, it does not exclude the existence of private game venues. 
2 Bitis: a brand of Vietnamese shoes famous for its latex sandals. 
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A long bridge above the Nanxi River separates Lào Cai from Hekou. Located 
in the prefecture of Honghe, the town of Hekou occupies the downstream part of the 
Nanxi River, which feeds the Red River that runs into Vietnam.1 The area enjoyed its 
first substantial development during the nineteenth century economic exchanges 
between Vietnam and China. These exchanges accelerated at the beginning of the 
twentieth century with the activities of the French-built railway line that connected 
Hanoi with Kunming.2 Trade continued to grow thereafter, despite the conflict (the 
Independence War, the Vietnam War and the Sino-Vietnamese War) that regularly 
closed the border and prevented crossings throughout the twentieth century. The year 
1992 saw Hekou reopen to the outside world, officially becoming a transit port for 
international trade and an international border gate for travellers. Today, Hekou is a 
rather small city mainly dedicated to commerce. Thousands of migrants3 from inland 
provinces in China have settled there, hoping to make their fortunes from cross-border 
trade. Among them, many goods wholesalers come from the factory centres of 
Shenzhen, Guangdong, and Zhejiang. Hekou also welcomes individual traders, who 
specialise in ready-to-wear garments, groceries, catering, and low-range 
accommodation. Similar to Dongxing, a micro society has settled there over the last 
fifteen years, members of which engage in trade activities with the Vietnamese 
                                                
1 Hekou County shares 193 kilometres of border with the province of Lào Cai in Vietnam. 
2 Today, for security and profitability reasons, this line is no longer in service on its Chinese section for 
passengers, although it is still used for the carriage of goods (since 2003) from Kunming to the border. 
In Vietnam, the line remains very active between Hanoi and Lào Cai for transporting passengers. 
3 The second part of this chapter will provide a more precise picture of human settlement in Hekou. 
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merchants who flock daily or seasonally to Hekou to obtain supplies of manufactured 
goods which they find sell more cheaply in China1 than in Vietnam.  
Clothing, household appliances, bedding products in bamboo or fabrics, and 
building materials were all on display in dozens of shops measuring only a few square 
metres each. These shops, which line the main street and were devoted to wholesale 
trade in the south part of Hekou, constitute the visible part of the city’s business. The 
main streets and the bridge (China-Vietnam Highway Bridge) that indicate the border 
gate were constantly crowded with bikes and trailers loaded with goods carefully 
packed and mainly ridden/driven by women. Larger firms dealing with bigger 
customers (He 2003) dominated the remainder of the transactions. The city is divided 
quite clearly between the wholesaler districts, a small commercial zone, guest-house 
areas and the Vietnamese market, all of which surround the border gate area and the 
Red River, and two rather off-centre administrative and residential districts. 
Population movements remain important; nowadays, some 103 000 people officially 
live in Hekou County.2 This number includes the original inhabitants of the city, 
migrants from rural or urban localities of the county or Yunnan, and traders from 
further afield (cf. later in this chapter). There is also a Vietnamese community living 
in or operating there during the daytime: the people return to Vietnam in late evening 
                                                
1 It is important to note that compared to the average quality of this product category available in other 
Chinese cities, goods sold in Hekou are of very average, even bad quality. Chinese traders argue that 
they are “appropriate to the limited budget of Vietnamese customers.” Therefore, the local market 
tends to sell unmarketable stock – the results of the bankruptcy of factories, for example - or already 
out-dated items in inner China, notably from the East Coast, where all modes are created. 
2  Official statistics: Hekou Economic and Social Development Report 2007 (source: 
http://www.chinaknowledge.com/Business/CityInfo/City.aspx?Region=Western & City=Hekou); 
http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/红河哈尼族彝族自治州; 
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and come back early the next morning. These persons are mobile and cooperate with 
the Chinese business owners as carriers, money exchangers, and street-vendors selling 
Vietnamese fruits, drinks or snacks. Some live in Hekou illegally under the rather 
indulgent eye of the local authorities. Finally, there is the visible presence of hundreds 
of young Vietnamese prostitutes living mainly in the small brothels on the second 
floor of the Vietnamese market, brothels like Lien’s ‘hair salon.’  
Hekou is host to a heterogeneous population that originates from diverse 
ethnic, regional and social backgrounds. As in most cities of recent migration in 
China, traders opt to gather according to their province of origin; the Vietnamese, on 
the other hand, are found in their ‘street headquarters’: a cheap restaurant, a 
refreshment stall, shaded spaces at strategic crossroads and the main market. Every 
community benefits from a shared historical heritage and enjoys a specific degree of 
interaction with others. This, in turn, influences neighbourly relations and cooperation 
while at the same time maintaining mutual perceptions, the specific impact of which 
is probably underestimated in analyses of border phenomena (cf. Chapter 4). 
Although these four cities, i.e., Dongxing, Móng Cái, Hekou and Lào Cai 
share a lot in common in terms of economic and social settings, I have acquired 
distinct knowledge of each of them regarding my research topic. In Dongxing, I 
learned more about identity issues, cases of trafficked women, and the viewpoints of 
local residents on migration trends. Irrespective of whether they were local Chinese or 
Vietnamese, all of these people seemed to me to have blended into each other’s 
communities, regardless of the border line. In Móng Cái, compared to other fieldwork 
sites, cross-border marriages were easy to identify among traders and translators, and 
tales about trafficked Vietnamese women were equally easy to collect. In Hekou, 
where I spent a comparatively longer time, I became familiar with cross-border 
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trading practices. Through conversations with economic actors, I came to realise how 
controversial social representations on cross-border marriages were heavily spread in 
public discourse. I was not successful in establishing a network of informants in Lào 
Cai: I found very few cases of mixed couples, people were reluctant to talk, and I 
believe I was to some degree monitored. As regards this sensitive topic, this city was 
probably the most secretive of the four sites. Yet, Lào Cai provided a perspective on 
the stigma attached to Vietnamese women, who cross the line between trading and 
marrying Chinese. Also, I sensed the Vietnamese authorities’ weight on the 
communities. I want to stress that all of these perceptions are solely mine. Even 
though they do not reflect the actual realities of the four cities, they show how 
complex these realities are to apprehend and explain how my initial research interest 
has slowly changed over months of encounters. 
 
Spaces of exception and sites for imagination 
A whole series of comparisons would be necessary to account for the magical powers 
proper names enjoy. They seem to be carried as emblems by the travellers they direct and 
simultaneously decorate (de Certeau 1984: 104).  
Borderlands are renowned for providing work opportunities and creative 
spaces for ambitious people. Vietnam and China are no exception. Their border towns 
continue to attract those who find themselves caught between two periods of their 
lives: “I decided to come here just to see what I could do;” “My friend told me there 
were many opportunities here, many needs to fulfil for new customers, so I came to 
study the market;” and, “I had nothing to do in my home-town, unemployment is 
everywhere, I heard about border-trade and I thought I could give it a try.” And, while 
these spaces are perceived as spaces of transition at the edge of the possible, they are 
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rarely considered/foreseen as sites of permanent stay. They can simply be stopovers 
for many yearning individuals. But, for many others, the image of flexibility that 
borderlands project encompasses blurrier and darker aspects. As regards Lào Cai 
province, for example, Sarah Turner notes how “[f]or some young upland residents in 
Vietnam, the border has become a rather terrifying linear entity, … they fear being 
smuggled and sold” (2010a: 269). In effect, places such as Hekou and Dongxing 
inspire: they appeal and give rise to fear and suspicion; but, they also offer hope and 
ambition despite all the uncertainties that emerge from contradictory accounts and 
popular representations (cf. Chapter 4) as well as economic circumstances. 
Nevertheless, despite the on-going difficulties encountered when attempting to 
establish harmonious economic exchanges between China and Vietnam, the 
attractiveness that border towns represent for investors, migrant workers, and tourists 
invariably contributes to creating a unique social space. Lào Cai, Hekou, Móng Cái 
and Dongxing have become attractions mainly because they are evolving rapidly. 
Their development benefits from the special official attention reflected in specific 
local policies and promising investments. At the peoples’ level, they represent a 
certain transitional space wherein one would spend some extra time during a trip, 
would work in for a certain period of time prior to departing for another place, or 
would transit to move from one country to another and from one village to another, 
even from one life to another. One always comes back to these places because they 
become benchmarks in the course of individuals’ trajectories. The cities’ residents not 
only become observers of the daily movements of people: they participate in their 
orientation, their integration, and their perceptions. Locals and passers-by coexist, 
gather information, communicate and exchange. 
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Thus, symbolically and concretely, border towns represent a more or less 
sustainable transition zone for their residents, liminal places where choices are made. 
Situated as they are between a ‘before’ and an ‘after’, they are sites of movement and 
instability, which frame and echo the life trajectories of cross-border couples, 
particularly those of Vietnamese spouses. At the time of our meetings, the majority of 
those who confided in me vis-à-vis their experiences were in just such a state of 
transition, in a more or less sustainable way. They were positioned between two 
women or two men, an ‘already lived’ and a ‘soon to live and enjoy’ life that gave 
their testimonies a particular psychological dimension, closely linked to the unique 
spaces they occupied. 
 Luan: a chaotic nature 
The conception of the world by the temporary or regular residents of the above 
four cities was very specifically articulated. It illustrated how a seemingly 
insignificant place conveys a whole range of concepts and reveals an even larger set 
of ideas, prospects and symbols. For example, according to those who visit Hekou, 
the little city can variously suggest pleasure, Otherness, business opportunities, 
freedom or chaos, insecurity, boredom, abnormality or stalemate reaching. 
Viewpoints easily emerged in conversations between the ‘experienced’ and the 
‘ignorant.’ The local residents’ comments on the perceptions of the newcomers often 
captured this contradiction. In the next section, focus is upon the widespread notion of 
luan [chaotic] that defines borderlands in general according to observers and local 
residents. 
Wang Tao is 40 years old and has lived in Hekou for twelve years. A tattooist 
by profession, he runs a parlour on the second floor of the Vietnamese market. He 
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also runs a shop on the ground floor where he sells a whole panoply of soldier/camper 
equipment ranging from army knives to training uniforms, swords and army shoes. 
This is where a local acquaintance introduced him to me. Wang Tao, a native of 
Kunming, arrived in Hekou at the age of 21. Already involved in a gems business in 
Kunming, he had spent some time in South Vietnam trading rubies. Wang started to 
expound a cogent point of view about the instability of local cross-border marriages 
and the lack of genuine feelings between partners, an eventuation he illustrated with 
his own case. He has had two Vietnamese wives. The first one stayed with him for 
seven years, followed him to Hô Chi Minh ville, and bore him a daughter who he has 
not seen for years. Soon after their dispute and separation, he met his second wife, a 
30 years old Hanoi native who had also lived in Hekou for twelve years. She was 
engaged to him for nine years and bore him a son. Neither relationship was 
documented. Wang did not feel very satisfied with his second wife: he could not 
guarantee that she would stay with him. “I have already said to my wife: ‘If you ever 
feel unhappy, you can go!’ You know, I have seen so many Chinese men being 
cheated.” 
The evening we first met, Wang Tao offered me a few insights into his 
relationship with his Vietnamese wife. But, he was happy to divert our conversation 
from the uncomfortable sphere of private life to a more inspiring topic when I 
provided him with what was intended as a nonchalant comment1 about Hekou after he 
asked me what I thought of the place: 
                                                
1 I have often used this ploy during conversations to stimulate people’s confidence. After I noticed how 
Hekou’s residents complain about their city, I intentionally gave them straightforward comments (good 
or bad) so as to provoke a debate and find out more about each object of complaint. 
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— [me] Hekou is so small, there is nothing much to do here [as a visitor]: it is 
far from everywhere and it looks quite chaotic. 
— You’re right, this place looks small but believe me, Hekou is a place where 
a lot is going on. You just can’t see it. When you have spent a certain time 
here, you will understand. In fact I could tell you many things about this place. 
I once had the idea of writing a book about it, you could help me doing this; I 
could tell you so many stories. It’s very complicated. 
I expressed my interest in knowing more about his insights into Hekou and he 
enthusiastically agreed to meet me another evening to talk. This conversation took 
place while we were sitting on plastic chairs on the busy sidewalk facing his shop at 
the bottom of the Vietnamese market. One of his friends was listening and I noticed 
him nodding ironically. Surprisingly – or maybe not surprisingly? – I was never to 
meet Wang Tao again, despite my calls and two failed attempts to arrange an informal 
meeting. I also passed by his shop several times during my numerous stays in Hekou 
but never managed to see him again. Was it a coincidence or not? Was he warned to 
avoid revealing too much to a foreigner, possibly a journalist? Notwithstanding, I 
found it quite strange that he suddenly seemed to have disappeared completely when 
his enthusiasm to provide material for my ethnography had sounded totally genuine to 
me. As I did not want to draw too much attention to myself or land him in trouble, I 
decided to stop insisting and resorted to fantasising about the fascinating account he 
could have offered me of his adopted city. As is the case with many other border 
spaces in the region, Hekou is run by various economic flows, including money, sex 
and all forms of smuggling. Officially, it is ruled as any other place in China; but, in 
reality, power relations are much more ambiguous on the margins of the state 
(Horstmann & Wadley 2006) and create a liminal space where, in the words of Wang 
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Tao, “everything can happen, everything can be found, everything is possible.” This 
range of possibilities is articulated by the frequent use of the Chinese word luan. In 
the Chinese language, luan has a large range of meanings depending upon the context, 
the moral values that locators adopt, and the acknowledgement or experience of actual 
facts. It is usually translated as ‘chaotic’, ‘full of disorder’, and/or ‘instability’, with 
the embedded suggestion that this combination disturbs the general well-being of 
society since the tools of control are corrupted. Zhang notes how the term luan has 
almost become the definition of Hekou. She explores this notion in the context of 
openness of borderlands. 
I evoke the notion of luan […] and argue that its tension, disorder and chaos render it 
kaifang [openness]’s irreducible double. Just like kaifang is an ambivalent yet 
powerful force of production, luan does not take on any concrete form and derives its 
potency through ambivalence. As kaifang is exalted to be a process that enables 
renewal and self-improvement, luan always follows as its shadow that threatens to 
jeopardize every progress. In other words, luan is kaifang’s inchoate Other, 
generating both fear and desire of domination through its ambivalence. To give luan 
any corporeality or concrete form (e.g. crime, illegal offence) is to immediately 
reduce it to something ‘known’ and potentially manageable. Because of its 
incorporeality, luan always remains ‘unknown,’ ‘unseen’ and refuses to be 
categorized. It thus becomes an object of paranoia, which at once incites even 
stronger desire of domination (Zhang 2011: 255). 
Luan thus represents the exact opposite of the ideal harmony that (Chinese) 
society is seeking to live in; furthermore, as a colloquial term, it also expresses a 
popular fear of disorder. It is an easy yet blurred description, one that allows 
avoidance of explanation: everyone is supposed to understand what it means. At the 
national level, it generally refers to the state of Chinese society since the reforms and 
the tremendous consequent social changes that have been imposed (Yan 2009). It 
generally encompasses public complaints and grievances that cannot be expressed 
openly. Nowadays, saying that a place is luan is implicitly criticising a lack of state 
engagement in resolving social issues. Furthermore, in the border context, luan 
characterises the recent evolution that remote places like Hekou or Dongxing have 
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experienced additional to that which the whole of Chinese society has had to endure 
in the process of ‘modernization.’ Among these problems we find population growth, 
business insecurity, safety issues, uncontrolled transactions and behaviour, Chinese 
mafia, prostitution, the involvement of local authorities in illegal activities, general 
corruption, and absence of physical or legal protection, to name but a few. As A Luo 
once said: “Shenmeyang de ren dou you [there are all sorts of people].” Outsiders are 
the first to attract blame: people often emphasise how borderlands supposedly attract 
social margins from everywhere. In this environment of anxiety, some individuals are 
referred to as hunzi or xiao hunhun, depreciative colloquial terms widely used locally 
to embody the luan state: their significance ranges from ‘small fry’, ‘petty thief’ to 
‘vagrant’ and ‘dropout.’ But, derogatory meanings hide beyond concrete forms of 
chaos – an ‘incorporeality’ that newcomers are usually left to find out empirically.  
During the first days of my stay in Hekou and Dongxing, people kept asking 
me what business I was engaged in there, a question to which I could only reply 
“none” and then briefly explain my research interest. When my interlocutors realised 
that most of the time I was alone, they issued warnings about the luan nature of 
border places where I should better not go unaccompanied: “Don’t go out at night, 
don’t carry your bag this way, avoid the Vietnamese market, beware the river-side in 
the evenings.” These pieces of advice were exactly the same as those given to me by 
various people in China over the last decade. Wherever I was staying, when people 
realised that I was travelling by myself, they issued these warnings. However, in 
Hekou and Dongxing, these words of warning were often illustrated with vivid 
examples of dramas, accidents or acknowledged issues that all reflected the residents’ 
daily experiences, common fears and imagined dangers that they wished to share with 
passersby rather than actual disturbances. The reality is that both Hekou and 
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Dongxing are tourist gates and international trading zones where security issues 
remain a major concern of the local authorities. However, what was not described in 
such detailed terms were the reasons for such a reputation. When asked “Why is this 
place luan? How different is it from elsewhere?” embarrassed answers tried to 
disguise the real features and activities of the city that could generate all sorts of 
disorders. “Nevertheless, just be cautious…” would generally close the debate before 
people later became more explicit. Whereas in other places, discussion surrounding 
rulers’ lack of ability to guarantee the safety of a place would be debated, one could 
feel that in Hekou and Dongxing this was not just a security problem but a let-it-be if 
not an intentional state policy that should not be interfered with. The cities’ existence 
actually relies on such an absence of strict control of every aspect of people’s life and 
activities. Reality slowly emerged through casual conversations with locals, 
observations and understanding of individual trajectories. 
 Underground activities 
As in most cities in China, it is not unusual to observe public walls covered 
with inscriptions. It is generally admitted that these indicate the degree of corruption 
of the local authorities as well as the scale of the black market. In Hekou in particular, 
this could not be truer. Phone numbers connect those who are willing to take the risk 
of dealing in all sorts of illegal transactions: credit, ‘black’ [smuggled] cars, fake 
certificates and permits, guns, drugs, prostitutes, even virginal women. Along the 
banks of the Red River, on every public and any remote portion of wall that can catch 
the eye, hundreds of numbers and temptations overlay each other, inducing a strange, 
mixed feeling about the place. A Min, a young smuggler who shared his time between 
his brothel and poker sessions in the tea-houses along the Red River shore, explained 
to me the underground market system: 
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Figure 4: Looking for a virgin or a prostitute? Call 134*** (Grillot 2009) 
— If you want, let’s say, a gun, you just call one of these numbers. The person 
you deal with will first make sure that you are a serious buyer. It’s a process. 
Then, when you both agree on item and price, you are asked to deposit money 
in a bank account. Only when money is received, the gun will be discreetly 
delivered. There’s a high risk of being cheated, but some people are ready for 
that and they feel thrilled by all these opportunities. You can find anything 
here… 
 
Figure 5: The signs indicating illicit forms of trade in Hekou have recently been painted over 
(Grillot 2010) 
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I had already noticed elsewhere that within the space of a day all of these 
numbers would be painted over with thick layers of grey paint, clearly demonstrating 
that something shameful needed to be hidden. Special attention was given to the main 
roads’ sidewalls; but, the back streets were left untouched. A Min explained that:  
— When officials come from above [district or provincial level authorities], 
the city needs to offer a healthy face of successful economic development. 
Roads will be carefully cleaned, brothels will be advised to close. Everyone 
will pretend that the city is ‘clean.’ 
To me this illustrated the Chinese concern for ‘saving face.’ One could see the 
obvious traces of the phone numbers on the wall, roughly covered by layers of grey or 
light yellow paint. Everyone knew what was underneath, but the face of the city was 
saved due to the effort made by the authorities to erase all evidence of illicit activity.  
 
Figure 6: A rather strange statement from the propaganda bureau in Hekou: “Secrecy is to 
ensure safety/security and development” (Grillot 2010) 
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This concept of moral cleanliness, however, was if anything ideological, as 
illustrated by slogans on large red banners that hung high over the streets calling for 
economic development, defence of the frontiers, the elimination of feifa [illegal] acts 
and the promotion of daode [social morality] in the city. But, the banners were only a 
public reflection of what the authorities wanted to convey – of what the local 
propaganda bureau sought to create; that is, an invented image of their border cities fit 
for consumption by outsiders’ eyes. This all occurred on a different level from that 
upon which real action was taken, far from the centre’s scrutiny, by both the 
population and the power holders. My personal impression was that illegal activities, 
along with calls for their banishment, resulted in nothing but the general apathy of 
borderlands residents towards these matters.  
Another intriguing feature of Hekou, a supposedly dynamic trading city, was 
the constant presence of idle (mostly) men and women, who spent their time playing 
mah-jong or cards in small, private, open places dedicated to games found in almost 
every street, in the tea houses and small spaces rented along the river.1 More than just 
a leisure activity widely encountered in Southwest China, this public expression of 
relative idleness suggested that some of the city’s inhabitants relied upon easy 
incomes derived from profitable businesses.  
                                                
1 However, when I last visited Hekou in September 2010, most of these places along the Red River had 
just been moved away. The city developers were building a long row of shops along the riverbank and 
renovating the ground, depriving locals of the natural scenery and of the convivial spaces where they 
used to gather for tea, cards and a chat.  
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Figure 7: Along the Red River in Hekou: Mah-jong spaces facing Vietnam (Grillot 2009). 
Most of these players, people said, were landlords of Hekou’s buildings. The 
majority of the original city-dwellers chose to rent their properties to migrant traders 
since the demand for rental properties had increased in tandem with the economic 
development of the city. According to my informants, these Hekou residents did not 
need to work: they could spend their time gambling their easily-earned incomes on 
games. Initially I found it difficult to verify to what extent these allegations were 
reliable; but, discussions with some of the idle tended to confirm the impression that 
landlords counted among the luckiest people in the city. But, the players, tea drinkers 
and chatting street observers themselves were representative of a somewhat unusual 
image of businessmen. In Hekou, trade is essentially with Vietnam. As the locals 
explained me: “You don’t have to worry or do much: clients call or come to order 
goods, they come and pick them up, transport them to Vietnam, and all you have to do 
is make sure the process is smooth.” However, others were much more secretive 
about the activities they engaged in. They mentioned irregular trading, the uncertainty 
of current market trends, and alluded to the specificities of border-trade to explain 
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their lack of precision: “I sell what’s on demand. If my Vietnamese clients suddenly 
need this or that, I will manage to find some and sell [it to] them. I adjust to new trade 
directions; I can do different things every year.” Many so-called ‘businessmen’ were 
actually intermediaries between a Vietnamese clientele with whom they were familiar 
and networks of suppliers from Yunnan. They helped the latter to sell stocks or 
surplus. Cell-phones constituted their main working tools; and, once their networks 
were well established on both sides of the border, and as long as they kept an eye or 
an ear on the most recent good bargains, almost everything could be achieved while 
playing cards with fellow players. In this way, the traders made themselves easy to 
find, to deal with and to socialise with. But, even some of my best acquaintances in 
Hekou seemingly remained confused regarding the content of their business activities, 
referring to the economic crisis that had tremendously impacted upon their affairs, 
and explaining that they might have to change their options… without clarifying the 
precise nature of said options. Although this lack of transparency may have worked to 
veil the actual dealing difficulties some traders had to contend with, the tendency to 
remain silent and vague vis-à-vis the kind of business they were actually engaged in 
was common among Hekou’s economic actors, especially among those in the 
informal parts of the sector. Two main reasons account for this: the prevalence of 
smuggling and the parallel major economic activity of prostitution. A comment one 
hears repeatedly regarding the city’s dynamism suggests that “everyone is involved to 
a certain degree with one or the other of these lucrative incomes’ generators.” 
In the pornographic city – the glittering and horrible spatial hallucination [that] smut 
creates – no one is unscathed. All spaces are fouled, all who touch are tainted. The 
pornographic city is a bacchanal of illegality, wrongdoing, unjust consumerism, 
waste, corruption, immorality, despoiling, human uncaring, unkindness, frustration 
and criminal waste. Husbands get drunk and have sex with other women. Good 
women are turned out as prostitutes. Sexually transmitted diseases pose a chronic 
danger. Undisciplined children terrorize their parents. […] A bleary, indistinct or 
luminal kind of specialty, the pornographic city is repetitive, violent and brutal; its 
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social imaginary is all about theft of virtue, duping, tricksters and cheats, human 
inability to survive the chaotic environment (Barlow 2005: 190). 
The above depiction of the pornographic city in Barlow’s account of smut 
readings in China could very well apply to what a border town like Hekou inspires in 
many of its residents and visitors, the main difference being that smut readings, as a 
source of narrative, are replaced with daily encounters with traded sexuality and 
deviant economic activities in a more mundane way than in the imagined smut city. In 
many ways, it is this particular atmosphere that makes Hekou a border gate and 
liminal space. 
 Prostitution 
The diversity of the population makes borderland society luan: the 
unpredictable nature of the relationships between individuals is defined as luan; and, 
even intimate life suffers from this pervasive atmosphere. In Hekou, luan also infers 
the city’s highly sexualised environment. Prostitution is illegal in China; yet, it is 
found in every corner of the country, in more or less disguised forms, usually 
practiced by Chinese and foreign women. Regular venues for this activity include 
hotels, massage parlours, hair salons, discotheques and Karaoke bars. Hekou is a 
place devoted to business, any kind of business. So, one could expect, given the 
acknowledged link between business, entertainment and the sex industries in China 
(Liu 2002; Zheng 2006, 2009; Jeffreys 2004), that Hekou would be a place where 
sexual consumption is included as a feature of local trade. But, as one Hekou resident 
explained, it is not so much the case that business supports prostitution but that 
prostitution actually supports business. It does not just help it to flourish. This is the 
difference between a regular city in China and this little border town. As A Wei, a 
trader from Hunan observed: 
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— Who would like to come so far, in such a remote place, make a ten hours’ 
trip from Kunming to end up in such an insignificant place? Who would do 
that, just to learn in the end [from business fellows] that Vietnamese traders 
are not that efficient, are hardly trusted, and that business is not easy to make, 
if a certain compensation was not offered on the spot for those who consider 
making the effort to invest time and money here? That is the real success trade 
in Hekou: sex industry is the only thing that drives men to come and 
eventually settle here. No one will tell you that frankly but I know this place. 
Believe me, brothels are the real support of international trade here (emphasis 
added).  
As A Wei suggested, while locals rarely concede to outsiders that the core of 
the local economy is prostitution, many suggest that tourism, as well as moral and 
legal flexibility, allow its continuous spread (Chan 2005a). Sex is, as with many 
adventures and entertainment activities in China, something that can be experienced 
in groups. The search for suitable opportunities, the renting of rooms and the sexual 
interaction itself are more than often a shared enterprise. I have witnessed male 
brothel customers arriving in groups of two or three, choosing girls from one or two 
salons, and going ‘upstairs’ together where intercourse would be engaged in on-site. 
Because I have stayed in one of the many little guesthouses nearby the Vietnamese 
market, where rooms are not particularly isolated from each other, on occasion I heard 
customers (two or three men at one time) renting the room facing mine, where they 
would pass a whole night with two or three prostitutes. At any time of the night, these 
men’s sexual activities were far from inhibited or discreet. They talked loudly, turned 
on the television (either from habit, or to avoid the discomfort that silence can create 
between unfamiliar partners, or to ‘drown out’ personal noise), made phone calls, 
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flirted loquaciously with their exotic companions, took showers, and all of this 
sometimes without even considering to fully close the ‘bedroom’ door. This very 
ordinary behaviour not only demonstrated how Hekou’s population (the owners of 
guest-houses, for example) and prostitution’s actors (prostitutes and clients) 
approached this illicit business, but also attested to assumptions regarding the 
openness of any visitor to and customer of these places wherein sexual activity is 
openly engaged in (Grillot forthcoming). In a similar way, staying overnight in 
Hekou, engaging in border trade or chatting with Lien about her new business as if it 
were a garment shop, implicitly required some – often feigned – degree of tolerance. 
In reality, this whole situation did not disturb me personally. And, I knew that 
showing signs of discomfort or disapproval at some point would probably have 
limited my access to these places. So, I adopted an attitude of general indifference 
towards the activity. Many unusual activities occur in Hekou, and prostitution is one 
of them. The indifference that people tended to exhibit in public spaces implied that 
“everything is just normal,” even though some informants confided in me that, in fact, 
they did not approve of such displays of luan – in the sense of immorality – and had 
to overlook their inner feelings regarding prostitution in the interests of their business. 
As far as I was concerned, visiting Lien’s brothel on a regular basis implied a certain 
position that was sometimes questioned by those who saw me there.  First of all, 
brothels (especially their impressive numbers) did not reflect a positive image of 
Hekou. And, since being a foreigner implied that I would take home certain 
impressions of the city, people hoped that they would be more flattering. Second, in 
the views of many of my acquaintances in Hekou, the Vietnamese market was not a 
suitable place for a foreign woman: it was a site of lust and shame, translated by their 
frequent use of the words zang [dirty], luan [chaotic] or simply bu hao [not good] 
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when referring to the marketplace. And, since I was neither engaged in any particular 
action to change the situation (I was neither a social worker nor an NGO activist, nor 
was I conducting research into this activity), there was a certain incompatibility 
between these regular visits to people widely despised for exploiting young women 
and my claimed concerns for Vietnamese women’s wellbeing. For my friends, herein 
lay a certain contradiction. But, the mere fact that most of the prostitution venues 
involved Vietnamese women only discharged Chinese people from feeling too 
concerned: hence their tolerance. In sum, due to this somewhat overt tolerance of lust, 
my ‘moral’ position – as it appeared from outside – as well as that of Hekou’s 
population, remained equally ambivalent in many ways.  
On a metaphorical level, border towns represent the margins of both societies 
and countries in terms of politico-economic and social practices. At the individual 
level, these social spaces symbolise close access to the foreign, to the elsewhere, the 
unknown, the border of conventionality, the limits of conjugality, the no-man’s land; 
in sum, the liminal space. In a very significant way, Hekou and Dongxing are 
separated from their twin cities in Vietnam by two rivers1 on the banks of which both 
local authorities have decided to create leisure spots, grassy areas, and walking paths 
so that people may enjoy the scenery. Visitors spend time observing and commenting 
on the ‘other sides’’ activities, their degree of economic development, their 
infrastructure performance, all observations drawn from the mere landscape and 
human sights they can actually view – or their imaginings – of the other side’s 
activities. Hence, most of the local guides canvass for clients on these riverbanks 
which are considered perfect spots for enhancing people’s imagination and igniting 
their spirit of adventure.  
                                                
1 The Beilun River in Dongxing and the Red River in Hekou. 
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        Figure 8: Chinese guides waiting for customers near the bridge that separates Hekou from Lào Cai 
Mr Guo was one such guide. When he was not accompanying his clients, he 
spent his days around Hekou’s border gate, waiting for phone calls, chatting with 
tourists, and selling fantasies to potential clients who he approached for a trip to 
Vietnam: “Qu bu qu Yuenan [do you want to go to Vietnam]?” One day, as he 
watched the Vietnamese bank of the Red River while we sat sipping coffee together at 
our favourite ‘street-refreshment-stall’, Mr Guo described his activities as follows: 
— Do you see the Casino over there? A Chinese from Malaysia built it. It’s 
only for Chinese customers, because Vietnamese people are not allowed to 
enter. Many Chinese laoban [boss] go there to play their money, they don’t 
need [a] passport, they toudou [cross the border illegally]. I can arrange [a] 
boat for them. I also take them to Sapa to have fun. You can find foreign 
prostitutes there: Japanese, Korean, and Russian. They are all available. I 
know where to find them because you don’t see them in the street. You can 
order kuaican [fastfood: a ‘short pass’], guoye [whole night] or baoyue [a one 
month reservation: rent a woman for a month]. People are very open-minded 
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in Sapa. I sometimes follow my clients for two or three days and then we 
come back. The price of a pass with a foreign woman is around 600 to 700 
yuan [around 60-70 euros in 2010]. But, I need to be careful because 
prostitution in Vietnam is very tightly controlled. It’s less flexible than in 
China. 
The first time Mr Guo talked about foreign prostitutes in Sapa, he mentioned 
French women. I have been visiting this Vietnamese hill-station regularly since 1993 
and even though I have observed significant changes due to the development of 
tourism activities there, including the growing number of foreign tourists and a 
corresponding rise in prostitution activities (Michaud & Turner 2006), I have never 
encountered or heard about ‘foreign women’ – i.e., European – engaging in sexual 
services in Sapa. On numerous occasions, Chinese people in Hekou emphasised the 
high numbers of French people living in Sapa. However, many of these people had 
never actually been to Sapa, or had only been once. In addition, they were not 
sufficiently familiar with western languages or physical features to be able to 
accurately distinguish a French person from a German or a Swede, for example. But, 
as Sapa was a former French resort during the colonial period – a well-known fact – 
and has retained some architectural legacies from the past, this shortcut to identity 
was easy to take. Many residents in Hekou assume, given the high number of Western 
people visiting Sapa and the regular presence of those who actually live there, that the 
French are back in Vietnam.1 Hence, narratives about French women selling their 
                                                
1 On various occasions, people asked my acquaintances ‘Is she Vietnamese?’ not that I looked Asian or 
Chinese but because I looked ‘foreign’ and the closest ‘foreign space’ was Vietnam, a place where 
population is imagined to be very diverse due to its colonial and migration history. 
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bodies in Sapa are easy-to-sell fantasies1 to those adventurous albeit naïve Chinese 
bosses, who are discovering the place without proper knowledge of it. The thought of 
sleeping with an allegedly ‘French woman’ may have a more significant impact upon 
men than sleeping with women of other ethnicities – ‘Russian women’, the ‘poor yet 
beautiful westerners’ for example – but, the term ‘French’ certainly embodies 
meanings of status and hierarchy that are worthy of their esteem. As Zhang writes: 
The ‘yellow’ man’s masculine potency is revitalized and embodied in their cash 
power and foreign women’s willing submission to their desire. But it was precisely 
this excessive style that the ‘yellow’ man needs to demonstrate that betrays his 
vulnerability and paranoia that his self-esteem and power might not be recognized or 
desired (Zhang 2011: 298). 
Crossing a border to spend money on entertainment activities is also a way for 
Chinese tourists or businessmen to show their economic power, especially in a 
country they evaluate in terms of its economic backwardness and alleged cultural 
reliance on China. In the Chinese gaze, enjoying Vietnamese women’s company, 
exploiting Vietnam’s resources, and enhancing cultural and economic hierarchy with 
contemptuous behaviour during interactions with Vietnamese people (Chan 2005a) 
has become a metaphorical way of re-exercising a powerful influence over a former 
suzerain. In Southeast Asia, each person – and by extension each power-holder and 
entity such as a site or country – is positioned according to a given hierarchy ruled 
and sustained by the elder-younger principle (Condominas 1983). This principle 
governs general relationships between Chinese and Vietnamese and will have strong 
implications for the rapport established between mixed couples, a subject I will 
                                                
1 The presence of foreign prostitutes in borderlands seems to be taken for granted. On several occasions 
during my visits to Lien’s brothel, some of her regular customers asked ‘Is she a new girl” and 
insinuated some propositions. They were surprised to see me not because I was a foreigner but because 
they did not know that Lien proposed ‘special’ girls. 
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examine later in Chapter 5. The dominating relationship briefly alluded to in the 
tourism and prostitution fields also finds illustration not only in the ways in which 
many Chinese people behave with their Vietnamese neighbours, but also in the 
reducing process of subjecting people to narrow stereotyping. 
 
2 Residents: old and new migrants 
We may describe a borderland as a zone or region within which lies an international 
border and a borderland society as a social and cultural system straddling that border (van 
Schendel 2005: 44, original emphasis). 
Who are the people who live in the border areas nowadays, especially on the 
Chinese side of the Sino-Vietnamese frontier? What make these border-gates specific 
in terms of residency and of involved human activities? In order to understand how 
they have become the active but ambiguous places they are recognised as today, it is 
important to trace the nature of the different waves of migrants, who constitute the 
roots of the contemporary population. 
 
Transition spaces for people in transition 
In the introduction to their edited volume on Southeast Asian borderlands, 
Horstmann and Wadley highlight the difficulty they encountered when attempting to 
define ‘borderlands’ in the region: 
Rather than assigning a definitive character to border landscapes in Southeast Asia, 
the empirical assumption underlying our research is the border’s inherent ambiguity. 
… In these places, where identity and culture are vague and shifting, local powers 
and social forces negotiate national intimacy, which may either fragment or become 
reinforced (Horstmann &Wadley 2006: 7). 
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The urban residents of the particular setting which I will now describe were 
mainly members of the Kinh and Han ethnic groups. Although the collected data 
presented in this study reflect the situation of mixed couples living in border towns, 
many of the informants I met there actually came from rural areas where they had 
lived for years during their childhoods, early adult lives or former marital 
arrangements. Thus, an urban setting will not necessarily condition the nature of the 
sample of population studied because migrants composed most of it. But, those living 
in the borderlands share a few other features besides belonging to a shifting 
population. 
In Southeast Asia, often the most vulnerable local minorities are found in border 
regions, and in those remote corners the politics of homogenization play out in terms 
of language, religion, and way of life. Border regions have developed highly specific 
cultures, with things as they are because of the border (Horstmann & Wadley 2006: 
7, original emphasis). 
Drawing upon Horstmann and Wadley’s conceptualisation of border space 
‘cultures’, I suggest that Hekou and Dongxing are imbued with particular 
characteristics that make them special in many senses. As far as their populations are 
concerned, these cities have indeed become the repositories of vulnerable people; but, 
rather than limiting this population to minority groups as the authors suggest, I 
include people who may be temporarily vulnerable, who are in a transitional state and 
who yearn to change their status. As I will explore further in Chapter 6, many of the 
male and female migrants inhabiting the borderlands initially had no specific plan in 
mind. They sometimes gravitated towards border towns in an attempt to find 
serendipity. In such cases, they often had little social capital to lose and were ready to 
experiment with anything that could help to position them both in life and their 
particular societies. The specific culture that is developing in border spaces is not only 
a ‘product’ of minorities in the ethnic and political sense as suggested by Horstmann 
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and Wadley, but also in the social sense. The way of life pursued in these regions, 
especially in the border towns, attracts those looking for exoticism and serendipity. 
As most of my informants stated when attempting to define borderlands, they are 
“places where everything is possible. But during the adaptation process, with little 
support and mainly dependent upon their networking skills, migrants remain 
vulnerable. Hence, border gates such as Dongxing and Hekou represent not only a 
passage for the physical, but also, in the abstract sense of the term, going to the border 
symbolises a certain passage from one state to another in the course of a life. This 
form of temporary stopover can be defined as a liminal space-time between two 
countries where one encounters flows of diverse and moving populations, who 
activate individual projects. In these experimental sites, migrants endeavour to 
implement projects and potentially to prosper; they can challenge one’s capacities and 
skills and invent a life, processes that could prove more difficult to invent elsewhere.  
However, for those who have nowhere else to go, these places might serve as 
shelters. Border areas are inevitably places where individuals end up when their 
situations prove to be fragile on both sides of the frontier. These spaces offer them 
some flexibility of movement, action and meeting in an incomparably extended way. 
Individuals attempt to blend into the anonymity of moving and active peoples, who 
use these spaces for their own economic development (prosperity) and for social 
emancipation. It is here that people come to see, to try, to enquire, to experiment: it is 
here that they end up scarred with uncertainty, crisis or failure from a former 
existence in their original hometowns. Some see these spaces as wonderful 
opportunities to be creative: others simply seek to be more competitive in their field 
and to expand their potential.  
  132 
As Horstmann and Wadley maintain, the “[s]tudy of borderlands should thus 
pay attention to boundary-producing practices and to narratives of inclusion and 
exclusion” (2006: 3). This emphasises how, in border settings, social boundaries 
become as significant as geographical frontiers. In this regard, during my sojourns in 
Móng Cái, Dongxing, Lào Cai and Hekou, I met and heard of numerous individuals 
who had settled in these borders spaces ‘by default’, unable to find their own position 
within their societies or precisely because these spaces offered them the anonymity 
and freedom of action they needed to build new lives. There, among an ordinary 
population composed of a majority of economic migrants and ambitious traders, ex-
convicts, ex-prostitutes, the ruined, relocated, ‘losers’, misfits or the confused can 
attempt to establish experimental businesses and personal projects that would prove 
more difficult to implement elsewhere. The relative flexibility of the local authorities 
regarding migrants, their status, purpose and activities, informally allows the latter to 
be more ‘adventurous.’ In some cases, failure due to lack of financial means, 
experience or connections, or perhaps due to fierce competition, may be conducive to 
individuals feeling ‘marooned’ in these spaces, which become symbolic shores for 
castaways. Then, a different dynamic starts: the appeal of illegal activities emerges 
from the urgency of survival. To this end, I distinguish three types of migrant profiles 
in borderlands: those who have a project and believe they can implement it there; 
those who do not have a project but are eager to seize any opportunity to build one; 
and, those who have neither project nor ambition but who let serendipity guide their 
existence, using whatever means necessary to survive. 
Van Gennep, in his seminal Rites de Passage (1969: 27), distinguishes three 
phases of initiation: (1) the preliminary rites that mark the separation from the anterior 
world; (2) the liminary rites executed during the marginal stage; and, (3) the post-
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liminary rites of aggregation to a new world. Transposed into this business-oriented 
setting, I believe that the ways in which many migrants settle in border-towns reflect 
just such a process in regard to their integration with the Chinese commercial 
economy. I now propose to examine the recent trajectory of Xiao Sun. 
Xiao Sun came originally from a small town in Hunan province. Born in the 
1970s, he married very young, having been introduced to his wife by go-betweens 
who knew both of their families. Xiao Sun used to be a soldier and often recalled his 
service in the army as a tough period of his life. A few years ago, he decided to quit 
his secure position and convinced his wife to go to Yunnan where they would start a 
business. As partners in the project, Xiao Sun’s in-laws also moved to Kunming 
where they opened a shop selling sewing machines. Xiao Sun had no prior experience 
of this particular business but he was willing to learn. Then, a well-intentioned 
acquaintance gave him a few tips about the current needs of Vietnamese customers. 
When I met him in 2006, he was renting a three-storeyed building in Hekou and 
reselling old sewing machines that came from Chinese factories that had closed.1 It 
took him a few months to establish a network through which to resell his machines to 
Vietnamese private clothing factories. But, ultimately he became an established 
business-owner in Hekou. In 2009, as a result of his ability to take advantage of his 
various connections and of lessons learned from his various collaborations with 
Vietnamese business partners, he started to travel regularly to Hanoi in search of 
future business opportunities, his aim being to diversify his activities and to increase 
                                                
1 His ‘work’ actually consisted of receiving these old items and stacking them in his store where his 
Vietnamese business partner would spend hours on a daily basis confirming their functioning capacity 
and packing each machine. Once ready, Xiao Sun would call Vietnamese carriers to load the heavy 
machines onto their special bikes and then cross the border to deliver the goods in Lào Cai. 
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his economic power. When I last met him in 2010, Xiao Sun had bought a car, was 
renting a house in Hanoi, and had decided to spend most of his time in Vietnam, 
developing his new business there and leaving his wife to manage their Hekou store.   
Somewhere between the business-blinded young soldier and the ambitious 
businessman he became, Xiao Sun has gone through stages of experience that only the 
prospect of a flexible environment in terms of business opportunities and informal 
border trade practices enabled him to persist. Xiao Sun started to deliver his machines 
through illegal channels to Vietnam, in this way avoiding tax fees and registration. 
Slowly, when his business became effective and profitable by employing such means, 
he opted for the ordinary – thus taxed – border crossing on the bridge. Lately, Xiao 
Sun confided to me that selling old sewing machines from his little shop in Hekou had 
become an anecdotal activity compared to more attractive business prospects in Hanoi 
on the other side. So, one can easily identify the three stages of his trajectory: the 
‘apprenticeship’ in Kunming and his early stay in Hekou (alone); the ‘establishment’ 
of a rather stable business and position over a time in the marginal space that Hekou 
represents (with his wife who came with him); and, the ‘projection’ into the future in 
a new territory (alone, but with the intention of taking his wife and daughter to Hanoi).  
Xiao Sun’s trajectory is representative of that which traders generally 
experience in Hekou and Dongxing. This general pattern of moving also translates as 
the general movement of Chinese ambition over a land that possesses the necessary 
resources and provides an extended market to supply with Chinese goods. Borderland 
economic actors, e.g., Xiao Sun, tend to follow this form of business trajectory where 
the role of the border town is to provide a site wherein they can experiment with trade 
with an ‘Other’ and overcome any obstacles before going on to conquer Vietnamese 
territories. It is significant of the transitional nature that border towns symbolize in the 
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context of a dynamic, developing area vitalised by a constantly moving and growing 
population. Above all, living at the border implies concrete participation in a public 
life closely connected to another environment, another society, an ‘Other.’ This 
particular context intensifies the feeling of liminality already created by a lived 
experience at the farthest geographical limit from one’s own country. Chinese 
migrants experience a genuine attraction, albeit an attraction tinged with some 
caution, for Vietnam and its economic potential, whereas for the Vietnamese, Chinese 
border towns represent easy access to a perceived modern world that will provide 
them with work and personal opportunity. Hence, migrants from both sides gravitate 
there to experiment with the attractive unknown, and to endeavour to realise personal 
ambition. 
 
Migration waves and population structure  
Hekou serves as an emblematic example of the human complexity of the area. 
This little city used to represent no more than just a passage between China and 
Vietnam; but, the setting has changed in the course of the twentieth century. From a 
small port mainly populated by Yao villagers on its highlands and by Yunnanese Han 
on its lowlands, Hekou has become a form of refuge for outcasts from contemporary 
history. Migration of ethnic minority people in this mountainous area occurred along 
the latest centuries, together with the back and forth movements of Chinese merchants 
and rebels on both side of the border (Lafont 1989). But from local memories 
collected among Hekou’s dwellers, it is during the Chinese revolution that the 
demography patterns changed in a durable manner, when the Republican Army 
soldiers established themselves in this village of petty traders, thus initiating one of 
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the most noteworthy massive migration of Han settlers to the Hekou lowland area and 
beyond the border (Marr 2010). Later, after the establishment of the People’s 
Republic of China in 1949, new settlers started to arrive. One of the main goals of 
foreign policy at the time was to protect China’s frontiers (Hansen 2005); to this end, 
large groups of young people from Yunnan and Guangxi were sent to remote places 
along the border with Vietnam. During the Cultural Revolution and its ‘Xiaxiang 
[down to the countryside] political movement (1966-1976)’, increasing numbers of 
people from all over the country settled in the area. Although these migrations mainly 
took place during the 20th century, these different layers of residents came to compose 
the ‘local’ peoples of Hekou. This majority of Han people and minority of urbanised 
ethnic group members still make for a certain human diversity. 
However, in 1978-1979, before and during the armed conflict between 
Vietnam and China, sudden migrations again changed the local demographic, this 
time in a different way. In response to a patriotic call from the Vietnamese 
government, Vietnamese people, who had been living as long-time residents in 
Hekou, as well as those in the whole of Yunnan – the Việt Kiều [Vietnamese 
overseas] – opted to return to Vietnam (Chan 2005b). Conversely, on the other side, 
the Hoa (a Chinese ethnic group in Vietnam) were ‘encouraged’, then forced to 
resettle in their ‘homeland’ of China. Many of the Hoa ultimately became refugees, 
whose status remains partly unresolved thirty years after the conflict (Lam 2000; Hai 
2000). They also account for a significant proportion of Hekou’s inhabitants, 
especially in its suburb of Nanxi. Others obtained Chinese nationality and decided to 
stay in the vicinity of Vietnam to maintain family links. Today, these two 
communities continue to live together in peace despite smouldering resentment: each 
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plays a crucial role in establishing communication between Hekou’s traders and their 
Vietnamese business partners. Their language skills make them ideal translators. 
When the border gate of Hekou officially reopened in 1991, new waves of 
immigrants arrived in response to the official call for the development of Hekou as a 
new ‘Border Economic Cooperation Zone.’ Entrepreneurs from the surrounding cities 
of Yunnan and Guangxi, started to visit – then settle – in the city, establishing a new 
and promising border trade business. The acceleration of these new settlements 
coincided with the first decade of the Greater Mekong Sub-region’s economic 
corridor that emphasises the Kunming-Hanoi trading route. As soon as news of 
business opportunities spread among the traders’ networks, increasing numbers came 
from Zhejiang, Guangdong, Sichuan, Hunan and even further north to engage in 
border trade activities. Some brought their families with them: others came alone. In 
the meantime, the procedures for entering China1 had been simplified, allowing 
significant migration of Vietnamese workers to Hekou. The prospects of work in 
prostitution, tourism, transport, construction and small trade lured thousands of men 
and women into town, either on a regular or permanent basis.  
Nowadays, Hekou’s population is composed of an admixture of people 
representative of the continuous waves of migration that have transformed the local 
human settlement over the last century. All of them have different perspectives of – 
and have had different experiences with – their Vietnamese neighbours and generally 
maintain pragmatic relationships. The complexity of the settlement in Hekou, which 
shares many similar patterns with Dongxing, is testament to how modest human 
                                                
1 For border residents, obtaining a ‘resident entry & exit permit [bianmin tongxingzheng]’ allowed 
unlimited border crossing: it replaced the classic combination of passport and visa to enter Vietnam. 
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settlements on the Sino-Vietnamese border have undergone unprecedented and 
tremendous change over the last decades, mainly due to rapid economic development 
and cooperation between the two countries. The marks of history are still easily 
detectable in the diversity of their populations and identity discourses, although they 
are not very obvious to unfamiliar eyes.  
However, what differentiates the current situation from the past are the ways 
in which migrants need to negotiate with the states in order to continue enjoying the 
permeability of borders that only recently became the object of specific policies. 
Crossing this border used to be no more than a simple journey over the hills or a 
passage over the rivers that separate the two countries. As Willem van Schendel 
observes, “[t]he state’s concern with controlling the movement of objects and human 
beings across space is a recent development in human history. It is characteristic of 
modern states to claim the exclusive right to authorize and regulate movement […] 
(2005: 59). Today, the need for a passport, a visa, or at least a permit for crossing the 
border imposes control over human movement and notions of legality on an action 
once tolerated as part of daily life in the borderlands. 
 
Personal trajectories 
Margin areas and borderlands in China have seen their populations structured 
and changed by various waves of migrants. One notable change in contemporary 
times, however, is that recent migrations have been the result of individual agency 
rather than state or communal projects. Scholarship on border settlements in China 
(Gladney 2004, Hansen 1999, 2005) describes how over the last decades, Chinese 
authorities have either forcibly relocated or encouraged millions of people to regions 
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such as Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, Tibet and Yunnan to secure the state frontiers, 
educate and control the local ‘backward’ populations and develop their economies. 
All of these migrations were organized by work units, the army and local 
governments, all driven by the conviction that protecting, controlling and developing 
the margins of China would guarantee security against inner strife and outsiders’ 
invasion ambitions (Olson 1998, Gladney 2004, Hansen 2005). Even though these 
migrations were not always the result of a deliberate choice by the migrants 
themselves, their duty to serve the state required a certain commitment to establishing 
stable relationships with their new social environment. In the contemporary period, 
individuals are not migrating to borderlands in the interests of local populations or 
state politico-economic plans, but precisely because they provide direct access to 
other countries wherein they can project their personal investment and effort. 
Under such different circumstances, the main characteristic of the border 
towns lies in the commonly acknowledged and claimed purpose of the populations 
who recently settled there – zheng qian [making money] by whatever means available 
to them. According to some of my informants, this context generates artificiality in 
social relationships. Each party tends to primarily serve his/her own – economic – 
interests when engaging with another. More than elsewhere, for a large section of the 
local population, the specific transitional nature of settlements in border towns calls 
for pragmatic connections that will serve immediate purposes. I have met groups of 
business partners and friends who seemed very well acquainted but who, when I 
inquired about their whereabouts a few months later, had already lost contact with 
each other. Many conversations reflected the fragility of some personal situations and 
thus, of local residents’ relationships. This precariousness revealed the pragmatism of 
local, social relationships and tended to frame the private interactions I will soon 
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explore. As a way of approaching the core protagonists of my research topic, I will 
now introduce some of the characters encountered by the side of the mixed couples, 
who illustrate the particularity of border communities. 
Hang, a charming woman in her mid-thirties, arrived in Lào Cai approximately 
three months before I met her in June 2006. She was not a native of the city but had 
just opened a Café-kem1 on one of the main streets of the old centre. Hang had 
married very young and produced a daughter when she was 18 years old, followed by 
a son with her husband. But, her marriage was unhappy. Somehow, she managed to 
leave her husband and go to Berlin where she spent two years illegally selling 
smuggled Polish cigarettes. After she was arrested,2 Hang spent a year in prison 
where she was well treated. She then went back to Vietnam and opened her business, 
living a single life. When I tried to find her two and a half years later, her Café-kem 
had closed and no one could tell me where she had gone. 
A Luo, about whom I wrote earlier, originated from Beichuan in Sichuan 
province. In his mid-thirties and unemployed, he was searching for business 
opportunities in Hekou when I first met him on my very first research day in 2006. At 
the time, he had been living in the city for two years with friends Lien and A Long. 
He liked to extrapolate on his future projects although he admitted that he had no 
money. A moody person, he spent his days wandering around the area, smoking and 
passing time in his friend’s shop. Somehow, according to his claims, he was familiar 
with the prostitution business at the Vietnamese market and his extended social 
                                                
1 These are places where one hangs out with friends to drink soft drinks and eat ice-cream. 
2 Hang did not specify if she was arrested for selling cigarettes or for being an illegal migrant. But, 
since she was not immediately repatriated to Vietnam, and served time in a German prison, I would 
assume that her illegal activity was the cause of her arrest. 
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network ranged from police and customs officers to petty vendors, Vietnamese 
translators and Chinese businessmen.  Initially I did not understand how or why he 
maintained such a network, since he always seemed idle and unprepared to engage in 
any (visible) activity. But later, he appeared to me to be a typical embodiment of what 
Chinese people call a xiao hunhun or hunzi [wangler/schemer]. A Luo was always 
very discreet about his past and current activities; but, he knew enough about the 
realities of the city to be a reasonable informant at the beginning of my fieldwork, 
especially on the topic of Vietnamese women. He was single and eager to find a 
girlfriend; but, he insisted on avoiding Vietnamese woman, claiming they were ‘too 
complicated.’1 When I met him two and a half years later, he had opened a brothel 
three months earlier, which he was managing with his partner, a twenty-two year old 
Vietnamese ex-prostitute. Considerably less loquacious than before, he still spent his 
days smoking, waiting and worrying. 
— I have just lost my mother in Beichuan’s earthquake,2 she just vanished 
under her house. My brother took care of the funeral. I didn’t go back, what 
for? She died, that was it. Here, I didn’t have enough money to start a real 
business, so when A Long and his wife opened their brothel, I followed them 
for a while. Then I met my wife and I decided to open one too. I rent [sic] two 
girls,3 both 18 years old, but the business is not good. Look at this one, she 
hasn’t started her day and it is already mid-afternoon… 
                                                
1 I will elaborate in Chapter 5 upon what A Luo and other Chinese men mean by this, i.e., how 
Vietnamese women are often perceived as shrouded in ambiguity (Grillot forthcoming). 
2 Beichuan city was the epicentre of the deadly Sichuan earthquake, April 2008. 
3 In Hekou, Chinese brothel owners always use the Chinese term zu [to rent] to designate the 
relationship between themselves and a prostitute. Lien explained to me that Vietnamese prostitutes are 
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When asked about his views on the future, A Luo remained silent, only stating 
that his current business was just a temporary activity he pursued in order to survive. 
He appeared much more worried about his wife’s weak health and her recent 
miscarriage. In 2010, the couple separated.  His ’wife’ returned to Vietnam and his 
brothel closed. As for A Luo, he was still wandering around. 
Xiao Yu, a man in his mid-thirties from Henan province, graduated in Chinese 
language studies from a University in Luoyang and took a position teaching Chinese 
language and literature at a university in Guangzhou. Disappointed by the mediocre 
level of his students and a bureaucratic/academic system he could not support, he 
resigned and opted for a new life in business. He had heard about border towns so 
decided to relocate to Hekou. For the first five years, he made a living selling 
(smuggled) computers from China to customers in Vietnam. Independent, single and 
interested in Chinese contemporary writers and thinkers, he spent most of his time 
surfing online in search of various reports, literature and business opportunities. 
During this period, he made very few friends. Until 2009, he lived next door to Xiao 
Sun and his wife, sharing time with them and cooking meals together, always saying 
that he might not stay very long in Hekou. But, in 2010, he moved into a new, large 
office-apartment with his recently-acquired Chinese girlfriend. After that, he no 
                                                                                                                                       
‘bought’ by a pimp who ‘rents’ them to a brothel. Brothel owners have to pay rent to exploit these 
women. This means that pimps (who are often Vietnamese women who find and buy young women in 
Vietnam and are always on the move) are not directly involved in brothel activities. They own and rent 
women like property, but remain ‘invisible’. Some brothel owners may also own prostitutes if they buy 
them from a pimp. For brothel owners, renting a woman allows flexibility. If business is not good, they 
simply send the woman back to her pimp without arranging other engagements. Vietnamese prostitutes 
function as commodities in these various levels of transaction. 
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longer saw his former friends and neighbours; instead, he concentrated upon 
significantly expanding his computer trade. 
Mr Ruan1 had just opened a restaurant when I met him in Móng Cái in June 
2006. One of the rare Chinese restaurants in the small city, it was easy to find; a large 
board written in both Vietnamese language and Chinese characters identified it on the 
sidewalk. Mr Ruan, a Yao2 man from the Dongxing area, was married to a Han 
woman with whom he had two children. He explained to me that since the Yao of the 
area had been living in the plains for four generations, they – including him – could 
no longer speak their own language. 
— I opened this restaurant three months ago. Before that, I was a cadre in the 
Chinese bureaucracy.3 I belong to the intellectual class of my generation. I 
                                                
1 The surname Ruan, the Chinese translation of the widespread Vietnamese surname Nguyễn, signified 
that Mr Ruan probably had some kinship links with Vietnam. 
2 The Yao of China are called Dao in Vietnam (pronounced ‘zao’) and call themselves Mien. The Yao 
now total more than 2.6 million people in the Chinese southern provinces of Guangxi, Yunnan, 
Guizhou, Hunan and Guangdong (Source: China Statistic Yearbook 2003, 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/ statistical-data/yearlydata/yarbook2003_e.pdf) and approximately 
620,000 in northern Vietnam (Source: http:// www. gso.gov.vn /-default.aspx? tabid = 503 & ItemID = 
1841). The appellation Yao includes several branches of a population with diverse dialects and 
cultures. This is true of several other of China’s ‘national minorities’. These categories, which were 
created in 1950 by the Government on the basis of research conducted by teams of ethnographers, are 
more of a political classification system than a faithful translation of a complex human, social, and 
ethnical reality. I use them, despite their irrelevance to this work, by convenience, since my intention is 
not to discuss ethnic identities here. 
3 He did not specify what his former position was. 
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graduated from high school. I just decided to leave my position to the young 
graduates who are more qualified and I established here. 
Mr Ruan was not a good cook his choice to open a restaurant signalled 
convenience (or opportunism) born of a sense of failure, the frustration of a man who 
felt disqualified from occupying an ‘intellectual’ position that had evolved with time 
and required new knowledge he did not possess. Even though he did not mention it, 
another explanation may have been that being a cadre, he lost his position after the 
birth of his second child.1 This relegated him to the outcast position of those who had 
lost the security and guarantee of state employment. 
Hang, A Luo, Xiao Yu and Mr Ruan, and many others I met, were all migrants 
trying to make a living in a town they had no particular relationship with prior to 
settling in it. All had in common the burden of previous dissatisfaction or failure in 
their private or professional lives. All arrived in border towns driven by the 
expectation that such a place might provide them with a solution to their 
dissatisfaction but without any intention to really engage with the local society. They 
mostly came single, rented places, and their social lives were/are built upon pragmatic 
relationships rather than long-term friendships or partnerships. They spend their time 
thinking about better ways to make more money rather than enhancing their current 
activity, which they view as a temporary step to better opportunities. Not one of them 
seemed to give anything back to the cities that had welcomed them, anything that 
                                                
1 The application of China’s One-Child Policy was more severe for state employees. In general, they 
were not fined for an accidental second pregnancy and birth in the way other citizens were fined. 
Instead, they stood to lose their positions and advantages if they decided to keep the second baby. As a 
member of a minority group, Mr Ruan had the right to have a second child; but, his wife was Han. For 
this reason, he was not entitled to keep a second child: it cost him his cadre position. 
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would reinforce a sustainable relationship with the local population. Although based 
in Móng Cái, Mr Ruan mainly received Chinese traders at his restaurant. As far as A 
Lien was concerned, despite all the young and active customers she encountered 
daily, she remained – in their eyes – a migrant. She said she had no friends among the 
locals (no one knew where she went after she left Hekou); Xiao Yu rarely left his 
apartment and did not trust anyone. A Luo’s attempts to actively connect with the 
Vietnamese brothels circle were not meant to facilitate his integration in Hekou’s 
society. Like their fellows, these migrants were often unable to articulate a feasible 
future plan for their lives and activities when I first met them in 2006. Three years 
later, Xiao Yu unexpectedly extended his business clientele in Vietnam without 
becoming more social: Mr Ruan still ran his restaurant despite its obvious lack of 
maintenance; Hang had vanished, and A Luo’s brothel failed as did his intimate 
relationship that could have settled him down.1 It is within this particular environment 
and social setting that the cross-border alliances I will describe in the next chapter 
occurred in a manner than illustrates the general lack of engagement and perspective 
of migrants and the somewhat indifferent attitudes of the locals regarding these 
outsiders’ intentions.  
As representatives of the crowd of migrants, one cannot deny the efforts of 
these four characters to recreate a certain social space out of their relationships with 
acquaintances (from the same province or town) and out of the serendipities that 
borderlands offer them in terms of main and extra activities. Xiao Yu, Hang, A Luo 
and Mr Ruan still aim to reinvent themselves via a new life despite identity issues, 
uncertainty, and/ or a degree of stigmatisation. 
                                                
1 A Luo’s Vietnamese partner fell pregnant; but, due to health problems, she miscarried. The couple 
split up a few months later. 
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“Ni zuo shenme shengyi [what is your business]?” The shapes of 
interactions and connections at the border  
[I]f we think of spatiality as an aspect of social relations that is continually being 
reconfigured, borders become much more significant (van Schendel 2005: 45). 
The diversity of ethnic groups, geographical communities, cultural identities 
and economic entities characterising the Sino-Vietnamese borderland render invalid 
an appreciation of the cross-border matrimonial exchanges phenomenon merely 
according to linguistic distinctions, official ethnic classifications, local mores, 
geographical or national specificities.  
Nga, Lan and Thao, three of my Vietnamese informants, are married to 
Chinese businessmen and share their lives between the two shores of the Beilun 
River. They are young, fluent in Chinese, and have known each other for a few years. 
They usually work in Móng Cái, live or shop in Dongxing, spend their holidays in 
Haiphong, are familiar with Hanoi, and visit their in-laws in Nanning or Guilin (two 
Chinese cities in Guangxi). Holders of border resident permits that allow them to 
travel back and forth between Móng Cái and Dongxing unhindered, their way of life 
seems not to distinguish between here and there. In both places, they have Chinese 
and Vietnamese acquaintances among long-term residents as well as migrants, can 
enjoy their favourite food and have places to stay. Their social space seems to be set 
in a unique space inscribed with various characteristics between which they navigate 
instinctively. Spending time in their company requires a certain familiarity with 
particular spots and streets names in their Vietnamese and Chinese translations given 
that they talk about them without referring to the city’s name. Like many other 
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migrants, Nga’s, Lan’s and Thao’s experiences of these cities is inadequately 
translated by the state’s definition of border, citizenship or nation.  
Therefore, comprehension of how individuals and communities conceptualise 
and practice the space within which they live and pursue their activities helps to 
sketch a more genuine map of the borderlands, a map grounded in social relationships 
and activities rather than according to geographic boundaries.  Irrespective of whether 
they are Chinese or Vietnamese, business associates are also neighbours, gambling 
partners, former schoolmates or spouses, peoples all intertwined into extended social 
networks. For example, a network of Chinese clothing wholesalers and their 
Vietnamese customers compose a group that does not occupy a clearly delimited 
geographical space in Hekou or Dongxing but links Guangdong and Zhejiang 
manufacturers to many garments shops in Hô Chi Minh ville. Sino-Vietnamese travel 
agencies cooperate to organise tourist tours, creating a very active branch of the cross-
border economy. Fluvial carriers work following interaction negotiated with both 
Chinese and Vietnamese customs, border control patrols and regular customers, all of 
which works to blur the boundaries. Complex, moving and changing, border societies 
compose and activate various dynamic networks that make sense mainly due to the 
economic links that bind them together. An individual can be the partner of several 
other individuals involved in common projects while at the same time being a 
member of several large networks. This implies evolving in various social spaces in 
and out of the individual’s living area, city or country. And, while this form of 
organisation does not fundamentally differ from that of Chinese provincial or national 
commercial networks, it has the particularity to associate people from widely diverse 
backgrounds with a transnational set of connections, which includes an even larger 
diversity of profiles appurtenant to the specific composition of border societies. 
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Hence, when engaging with border trade, one may encounter and collaborate with 
people one may have never considered working with otherwise; translators, smugglers 
or wanglers, for example. Moreover, as I have already suggested, the reunion of such 
a large range of individuals finds justification in the degree of participation in a 
business and a collective purpose, i.e., wealth. This is so obvious that the first 
question ever asked of a newcomer concerns his/her activity and proposed 
commercial project in the city.  
In sum, in the perceptions of those who pass by, live and work in Hekou, 
Dongxing or their twin cities of Lào Cai and Móng Cái, spaces are not simply 
demarcated by their geographic boundaries but are experienced as a much larger 
tangible and imagined – because in the process of construction – social space, a 
turntable for networks of exchanges of any kind which enhance the impression of 
constant metamorphosis of each side (although this is more obvious on the Chinese 
side which tends to be more dynamic in terms of development). The nature of the 
relationships established between the various segments of borderland residents, 
especially among the Vietnamese and Chinese migrants, relies upon their empirical 
appropriation of a space that they tend to conceptualise either as whole or as clearly 
demarcated: a space that may or may not include the ‘Other.’ These boundaries are 
shaped by lifestyles, cultural influences and social representations, a consequence I 
examine in Chapter 4.  
 
Conclusion 
It is in these very unusual yet dynamic social spaces that the phenomenon I 
will now describe is taking place. Cross-border relationships, irrespective of whether 
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they are business partnerships or private unions, cannot be examined without taking 
into account the exceptional context within which they were matched, built, and kept 
alive, often leading to further involvements in two neighbouring communities.  
As van Schendel contends, “[i]f we want to understand how [borderlands] 
‘scale’ the world, we must start from their cognitive map – their organized 
representations of their special environment and their own place in it”1 (2005: 55). 
The ‘cognitive maps’ or ‘social spaces’ of borderlanders are all underlying elements 
that must be taken into account when exploring a social phenomenon such as cross-
border marriages. They shape its contemporary manifestation in a context of intensive 
human mobility set in a continuously changing region. 
Cross-border marriages may be seen as a significant way of reconciling with 
Otherness, the former enemy, the economic partner, the peaceful neighbour – the 
ideological brother. But, as Zhang maintains, border areas are “usually seen as … 
site[s] of transgression, controversy and disorder” (2011: 11). In a certain way, the 
bias directed towards mixed alliances could limit any possibility of normalisation of a 
relationship. Because the comments and perspectives of the locals regarding particular 
marriage arrangements mostly engage with more general debate on any ongoing 
political argument, these marriages tend to embody the recurrent sensitivity of Sino-
Vietnamese relationship at the diplomatic level. Unsolved issues find their illustration 
in local marital experiences. However, before analysing the impact that both context 
and public discourse have on mixed marriages, it is time to introduce the specificities 
of the Sino-Vietnamese cross-border alliances. 
 
                                                
1 Van Schendel, citing Downs and Stea (1977). 
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Chapter 3 
Marriages without weddings: A typology of cross-border marriages 
 
Introduction 
Now that I have reviewed the methodological issues related to data collection 
and described the geographical and socio-economic backgrounds of the two border 
areas of Hekou/Lào Cai and Dongxing/Móng Cái, it is time to turn to the core object 
of this study; i.e., the matrimonial alliances occurring in this particular setting. All 
along the 1306 kilometre land border between China and Vietnam, deep into the 
provinces of Guangxi and Yunnan and as far as the Northern provinces of China, 
Sino-Vietnamese marriages are occurring at a significantly visible albeit 
unquantifiable level.1 While the variety of cases encountered and heard about required 
cautiousness when sketching an average profile of the spouses involved, outlining 
some of the recurrent circumstances within which such marriages occur has proven 
useful to the analysis. In this chapter I propose a typology of the different cases 
encountered in the two field sites. I considered this a prerequisite to examining in 
subsequent chapters what they actually mean and reveal about the communities and 
                                                
1 Various reports and local estimations mention tens of thousands of unions, but without much 
explanation on the methods employed to gather these data. Hence, it is hard to appreciate how 
extensive this phenomenon is nowadays compared to what it was in the past, given the illegal nature of 
many of these unions and the absence of historical data. This is mainly due to its association with local 
practices, which had no real impact in times when control of both population and frontiers was not as 
crucial as it is now. 
  152 
societies to which they belong. This chapter will be divided into three main parts; in 
the first part, I will situate the contemporary forms of Sino-Vietnamese cross-border 
alliances I encountered in the historical tracking of social exchanges at the local level, 
and within the phenomenon of international marriages in the East Asian region. 
Following this I will detail the life stories of several of the persons and generations 
involved in these marriages and the unions they have created. Further descriptions 
will include the various trends, legal aspects and common features of the seemingly 
different trajectories of the couples. These extensive ethnographic accounts reveal 
how normative categories fail to adequately provide room for the alternative 
matrimonial practices that re-emerge when dramatic social, economic and political 
evolutions challenge traditional kinship rules and marriage customs. 
The marriages I address in this thesis challenge the normative structure of 
marriage in Southwest China and Vietnam. For example, the administrative rules are 
defied: many Sino-Vietnamese couples choose not to register their marriages, thus 
failing to comply with the policy of both the People’s Republic of China and the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Local practices are often ignored for despite 
customary practices, Sino-Vietnamese marital exchanges do not necessarily require 
the payment of a bride price or dowry. So, what does this say about these two 
societies that notwithstanding share coherent and similar – although delayed in time – 
changes at the socio-economical level? My aim in this chapter is to illustrate how 
despite these perceived discrepancies, mixed marriages highlight the significant 
variations in the Chinese and Vietnamese societies’ evolution during their transition 
from socialist revolutions to liberal reform eras, specifically in the domains of family 
life and gender roles within the domestic and public spheres. I will also begin to 
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demonstrate how normative categories fail to adequately account for individuals 
whose trajectories and yearnings lead them to transgress social rules of conjugality. 
Issues of love and conjugality will be discussed further in Chapters 4 and 5. In 
Chapter 3, I frame the structure that may have resulted from love, may indicate the 
standing point for its development or mark the end of the personal yearning for it. In 
an attempt to provide clarity, I will offer extended ethnographic accounts of some of 
these marital relationships, as they are experienced now before delving further into 
the affective states they create. And, since my argument revolves around the word 
‘marriage,’ it is crucial to define precisely what I mean by this term, and more 
importantly what the informants meant when they employed it to describe particular 
individuals’ situations or to contest its relevance. 
 
1 Historical continuum versus global trends: “cross-border marriages” 
There is a need here to assess the historical roots of various marginalized 
forms of conjugality and the specificities of their current forms linked with the 
Chinese and Vietnamese contemporary social context. Cross-border marital 
exchanges do not represent a new phenomenon: their roots are deeply embedded in 
the region’s history. In this section, I will review the main aspects of historically 
observed cross-border alliances by tracing the slavery patterns and internal marriage 
migration in China, the human trade, the commercial exchanges and the “industry of 
marriage” (Phụng, 2006) in Vietnam.  
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The need for historical perspectives 
Historical records provide evidence of marriages between Chinese men and 
local South East Asian women. Sources generally describe the alliances formed 
between the various waves of Chinese men who travelled to countries that needed 
them as a work force, many of which encouraged their immigration by allowing them 
to marry the local women. These measures contributed to Chinese 
establishment/settlement and assimilation. Historians of Southeast Asia have long 
noted the ease with which wealthy Chinese, for example, married into some Southeast 
Asian ruling dynasties and upper classes (Andaya 1992; Loos 2008; Stoler 2002). 
However, exploration of lower class Asian immigrants to Southeast Asia during the 
colonial period reveals the existence of different kinds of relationships (especially 
informal unions) that have only infrequently been monitored by states (or by 
scholars). Historically, lower class intra-Asian intimacies fell off the colonial state’s 
bureaucratic grid because their unions did not threaten the state as long as they 
ensured a continuous pool of labour and promoted economic growth (Loos 2008: 28). 
Nowadays, the term ‘Sino-Vietnamese marriages’ may also refer to Chinese 
men who enter Vietnam (and its market) through their romantic affairs with the local 
women. However, as was the case in earlier history, these men were often traders who 
enjoyed an advantageous economic position compared to that of the local men (as was 
the case in Siam, as Loos discovered). Few of them became really established in 
Vietnam given that the contemporary marriage migration path that unites the 
Vietnamese and Chinese people generally starts from Vietnam, then goes to China. 
And, because most of the migrants are Vietnamese women, who cross the border not 
as needed workers (Loos 2008: 35) but as temporary illegal migrants, the Chinese 
authorities definitely do not encourage them to stay. Questions of direction, purpose, 
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gender nature and scales of migration, and the ways in which they have changed 
throughout history, represent crucial factors to consider in the analysis of cross-border 
marriages. Most of the cases upon which I focus belong to the invisible category of 
international marriages that constitute the majority of the “landscape intimacy” (Loos 
2008: 29) in these border regions; in other words, those that do not appear in official 
statistics and do not reflect local realities. And, even when examining the various 
estimations of the scale of the phenomenon, it becomes clear that the modern tools 
born out of various political concerns (like the control and measure of border 
crossing) create the illusion that the current practice varies tremendously from that of 
the past.  
[P]lacing contemporary studies of intra-Asian unions within [an] historical context 
may attenuate implicit claims of absolute increases resulting from ‘globalization.’ In 
other words, a historical view would see fluctuations in international marriage rates 
that are tied, in chronological order, to early modern trade patterns, imperialism’s 
massive demand for labor in its public works projects and plantations, war (WWII, 
the Korean War, and [the] US-Vietnam War, for example) and most recently the 
demand for labor that has arisen from low birth rates and uneven economic 
development (Loos 2008: 28). 
In reality, as I mentioned earlier, the statistics for Sino-Vietnamese marriages 
remain somewhat unreliable due to factors considered as valid for estimating marriage 
migration. Nevertheless, this is probably less important to assessment than the 
relevant motivations hidden behind the phenomenon’s continuity. “The point is that 
depending on how one defines who counts as an ‘international’ subject and what 
counts as marriage, one will draw radically different conclusions about the size and 
significance of populations and state policies regarding ‘international marriage’ in 
colonial-era Southeast Asia” (Loos 2008: 36). When Chinese merchants opted not to 
register their marriages to Siamese women until the early 20th century, for example, 
they were simply following their own customs, as well as local customs. And, being 
Asian men, their marital status was of less concern to the Siamese rulers than that of 
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Western men married to local women, unions that had hierarchy connotations and 
implied the need to protect the national interest in a colonial era. 
In contemporary China, mandatory registration of marriage – national and 
international – with Chinese legal authorities only started after the establishment of 
the People’s Republic of China (1949), when legal procedure became a condition of 
being officially recognized as a new family. Weddings, on the other hand, varied 
considerably in the extent to which they followed tradition. Since 1950, the Chinese 
government has encouraged very simple, civil weddings centred upon registration at a 
government office. The 1980 marriage law states: “Article 7. Both the man and the 
woman desiring to contract a marriage shall register in person with the marriage 
registration office. If the proposed marriage is found to be in conformity with the 
provisions of this law, registrations hall [will] be granted and a marriage certificate 
issued. The relationship of husband and wife is established when a marriage 
certificate is acquired” (Engel 1984: 959). 
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Figure 9: Freedom of marriage, happiness and good luck, 1953 (Source: 
http://chineseposters.net/posters/e15-594.php). The idea that marriage should be synonymous with 
happiness and free will was sufficiently new to justify a mass educational campaign among the Chinese 
population. 
 
 
Figure 10: In marriage, keep an eye on your own interests, and return radiant after 
registration, 1953 (Source: http://chineseposters.net/themes/marriage-law.php). This propaganda poster 
was intended to convince Chinese newly-weds to register their marriages for official recognition. 
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Despite these early measures, and their enhancement throughout recent history, 
coerced and arranged marriages still exist (McLaren 2001); and, registration still 
represents an obstacle to those who find themselves trapped in an awkward or 
complex situation. This would be the case with informal international marriages, 
which in the case of Vietnam are no exception but simply the extension of an already 
existing process. 
 
Historical trends during the colonial period: human trade/exchange 
background 
Baudrit (1943, republished in 2009) in his time, and Lessard (2009) very 
recently, are among the few historians who wrote on the topic of human trade or 
slavery during the colonization of Indochina and especially in North Vietnam – in 
Tonkin – documenting the widespread practice of selling Vietnamese women to 
China for purposes of prostitution, marriage or domestic work. The incredibly 
detailed information that these accounts provide finds a strong echo in contemporary 
Vietnamese women’s stories, especially concerning the ways in which they reached 
China (as some of my informants’ narratives will demonstrate). 
On the Chinese side, recourse to the work of several European observers of 
Chinese society under the imperial regime, prior to the contemporary period marked 
by civil wars and the socialist regime, reveals a trade in women within as well as 
without China’s frontiers (Cooper and Gallieni, cited in Baudrit 2009). In South 
China, for example, slavery was practiced until the middle of the twentieth century as 
James Watson’s research into the Cantonese region (including Guangxi) has shown 
(Watson 1980). Watson writes: “Until the foundation of the People’s Republic in 
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1949 China had one of the largest and most comprehensive markets for the exchange 
of human beings in the world. In many parts of China, notably in the south, nearly 
every peasant household was directly or indirectly affected by the sale of people” 
(Watson 1980: 223). 
More than a century later, the attention given to this phenomenon still errs 
through its presentation. The term ‘slavery’ faded in favour of ‘trafficking,’ a still 
reprehensible reality that embeds a political meaning. But, nowadays, an often de-
contextualized Manichean vision, associated with a condemnatory position and 
supported by moving testimonies, has become a conjectural interpretation, forged 
under legal and political terms.1 A rather consensual and scandalized discourse, along 
with some associated repressive measures (including repatriation programs for 
‘victims’), reflects the desire of nations to apply the concepts of universal human 
rights and justice, often irrespective of the specific approach that some complex 
realities of human exchanges rooted in local history would require. Among these 
exchanges, some extreme forms have followed the vicissitudes of contemporary 
history enacted in countries like Vietnam and China to reify control over their 
population movements. But, a categorical vision of migration, that readily classifies 
some cases as ‘illegal migration’ or ‘human trafficking,’ reflects the course of the new 
                                                
1 Indeed, some activist, non-governmental organizations and institutions such as the Department of 
State’s Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, that annually releases its report on 
human trafficking in the world, tend to generally adopt and disseminate a rather judgmental position 
that separates the world into two assumed clear categories regarding this matter: the victims and the 
perpetrators of human trafficking. Although my purpose here is not to engage with increasingly 
complex discussions on human trafficking between activist and academics, I notice from this debate 
that such framing of a ‘black-and-white’ picture of certain forms of human exchange remains 
questionable because it often ignores individual agencies, local contexts and historical backgrounds. 
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international order, which makes the fight against any forms of goods and human 
smuggling one of the prerequisites and understandable conditions of the establishment 
of harmonious relations between the countries bordering the region, and their 
integration – and, by extension recognition – with and by ‘respectable’ nations. 
But, beyond the slavery/trafficking debate one finds other realities that are 
somewhat difficult to label. Although not exactly an ethnographic account, The 
Industry of Marrying Europeans (Phụng 2006), for example, represents a local 
investigative journalist’s report about mixed marriage practices in Saigon in the 1930s. 
This report remains one of the liveliest, historical indications that in contemporary 
Vietnam, besides colonial exploitation, there has long been an ambiguous association 
between marriage with (any) foreigner, prostitution and/or opportunist partnerships. 
This perception relegates love stories to a secondary level in the decision-making 
process surrounding two individuals’ plans to settle down and start a family. Here, 
using the term ‘industry’, the author implies “that the marriages of the local Annamite 
[Vietnamese] women and the European men were mechanical and businesslike 
matters. The term ‘industry’ in Vietnamese encompasses places, like factories, that 
employ many workers. As a hired worker, a man or woman works for a price, and the 
length of one’s employment depends implicitly on the monetary value of one’s 
service” (Thúy 2006: 12). 
From the point of view of Chinese residents of Hekou and Dongxing, 
contemporary examples of mixed marriages do not differ much from those of earlier 
times that Vũ Trọng Phụng describes. Their comments – which will be the subject of 
Chapter 4 – suggest that many of these marriages result from the conscientious 
strategies of individuals who wish to improve their original unsatisfying situations, 
despite the vulnerability of these types of relationships. Popular viewpoint also entails 
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that Chinese men provide their Vietnamese female partners with certain forms of 
material and financial compensation for their availability, a position that renders 
blurry the distinction between long-term cohabitation and prostitution. Other sources 
document forms of free alliances in pre-revolutionary Vietnam that attest to the 
possibility for some individuals to experiment with non-conventional alliances, driven 
by the given circumstances and pragmatism. More often than not, contemporary 
informal unions reflect the earlier absence of any public ceremony to seal the alliance 
between two families, the consequent lack of gift exchange and neglect of immediate 
administrative validation. These historical accounts provide examples that reveal very 
similar standpoints vis-à-vis my own ethnographic data: 
A young man, tired of dragging along a life of misery in his village, tempted by 
adventure, or [in a] hurry to escape from the mandarins’ investigations, emigrates, 
and reaches the red lands’ rubber plantations, or some public construction sites. 
There, after some time, he meets a girl who is more or less an expatriate like him. 
They get along, and live together, without organizing any of the ceremonies that 
usually accompany the celebration of marriages. Is there marriage or not? The future 
will tell. The reality of marriage, or the lack of conjugal bond itself, will be proved by 
the state of affairs after a few years. If after a short or long-term try, living together is 
not possible, one separates amicably, or with a few blows [to] each other, and all is 
said. This temporary union turns out, in the eyes of both spouses, as [in] the eyes of 
everyone, to be a youth entertainment, choi-nhoi. And it should be noted that this 
cohabitation could last several years, and that children might be born. Neither time 
nor the offspring do make the marriage actual. There should be continuity. If, indeed, 
the man and woman continue to go along, to cohabit with each other, they will look at 
each other, and will be seen by their neighbours, as genuine husband and wife, as 
forming a real family. And when, later, they will return to their villages of origin, 
everyone, relatives and fellow citizens, will regard them as truly united, albeit none of 
the usual ceremonies were held. But can one tell, in the early days of the union, 
before the separation has disjointed or before the continuity of life together has 
strengthened the bonds of this union, how both partners view themselves, and why 
are they considered by their neighbours, whether ad tempus partners or regular 
couple, as husband and wife? The answer is not easy. These cases occur in 
environments where living alone is so difficult, where consciousness is so broad, and 
free union so close to regular marriage, that in most cases, individuals do not know 
exactly in what condition they are, and they do not care to pursue this matter of 
conscience, whereas their neighbours, mostly in the same situation from the marital 
standpoint, are in the same uncertainty. I believe that their condition can be defined 
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by the reflection that they may be doing, or at least could do: we live together for 
now, we will see for the future (Cadière 1992: 44-45). 
These observations from the beginning of the last century enlighten the 
contemporary situation. Even though Cadière specifies further that these “abnormal 
unions” remained rare in the old Vietnam, they nevertheless attest that besides 
customary marriage, alternative forms of conjugality have coexisted in Vietnam for a 
long time. These unions also mean that despite the modern registration and framing of 
what ‘marriage’ is supposed to legally mean (cf. Marriage Law(s) in socialist 
Vietnam), these pre-existing figures, along with earlier practices such as polygyny 
and new practices such as pre-marriage cohabitation in urban settings, have endured 
and even reappeared as common in the Sino-Vietnamese border zones. But, to what is 
this attributable?  
In the context of extended exchanges with Chinese populations, under the 
frame of trading collaboration in most cases, Vietnamese women may experience 
marriage without the absolute commitment required by their communities’ males (a 
proper and exclusive marriage), and without necessarily being exposed to social 
judgment. Yet, when accepting the terms of common-law marriage with Chinese men, 
Vietnamese women still expose themselves to social criticism and judgment since 
their communities regard their choice as disrespectful of customs and of parents’ 
expectations (cf. Chapter 4). However, unlike the examples provided by Cadière, 
contemporary cases do not refer to Vietnamese men, only to Vietnamese women who 
choose Chinese men and, in doing so, abandon their communities. Such a choice 
might challenge the masculinity and pride of the Vietnamese males, who in most 
cases respond with contempt; but alliances with ‘foreigners’ do not directly threaten 
Vietnamese men’s domestic position. Therefore, by extension, given the low position 
of Vietnamese women in Vietnamese society, these alliances are less likely to attract 
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the scrutiny of the male-oriented Vietnamese authorities (Luong 2003). This reminds 
us of the attitude of the past colonial powers in various parts of Asia toward the white 
women (usually single, widow, poor and discriminated) who were settled there and 
who engaged in intimate affairs with local men. Most were regarded as offenders of 
the moral standards established by the ‘white’ colonial supremacy and manifested in 
unequal treatment of taboo relationships or mixed unions between Europeans and 
indigenes. According to their gender, such couples were the object or tolerance or 
rejection. In Stoler’s words, such sexual prescriptions based on race, gender and 
power hierarchies illustrate a “defense of community, morality, and white male 
power…” (Stoler 2002: 60). In these two situations, male chauvinism of both white 
men in Asia and Vietnamese men illustrates two points. First, it expresses a basic 
disregard toward women who challenge their power by openly yearning for 
emancipation from their conjugal position and role at a time and a place that allow 
them to challenge conventions: single white women in the colonies, and Vietnamese 
women in an opening society. Such emancipation may as well be associated with 
national betrayal. Secondly, male chauvinism also illustrates how these women, 
perceived as defiant, easily become the site of animosity toward an Other whose 
control conditions male domination: white men needed to control the potentially 
rebellious native male, and Vietnamese men nowadays wish they could control the 
economically ‘invading Chinese’. In that matter, mixed conjugality embodies a wider 
social and ideological challenge than private affairs would initially suggest.1 
 
                                                
1 One should note that this argument is also true in other countries in Asia where native women 
entering cross-border marriages give rise to the wariness of their compatriots (Constable 2003, 2004; 
Kelsky 2001). 
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International/cross-border marriages in Vietnam nowadays 
Recent scholarship on cross-border marriages compiled by Minjeong Kim 
(2010) tends in general to locate contemporary mixed unions as part of the 
globalization process: they are mostly interpreted as ‘commodified marriages.’ This 
may be due to the objectives of these studies wherein analyses are of ‘male-order 
brides’, the relatively new trend of female migrants from developing countries who 
marry husbands abroad. Such women embrace an imagined future through a broker 
agency, implying rupture from their own affines and the adoption of a new life in an 
unknown environment. Hence, the absence of an historical background to most of 
these instances leads to interpreting these marriages within frameworks such as 
globalization, human trafficking and/or governmentality, often from a post-feminism 
perspective. As Kim observes: “[G]iven the persistent stereotypes as either victims or 
opportunists, women marriage migrants are still marginalized in their society and 
objectified in academic writings” (Kim 2010: 727). Although some changes have 
appeared in the scholarship’s approach (Constable 2009; Jones & Shen 2008; Kim 
2010), these studies reveal a tendency to confine women who enter into 
international/cross-border marriages to a category that ignores their past reality and 
the social backgrounds they actually come from, both of which elements complicate 
their status.  
For example, when Vietnamese brides are the objects of a particular research, 
they only appear in terms of how they are studied for: marriage migration. Yet, 
evidence from the field suggests that social categories are often blurry and can 
influence the image of a phenomenon based on certain stereotypical cases, even when 
the latter do not constitute the majority. But then, what should we call a Vietnamese 
woman, who has been deceived and sold to a Chinese man but escapes and officially 
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marries a Vietnamese man, then divorces the latter and becomes a prostitute in China 
solely as a means of survival, enters into cohabitation with a Chinese client who 
becomes her boy-friend, becomes the long-term unregistered spouse of a Chinese 
migrant, before returning to Vietnam as a regular worker, ultimately single? Should 
we classify her as a victim of human trafficking, a prostitute, an illegal migrant, a 
marriage migrant, a returnee or a regular rural migrant within Vietnam, or all of the 
above? Many of the women who confided their stories to me had experienced such 
complicated life journeys that prevent any simple categorization. Hence, the complex 
image that emerges from these alliances forces one to initially locate them in an 
historical context, then in a social context. Only then can one understand the 
heterogeneity and blurriness of their status, their social position, even their 
image/credibility as seen by the community that is host to them (which I will discuss 
in more detail in Chapter 4). Again, the same limits apply when interpreting the men’s 
position, since most of them have a background of disruptive life experiences that 
have rendered them receptive to cross-border marriage, a non-normative marital 
choice (discussed further in Chapter 5). Nicole Constable (2006), arguing for a new 
approach to these migrants categories, warns researchers against quite the opposite 
tendency from that which I have just mentioned: “Instead of arguing that the three 
separate literatures on what I prefer to call domestic workers, sex workers, and 
correspondence brides are too separate and would benefit from being combined, I am 
concerned with the potential for unwarranted blurs—or fuzzy shadow lines—between 
the three categories” (Constable 2006: 1, original emphasis). Here, Constable refers in 
particular to the ‘trafficked women’ discourse that tends to assume that these three 
categories are different names for a common profile of women. Keeping with her 
argument, I suggest extending her warning to the fact that categorizing people into 
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one of the three categories Constable identifies may be more convenient than relevant. 
For instance, many of my female informants were neither domestic workers nor 
prostitutes when I met them. Yet, they could all have been engaged at one time or 
another in their lives in one of these activities. While in some cases people had 
undoubtedly deceived them, in others they had decided themselves to cross the border 
and work illegally. None of them had gone through a process such as correspondence 
to meet their husbands; yet, they were all involved in various forms of cross-border 
marriage at some point in their trajectories, not necessarily as a consequence of a 
coerced match. I was personally confronted by difficulty when trying to fit my 
informants into neat categories: I had to ask myself were they trafficked women, 
regular foreign spouses, or migrant women in long-term relationships with Chinese 
partners? At the individual level, life experiences blur categories intended to 
differentiate one case from another, until terms themselves lose their initial meaning 
and purpose. Depending upon what period of an individual’s life we consider, his/her 
profile would require different frames, assuming that these very categories do make 
sense to him/her, or that they reflect the ways in which people articulate their own 
experiences and their ongoing lives. Identifying informants according to blurry 
categories that do not enclose the same realities for either the Chinese or Vietnamese 
people particularly by outsiders like myself, tends to create more confusion than that 
which already exists in the field. Hence, as Constable suggests, “[i]dentifying whom 
we are talking to and about by the labels they would recognize and respect, would 
seem be a fundamental step in the right direction for scholars, activists, and policy 
makers” (Constable 2006: 21-22).  
As far as Vietnamese international marriages are concerned, however, two 
recurrent images emerge. The first shows cohorts of educated women, who cannot 
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find suitable matches within their communities but find among Western-based 
Vietnamese men a possible satisfying life-partner (Thai 2008). A second image 
displays lines of young Vietnamese women patiently waiting for potential husbands in 
the obscure bars and hotels of Hô Chi Minh city. Sponsored by semi-legal broker 
agencies that arrange their departures for Taiwan, Singapore or South Korea, they 
clutch bunches of wedding pictures and a few gifts to share with their families before 
their flights depart. These commercially arranged marriages, which are considered 
one result of the globalization of – and transnationalism patterns in – the Asian region 
(Yeoh, Huang & Lam 2005; Williams & Hampshire 2010) supported by new 
technologies, have been both extensively reported by the media and observed and 
studied by contributors to activist and academic literature (Hugo & Xoan 2007; Wang 
2007, Tam 2003). Some findings tend to oversimplify – even forget about – 
international marriages that do not involve, for instance, an administrative procedure 
and the following-up of the brides’ socio-economic and legal position in their host 
societies. In order to travel abroad, these Vietnamese brides are required to submit to 
a medical examination, must be in possession of a proper marriage certificate, a 
passport, a visa, a flight ticket, and various (reliable or not) guarantees from their 
prospective husbands (via brokers) that they will indeed embark upon married life 
immediately after arriving at their destinations. Taken as a whole, the process offers 
very little space for coincidence and personal initiative. Unlike their southern sisters, 
Vietnamese women from the northern parts of Vietnam tend to look towards China 
when they have marriage in mind that cannot be satisfied locally. Even though 
brokers’ agencies have recently emerged in Hanoi and Haiphong to match Mainland 
Chinese with local Vietnamese women, most alliances occur across the border, 
without any ‘professional’ intermediaries and most of the time without any initial 
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plan. As a consequence, most academic discussions about Vietnamese brides tend to 
omit the specific issues that the existence of Vietnamese brides involved in ‘cross-
land-border’ marriages have created over the course of history and in particular in 
contemporary times.  
The study of ‘international marriage’ requires us to understand the process of 
recognition which divides various intimacies according to the ethnicity, gender, 
religion, class and nationality of the parties involved. It was not until the introduction 
of the passport as a method of surveillance and regulation that such ‘international 
marriage’ unions could be effectively monitored and categorized. Thus, the very 
notion of the ‘international marriage’ is itself a product of the modern twentieth-
century state (Toyota 2008: 2). 
These marriages are technically/theoretically international since they bind 
together individuals from different nationalities. But, they are also local because they 
are inscribed in a social space that links China’s Yunnan and Guangxi provinces to 
the Southeast Asian region and occur in societies linked by a complex hierarchy, all 
of which tends to change following similar dynamics. Unlike other international 
marriages in the region, personal and business-oriented alliances between local people 
still rely on personal networks. In the Sino-Vietnamese borderlands, for example, 
women and men do not meet within a structured and organised frame such as that 
provided by a broker agency. In fact, a larger space is left for interaction between 
coincidence, calculation and individual strategies which distinguish every case from 
the next and, above all, make relationships evolve in different directions despite their 
similar beginnings. Each stage of a marriage sees various factors influencing the 
relationship between a man and a woman: one union may fit different models during 
different periods of time. A woman forced to marry a foreign man might accept her 
situation when she realises she will be well treated. After bonding with her husband, 
the passage of time sees her rejecting the label of coerced union. Thus, analysing a 
precise moment of a marriage can never accurately capture the full experience of a 
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relationship or the way it transforms over time: nor can it define into which category 
it should enter. Only longitudinal, qualitative ethnographic research can begin to 
encapsulate the complexity of these couples’ conjugal reality. Therefore, the 
classification proposed here is merely an attempt to distinguish the main tendencies of 
marriage forms, according to how they begin and how they become a reality in the 
lives of both spouses. 
 
2 Today at the Sino-Vietnamese border 
My research intends to respond to Constable’s call by proposing a broader 
perspective that accounts for the various ways in which people’s lives inhabit multiple 
categories and cannot be reduced to simplistic typologies. Thus, in the interests of 
clarity, drawing on the life-stories I have gathered and followed up and upon the 
details offered by the individuals’ backgrounds, I will now outline the various 
profiles/patterns of cross-border alliances that are commonly found in the borderlands 
of Northern Vietnam and Southwest China. 
 
What do all Sino-Vietnamese couples share in common? 
What does a Vietnamese interpreter who marries her former Chinese employer 
with whom she fell in love have in common with a woman from a rural area in 
Vietnam who finds herself trapped and sold to a Chinese farmer? What makes two 
very different women, one from a rural area with only primary school education, and 
the other an urban dweller and university graduate, occupy a rather similar social 
position in China? What does a young enthusiastic businessman from Zhejiang have 
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in common with a middle-aged peasant from Guangxi? The second part of this 
chapter aims to provide a few answers to these questions by addressing the context in 
which these unions occur nowadays in the border areas, and to examine the types of 
marriage that emerge from both national context and individual situations. I argue that 
the main commonality between these very different patterns of conjugality resides in 
the interpretations that communities reach regarding them, and in issues related to the 
social status that their marriages actually reveal. 
One characteristic of these alliances is that in most cases they challenge the 
commonly accepted notion that marriage, in particular in Chinese and Vietnamese 
societies, unites two families, and that this is more relevant than the feelings that exist 
between the two main protagonists involved, more important than their own agency. 
Here, not only are the two families rarely if ever involved in the choice of each 
partner, but they are usually the missing link, overwhelmingly absent from the whole 
arrangement. Sino-Vietnamese alliances in the borderlands tend to be mostly based 
upon common interest and/or personal attraction of two adults rather than the result of 
two families’ negotiations that bind their children’s lives together. Alliances are 
settled irrespective of whether both partners have a say in the process or not. Because 
they often occur in a context of migration that isolates individuals and puts them in a 
specific position due to immigration rights, these mixed marriages generally embody 
the union of one family with one individual – at best – or the union of two 
independent individuals regardless of their relatives’ advice – at worst. This is, among 
other reasons, why the English term ‘alliance’ seems more appropriate to define these 
unions than the word ‘marriage’ that entails implications of a large range of actors, 
rituals and projects. 
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Contemporary terminology: How is marriage defined today at the Sino-
Vietnamese border? 
In her contribution to the International Conference on International Marriage 
in Asia (Singapore, NUS, 2010, October 14-15th), referring to the lack of clear 
definition of ‘marriage’, Lyons regretted that “we [researchers] recognize legal stated 
view of marriage and ignore others.”1  The conclusion reached at this conference 
deplored the lack of consensus regarding the terms used to describe marriage by each 
of the attending scholars. What they failed to ascertain was: is there any difference 
between international marriage, transnational marriage, cross-border marriage or 
cross-cultural marriage? Lyons’ review of the academic literature on the topic 
demonstrated that there was no clear distinction between – or explanation of – the use 
of one term rather than another. My personal choice was to follow the local definition 
which embedded many meanings that English terms such as marriage, union, alliance 
and arrangement could apply to without exhausting its content. 
 Jiehun [married]: a blurry definition 
So in contemporary times, at the local level, what exactly does the word 
‘marriage’ mean or evoke? What is a marriage? I recall the difficulties I encountered 
when first trying to identify informants because use of the words hunyin [marriage] or 
jiehun [married] was not necessarily appropriate in the eyes of local population to 
describe the domestic arrangements of the couples I was looking for. But, while the 
locals do not always use the word hunyin when referring to the relationships of mixed 
marriage couples, most of the latter refer to their relationships as hunyin. From their 
viewpoint, they are married, irrespective of whether or not they have performed the 
                                                
1 Leonore Lyons, unpublished presentation, Singapore, 14 October 2010. 
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requisite public rituals and registration that allow society and state to recognize their 
unions. 
To date, the anthropological definition of marriage remains the subject of 
ongoing debate. Since the Royal Anthropological Institute defined the institution of 
marriage as a “union between a man and women such that the children born to the 
woman are recognized as legitimate offspring of both partners” (RAI 1951), much has 
been written on the topic. The difficulty to agree on an updated universal definition of 
marriage – at least for anthropologists – mainly lies on the attention to pay to factors 
such as sexuality, gender and identity, reproduction, economic exchanges, inheritance 
rights, or relationships with kinship. Each attempted definition tends to cover many 
but not all aspects of marriage. All fail to be applicable to every society of this world, 
and create more debate than they reach any consensus. The diversity and exceptions 
found in many social groups nowadays make the task even harder in a contemporary 
world that evolves at an unprecedented speed. However, as Lyons notes, the legal 
definition generally validates what one should regard as marriage. The contemporary 
marriage laws of Vietnam (1986, revised in 2000) and China (1980, amended in 
2001) enforce monogamy, equality of men and women, and choice in marriage. If a 
union meets the criteria of marriage, the state sanctions it with civil registration. 
However, my use of the term ‘marriage’ in this thesis extends to include a large 
variety of cases which, while not considered as formal legalized marriages according 
to the law, were nonetheless experienced as marriage by my informants, according to 
their personal interpretations of the institution. I have chosen to use the terms of 
address that men and women use when referring to their partners as a means of 
assessing the particular circumstances of their relationships. In China and in southern 
China in particular, the Chinese terms laogong [husband] and laopo [wife] mean ‘life 
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partner.’ They are also used to refer to fiancés/ées (i.e., boyfriends and girlfriends 
respectively) when a relationship is thought to be stable and may culminate in official 
registration. Individual, family or community member usage of the terms laogong or 
laopo signals that the couple’s relationship is socially recognized – at least by their 
given circle of acquaintances – and regarded as a form of marriage, irrespective of 
whether official paperwork supports the fact. Full social recognition comes with a 
series of rituals organized between the two families and a final ceremony that gathers 
family and friends together at a banquet.  
Following the approximate definitions provided by the available vernacular 
terms to describe locally known versions of conjugal relationships in Hekou and 
Dongxing, there are additional ways of classifying these marriages. The first classifies 
a couple’s relationship according to the spouses’ places of origin and mobility. A 
marriage may be variously identified as tong minzu [intra-ethnic], bendi [local], waidi 
[outsiders], or kuaguo hunyin [cross-border marriage] in cases where the man and 
woman are from China and/or Vietnam. The last mentioned category constitutes the 
subject this thesis. Even though a marriage is identified as ‘having occurred across the 
border’, this informs little about its characteristics from the community viewpoint. 
The background and circumstances of an alliance provide much more relevant 
information. A marriage may variously be attributable to a business arrangement, 
escape from prostitution aided by an understanding client (or not), a forced marriage, 
an arranged match, a love story, or a family’s interference in their children’s personal 
affairs. Based upon the circumstances a couple has to contend with, the marriage 
evolves and constitutes a labelled reality. The status of the relationship comes first: a 
registered or tolerated cohabitation. The form that their union takes comes next: 
coercive marriage, an agreed-upon union, a pragmatic association or a precarious 
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romance (in the case of the woman, as a second-wife/lover). Eventually the 
temporality factor defines whether or not a relationship between two individuals 
constitutes a serious commitment: short arrangement during a temporary migration, a 
non-affianced romance, or a long-term union that may include children. Additional 
criteria, e.g., whether or not a couple live together, help to define their relationship’s 
stability. When the Chinese community, who are host to the majority of Sino-
Vietnamese couples, do not recognize two persons as married, they refer to their 
relationship as tongju guanxi [cohabitation] or hezuo guanxi [collaboration]. The most 
ambiguous albeit meaningful term, pin le [living as de facto spouses], designates a 
man and a woman as sharing a life together when at least one of the two partners is 
already married (although away from his/her family). However, use of pin le is in 
effect judgmental: it suggests that local communities, irrespective of their outward 
display of tolerance and indifference vis-à-vis local unconventional conjugal 
practices, continue to regard them as problematic. And, once a relationship is 
classified into one of these frames, individuals become the focus. 
 Yuenan laopo or Yuenan mei: Vietnamese brides/wives/partners 
I have found that foreign brides have little reason to identify themselves as a group on 
the basis of how they met their spouses. If we listen carefully, we may hear the voices 
of immigrant wives, but most have little reason to identify themselves as or to reply 
to the name of ‘mail order brides’ or trafficked women (Constable 2006: 19-20). 
Despite the social debate they have sparked in Taiwanese, Singaporean and 
South Korean societies in recent years, Vietnamese women, along with Chinese and 
other foreign brides in general (Lu 2005, 2008; Lu & Yang 2010), are now recognized 
as a category of specific immigrants with specific issues (Xoan & Xuyen 2010). 
Media and civil society have together played a decisive role in recognising and 
creating a platform from which to discuss the recurrent issues that Vietnamese 
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women’s existence in local society entails in terms of integration, education, civil 
rights and social security. In the public culture and discourse spheres, Vietnamese 
women constitute a category known as Yuenan xinniang [Vietnamese bride] or 
Yuenan mei [Vietnamese younger sister], terminology that broadly refers to the 
phenomenon of young Vietnamese brides matched with local, disadvantaged 
husbands, often in a very organized and efficient way, but also with a strong 
commercial orientation. This includes all the deviant affairs linked to dubious 
profitable business, as Figure 11 below reveals. 
 
Figure 11: Vietnamese Brides Matching. Guaranteed wedded and taken home within 3 months 
(Procedure completed within a 6 days return trip); Only 20,000; Four guarantees: 1. Virgin  2 
.Married within six months 3. No extra cost  4. Replaced if escaped before a year time, undated 
(Source: Internet, unknown author, translation by thesis author). This represents an extreme case of 
Vietnamese women commodification for marriage via a public advertisement in Taiwan, widely spread 
and commented upon over the Internet. 
In Hekou and Dongxing, Yuenan mei and Yuenan laopo [Vietnamese wife] are 
the terms most commonly used for Vietnamese women, although their meaning 
differs slightly. In these two cities, Yuenan mei can mean either a young fiancée or a 
prostitute: Yuenan laopo (or its shortened version Yuenan po) refers to a Vietnamese 
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woman who is actually sharing her life with a Chinese man, laopo being the 
colloquial term for wife in this area of China. But, none of these terms explicitly 
indicates the real position of a Vietnamese woman in her relationship with a Chinese 
partner. Yuenan mei and Yuenan po are simply generic terms that when translated are 
of little relevance to the conjugal reality. Xuan, a Vietnamese woman living in 
Dongxing observed: “When my husband is angry and insults me, he calls me Yuenan 
po.” According to some of my Vietnamese informants, use of this term implies a 
certain sense of condescension, usually conveyed via Chinese interlocutors’ facial 
expressions. This seems certainly to be associated with the diversity of realities that 
such terms cover, a topic that I will now explore further.  
Cross-border marriages in Sino-Vietnamese borderlands involve various 
patterns of migration of one or both partners, on a temporary, regular or long-term 
basis. Since the majority of Sino-Vietnamese couples tends to settle in Chinese 
territories, the migration process mostly involves Vietnamese women, who move out 
of their country and establish themselves with their new families in China. Some 
Chinese men may move to Vietnam, although my data suggest that such relocation is 
usually undertaken on a temporary/regular sojourning basis without actually settling. 
Some Chinese men maintain a second residence in Hanoi or in one of the Vietnamese 
border towns, from where they conduct business and share a part-time family life with 
their Vietnamese partners. However, marriages between Chinese women and 
Vietnamese men are rare1 and for this reason are not included in this research.  
                                                
1 According to my Chinese informants, some Chinese women used to marry Vietnamese men in the 
past. That was before the advent of the reform era which created an economic gap between the two 
countries and made such marriage prospect gradually less advantageous to Chinese women. Another 
explanation of the rarity of these marriages nowadays may be found in women’s position in the 
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Sino-Vietnamese marriage and women’s mobility 
Sino-Vietnamese marriages would not occur if Vietnamese women opted not 
to migrate at some point in their lives. Migration, for their part, means following an 
acquaintance or boyfriend, or may simply be attributable to a deep-seated yearning for 
change. Hence, migration patterns tend to define the type of marriage that sees them 
settle in China. Below are the main cases that I encountered during my research, cases 
that are frequently mentioned locally in terms of Vietnamese women’s mobility1 in 
the area. 
First, in the context of regular encounters with their Chinese neighbours, for 
example at rural markets, many Vietnamese women from border localities cross the 
border via mountain paths and small border gates. In the frame of local social and 
trading exchanges, they sometimes find a match with male partners from China: they 
stay on in the border Chinese villages following the marriage. And, while this type of 
marriage prevails among ethnic groups who share a common social space (Zhou 
2002: 229-230), they also mix with individuals from the majority groups. Daxin 
village, which borders Vietnam, has become a small tourist spot for those interested 
either in viewing the remains of the Sino-Vietnamese conflict (tunnels) or a lovely 
waterfall that marks the border. The village leader told me that thirteen out of fifty 
local families were composed of mixed couples (according to data I collected in 
                                                                                                                                       
Vietnamese family and society, which Chinese women perceived as ‘too low’ to  meet their personal 
yearnings and social expectations.  
1 I will discuss the issues of ‘pushing factors’ and outcomes, agency, strategy and expectations in 
Chapter 6. 
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2009). Go-betweens introduced ten of them, while the three others chose their 
partners themselves. Most of the Vietnamese women arrived during the 1990s, after 
the re-opening of the Sino-Vietnamese border gate. Once a poor village, today Daxin 
benefits from tourism activity, which started to develop the area post 1999. Since 
then, according to a Vietnamese woman selling Burmese jade in the market, the 
village men have grown richer; as a consequence, now they attract Chinese women 
from neighbouring villages and are no longer looking for partners among their 
Vietnamese neighbours. The few couples I met in the villages of Wanwei, Shanxin 
and Wutou, near Dongxing, constituted another case that conformed to this first 
pattern of cross-border marriages. These villages are locally known as the Jingzu 
Islands.1 According to the Fifth National Population Census of China (2000), the Jing 
(as suggested in Chapter 1) are a Vietnamese-speaking ethnic group of China totalling 
approximately 22,000. Many men from these villages meet their wives through 
regular exchanges with the Vietnamese during visits to border towns. Unlike their 
Han Chinese fellows, they encounter no major difficulties with language (although the 
form of Vietnamese spoken in the village is mixed with elements of Cantonese and 
not exactly the same as the standard Vietnamese spoken in Vietnam). One day, I was 
wandering in Shanxin village when a friendly secondary school girl engaged in 
conversation with me on her way home. I explained the purpose of my visit and she 
enthusiastically offered to introduce me to her uncle who, by chance, was married to a 
Vietnamese woman. Mr Long briefly acknowledged: 
— I married my wife in 1990; she was much younger than me. She came from 
Haiphong. We met while I was doing some business in Móng Cái, because I 
                                                
1 Nowadays, although the original islands are connected to the land, the villages are still called 
‘islands’. 
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was staying in her family’s house. She already had an elder sister married in 
Shanxin. We were introduced to each other. Before her, I had a Chinese wife, 
a crazy woman who gave me two daughters. I didn’t want her anymore. My 
Vietnamese wife gave me a son. 
One of his acquaintances, Mr Peng, invited me to stay for tea in his 
comfortable home. I understood from the pictures he showed me and from the 
explanations he gave that under the cover of being a ‘guide’, Mr Peng smuggled 
Russian cars from the northern Sino-Russian border down to the Sino-Vietnamese 
border: 
— My wife comes from Thái Bình1 province. I was on a business trip when I 
met her there. I had to go back three times to her family before her father 
agreed to let his daughter go. We are about the same age – only two years 
apart – and we now have two children. She is registered at the Village 
Committee but this doesn’t give her the right to register on my hukou 
[household registration book].2 Most Vietnamese women here are in this case. 
But our marriage results from our love for each other. This is rare in this 
village where many have bought their wives. Even Mr Long! But my wife was 
a high school teacher in Vietnam and a member of the Vietnamese Communist 
Party; she’s educated, she’s not [just] anybody. 
                                                
1 Thái Bình is a northern littoral province in Vietnam. 
2 To provide me with more precise data, Mr Peng took out of a drawer the registration form he filled in 
1993 to register his wife with the local authorities. Living together marks the beginning of an alliance 
rather than a proper marriage registration. In some places, local authorities may display some degree of 
tolerance towards free unions and allow Vietnamese migrant to stay, or at least live openly in China. 
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Mister Su, a fisherman in his fifties who was the third man I met within this 
network of acquaintances, shyly spoke to me after some hesitation: 
— My wife arrived in Shanxin in 1989, brought from Vietnam by her elder 
sister who was already living in our village. I only married her in 2001. In 
Vietnam, she was married to a man who drunk and gambled, and she had a 
child. She left him to come here and find a new partner. At that time, I was 
very poor. Before knowing her, I… had a Chinese partner for five years, but it 
was a long time ago… I had no intention to marry a Vietnamese woman 
though.  I used to see Vietnamese people as lazy people who want to enjoy 
life. We speak the same language, that’s true, but some differences subsist, 
especially in the terms of address. Most Vietnamese women arrived after the 
opening of the frontier, voluntary, for economic reasons. Anyway, there are 
too much women over there [Vietnam]. My wife is… [he takes some time to 
think about it] 32 years old. Now we have a child together. 
A second pattern of cross-border marriage resulting from migration of 
Vietnamese women to China concerns members of communities who are historically 
spread between two countries, have learned to make use of their mixed identities and 
cultural knowledge, follow their communities’ traditions, and extend their family and 
trading networks to a new and promising context of cross-border trade (Chan 2005a). 
These communities include the Huaqiao/Hoa kiều overseas Chinese (in Vietnam), 
and the Yueqiao/Việt kiều1 overseas Vietnamese (in China). Since the re-opening of 
                                                
1 This term usually refers to members of the Vietnamese diaspora settled in western countries. 
Informants in the border areas used it to refer to Vietnamese settled in China. In general, being Việt 
kiều also suggests Vietnamese enjoying a higher economic status than their counterparts residing in 
Vietnam. 
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the border and economic exchange between the two countries, traders from both sides 
have made use of their connections to find their life partners. They usually share a 
common identity; but, in some cases, they can only openly proclaim their identity 
through marriage.  
One young Vietnamese Huaqiao named Li (cf. Chapter 1) used to be ashamed 
of the Chinese background she inherited from her mother’s family.1 But, since her 
marriage to her Chinese husband in Dongxing, Li can now make use of her language 
ability – even pretend that she is Chinese, not Vietnamese (in terms of citizenship). 
Even though she is officially married to her husband and does not need to hide her 
natal identity, she sometimes chooses to introduce herself as Chinese to people she 
meets for the first time (whether they are Vietnamese or Chinese). When I asked her 
why she chose to lie about her ethnicity, she explained that she did so for two reasons: 
(1) She feared the stigma attached to Vietnamese women living with Chinese men; 
and (2) She was proud to reveal a part of herself that her parents used to deny and 
hide when she was growing up in Móng Cái. Li learned the Chinese language by 
secretly watching Chinese TV when she was young. Thanks to her language skills,2 
she had managed to find various jobs in Dongxing, as guide, interpreter or 
salesperson.  
In Hekou, Kim spent her entire childhood torn between Vietnam and China, 
due to the conflicted relationship of her separated parents (a Vietnamese father and a 
Chinese-Vietnamese mother) who made her the object of recurring custody 
negotiations between two families (cf. Appendix 4). Upon reaching adulthood, she 
                                                
1 Li’s mother was born in Hainan province, China 
2 Li speaks Chinese Mandarin, the Hainan and Baihua Chinese dialects as well as the Vietnamese and 
Zhuang (an ethnic group) languages, all of which are commonly used in and around the Dongxing area. 
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chose her identity and decided to become a guide. This meant living on the Chinese 
side of the border, independently from any members of her family. A few years later, 
Kim accepted her Chinese boyfriend’s (a former colleague) proposal. The couple, 
who are now well established, manage the bar of a government-owned high standard 
hotel in Hekou. Through their work and leisure activities (mah-jong and gambling), 
they are constantly enmeshed in a new business network built around their relatives in 
Vietnam and China and new customers/acquaintances. Although not always 
benefiting from their involvement in such a connecting dynamic, Kim and her 
husband have participated in creating a transnational community moved by similar 
economic goals.  
Vietnamese women from the rural localities of Northern Vietnam, who have 
migrated to border towns such as Lào Cai or Móng Cái for trading and/or working 
purposes, constitute the third group of ‘marriage migrants.’ Many of them initially 
had no intention of becoming involved in intimate affairs with Chinese men when 
they first came to the border in search of a new life or possible working opportunities. 
They regularly cross the border, in the process becoming acquainted with Chinese 
people among whom they may possibly find potential partners (migrant workers, 
business owners or traders). Months or years later, depending upon both partners’ 
ages, education levels, family opinion, material conditions and feelings, the above 
couples emerge from the social dynamics and activities of border towns. Frequently, 
Vietnamese women relocate into various types of Chinese localities in the borderlands 
– even all over China – after marriage. But, while they may have left a previous 
household in Vietnam, they do not necessarily turn their backs on Vietnam. Some, 
however, due to complex issues related to the recognition of their marriages, fall into 
the category of ‘illegal migrants’ in China. 
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Close to this group are the Vietnamese women who originate from the inner 
provinces of Vietnam, who are deceived and lured into obscure (often nefarious) 
deals. Relatively ignorant of the border reality, they cross the frontier, often being 
unsuspectingly coerced into prostitution or arranged marriages with eager men from 
various places in China. These women tend not only to vanish from their place of 
origin, but to disappear as well from their new environment. In effect, they become 
‘non-existent’ This particular category of marriage includes cases of ‘trafficked 
women’, a subject to which I refer at various stages throughout the thesis. 
Related to this group of Vietnamese women are the deceived/trafficked 
women, who have lost their social and legal existence in Vietnam and cannot acquire 
new legality in China. For reasons that I will detail in Chapter 5 they cannot – or do 
not want to – re-integrate with their own communities, and often end their trajectories 
in border localities where they hope to ‘benefit’ from the flexible/chaotic environment 
that the border towns (seem to) provide them with. Where “everything is possible,” 
they hope to find partners with whom they can build new lives out of what is left of 
their dignity, bodies, health, strength and flexibility. 
Probably smaller in number but consequent in reputation are the specific cases 
of Vietnamese prostitutes, madams and/or procurers. 1  Sometimes, with the 
compliance of a compassionate client, they retire and become engaged to Chinese 
partners. They may remain either in the border towns where they work, or anywhere 
in China as long as they follow their husbands. They spread out among the Chinese 
                                                
1 All my informants referred to madams (as for brothel keepers) and female procurers in their accounts. 
Therefore, in this thesis, I will generally use these terms to designate the persons who control 
Vietnamese prostitutes, but I will use the gender-neutral word pimp when these persons are 
unidentified. 
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population, where some pursue their activities as brothel madams or procurers. Lien 
and her partner A Long, who own a brothel in Hekou, are among these couples, even 
though they opt not to acknowledge the actual circumstances of their initial encounter. 
Although rather easy to identify, these various patterns of Sino-Vietnamese marriages 
are not exclusive. Some couples fit into more than one category, according to the 
evolution of their marriage status over the years. Cases of women who have 
experienced various forms of marriage remain difficult to classify. 
 
Migratory movement and marriage trajectories in the case of involuntary 
first migration 
An acquaintance from Lào Cai introduced me to Yen, a vegetable seller at the 
market behind the train station. Yen was living in a small, simply built, ground floor 
wooden house outside of town, modestly furnished with only the necessary furniture. 
But, we first met at her sister’s place, a modern-style house in the suburbs of Lào Cai. 
She welcomed us (my interpreter Loan and me) with a smile. She had just showered 
and eaten dinner after a long working day. She sat on a bed, and, when her sister was 
busy with her children, Yen started to quietly talk. Our conversation was limited by 
time restrictions, so, we agreed to meet the next morning. Yen’s Vietnamese husband 
welcomed us, then left us alone so Yen could continue her narrative (cf. Appendix 2). 
Yen went to China, came back, intended to go again but eventually stayed in 
Vietnam, all the time wishing she could return to China one day to see the son she had 
to leave there. Such comings-and-goings occur frequently among Vietnamese women, 
who did not plan to cross their country’s border in the first place, and who seem to 
experience psychological difficulties during the process of settling. Not far away, on 
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the other bank of the frontier, Tam was selling lemon juice in one of Hekou’s little 
refreshment stalls for Vietnamese people. When I met her, she immediately trusted 
me because we had something in common that no one around could share with us: a 
‘French’ father.1 This is how our friendship started. Later she confided in me the 
whole complex trajectory of her life, which involved several marriage experiences 
between China and Vietnam (cf. Appendix 6). Drawing on the lives of women like 
Yen and Tam as examples of deception that led some Vietnamese women into marital 
life with Chinese men, one can trace a somewhat typical pattern of migration. A first 
step takes them from their communities and brings them into China. Some 
Vietnamese women cross the border and end up with living with Chinese men due to 
deception, disobedience and human trade circumstances. It may be a few days, a few 
weeks or years before they are able to seize a chance to return to Vietnam. They 
experience life in a Chinese family and in a Chinese community on both emotional 
and material levels. A second step brings them back to their country. Somehow, they 
return to their communities to visit their families, to escape abusive husbands, all the 
time yearning for comfort and understanding. After a certain period of recovery and 
exchange, raising awareness of their respective plights and searching for support for a 
new start, they begin to face suspicion, pity, mockery, discrimination and/or rejection. 
Finding themselves trapped in difficult circumstances, they invariably take the third 
step which takes them away once more, but this time on a more voluntary basis; 
because, once they realize that there is little chance of resettling in Vietnam due to 
their problematic legal status and social ostracism, they are left with no other option 
                                                
1 Tam’s father was actually a Moroccan-French soldier who fought with the French army in the 1950s 
but had rejoined the Việt Minh during the First Indochina War (1946-1954). Following the 
independence of Vietnam, he had since lived and married in North Vietnam. 
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but a second migration to other places in Vietnam or to China. Ultimately they hope 
to establish themselves, find work, a partner and a home. This is how their trajectory 
often leads them to border towns where their ‘nonexistence’ appears more like a 
permanent status. 
The above migratory movement patterns of Vietnamese women say little 
about how they and their husbands experience their relationships; that is, whether they 
were sealed on a voluntary basis or not, and for a short or long period of time. Yen 
and Tam had already pointed out how feeling emerged in marriages and might take a 
favourable turn. And, while migration and the instability of both partners may 
possibly be attributable to external factors, taken together they neither define the 
nature of a marriage, nor the strength (or weakness) of a personal connection. Yen 
misses the family she did not choose initially; Tam trusted the Chinese men she 
maintained affairs with, despite her dramatic experience with her first partner in 
China. Other couples developed affection for each other regardless of their initial 
feelings and behaviour. In their talks with me, both Yen and Tam expressed some 
nostalgia about life in China among the Chinese people that revealed more about their 
marriage experiences than a trajectory – a before and after – could after positioning 
them in a given fixed category. 
 
Frequent patterns of cross-border alliances 
Drawing upon the variety of cases I encountered in the Sino-Vietnamese 
borderlands, I now propose classifying the marriages according to the Vietnamese 
women’s mobility and to highlight the role of coerced migration in their subsequent 
relocations. But, regardless of how they actually occurred in terms of circumstances 
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that allowed two strangers to meet and settle together, I now suggest classifying these 
marriages into three other categories, according to the nature of the spouses’ 
relationships. This classification represents both the ways in which border people 
define the cross-border marriages they observe in their social environment and the 
way the protagonists themselves articulate them.  
 Forced relationships 
When I first met Mai a woman from Haiphong, she was working as an 
interpreter for a couple of Guilin shop-owners in Dongxing. The mother of two 
teenagers, she was still living with the man who bought her from a broker. It was only 
after weeks of silence during which she observed me interacting with other 
Vietnamese women at her neighbour’s refreshment stall that she eventually disclosed 
her identity and past to me. She recalled how she met her husband in 1989:  
— I had a girlfriend, Thanh, who spoke baihua. We had a small business 
selling vegetables together. One day, with another friend, Nan, we decided to 
go to Móng Cái to buy fresh supply. A male friend of Thanh came with us. 
But, once [we] arrived there were no cucumbers. Then, Thanh suggested 
crossing the border to see what might be available on the Dongxing side. An 
old Vietnamese woman joined us to take us all to her married daughter in 
Qinzhou. From there, we went to Fangcheng to have lunch with one of her 
friends. This is where the suggestions of our guests and guides to find a local 
husband made us realize that we had no money and didn’t know our way back 
to the frontier: we found ourselves trapped. Much later, I realized the bottom 
of the story: the man from Haiphong was Thanh’s lover whose wife had 
threatened to disfigure Thanh with acid if she didn’t disappear. So Thanh 
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asked her lover to take her to China where she would find a husband; he was 
her accomplice… it was the easier [this] way to rebuild her life. But, she 
couldn’t leave alone and therefore, she cheated Nan and me. It was the son of 
the old Vietnamese woman who found us our husbands. He first introduced 
me to an old man who had a three-storey house, and tried to convince me that 
it was his son that I could marry. But the son was away, working in Shenzhen 
[in Guangzhou province]. So the proposition could be a trick. Then the old 
woman’s son took the three of us to a village near Qinzhou where he 
introduced me to my current husband. But I refused the same way: I didn’t 
want to get married! But the guy was young and my girlfriend convinced me: 
“If you don’t want him, I'll take him!” So it was this young guy or the old man 
I had met earlier. Anyway, the people who had brought us to this village 
refused to take us back to town, leaving us at an impasse. So I finally agreed, 
thinking the situation would be temporary. My two girlfriends and I asked to 
stay together. They both agreed to marry two other men from the village, and 
then things turned out right. I learned from my husband’s family that I was 
sold for 1200 yuan.1 
If it took Mai a period of time to acknowledge (to me) that she had been 
forced into marriage with her husband, it may be because twenty years after the fact, 
her perspective on her personal life had changed. She was still married to her Chinese 
man, had two teenaged boys and said she was rather satisfied. And, so it was with 
many similar life stories I have collected. Even though the category of ‘forced 
                                                
1 Mai did not say who received the money but according to all testimonies of this kind in the region, the 
money never goes to the bride’s family, as would be the case were it bride price. The money is simply 
shared between the various intermediaries who brought a woman from Vietnam to a groom’s village. 
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marriage’ seems relatively easy to identify in such stories, the temporality factor and 
the phenomenological experience emerge and raise doubt about any attempts to 
conveniently classify these cross-border relationships.  
 Performed relationships 
For many local border town residents, cross-border marriages occur because at 
least one of the two parties sees an advantage in making the troublesome choice of 
marrying a foreigner. To the onlooker, a couple’s adherence to the required 
registration of marriages suggests a romance-based relationship that promises a life 
commitment, whatever the benefits each party may find in the marriage apart from 
family-oriented projects. But, from a community perspective, unions that are not (or 
not yet) registered – that is, the majority – only find justification in hidden interests. 
This is why whenever I asked people what they knew or thought about a particular 
mixed couple, judgmental comments would immediately follow, indicating that there 
was some form of pretence in the relationship, i.e., that the marital arrangement was 
simply a cover to conveniently achieve certain concrete projects while enjoying each 
other’s company without sentimental commitment. Assessing the subjective 
experiences of such marriages first relied on my primary sources, that is, on 
community observers’ accounts. It was unlikely that anyone would admit to being 
engaged to a foreigner for pragmatic reasons only. However, a few Vietnamese 
women admitted to feeling some disappointment: some suspected that their 
companions showed little or no interest in engaging any further in the relationship; 
they were only interested in any immediate benefit it would bring. One afternoon in 
Hekou, Tam’s young friend A Mei sketched a rather neutral portrait of her personal 
life: 
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— I am Yao (cf. Chapter 2) and I come from Yên Bái. I am 26 years old. My 
laogong [husband] husband is a nice man, he likes to gamble but he’s nice to 
me. He was a worker in a factory but he had an accident and lost three fingers 
on one hand. Since then, he receives a monthly pension from the factory. Now 
he’s a sanlunche [cyclo-driver] which is less demanding. I met him at the 
market. He is 48 years old. We have been together for less than a year, and we 
get along. We live comfortably here, even though this is a lent apartment. 
When I came back a few weeks later, A Mei was alone at home and confided 
her sorrow over some fruit that we ate together in front of a television program we 
were not really watching: 
— I don’t trust men, neither my father, nor my brother nor my husband. We 
never know what they really think about. My family is very poor, my mother 
isn’t a smart woman, my father is rude and I have many siblings. I am the only 
one who studied up to secondary school. Then I studied medicine during six 
months; I couldn’t finish the three years studies because I had no money. But 
with my knowledge, I could sell drugs [medicine] and heal people in 
mountainous areas in Yên Bái. I liked it, you know. But, when I was 22 years 
old, my father forced me to marry a man because I was getting too old. I left 
him a year later because he was beating me and I didn’t want to accept this. I 
felt it was wrong that a man beats his wife. I stayed at my mother’s with my 
baby but since my husband never tried to visit me, we divorced. I have a five 
years old daughter who lives in Vietnam now. Then, my brother and his wife 
tried to sell me as a prostitute once. So I came to Hekou to sell vegetables at 
the market. And now I am here, I spend my days cooking, washing clothes, 
and taking care of this apartment. My husband’s son also lives here with his 
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girlfriend. He doesn’t like me very much. My husband is nice to me but he 
doesn’t help me, and I don’t think he loves me… I am his third wife. After he 
divorced his Chinese wife because she was cheating on him, he had a 
Vietnamese wife who left him: he beat her and broke her arm during a fight. I 
don’t know what will be the future.1 If he decides to go back to his hometown 
[another place in Yunnan] I won’t be able to follow him because we are not 
really married. 
Was it to preserve her dignity or was she concerned about what she would tell 
a relative stranger? A Mei avoided mentioning all of the last details when she first met 
me. But, the anecdote she imparted to me this afternoon translated her disappointment 
and her awareness of being maintained as a convenient housemaid/housewife destined 
to fulfil the needs of several individuals: A Mei’s husband, his son and girlfriend and 
couple of friends who regularly stayed at their place. A Mei explained that she did not 
have any income or money of her own. She was totally dependent upon the money her 
husband gave her to buy food; but, she never dared to ask for money for other needs, 
fearing the son’s reaction.  
Whether some couples are seen as ‘performers’ of a romantic union by 
community members, or are themselves performing a marriage for the sake of social 
face through attitudes and narratives, their relationships’ images all reveal the 
vulnerability of mixed couples’ social position. Adding to an already complex 
distinction between ‘real’ and ‘fake’ marriages, unscrupulous individuals tend to 
behave controversially. As Chan observed during her study of tourism and trade in 
                                                
1 When I returned to Hekou two years later, I tried to contact A Mei, but she had vanished. The 
apartment she used to live was unoccupied. When I called her cell-phone, a man answered and said that 
A Mei was in Guangzhou province (China) but that he did not know her new phone number.  
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Lào Cai, some Vietnamese women set out obtain favours, in a bid to enhance their 
economic status. What may simply be a common strategy of social climbing through 
marriage may lend itself to harsh interpretation as ‘commodification of ganqing 
[feeling]’ (Chan 2005a: 220). Lifestyles that fit the category of ‘performed’ 
relationships include those of Vietnamese women who are local concubines of 
Chinese men. Publicly, their ‘husbands’ pretend to enjoy a stable marital life with 
them while still being officially married to another woman in China. China is no 
exception when it comes to adultery, although maintaining a mistress usually implies 
notions of prestige, manhood and wealth (Lang & Smart 2002). In the case of 
Vietnamese concubines/second wives, an issue I will discuss in more detail later in 
this chapter, such practice is more a question of commercial strategy and convenience 
– as well as personal feelings – one that proves a man’s ability in trade. Locals also 
emphasise that a Vietnamese concubine costs a lot less money than a Chinese 
mistress. 
According to my informants, a further form of temporary and pretended 
alliance, which people refer to as fang gezi [stand someone up], is practised in the 
Sino-Vietnamese borderlands. This colloquial expression literally means “liberate/free 
the pigeon.” In the specific context of cross-border alliances, as confirmed by some 
media reports,1 this refers to wives who suddenly disappear from the households to 
which they belong in China, along with the family savings and sometimes the 
couples’ offspring.  This category constitutes women who are commonly referred to 
as ‘scheming fakers.’ In Hekou, I met several men who complained about their former 
Vietnamese wives’ attitudes upon which they had earlier based their understanding of 
                                                
1 http://law.anhuinews.com/system/2005/02/24/001141779.shtml; 
 http://news.sohu.com/20101215/n278312051.shtml   
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certain forms of intimate business. Typically, a woman would pretend to be party to a 
romantic liaison with a Chinese man; she would stay with him, gain his trust, and then 
abscond with his fortune once she had achieved her purpose. According to the locals, 
such a performance can last for years before the true nature of the woman is revealed. 
Mr Hu, who was born in 1947, originated from Sichuan. He settled in Hekou during 
the 1960s as a single man. Now retired, he stays there, playing cards most of the time 
on the Red River banks where he conducts some obscure business he did not wish to 
talk about. 
— I have been married to a Vietnamese woman; well, let me tell you about 
her. She had left her Vietnamese husband because he was a drug-addict. She 
had three children. I stayed with her and I raised her children as mine during 
eleven years! And one day she just left. I have been cheated. Look at him [he 
said, nodding at his game partner]: he experienced the same thing! These 
women are like that, no heart, no feelings. 
The man to whom he referred simply agreed with Mr Hu without offering any 
personal details. He was obviously embarrassed. On other occasions, I tried to raise 
the subject again in conversations with Mr Hu, but he did not want to comment 
further on the affair. Such marriages generate so much mistrust in the local population 
that they are easily categorized as ‘pretended unions’, at least pretended by one of the 
two partners. I found many Chinese residents eager to report such stories. Facts, 
assuming they are impartially presented, are often difficult to interpret; but, what are 
worth noting here are the marks that these episodes of local intimate life leave on the 
discourse surrounding Vietnamese women. 
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 Romantic but pragmatic relationships / business-driven relationships 
Wang Litao, a businessman established in Hekou, originally came from 
Sichuan where he served in the army as a soldier for 12 years. In 2008, I met him in 
his shop/office from where he sold Japanese construction/building equipment and 
machines. 
— When I left the army, I was appointed a job, but I refused it because I 
wanted to be free. It’s harder this way but it’s better. I am married for three 
years now. My wife Xiao Hu was born in Vietnam from an overseas 
Vietnamese family who returned to Vietnam in 1978. Her family lives in Lào 
Cai. She [has spoken] Chinese since her youth. She has also spent three years 
in Japan to study and work, and now she runs this business with me. [Our 
conversation is interrupted by Xiao Hu’s arrival and the couple spend a few 
minutes on accounting issues before returning to our dialogue]. Xiao Hu is 
five months pregnant. We already know it will be a girl, because Xiao Hu had 
an ultrasound in Vietnam.1   
A few months later, I met Wang Litao again. He had just bought a smart 
Toyota car and an apartment in Hekou. To diversify his business activities, he had 
also bought a piece of land with a plantation of eucalyptus. He explained that 
eucalyptus wood was used as construction material for building structures inside 
mines. The exploitation of mineral resources in the northwest provinces of Vietnam 
aims to fulfil the Chinese need for natural resources; thus, demand for such equipment 
                                                
1 During an ultrasound in China, the doctor is not allowed to reveal the sex of the baby. This policy 
aims to avoid selective abortion. In practice, however, in many cases it is possible to bribe medical 
staff. In Vietnam there is no restriction. 
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is rising. Xiao Peng, the young local wheeler-dealer who initially introduced me to 
Wang Litao, expressed his scepticism as follows: 
— Actually, what Wang Litao doesn’t tell you is that he leaves all the business 
to his wife. She is the one who has contacts in Vietnam; she cares about 
everything, all the details. Wang Litao only gets busy with searching [for] new 
business opportunities. 
Sang, the couple’s Vietnamese assistant, took the opportunity to engage in idle 
discussion about Xiao Hu’s pregnancy and the early stages of motherhood: 
—  Xiao Hu has become very Chinese in her life-style. Have you seen her 
luxury apartment? She has everything! She became lazy and she relies a lot on 
her mother for her childrearing. Her mother has always spoiled her; Xiao Hu 
never had to do anything at home.1 She could lose some weight if she made 
some efforts [she smiles]. If she were in Vietnam, she would have to do 
everything by herself. Vietnamese mothers do not help or spoil their daughters 
as much as in China when they have children on their own. When I had my 
children, my mother didn’t have time to help much. Vietnamese women are 
too busy, they are still young and they still work when they become 
grandmothers, they don’t have time. Xiao Hu still complains she doesn’t have 
time to deal with all her tasks and she would like to hire a baomu 
[housekeeper/babysitter]. Actually, this is also a suggestion from Wang Litao. 
Being a father, he does not help her a lot, he does not know how to take care 
of a baby; he is a typical man! 
                                                
1 Sang, who has known Xiao Mei from childhood, is a personal friend of her family in Vietnam.  
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Xiao Hu’s mother-in-law lives in Sichuan province (China) while her own 
mother lives across the Red River in Lào Cai. This is why the latter is more available. 
And, while this situation reverses the roles traditionally attributed to grandparents vis-
à-vis childrearing, it also signifies contemporary family transformations. Nowadays in 
China, due to the large numbers of people emigrating, grandparents from both 
families contribute to the childrearing and education of their children’s offspring, 
sometimes fulltime and up to an advanced age. This often occurs when parents live 
too far away to take care of their own children. A year later, during my last visit to 
Wang Litao, Sang added a few details which to her signified Xiao Hu’s embracing of 
a typical yet questionable contemporary Chinese way of coping with early childhood.  
— Xiao Hu is still very busy with business. After a few months of care in 
Hekou, she sent her daughter to Kunming [capital of Yunnan province]. Her 
mother lives there now so she can take care of the baby while Xiao Hu 
conducts the business here. She doesn’t want any other child because she says 
it’s too tiring. .. Like many Chinese women do, she sends her kid away. But I 
see it as marks of laziness. When I had my children, I had to do everything as 
before, and so do most Vietnamese women. It’s hard but we can work and take 
care of our children ourselves.  
Here, no one openly questions the romance uniting Wang Litao and Xiao Hu. 
The couple are officially registered and belong to the quite respected fringes of 
business-oriented marriages (mainly due to their established success and cohesion), 
whereas many other mixed couples simply accommodate each other as long as their 
association remains financially reliable and beneficial for both. But border towns are 
special places where everything relates to business, where competition is fierce, and 
where many conversation topics (including assessment of other’s business affairs) are 
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discussed through the lenses of the economic climate. Like Wang Litao, most 
migrants’ purpose when settling in Hekou or Dongxing was to earn money and to 
participate in the development of cross-border activities. Hence, some men find it 
difficult not to link their business ambitions with opportunistic alliances with 
Vietnamese women. From the local residents’ standpoint, nowadays, “romance-based 
but pragmatic relationships” are the most common form of cross-border alliances in 
border towns, domestic relations which invite the most extensive and controversial 
comments from the community (cf. Chapter 4). But, as I have already suggested, 
evidence of these short or long-term alliances can be traced down through the region’s 
history (Loos 2008; Phụng 2006) and are a contemporary version of what Barbara 
Watson Andaya, describing trading strategies during seventieth century Southeast 
Asia, calls ‘temporary marriage:’  
Such arrangements were typical of the temporary marriages that were a feature of 
Southeast Asian economic life. Southeast Asian men always preferred to trade in 
places where they already had relatives who could furnish companionship and 
assistance, and assumed others would feel the same. By recognizing a woman as the 
wife of a foreigner, be it a few days or months or even years, temporary marriages 
helped create the kinship networks critical to the whole commercial structure. The 
female ‘promiscuity’ that displeased early Chinese observers thus reflected not 
merely relaxed ideas regarding interaction between men and women but the use of 
sexual relationships to welcome traders into the community … Temporary marriages 
were indispensable to successful trading, not merely due to the kinship connections 
they created but because throughout Southeast Asia it was women, not men, who 
controlled the retail trade. A relationship with a foreign merchant gave a woman a 
clear advantage in access to desired goods either as sole seller or as agent (Andaya 
1998: 12 & 14). 
Although historical documents lack the phenomenological perspective of those 
particular married couples, they attest once again to the fact that contemporary cross-
border marriages occurred in line with the old pattern of trading alliances that 
involved personal commitment to the populations of the localities that were trading 
partners.  
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State intervention in and flexibility regarding local marital practices 
Such arrangements were tolerated in the borderlands because there, as many 
informants put it, anything is acceptable. “Mei ren guan [no one cares].” Apart from 
the regular duties related to city management and social organization, the main 
concerns of the local authorities were: regulating trading flows, controlling migration, 
and scrutinizing underground activities. Without stating that individuals’ private 
practices were left out of social policies, practices show that tolerance and 
understanding defined the Chinese local authorities’ attitudes towards the lifestyles – 
and, by extension, their compliance with the legal registration of the marriages – of 
the communities they supervised. “Tamen tai mang [they are too busy]!” the Hekou 
and Dongxing residents used to say about the authorities. Some even ironically 
suggested “Tamen tai mang zhuan qian [they are too busy making money],” implying 
the rampant corruption and the privileged site that the border represented for 
additional income. Meanwhile, flexibility regarding the people’s private life patterns 
reached its limitation as far as the children were concerned. Control is still exercised 
over the population as the investigations into Family Planning attested. Even though 
the status of the Vietnamese wives of Chinese men is not legally recognised if they 
fail to register their marriages, their fertility still falls under the control of the 
government health workers. Xuan, an unhappy Vietnamese woman and a motorbike 
taxi driver in Dongxing once told me:  
— I had my first son with my laogong [husband]. Soon after, I was pregnant 
with my second child but the Family Planning discovered me during a control. 
They forced me to abort at seven months pregnant. I was so sad, it was a 
boy… I felt so bad and my husband was so mean with me… I wanted to die, 
and as I cried in the street, he yelled at me, “If you want to die, do it at home, 
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not on the street!” He said I should have waited for five years, that it was my 
fault. When I fell pregnant again, I had to leave to escape the health workers 
… I gave birth to my second boy in Fangcheng.1  
Chi, a Vietnamese migrant, spent some years working in Taiwan after she 
ended an unhappy marriage in Vietnam and left her children in her husband’s custody. 
She re-married to a Chinese man in Hekou after settling in China (cf. Appendix 7). 
Their marriage was not registered. After an abortion she underwent without telling her 
husband (the pregnancy was unexpected and she did not feel their relationship would 
last), she fell pregnant again and decided to keep the baby in accordance with her 
family’s advice and because her husband yearned for a male heir. In 2008, at 42 years 
of age, Chi gave birth to their son. Speaking in her unusual Taiwanese Chinese 
accent, she recalled her experience: 
— During my pregnancy, I underwent two ultrasounds in Vietnam and 
everything was fine. My baby was healthy. But, when I went to Hekou’s 
hospital … there the doctors told me that the baby was too small, that he 
missed one ear and his mouth. I was really worrying. But I delivered and 
nothing was wrong with my son. 
Although I was not able to check with authorities regarding their motive, I 
argue that one possible reason for the intimidation exercised by the hospital 
authorities, and the strict application of state policies to the specific case of 
unregistered mixed couples, was that parents of a child born out of wedlock are 
required to register the baby’s identity on his/her Chinese father’s hukou. If the 
                                                
1 Fangcheng is a neighbouring city district under the same administration as Dongxing. 
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newly-born infant is a second child of a family who has the right to one child only,1 
his/her father will be fined and the child’s rights will be subject to restrictions. In 
addition, too many extra births may urge the authorities to sanction the local health 
officers for their inability to control the population’s fertility. Circumstances such as 
these complicate the fragile, artificial balance that the Family Planning authorities 
attempt to establish among the Chinese population. Yet, in many other cases 
encountered in Dongxing and Hekou, mixed families produced two or three children 
without incurring the same strict measures. The usual gap between policies that justify 
state intervention in marriage and local practices in terms of implementation explains 
the variations in the rules regarding the registration of marriage and children, and the 
difficulty in obtaining genuine information about what the rules really imply/stipulate.  
Among a large majority of de facto married Sino-Vietnamese couples in 
China, explanations concerning marriage recognition differ from one case to the next. 
However, the blurring of the administrative procedure pertaining to international 
marriage registration, apparently well maintained by ignorant, unskilled or reluctant 
local authorities, is responsible for the illegal situation that most of these mixed 
couples are compelled to endure. Only a few of my informants were able to explain 
the different stages of the necessary procedure to legalize their union. And these 
informants were representative of the most stable, love-story-based responsible 
couples who wished, dared and struggled to proceed through -and comply with -
official channels. From the information I gathered (up to 2009), and from my personal 
                                                
1 Some families, for instance those from minority ethnic backgrounds, are permitted to have two 
children. This is also true in Han [the main ethnic group] rural households when the firstborn is a girl 
and a boy will ultimately prove of more value in a work sense to the parents. 
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experience that confirms most details, in order to register a marriage in China a mixed 
couple needs to meet the following official principal requirements:1 
- Being single or officially divorced and providing the following documents as 
proof: (a) a marriage certificate (weihun zheng), or (b) a divorce certificate (lihun 
zheng). In the first case, the document can only be provided by the place of hukou 
registration. This can be far away from the border, and usually requires the person 
who intends to marry to request it in person. This alone posed several problems. If 
one tries to conceal a previous marriage (is not divorced), the requisite document is 
impossible to obtain. The inability to afford a long trip can also prevent one from 
obtaining the required document. On the Vietnamese side, a bride-to-be needs to be 
registered as a resident in her original place of living. But, if she embarked upon long-
term internal or international migration without notifying the Vietnamese authorities, 
her legal existence may have been erased from the local records.2 If she was 
previously married but was abandoned by her husband – or if she abandoned her 
household – and failed to obtain a legal divorce, then again her ‘single’ status may be 
undocumented. For these reasons, the compulsory documents might become 
impossible to obtain through ordinary channels (i.e., without bribery/corruption). 
- Each of the documents has to be certified by both Chinese and Vietnamese 
Foreign Affairs Ministry representatives. The closest office for Vietnam is in Hanoi 
and the closest for China is in Kunming or Nanning.3 Again, this may entail a journey 
that the concerned parties cannot afford (including the cost of staying in the cities 
during the proceedings time). 
                                                
1 This information may be subject to regular updates. 
2 These are the household registries (hộ khẩu) and the government census reports (Peters 2003). 
3 Kunming is the provincial capital of Yunnan: Nanning is the provincial capital of Guangxi. 
  202 
- The Vietnamese bride needs to provide valid documents approving her stay 
in China. These include a passport, a visa, a local border-pass if she is a native of one 
of the border provinces, and a registration form provided by the Chinese authorities if 
she lives in China. The latter is rarely the case as many migrants either live illegally in 
China or on short-term stays to avoid paperwork, control and fees. 
- In cases where all of these steps can be completed, an interview is scheduled 
for each couple so that the authorities can verify that the projected marriage is in 
compliance with the consent of each spouse-to-be and that there is no evidence of 
coercion. 
- Then, a marriage certificate can be issued in one of the applicant’s original 
place of registration and needs to be certified by the other country’s authorities, i.e., 
consulate representation.  
Su Yong, a trader from Henan (Northern China), was born in 1976. After he 
graduated from a university in his hometown, he moved to Shenzhen (Guangdong 
province) in search of work. There, a friend introduced him to Hekou, a ‘land of 
business opportunity,’ where he eventually settled in 2003 and opened an electrical 
appliances shop. He soon met Nhung in Lào Cai where she was working as a 
shopkeeper. They started to live together in Hekou the next year, married in 2007 and 
had a baby. Su Yong, commenting on the opacity surrounding the international 
marriage procedure, stated: 
— People are left on purpose in this confusion. Authorities don’t provide any 
clear and consistent answers to their questions and practices can differ from 
place to place, especially on the Vietnamese side. People ignore the 
formalities or they don’t know where to get information. They also believe it 
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is a very expensive process to get an official registration of their marriage. In 
fact it is not supposed to cost money, but the corruption is very severe in 
Vietnam. At each level, you need to pay amounts of money to get a certificate, 
a stamp, or a medical examination, and to get it fast. But, many Chinese men 
in Hekou are already married back home: they just want a local concubine. In 
that case, they find excuses for not registering their relationship. It’s the same 
for Vietnamese women. 
As Su Yong eventually noted, individual narratives may also protect intimate 
realities and blur the picture even further for those seeking information from other 
mixed couples in a similar situation. His own relationship relied on Su Yong’s general 
knowledge, his use of the Internet and reliable sources of information. Both Nhung 
and he understood that legalising their relationship was necessary to ensure that their 
child would be granted status. But, requesting legal recognition of a marriage required 
determination, a certain familiarity with bureaucratic procedures, being in close 
proximity to the concerned departments, and having sufficient financial means. In 
both countries, informants stressed that corruption and connections could either help 
or delay the resolving of these issues; but, since maintaining open door access 
required financial input, it was unlikely to prove a viable solution for everyone. In 
practice, very few of the concerned individuals manage to gather precise and reliable 
information on international marriage procedures. A surfeit of stories circulates, 
disinformation is widespread, and discouragement is the norm. Many couples opt to 
avoid the hassle, to remain in a de facto relationship as long as they do not get into 
trouble. They usually articulate their fear or annoyance using the colloquial 
expression “tai mafan [too troublesome]!”  
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But often, contrary to expectations, officers show some signs of laxity. In 
China, it is generally acknowledged that the state is highly regulatory and does not 
hesitate to intrude into the private lives of individuals. However, border town 
authorities tend to be less inclined to target people who choose inconspicuous albeit 
deviant ways of conducting their private lives, especially where waidi [migrants from 
other provinces] men and illegal (i.e., mobile and uncontrollable) Vietnamese 
migrants are concerned. The fact that some Chinese men have children with illegal 
migrants in practice seems less problematic than Chinese couples having children out 
of wedlock or exceeding their allowed quota. As far as Chinese citizens are 
concerned, the Chinese state remains intrusive. But, when foreigners, e.g., neglected, 
poor, borderland Vietnamese engage in non-normative practices in the sphere of 
conjugality, the Chinese state tends to adopt a ‘let-it-be’ attitude at the local level. 
Most of my informants acknowledged that although it also signals a lack of support 
for genuine victims of abuse, this apparent flexibility has always represented a 
convenient reality for men and women whose relationships will ultimately benefit 
from lack of control. In addition, one must remember that Family Planning and the 
Migration Office are two separate entities of the Chinese state: they do not intrude 
upon their respective domains of competence. In particular, at the border, which is a 
sort of enclave in which many illicit activities take place and require the special 
attention of the authorities, deviant practices of conjugality seem to benefit from state 
laxity. And, while Chinese citizens in general have to comply with the uniform 
regulations imposed throughout China, at the border Chinese state representatives 
seem less concerned with enforcing marriage laws as long as no social disruption 
(chaos) results from the unions. As proof, the only occasions on which media report 
cases where Vietnamese immigrants are subjected to official intervention (by the 
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police or the immigration or customs departments) are generally related to illicit 
activities such as ‘human trafficking,’ ‘cheating and stealing’ and ‘illegal work,’ 
activities that threaten the social stability and have the potential to directly affect, in a 
negative sense, the Chinese population in general. In such cases, the ‘foreign 
elements’ are considered trouble makers. But, in cases of peaceful (or at least 
privately monitored) marital arrangements, the local authorities rarely bother to 
intervene in the interests of the law. Conversely, in China’s rural areas, compassion – 
even the complicity of local officers – for the local men, jeopardises the 
implementation of strict regulations regarding international marriage, as I am now 
going to describe. 
 
3 Perspectives on contemporary conjugality in China: how do these stories 
inform post-reform social change and its consequences? 
Any attempt to review the evolution of family and gender in both China and 
Vietnam over the last decades would only prove an ambitious project that several 
scholars have already achieved (Hershatter 2004; Luong 2003; Pettus 2003; 
Brandtstädter & Santos 2009; Yan 2003, Bich 1999; Croll 1994). Therefore, for the 
purposes of analysis, this section will simply address two major changes in Chinese 
society in which contemporary forms of Sino-Vietnamese marriages are grounded and 
expand, namely internal migration and demography, and their outcomes for marriage 
in post-reform China (1979-). 
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The demographic burden: marriage squeeze for men 
In China, the evolution of family and of women’s condition over the last 
decades of the implementation of the powerful yet uneven socialist agenda has been 
turbulent. Needless to say that the socio-cultural diversity of China compared to 
Vietnam – despite the strong dichotomy between Vietnam’s southern and northern 
provinces – has imposed some radically different socio-economic conditions in 
various parts of the country that have considerably affected the ways in which people 
manage their daily lives. 
In order to contextualize cross-border marriages and serve my argument, it is 
necessary to address the issue of demographic imbalance, which is frequently invoked 
to explain the need for foreign brides in disadvantaged regions of China. Although my 
intention is to question the importance of this factor in Chapter 5, it remains a 
structural issue critical to the ongoing transformation of conjugality in China (Yan 
2003). Since 1979, China has implemented a One-Child Policy, which, while 
considerably reducing population growth over the last three decades, has created an 
unprecedented demographic crisis that has clear consequences for the marriage 
market (Poston et al. 2006). Because Chinese families have always favoured boys 
over girls (although this is changing today in the country’s urban areas), parents have 
found ways to avoid giving birth to daughters when they can only bear one child 
(Attané 2010; Croll 2000). Millions of girls have either never been born, have died at 
birth or during childhood: millions of others, who are considered “black citizens,” 
enjoy no rights as their existence is not recognized (Merli 1998). As a result, women 
have become increasingly missing over the years. It is no mystery that today 
overpopulated China suffers from a marriage squeeze that particularly affects the 
provinces of Hainan, Guangxi and Yunnan. According to demographic data, the sex 
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ratio at birth in provinces such as Hainan and Guangxi is much higher than the 
biological norm. The national crisis informs of the strength of male preference in most 
Chinese families, although the reasons why certain regions show extreme variations 
of sex ratio remain confusing. Information pertaining to local practices that could 
enlighten quantitative data is sensitive to collect. Guangxi, one of the regions in which 
numerous Sino-Vietnamese marriages take place, is not only one of the poorer 
provinces of China but one where deficit in female infants at birth and an abnormally 
high death rate among girls are most significant (Banister 2004). It is also home to 
China’s largest ethnic group, the Zhuang (16 million, National Census 2000). Attané 
offers the following summation: 
[Zhuang] numerical superiority over the other minority groups earns them a 
significant drawback: the obligation to submit to draconian limitations of birth. While 
smaller minorities are granted significant concessions in the matter, to guarantee them 
sufficient population growth, the Zhuang, because they are the largest minority in 
number, are … required to have no more children than the Han: one for urban 
couples, two for rural couples … Herein lies the main reason why, among the 
Zhuang, it is so important to [get] rid of a girl to make way for a son (Attané 2005: 
39-40, translation by thesis author). 
Girls who do not appear in statistics or in households vanish in accordance 
with various methods: selective abortion, infanticide, abandonment or non-
registration. Hence, once a generation reaches a marriageable age, girls are lacking in 
these communities, much more than elsewhere. Dongxing resident A De explained 
that his first wife, a Chinese woman, could not have children so they adopted a baby 
girl. The baby’s biological mother was a Zhuang woman, who bore a daughter as a 
first child. As a rural resident, she was permitted have a second child. She was eager 
to have a son; but, when she gave birth to a second daughter, she decided to try again 
and again until she eventually produced a boy… after bearing five girls. Unable to 
declare these girls births unless she agreed to pay the fines and submit to sterilization, 
“she gave them away.” A De adopted one of them. The other girls may have been 
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abandoned, given to relatives or friends, or sold. A De claimed that such cases were 
not unusual in the region. Despite the widespread local belief and this particular story 
told by A De, both of which blame the Zhuang for the disproportionate male-female 
ratio in Guangxi, the Zhuang alone cannot be the cause. Additional convincing 
explanations have yet to emerge. 
In her contribution to an edited volume on Chinese kinship based on her 
research findings in a rural area located between Sichuan and Yunnan, Han questions 
the frequently cited assessment that “[a] shortage of young women as a result of sex-
selective abortions and female infanticide is … the leading reason for bachelors” (Han 
2009: 51). Even though the effects of the demographic upheavals that have occurred 
in contemporary China are undeniable as far as the lack of girls (and ultimately 
women) is concerned, they only represent one structural factor of the dramatic 
position Chinese men now find themselves in. In reality, understanding of this issue is 
highly related to local factors and testifies that “marriage practices and demographic 
behaviours are contextualized to the transformations of political economy spanning 
transnational and global capitalism, national and regional policies, wage migration, 
village and household economies, and personal aspirations for modernity” (Han 2009: 
62). The situations and narratives of many men who I encountered at the Sino-
Vietnamese border also challenge the assumption that the demographic context is 
responsible for the shortage of marriageable women in China’s rural areas, or that 
alternatively there is an excess of bachelors everywhere in China.  
In their article published in 2006, Poston and Glover reviewed the likely and unlikely 
options that millions of Chinese bachelors may find themselves having to adopt to 
overcome their miserable situation – miserable inasmuch as Chinese believe that 
marriage is an indispensable duty in life – in current and future decades (assuming 
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that a demographic transition will eventuate and slowly fill the gap of sex ratio at 
birth for the coming generations). Among their options is the possible immigration of 
women from abroad to China and their matching with local Chinese men. However, 
as far as the rural men are concerned, such migration would only realistically occur if 
the potential brides were coming from places where they would consider going to 
China advantageous in terms of life improvement. This is why, apart from countries 
that are poorer than China’s rural areas, such large scale migration is unlikely to 
occur. The attention that Sino-Vietnamese marriages have attracted in recent years is 
thus very much connected with much of the speculation – and sometimes fantasised 
scenarios – expressed by experts and politicians in their bid to reassure and control the 
fear that 25, 30 or even 40 million bachelors1 in a powerful but socially unstable 
country might in the future prove guang gun, i.e., a potentially uncontrolled force 
(Hudson & Den Boer 2002). The major concern is that this powerful body of men 
may lapse into crime and illegal activities that would potentially threaten both 
national and global security. As Ross notes in her critical overview of these fears, 
such allegations, particularly when articulated by Western observers, tend to 
“reinforce powerful orientalist images of China” (Ross 2010: 359). In sum, the 
reasons for the shortage of women in this region of China are still unclear. This leaves 
us without a satisfying explanation of the increasingly visible occurrence of cross-
border marriages and calls for a closer examination of other factors. 
 
 
 
                                                
1 According to various sources, demographic projections in the future decades vary dramatically. 
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Social disparity and marriage migration: a new feature of conjugality 
The second major structural factor of cross-border marriages in the Asian 
region is undeniably the new economic order imposed by globalization, an 
opportunistic and challenging environment for nations that have implemented 
economic reform for only two or three decades. In China, the new context induced 
massive rural-to-urban migration to promising areas located within and without the 
country, and a constant renewing of the labour force that both supports and endures 
simultaneously the country’s tremendous rate of development. People move, meet, 
and change their perspectives of their lives and the possibilities offered in the new 
socio-economic settings. However, upheaval often occurs in the lives of those of the 
populace who may opt not to follow the mainstream movement in terms of 
geographical mobility, but who are equally affected by its consequences. 
In most of rural China, the already reduced numbers of potential brides join 
the movement, rendered easier by the more flexible migration conditions than those 
their elders had to endure during the early years of China’s economic reform in the 
late 1970s. Women leave, irrespective of whether it is for work or for marriage. The 
extended exogamous trend observable in most areas of rural China today (Davin 
2007, Jacka 2006), to which the current shortage of marriageable women in villages is 
frequently attributed, is not solely due to a reinterpretation of local practices of 
residence. New behaviour patterns among the marriageable cohorts also reflect the 
Chinese youth’s aspirations for an alternative to their rural life-style, as is the case in 
most of the world’s developing countries. Apropos of this, Jacka writes: 
[D]ominant discourses on modernity and the denial of cœvalness that they entail have 
had powerful material effects on the ways in which the countryside and the city are 
experienced by rural migrants. They have also become so thoroughly absorbed in the 
outlooks and subjectivities of individuals, and are generally so central to the 
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evaluative and explanatory systems of their life stories, that to hear a rural migrant 
deny the superiority of the city and to advocate the countryside as the site of self and 
collective development is truly startling … Since the 1990s the countryside has 
ceased to provide an identity for young people in the way that it did in the past – to be 
a part of the nation’s project of development and modernity, a young rural person 
must now migrate to the city (Jacka 2006: 159). 
With reference to gender, several authors (Woo 2006; Attané 2005; Hershatter 
2004, 2007) have noted how, in the post-reform era, “Chinese women’s social status 
has increased in some ways, but decreased in others” (Woo 2006:  62).  Any review of 
the negative effects of China’s socio-economic reforms on its women fall outside of 
this thesis topic. The proletarianization of rural women, increased inequality in terms 
of access to education and work, the implementation of the One-Child Policy, the 
rising of divorce rate due to conjugality crisis, or the development of prostitution are 
among the most commented on (Attané 2005; Hershatter 2004, 2007). However, a 
few facts are worth noting on the positive side. For example, the possibility for young 
generations of women to experience work, study and live outside of their birthplaces 
prior to their engagement with marriage and family life has enabled a form of 
emancipation, a rite of passage into adult and independent life that would not be 
possible otherwise. But, I want to stress that moving out does not only mean marrying 
out of the village, but out of the district, the province, of a familiar life-style, 
hopefully to a city with a man of comfortable means. It is about changing values, 
questioning women’s rights or sense of identity, and rejecting countryside or semi-
urban localities as symbols of backwardness. Women who opt to stay in their villages 
or to return to them after temporary migration to urban areas for work number fewer 
and fewer over the years, regardless of from which part of China they originate. 
Degrading images of rural life in a society yearning for modernity, a synonym for 
comfort and broader views of the rest of the nation and the world, impact strongly 
upon young women. They can no more contemplate spending the rest of their lives 
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enduring agricultural hardship than they can contemplate surrendering their right to 
emancipation. 
This does not in any way suggest that migrant women’s experience of and 
adaptation to town life is necessarily effortless or gratifying (if at all); rather, they 
acquire new perspectives by discovering new sets of values and new behaviours that 
influence and allow their decision-making (Jacka 2006). Empirical awareness of the 
social disparity that interaction with urbanites, observation of life-styles and fierce 
competition on the labour market triggers new yearnings and inner goals. The direct 
consequences of such change among cohorts of young Chinese women are manifested 
in their reluctance to return to their initial life-paths, in their longing for life 
improvement in a challenging yet promising urban environment. Disillusionment – 
including failure, exploitation, deception, and the precariousness of various (often 
nefarious) aspects of life – dashes the aspirations of many of these hopeful women. 
Many go back to their places of origin, to where they were meant to fulfil their 
familial obligations, i.e., get married and settle down permanently. If and when they 
fail to successfully achieve a personal project that would permit them to enjoy more 
satisfying lives, a large proportion of these young female migrants play another card. 
They embark upon a search for the ideal match, one that will help them to cut their 
disadvantaged rural ties (at least it is perceived as such). When they succeed, with the 
compliance of their husbands, they re-establish themselves in places they see as more 
advantageous, where they can upgrade their ranking on the social hierarchy (Davin 
2005, 2007; Fan & Huang 1998; Fan 2004; Jacka 2005; Jacka & Gaetano 2004; 
Gilmartin & Lin Tan 2002).  
Although young men also yearn for change in their rural routine lives, many 
find themselves irrevocably tied to family duties and land care, which render them 
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unable to pursue and/or implement marriage strategies. According to local kinship 
practices, which differ between ethnic groups and regions, at least one son in each 
family must take care of the elderly: either the youngest or the oldest. Groups of rural 
men, who may have experienced life ‘outside,’ are notwithstanding required to wait 
for marriageable women, wait to start a real adult life, i.e., achieving their manhood, 
raising a family and perpetuating the family line. Some continue to wait: others are 
searching for a distant match. Whatever their circumstances, the competition is 
always fierce. Internal migration in China has created a pool of missing potential 
fiancées. The situation is worse in the rural localities where sex ratio disparities are 
already challenging the marriage market. The conditions for extending the hunting 
territory of desperate men and their families, that will enable them to find a life-
partner, are harder in a country where “male marriages are more closely constrained 
by changing socio-economic conditions … [and] where capitalism and market-driven 
economies … [show] increasing discrepancies and social stratifications …” (Han 
2009: 58). Single men need to expand their hunting ground, and so do the divorced 
men with inclinations to remarry: this leads some of them to seek foreign wives.  
 
Normative structure versus alternative forms of conjugality 
 Couple formation 
In the case studies I introduce in this thesis, women and men generally do not 
meet through organized (settled) structures such as broker agencies.1 One needs to 
                                                
1 This situation is currently changing. Media have reported the presence of broker agencies in the 
northern city of Haiphong, for instance, representatives of which target Mainland Chinese men and 
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consider various factors such as coincidental meetings, individual strategies (cf. 
Chapter 5) and family arrangements to appreciate the ways in which initial encounters 
occur. Although one ritual common to conventional marriages and certain of these 
cross-border alliances remains intact, in many cases, recourse is to a form of 
matchmaking.  
Before the Chinese reforms of 1979, finding a spouse was only possible within 
one’s own social space; that is, among classmates, work units or neighbours. In most 
cases, this required the intervention of a go-between or folk matchmaker. Voluntary 
migration was rarely possible; thus, the range of marriageable partners was to say the 
least somewhat narrow. With the opening-up brought about by Deng Xiaoping’s 
social reforms, the whole process of finding intimate partners benefited from new 
possibilities for singles to migrate and settle in new areas. The changing of social 
space allowed a much wider perspective of potential partners in terms of social 
background, class and hierarchy; wider, but unknown too. Urban migration provided 
men and women with the possibility to discover the social diversity of their country, 
the different practices associated with courtship, and the possibility to match with 
someone they would never have had the chance to meet otherwise. Among rural 
women, marriage migration started to be more commonly practiced and accepted (Fan 
& Huang 2008; Davin 2005, 2007; Chang 2008). According to virilocal residence 
practices in many parts of China, women are meant to leave their homes and marry 
outside whereas at least one son per family is expected to stay at home to take care of 
his parents and the land. Chinese bachelors, who return home after a period of 
working migration, including those who never leave their families, and, in particular, 
                                                                                                                                       
arrange fast marriages following similar procedures to those initiated by southern Vietnam agencies 
(source: http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-chat/2560391/posts). 
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those who are not used to travelling far from home, that is, men who have no 
networks further than their own living place and are disadvantaged in any way, still 
request help from go-betweens to find marriage partners among a narrowing 
population of potential brides (Kohrman, 1999). Many of the men I met in Dongxing 
and Hekou belong to a generation of men (in their forties, fifties and above) born in 
rural or semi-urban settings, who have benefited from the favours and services of 
social networks and matchmakers, and are not familiar with the whole process of 
ziyou tan lian’ai [free dating] (Zhang 2005).  Nowadays, these men feel disturbed by 
the way young people date and have learned to express and listen to their feelings 
(Diamant 2000; Yan 2003; Ma & Cheng 2005). But, when they need to find new and 
suitable partners (after a divorce, for example), they still prefer to rely on experienced 
matchmakers upon whom all hope and uncertainty rests.  
Chi, who I introduced earlier in this chapter, recalled the matchmaker and the 
circumstances within which she met her current Chinese companion (cf. Appendix 7), 
or how a barely known woman managed to find her an unexpected partner. Among 
so-called ‘matchmakers,’ one also finds brothel madams and pimps who sometimes 
agree to negotiate the new recruits’ sale to bachelors with the women themselves. Van, 
a young Vietnamese mother raised in Haiphong (cf. Chapter 1), told of the difficult 
childhood she experienced being rejected or exploited by members of her family. She 
remembers how she met her Chinese husband: 
— It was in 2001. I was 17 years old then, and I had already worked several 
years in restaurants and factories. I had recently settled in Móng Cái with my 
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mother,1 who had moved there after her third divorce. My aunt [Van’s 
mother’s younger sister], who lived in China, came to take me to Dongxing to 
offer me some holidays, she said, and to help her to take care of her baby son. 
I was so naïve. I even asked my mother [for] permission to travel with my aunt. 
But, once the border [was] crossed, she offered me a pair of jeans and 
abandoned me in a brothel, asking me to wait for her. Ten days later, she still 
hadn’t showed up. The brothel madam confessed that my aunt sold me for 
2000 yuan. I cried a lot because I didn’t understand. I suspect an arrangement 
between her and my aunt because my mother recovered some money from my 
sale. But, I threatened … to denounce [the madam] to the police if she tried to 
force me to have sex with customers. I negotiated the permission to get a 
husband instead of becoming a prostitute. She arranged something and in 
November 2001, a man came with his mother to see me. The mother asked 
him if he found me suitable. He was 23 years old and his elder brother was 
already married with a Vietnamese woman whom he treated well. The man 
said yes. The family bought me for 2900 yuan and they picked me up one 
evening to take me to a village in the mountains, not far from Fangcheng. 
That’s how I met my husband. 
If finding a suitable partner remains a question of personal compatibility for 
the sustainability of a marriage, the intervention of a third party (family, matchmaker 
or friends) is still considered valuable, if not compulsory, when sealing a prospective 
alliance or arranging a promising union. Generally, two families engage in the process 
via an intermediary; but, in cases of cross-border marriages, the two families are 
                                                
1 Van is the illegitimate daughter of her father and his mistress. The mother Van mentions in her 
account is actually her father’s wife who raised her since she was a baby. 
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rarely consulted directly. The geographical distance between the two generally does 
not allow for easy meetings between the two parties’ families. Hence, either the 
Vietnamese woman or the Chinese bachelor asks a friend or a family member, usually 
someone well connected and familiar with both Vietnamese and Chinese societies, to 
assist her/him to find a partner, should a specific situation so require (cf. Chapter 5). 
In most cases, parents are visited once the marriage is settled, not to obtain approval 
but as a familial acknowledgment of an already given situation. But Li, my main 
informant from Dongxing, had principles; so, she acted differently. She described the 
awkwardness of the first meeting between her parents and her Chinese husband as 
follows: 
— My mother doesn’t like Chinese people, even though she is Chinese 
herself. Actually, she doesn’t like Mainland Chinese. When I was young, she 
always repeated that she didn’t want me to get involved with a Chinese man. 
But things happened.  A Linh and I were in love and we decided to get 
married. I didn’t plan anything though; I was even reluctant to trust A Linh 
when he flirted with me. But he was persuasive, tender and consistent. I tested 
him until he proved to be reliable. But it was important that I introduced him 
to my parents before I married him. I had already met his family and they all 
accepted me. So I took A Linh home [to a village near Móng Cái]; he had 
brought some cigarettes for my father. He acted very nicely but both my 
parents ignored him, they were very angry understanding that he wanted to 
marry me. My mother worried, but my father eventually gave in. They were 
just afraid something would happen to me. But they were still unsatisfied. 
When I came back months later with my newborn daughter, my parents didn’t 
even look at her. I was really hurt. 
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Li and A Linh dated without any intermediary’s participation. They enjoyed 
their free romance and did everything that marriage rules expected of them: 
introductions to each other’s families, a baby, paperwork for the registration of their 
marriage, purchase of an apartment, and so on. They proceeded according to their 
own rhythm and ability to cope with various issues such as parental opposition, 
administrative obstacles, and economic precariousness. But, despite all, they managed 
to form a stable family and to attain a respected social position. 1  Somewhat 
regrettably, the reality is that they represent an exception in this environment, as I will 
demonstrate through other case studies in this thesis. 
 Er nai at the border or ‘being a man’ 
As discussed earlier, there is a demographic issue that prevents some men 
from finding a suitable partner for marriage. However, most of the time this concerns 
those men who are short of means and cannot respond to increasing demands from 
brides’ families. As a consequence, they also compete with another growing category 
of Chinese men who can afford having more than one life partner, rendering the 
search for available women even more complex. Among the marriages observed in 
the border areas of China I noted the phenomenon of polygyny among rather wealthy 
businessmen, a marriage state broadly referred to by informants. A few cases testify 
to this reality in Dongxing, for example. Polygyny was earlier practiced without 
restriction in pre-revolutionary China (Watson & Buckley Ebrey 1991; McMahon 
2010, for an approach to fiction production) and Vietnam (Binh 1975); but, the latest 
marriage laws of both countries condemn this form of conjugality. Notwithstanding, it 
                                                
1 A Linh has since developed his business. Li found a new job and gave birth to a second child. Her 
family now accept her marriage and her children. 
  219 
still persists and even on occasion meets not only the specific needs of men, but also 
of some women.  
The rich men, or those who do not have children, usually take a second wife. Those 
who agree to be a second-rank wife are, first, those who are poor, then those in 
difficult situations, those who seek wealth, honors, and finally the young widows 
without children who are struggling to remarry. Few girls of respectable families are 
willing to become second wives (Binh 1975: 70-71, translation by thesis author). 
If this marriage pattern could be translated into contemporary terms, it would 
unarguably fit the profile of most Vietnamese women who settle in Chinese families 
or in their Chinese husband’s relocated homes. The quasi absence of ceremony also 
attests to the lower status of these migrant wives compared with principal wives, i.e., 
Chinese wives. This particular social hierarchy is clearly evident in the ways in which 
Vietnamese wives are introduced to the community, accepted, talked about and 
treated. Lao Wang, a married Chinese business man in Hekou stated:  
— My Vietnamese partners always want to introduce me to a pretty young 
wife. I keep arguing that I am already married, but this does not seem to 
prevent them from proposing. I know a few of them who have two wives; they 
can enjoy having big families as long as they have sufficient incomes to 
provide them with what they need.  
Lao Yuan, a former soldier during the border conflict and now a businessman 
in his forties, has lived in Hekou for more than twenty years:  
—  I have been married once with a Chinese wife but we have divorced. Now, 
I am too busy to think about having a family, I don’t need a wife now. There 
are opportunities but I am not interested. It’s not about Vietnamese women, 
it’s about getting married; it’s too troublesome. But my Vietnamese business 
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partners have a hard time to understand that I want to remain single when so 
many Vietnamese women are available. 
It is interesting to note that the Chinese population in the border area generally 
believe polygyny to be a common practice in Vietnam. The assumption that a man 
can easily marry two or more wives as a matrimonial practice facilitated by a 
demographic ratio disadvantaging women1 is widely spread. Genuine cases alluded to 
by those who have been there or have connections there support this belief. In reality, 
even though cases of polygyny still occur in rural Vietnam despite its prohibition in 
1960 (Luong 1989; Pashigian 2009), it is certainly not as commonplace as Chinese 
men seem to imagine.  
In 2006, I met one family in Lào Cai living in a polygynous relationship, 
which seemed sufficiently unusual to be referred to as an ‘example’ by the locals. 
Yang, a Vietnamese man of Chinese origin, had been married to his wife Binh for 
more than thirty years. They had a daughter (already married) and a younger son 
together. But, Yang had an affair with Ha, a woman who used to work in the coffee 
shop they ran on the ground floor of their house. Then in her late twenties, Ha became 
pregnant and in time gave birth to a girl. The family lived near the centre of Lào Cai2 
in a fairly big modern house to which Yang was adding a storey to accommodate his 
                                                
1 The belief that women outnumber men in Vietnam is strong in the Chinese borderlands. In fact, 
consequent to the Vietnam War, this was a reality until the 1990s (Goodkind 1995); however, the 2009 
Vietnamese Population and Housing Census data show a slight variation in sex ratio: 49,4% for men 
and 50,6% for women (http://www.gso.gov.vn/default_en.aspx?tabid=599&ItemID=9788).  
2 According to Binh, many houses in the area were reconstructed after the 1979 war. But, she 
resentfully stated, most of the destruction occurred as a result of the Vietnamese Kinh vandalizing the 
Hoa houses, motivated by their hatred of the Chinese people. 
  221 
entire family in a more independent way. His second wife, Ha, cooked and took care 
of the household chores while Binh, his first wife, was busy with her business 
(tobacco trade). During a dinner with the family and a few other casual visits during 
the daytime, I observed that Yang was very hard on his son while being very sweet to 
his daughter. Clearly, my presence did not prevent him from showing his authority 
and violent behaviour. I once saw him shouting at his son and slapping his face. Binh, 
Yang’s first wife with whom I was acquainted as she could speak Chinese, confirmed 
that her husband treated their son very badly while being too caring, even lacking 
severity, with his young daughter. During my visits to the family, the little girl acted 
like a princess, albeit one lacking in politeness; in sharp contrast, most of the time the 
son remained very silent and withdrawn, displaying what appeared to be stubborn 
behaviour although he was tender with his mother. Binh, delineating the complex 
situation of her family said: 
— My son hates his father; he knows the man doesn’t treat me well either. He 
wants to take me away to protect me. I … separated from my husband three 
years ago.1 I am the one who raised his daughter, and I managed to force him 
to take his responsibility and ask his lover to come back and live with us. But 
you know, my husband cheated on me so many times that I really feel 
ashamed now. I would like to leave but he told me that he would not pay for 
his son’s care if we leave his house. I am caught in this situation until my son 
reaches 18 years old. Now, he is only fifteen. His father hits him, and he [has] 
hurt him several times. 
                                                
1 By this, Binh meant intimate separation; but, she was still living at home with him in a separate room. 
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I did not learn about the conjugal situation of Yang’s family directly from him. 
His sister Thuy, a friend who lives in Hekou, briefed me on the family arrangement 
before she took me to their house/coffee shop. Hence, although initially I only met 
Yang and Binh, when the second wife Ha appeared in the living area soon after we 
arrived, there was a tacit understanding between all of us regarding the identity of the 
young woman. Binh did not introduce the young woman to me (although she 
introduced me to her), implying that she was not comfortable with the situation, 
especially in front of an outsider. Everything was implicitly conveyed. Despite his 
personal situation, Yang was still keen to meet other women, and not only women 
from his community. He made me personally feel uncomfortable on different 
occasions and I avoided staying in his house when neither of his wives was around. 
Even when they were present, he did not hesitate to ask me personal questions to the 
limits of flirting. He once proposed driving me to the railway station when I was 
about to take a train to Hanoi. As this was shortly after dinner in his home with his 
family, I accepted politely. On the way to the station, he drove slowly, asking me 
several times if I wanted to stop for a drink and to đi chơi [have fun/hang out] at one 
of the small cafés located in the station area. Given the suggestive way in which he 
sometimes looked at me, accepting his offer could well have invited complications 
and put me in a very difficult position. As well, because we had communication 
problems – he was not speaking Chinese and I had exhausted my limited range of 
Vietnamese earlier during the few family gatherings I had attended– he may have had 
other activities in mind that I did not care to contemplate. Here, I cannot deny that in 
light of what his wife Binh had told me of her life with Yang1 and of how many local 
                                                
1 I met Binh several times during my stays in Lào Cai; and, even though she did not have much to say 
about cross-border marriages in the area, she obviously found me to be a confidante to whom she could 
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women constantly portrayed Vietnamese men, my own judgment was biased not only 
by this encounter but also by other interactions with local male acquaintances.1 The 
point of this somewhat lengthy anecdote is in effect to assess Vietnamese men and 
women’s perspectives of polygyny. Whether they feel comfortable or awkward with it 
appears to depend upon who benefits, tolerates or suffers from such marital 
arrangements. Drawing on this sole example to demonstrate that polygyny is not a 
situation people live with comfortably may somehow overstate the case; but, any 
assumption that it is a current and well accepted marital arrangement in Vietnamese 
society, as suggested by my Chinese informants in Hekou, verges more I will suggest 
upon fantasy rather than reality, a subject I return to.  
Many Chinese men conveniently slot second wives into a category of 
‘accepted’ polygyny as a way of excusing their own actions. Jones and Shen allude to 
polygyny in their overview of contemporary cross-border alliances in the Asian 
region: 
Medium-term business migration also appears to lead to many international 
marriages. There is clearly a positive correlation between foreign investment from 
more developed countries to developing countries and the emigration of women from 
these developing countries as ‘foreign brides’ to the more developed countries … The 
married men frequently leave their wife and children in the home country, so that the 
children can continue their education there. In many cases, they strike up liaisons 
with women in the country where they are working, some of which produce children 
and some of which result in formal marriage (Jones & Shen 2008: 17-18). 
A decade ago, Lang and Smart undertook a period of research into the topic of 
polygyny at a specific location in Hong Kong where cross-border polygyny among 
                                                                                                                                       
express all of the resentment she felt about her own family life, a subject that was difficult to discuss at 
other social gatherings due to its sensitivity and the loss of social face it had already incurred for her. 
1 On a personal note, I have to admit that in the course of my fieldwork, the figure of Vietnamese men 
has had very limited chance to contradict the easily stereotyped yet realistic portrait of men offered by 
Vietnamese women. 
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migrants was in the main dependent upon the economic development of the 
Guangdong region (Lang & Smart 2002). We can draw an obvious parallel between 
the situation the two authors describe and that of the Sino-Vietnamese. The authors 
argue that for Hong Kong men, “[t]he ‘second wife’ demonstrates both a man’s 
virility and his economic status” (Lang & Smart 2002: 554) and, as in Chinese border 
cities, men can be teased by their peers for not having a local girl-friend or mistress, 
as Lao Wang and Lao Yuan’s cases attest. The main difference lay in the meaning of 
maintaining such a relationship as the main one by abandoning a recognised Chinese 
marriage (divorce) or deliberately choosing to engage with a ‘foreign’ woman 
(Vietnamese). The implications for a man’s reputation may, in this case, be necessary 
to consider (cf. Chapters 4 and 5). 
The various patterns of de facto polygyny (not legally legitimate) that Lang 
and Smart found in Hong Kong recall the conjugality patterns observed at the Sino-
Vietnamese border among local communities. Such alliances can be the consequences 
of overlapping migrations and the frequent mixing of Chinese businessmen and 
Vietnamese female migrant groups that results in maintaining a second household in 
the meeting areas that border towns represent. These unions may also “involve a 
longer-term commitment and are often characterized by considerable mutual 
affection” (Lang & Smart 2002: 563) and become a second family once a child settles 
the relationship. 
Out-of-wedlock affairs are not a privilege enjoyed solely by businessmen 
involved in border trade in China (Shen 2008). The er nai [mistress or concubine] 
phenomenon has persisted for over two decades now: border areas have not made any 
marked difference to the way in which these liaisons have become almost as common 
as casual sexual relationships in prostitution venues (Zheng 2006, 2009). Moreover, 
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mistress/concubine relationships seem to be even easier to maintain in a border town 
where they are considered a way to engage in efficient business partnerships in which 
women often play key roles, besides being the embodiment of men’s social prestige 
and financial ability. Here Vietnamese women are neither simply casual entertainment 
– the ‘icing’ on the negotiations – nor the person to fulfil the sexual or emotional 
needs of frustrated men. They represent a perspective of a whole market, an unknown 
area in which a devoted guide may ease the complicated process of 
establishing/negotiating a new business. However, when these relationships exist in 
tandem with a normative marriage back home, they represent a site that embodies the 
wielding of masculine power, unless a man meets a woman who dares to challenge 
said power and in the process changes the rules of performance. 
Sino-Vietnamese cross-border alliances, however, present one significant 
difference from the phenomenon that Lang and Smart describe. My informants in 
Hekou and Dongxing stressed that cases of polygyny are as frequent as cases of de 
facto polyandry in the Sino-Vietnamese borderlands. There may be two possible 
reasons for this: (1) a Vietnamese woman has left her husband and household in 
Vietnam for various reasons without officially divorcing. After she settles in a border 
zone in China or Vietnam, she lives and sometimes even has children with a Chinese 
partner. Legally, this is polyandry; (2) a further common pattern relates to a 
Vietnamese woman who has a husband or lover in Vietnam but becomes (in 
accordance with the wishes of this Vietnamese man who acts as her accomplice) 
openly committed to a relationship with a Chinese man for either a short or long term. 
This is also considered a form of polyandry. As I have earlier suggested, local stories 
inform about such female deceivers whose purpose is clearly to take advantage of a 
man by faking a romance until they can gain access to his money. Some of the 
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accounts I have collected reveal cases where the Chinese lover of a Vietnamese 
woman engages in the role of ‘bachelor procurer’ so that both can easily cheat 
wealthy candidates into marriage. Underscored in borderland contexts, un-trusted 
Otherness and fang gezi stories directly reflect the large-scale deceptive behaviour 
that frequently occurs within a highly competitive Chinese society wherein the 
ultimate goal of becoming rich justifies any means to the end.  
However, the generally disadvantaged social position of Vietnamese women 
prevents one from overestimating the meaning of such intimate arrangements that 
seem to translate more as frustrated feelings than as a disturbing reality peculiar to the 
Chinese male population. In fact, a mistress who finds herself in an economically 
disadvantaged position becomes a disposable person. Whatever her purpose, a 
Vietnamese woman who engages in a long-term relationship with a foreign man, 
without the guarantee of marriage, invites a social stigma that prevents her from being 
considered a potential mate by single Vietnamese men (cf. Chapter 4). Hence, by 
keeping a Vietnamese mistress, a Chinese man imposes on her (either knowingly or 
unknowingly) a social burden that is more difficult to cope with than in Chinese 
society, i.e., the bad reputation that these mistresses bear in their homeland. Although 
extramarital affairs in Vietnamese society are very common among men, they are still 
the subject of strong prejudice upon the women involved; they enjoy little social 
tolerance if their relationship is publicly known (Thi 2008; Phinney 2008b; Nguyen 
2007). For Chinese men, bao er nai [maintaining a mistress] in Hekou or Dongxing 
may not have the same implications as it does within China. If some Chinese men feel 
more inclined to follow such pattern, it is because first of all, it is much cheaper to 
maintain a Vietnamese woman than a Chinese woman: the former’s demands are 
lower and, with the currency exchange rate, investment also represents less of a 
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burden on a man’s personal budget. Thus, keeping a Vietnamese mistress becomes a 
worthwhile investment for a broad range of Chinese men. Even a man of modest 
means can enjoy such a perceived privilege. Secondly, the belief that polygyny is still 
practiced in Vietnam comforts the Chinese male and allows him to act with a sense of 
impunity as long as his official wife and family do not suspect anything. In other 
words, not only do border towns offer the possibility to experience exotic encounters 
with ‘local (i.e., cross border)’ women (given that prostitution relies precisely upon 
this exceptionality to attract customers) but for those willing to push the limits of 
convention further, the possibility of keeping a local concubine appears as if it were a 
local and well-accepted custom, all at a low cost and conveniently out of sight. One 
must admit that the temptation may drive numerous candidates to access these 
‘freedom areas’ (Zhang 2011). 
 The afterward feelings 
In line with other anthropologists studying the family, Rebhun argues that the 
notion of couplehood – a relationship based on personal attraction rather than on 
corporate family rules – reflects “the effect of a shift from the kind of social relations 
common in small, kinship-based villages to those in wage-labor-based cities, in which 
the definition and expression of conjugal attachment becomes more verbal, less 
instrumental, more romantic” (Rebhun 2007: 115). In China, the opening-up that 
economic reform has facilitated over the last two decades shows similar changes in 
conjugality. But, what happens at the Sino-Vietnamese border remains indicative of 
the confusion that such opening-up has created in societies that have had to shift very 
quickly from one model to another. The diversity of marriage patterns observable in 
Hekou and Dongxing, for example, reflects the degree of ease with which each 
individual adapts to the new social order. Where one opts for free union without 
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engagement, another may prefer polygyny: a third will simply coerce a woman into 
becoming his wife. All of these scenarios put Vietnamese women in a quite 
vulnerable position in the sense that they rely on their partners’ decision-making and 
will to compromise with convention in order to find their own niche in their host 
societies. Each case takes for granted the compliance of the Vietnamese woman to a 
rather low profile since she tends to occupy the position that her Chinese counterpart 
no longer seeks or agrees to occupy, i.e., that of the ‘obedient wife’ (cf. Chapter 4).  
But, what of the conjugal bonds and the usual rituals that seal a betrothal? In 
China as well as in Vietnam, the recurrent belief that love and affection between two 
spouses comes after marriage, and that one should pursue a marriage free from the 
disturbing influence of romance, still represents the norm. Rebhun describes a similar 
belief in Brazil:  
Older couples [in Brazil] tended to say that true love develops after marriage or 
cohabitation, as the couple learn each other’s preferences, raise children together and 
form a partnership … They regarded the emotional content of the conjugal bonds as a 
private matter; in public spouses treated each other with formality and avoided 
displays of affection (Rebhun 2007: 113). 
Many of the Vietnamese women I met had not mastered the Chinese language 
when they met their husbands. Each had to find other ways to communicate and to 
understand the other’s messages. Interestingly, those who were deceived and coerced 
into marriage did not necessarily express aversion towards their husbands after they 
commenced conjugal life. Yen, the vegetable seller who left her son in China, recalls 
with affection that the Chinese man to whom she was sold respected her (cf. 
Appendix 2). Oanh was a young married mother in Vietnam when she was smuggled 
to China and sold. Now a street bike repairer in Hekou, she decided to stay with the 
Chinese man to whom she was brought in a Guangxi village because she pitied him:  
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— His Chinese wife died at the hospital and he was alone with three children. 
He had already bought three Vietnamese women who all escaped from him. 
He was poor but he spent again 4000 yuan to have me1 and I felt sorry that he 
lost so much money before for nothing in return but abandon. I stayed with 
him. And he … agreed to adopt my [Vietnamese]. I have spent twenty years 
living and working with him and we have had three children together. I 
learned to love him; he is a responsible man.  
A Hua, a Vietnamese street dressmaker I met in Wanwei (a Jingzu village near 
Dongxing, cf. Chapter 1) through the village’s CCP secretary explained:  
— A neighbour of my parents introduced me to my Chinese husband. I was 30 
years old and many men wanted to marry me, but they were mostly drug 
addicts. I heard good things about Chinese men. When I first met my husband, 
I didn’t like him. But I was told that he was an orphan, and that he was too 
poor to find a wife. So I decided to give it a try and stayed with him [for] four 
months. We managed to go along well so I decided to accept the marriage. 
Since the birth of our son, our feelings for each other improved.  
Despite the initial lack of communication, there are other ways for these 
couples to bond/bind together in a peaceful way. Positive behaviour, births and 
compassion are among the feelings that seal marriage bonds despite the obscure and 
sometimes dramatic circumstances of cross-border marriages that expose these mixed 
                                                
1 In 1991, 4,000 yuan was a large sum of money, especially for a peasant. But Oanh assessed that the 
average bride price for a Chinese bride was approximately 10,000 yuan. This information, although 
difficult to verify, seems suspicious since my informants in Guangxi informed me twenty years later 
that 10,000 yuan is the minimum amount of money that Chinese families ask nowadays for marrying 
their daughter. Oanh wanted to stress that she was a cheap investment compared to a local bride. 
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couples to psychologically vulnerable consequences. For those couples who have the 
possibility to freely agree on an alliance, intimate feelings are less questionable. 
Marriage rituals, however, may constitute the missing link. 
 Rituals and ceremonies: marriage without a wedding 
Kim, a determined young woman from Hekou, was the only Vietnamese 
informant able to give me a full account of the rituals that surrounded her marriage. 
She described the customary steps that guided her from her home in Lào Cai to her 
husband’s place in Hekou, where most rituals conform to both the Vietnamese and 
Chinese wedding traditions. But the general tendency concerning matrimonial 
practices in cases of Sino-Vietnamese marriages, even though a certain degree of 
variety exists, is to simplify any formal ceremony, even avoid organizing any public 
display of the event. Van mentioned a private banquet held at her husband’s home 
where she drank to forget her misfortune. Yen recalled having to enter her husband’s 
home without stepping on the doorway, a symbolic gesture requested by the family. 
Many Chinese men’s companions simply moved into their lovers’ houses without 
further ceremony: some women chose to emphasise their first intimate contact with 
their husbands as the real sealing event of their relationships. In sum, no horoscope 
prediction, no prostration before the ancestral altar, no tea ceremony with parents, no 
exchanges of gifts, no festivities in fancy restaurants and expensive sessions of 
shooting at local photographic studios embellish the alliance. Several factors explain 
this secrecy. 
In Vietnam, as well as in China, a wedding ceremony is a costly but necessary 
step for recognition of an alliance and the prestige of a family. It firmly establishes 
extended kinship networks and is one of the major events of a lifetime that needs to be 
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celebrated in proper fashion according to local traditions, family backgrounds and the 
degree of integration of the socialist wedding practices more prevalent in Northern 
Vietnam (Goodkind 1996). In the 1990s, for example, in a village in North Vietnam, 
Krowolski (1999) had already observed a radical change in the expenses dedicated to 
a marriage ceremony that broke with the restrictions imposed by public policy until 
the reform areas (1986-) that prefigured the coming growing changes up to the early 
21st century. A decade later, Hy Van Luong made a similar observation that he 
attributes to the “need of households to maintain their informal networks of 
reciprocity, which could be mobilized in times of need” due to the “[Vietnamese] 
state’s partial disengagement from the public sphere” (2003: 212, 216). Display of 
personal and family wealth and networking ability of this type has also become 
commonplace in today’s China (Liu 2000). But, when a Vietnamese daughter marries 
a Chinese man, the technical possibility of organizing a wedding and the whole 
function of linking two new groups of relatives together become – to say the very 
least – problematic. 
As I have argued elsewhere (Grillot 2010), on the Chinese side of the border 
the quasi-absence of significant family and/or community acknowledgment of Sino-
Vietnamese marriages through a public event calls into comparison the treatment of 
concubines in pre-revolutionary China. When Watson explored the position of 
concubines in Chinese families up until the last century (Watson 1991), she stressed a 
few important characteristics of this special status. When a concubine was bought, she 
received no dowry: nor did her family receive any betrothal payment. Her children 
were considered those of her husband’s wife. She possessed no property and lacked 
private funds. Also, she usually lost contact with her family; thus, her children could 
not possibly bond with their matri-lateral relatives. Finally, as she was denied an 
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influential role, social recognition, participation in kinship rituals and a right to her 
offspring, a concubine’s position was closer to that of a maid than to a wife within the 
household of her husband. Chinese society gave little consideration to these second-
rank wives, even though their mere existence participated in social reproduction given 
that one of their main tasks was to provide men with heirs. However, having a 
concubine was a sign of prestige for men. Today, a Chinese man who has a 
Vietnamese concubine (in the technical sense of an unrecognized wife) as a unique 
partner, because he has no access to the pool of marriageable Chinese women, reads 
more like a failure than a success, for having a Vietnamese concubine seems almost to 
represent ‘choice by default,’ a topic I will explore further in Chapter 5.  
 Bride price and other compensation 
Linked by a common framework that includes marriage customs, marriages in 
Southern China and Northern Vietnam – particularly among the main Han and Kinh 
groups although not exclusively – are based on a principle involving the exchange of 
a bride against monetary or material compensation, an arrangement known as ‘bride 
price.’ Despite the radical changes it imposed on the Chinese family structure, 
Maoism did not succeed in its attempt to ban some marriage customs and eradicate 
the practice (Marriage Law, 1950, clause 3). Although it was pragmatically difficult 
to practice due to the country’s poor economic performance and the people’s poverty 
prior to the economic reforms (Chu & Yu 2010), the marriage payments tradition 
never totally disappeared. Today, although officially banned, bride price remains a 
major source of concern for many Chinese families. And regrettably, the 
contemporary era has seen a considerable increase in the requirement for this 
marriage payment. According to Alain Testart, the term ‘bride price’ refers (1) to 
“any transfer of relatively standardized goods, the nature and quantity of which are 
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generally determined by custom; (2) to payment normally provided by the groom; and 
(3) to the role of the parents of the bride (Testart et al. 2002a: 166). In other words, 
bride price is “an institution that reflects the authority and the power of one generation 
on the other” (Testart et al. 2002a: 169). With reference to China, Alain Testart 
argues to the effect that: 
The implicit idea is that fathers must not get rich at the expense of their daughters; 
this implies that the only decent model of marriage is the bride price with return (i.e. 
a combination bride price with dowry). The Chinese example illustrates well the 
conviction of the bride price without return because accepting it would mean that the 
father takes advantage of his relative, namely his daughter … This did not prevent 
farmers from doing so. Such differentiation of marriage practices according to social 
class strengthens value judgments: … bride price without return is both morally 
wrong, illegal and dishonourable, and it is significant that it is the prerogative of the 
lower classes; .. bride price with the return of an equivalent dowry is just the opposite 
(Testart et al. 2001: 28-29, translation by thesis author). 
These practices continue to have a substantial impact on members of grooms’ 
families, who increasingly consider marriage a drain on their resources, despite the 
compensation. But what form does bride price actually take? Who does it pay? 
The bride price is by no means a gift: it is due. It represents a payment of marriage. 
What does it pay? Not a woman, who would only be a slave, but … the rights of a 
woman. Not just sexual access rights to her, but a whole set of rights, both financial 
and parental: the right of the husband to link his children to his own lineage, the right 
to receive fines in case of adultery, the right to benefit from her work, and so on. 
Before the groom pays the bride price, these rights belong to the bride’s father … The 
bride price can be interpreted as the price of transfer of rights from the father to the 
husband (Testart 2002b: 35, translation by thesis author). 
The payment of bride price represents a symbolic and economic commitment 
by the groom and his family; once accepted, given the sacrifices it represents, neither 
the bride nor her parents can reverse the decision. Bride price has now become very 
high. Built on tradition, it now translates into economic and property terms. Whether 
due to sex ratio imbalance at birth or to their migration to urban areas, the scarcity of 
marriageable young women in rural China further limits access to marriage for men 
from the most disadvantaged families, who find themselves required to meet 
increasingly excessive demands: land, independent housing, household equipment, 
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electric appliances, vehicles or photo albums.1 In the Dongxing area, for example, 
informants indicated that the current average bride price is around 10,000 yuan 
minimum, a substantial sum for many rural families.2 Marriage payments not only 
mean transfer of rights and wealth and declarations of prestige, but also devolution of 
property between two families (Siu 1993). Chinese men in Guangxi and Yunnan 
claim that increased payments are among the main reasons underpinning the difficulty 
they face trying to find suitable (affordable) wives. 
However, today one finds adaptive forms of compensation replacing the 
conventional bride price. This is the case with those men seriously committed in a 
long-term relationship with their Vietnamese partner. For example, some Chinese 
husbands can adopt their Vietnamese wife’s children (from a first marriage) or 
participate in taking care of their in-laws in Vietnam; they can also propose to help 
with the education fees for children left in Vietnam. Others with sufficient means may 
also invest in land or housing, especially in cases of non-officialised unions, and in 
provision for difficulties in the future that may impact upon the conditions of 
existence (or nonexistence) of the couple. To a Chinese man, this may act as a 
reassuring form of commitment toward a Vietnamese wife and her family, while it 
may also be an investment easily transformed into a material compensation in the case 
of a separation.3 On a smaller scale, compensation can take the form of gifts offered 
                                                
1 Realized by a professional photographer, a marriage album can be very expensive: charges include 
the rental of costumes, makeup, digital touching up and printing as a book. 
2 The average income of a rural family in Guangxi in 2004 was 2,300 yuan per person per year (source: 
http://www.allcountries.org/china_statistics/10_21_per_capita_net_income_of.html). 
3 At least in three cases, my informants explained to me that the house they bought in Vietnam was 
under their wife’s name because this eased the procedure regarding land property. 
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after the marriage during the wife’s first return home (medicines, tea), or of self-
decided amounts of money which while of consequence to a Vietnamese family do 
not pose a burden for a Chinese man. In other cases, a Chinese husband will help one 
or several family members of his Vietnamese wife to migrate and find an occupation 
in China, although mostly under informal conditions. Efficient connections and 
logistical and financial assistance represent further forms of compensation; but, to a 
Vietnamese family, they also prove the commitment of a son-in-law to his wife. 
Notwithstanding, differences between a proper bride price and the above forms of 
material compensation persist. A bride price is negotiated before a union whereas the 
various forms of compensation enumerated above are spread over time. And, the 
amount of money and effort that a Chinese man and/or his family agree to spend on 
his Vietnamese wife’s affines is also more difficult to assess. But, even more 
significant is the missing half of the procedure; i.e., the dowry. Brown explores the 
meaning of the transaction: 
After brideprice had been paid, the bride's family determines the size and composition 
of the dowry; unlike brideprice, dowry is not negotiated with the groom's parents. In 
much of rural China, a bride's parents retain part of the brideprice and transfer part in 
the dowry. Offering elaborate dowries provides a vehicle for prestige building by the 
bride's family and ensures against a daughter's maltreatment by her in-laws … 
Modern dowries often include bedding, clothing, furniture, and possibly other 
durables such as a bicycle, a sewing machine, a radio, and a television. Dowries also 
include a significant cash component for the bride's exclusive use. Dowry thus forms 
the foundation of the conjugal unit's household (Brown 2009: 29). 
In many Sino-Vietnamese marriages, if the bride comes to the groom without 
dowry, there may be negative consequences for the bride’s treatment. Since one 
function of marriage is the transferring of economic resources from one family to 
another, it is understandable that Chinese families, having reckoned that the 
likelihood of receiving a dowry from a Vietnamese bride’s family is almost negligible, 
opt not to invest much in a bride price. Not only is there little likelihood of them 
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meeting in person members of the other ‘foreign; party, but there is little guarantee 
that a go-between will effectively transfer the compensation into the right hands. In 
other words, there is almost zero hope of receiving any return compensation. Hence, 
one observes alternative and symbolic forms of contribution from the groom’s family 
to the bride’s family that encompass the particularity to occur after the alliance and 
without specific negotiation. In some cases, the term ‘bride’s family’ does not 
necessarily refer to the bride’s parents but to her own household, i.e., to her children 
from a previous marriage. Chi’s initial suitor from Shanghai proposed to pay her 
daughter’s school fees, and her Chinese husband promised to pay a certain amount of 
money as a contribution to her education (cf. Appendix 7). Oanh’s children were both 
adopted by her new Chinese husband as proof of his commitment to her. In both cases, 
the Vietnamese parents of these women were no longer concerned regarding the 
outcome of their daughter’s second marriage. Such situations highlight the lack of 
academic resources to analyse marriage payment patterns in increasingly frequent 
cases of second marriages of divorced/widows/women. So, to what extent her family 
and in-laws are concerned by this practice remains a question open to exploration. 
 
Conclusion  
This chapter has explored how border towns, as liminal spaces, become sites 
for numerous transgressions, notably of conventional marital practices. Through 
various examples of cross-border alliances, I have shown how Chinese borderlands, 
due to their deviance from normative social settings, offer a fascinating range of 
marital relationship forms. For some individuals, living at the territorial margins of 
their country may conveniently represent the potential to cross the borderline of what 
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is conventionally accepted by mainstream society, and to experience the revival of 
earlier models of conjugality (Lang & Smart 2002). When these individuals opt to 
observe certain forms of cross-border alliances, whether consciously or not, they tend 
to comply with rules of convenience, pragmatism, commodification, needs and a 
given context with much more impunity and flexibility than expected and experienced 
elsewhere. 
These various and intertwined patterns of mixed marriages exist in line with 
two frameworks: an historical continuum that provides pre-conditions for certain 
forms of human exchange to reappear, and a global trend towards ‘cross-border 
intimacy’ or ‘international relationships’ that are tolerated and practiced again by both 
the Chinese and Vietnamese societies – even compared to the colonial French period 
which tolerated only certain forms of mixed alliances between French and 
Vietnamese (Stoler 2002; Phụng 2006). But, the alternative forms of alliances 
observable in the Sino-Vietnamese borderlands also inform the major changes the two 
countries have experienced in terms of demographic transition, people’s mobility and 
changes of values. These changes translate in terms of practices such as polygyny or 
non-practices such as de-valuing conventional marriage rituals. 
While the impact of economical migration and demographic imbalance on 
China is undeniable in these transformations of the internal marriage market, they are 
only structural factors that are easy to focus on while other neglected factors remain 
underestimated, especially in Vietnam. I will now assess how contextual, 
circumstantial and personal factors evolving in this acknowledged background 
provide a different picture of Sino-Vietnamese cross-border marriages, a picture that 
will progressively highlight the extant links between – apparently – very contrasting 
local figures and couples. 
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Chapter 4 
Expectations, discourses and representations 
Narratives as the site of confrontation between intimate 
yearnings and community suspicion 
 
Introduction 
Borders need to be constantly maintained and socially reproduced through particular practices 
and discourses that emphasize the ‘other’ (van Schendel 2005: 46). 
 
In her assessment of mid-2000s scholarship on brides, maids and prostitutes, 
Constable shares her scholarly concern by pointing out the difficulty with which many 
cases from the Asian region fit into the current framework of academic and activist 
literature; a scheme that highlights economical inequalities and the search for 
traditional values as motivating factors for marriage migration, while ignoring other 
factors that eventually make such a conventional narrative rather inaccurate: 
[D]espite some broader gendered migration patterns, the overall theme [i.e. the 
scholarly and popular descriptions of ‘mail order brides’ as ‘trafficked women’] lends 
itself too easily to the well-accepted logic of a more simplistic modernization 
narrative: of course poor women will want to move from a poor or ‘backward’ 
country to work for or marry a richer person in a more ‘modern’ country. The 
structural inequality of such a situation provides a common and readily accepted logic 
for the growing pattern for female labor and marriage migration. This logic is not 
necessarily wrong, but it is not the only way to tell and understand the story. 
Moreover, if it is read as the story, it obscures significant variations among and 
between women and through time (Constable 2006: 3, emphasis added). 
To address this issue of variation between what appears as ‘logic’ and what is 
more obscure in individual choices, this chapter will explore the complex dynamics 
between personal narratives and social discourses that both shape representations and 
establish a framework through which Otherness is interpreted. It will show how this 
‘framework of thought’ tends to shape relationships between various border 
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communities, and to act as an attractive/repulsive site in which intimacy is 
experienced at the border. This chapter is thus divided into two parts that are 
responding to each other to illustrate the dynamics observable in the field. In the first 
part, I explain the dynamics of social representations as a core issue in the evolution 
of cross-border marriages in the Sino-Vietnamese border regions. In the second part, I 
stress how intimate longings confront and are influenced by the stereotypes to which 
couples are constantly exposed. I will analyse how these two sets of perceptions 
interfere with one another, leading individuals towards undesired and precarious 
positions, while questioning the purpose and relevance of their choice. I employ 
narratives gathered through the course of my fieldwork to explore this new 
perspective on the alternative conjugality represented through international marriages 
in China. 
 
1 The Dynamics of social representations 
Getting to know who the Other is supposed to be like 
As I delved into scholarship readings and interviews in the field, it occurred to 
me how certain subjective factors seemed rather neglected in the analysis of cross-
border marriages. Such factors include the way interacting communities apprehend 
and appreciate each other, how they mutually shape and identify themselves with or 
against each other, and how the nature of their respective perception affects their life 
choices, expression, and their status in a given social space. Actually, many of my 
informants would not let me enquire about their very private sphere. What I first 
perceived as a methodological obstacle to access personal experiences of cross-
cultural marriages from the inside actually led me to a perspective rarely examined by 
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scholarship on this particular phenomenon of border society. To compensate for the 
difficulty I experienced in gaining a sense of mixed couples’ relationships and 
penetrating the opacity of their intimacy, I tried to understand their reality differently 
by examining them from an external perspective. In doing so, I aimed to give voice to 
the outsiders, community members who assume that they know about these marriages. 
This unexpected way of picturing this form of conjugality enabled me to see how 
representations of marriages’ experiences could be as enlightening as any daily life 
and actions, since both construct the identity of a certain type marital relationship. 
Therefore, instead of engaging with debates on the experience of mixed marriage, 
cross-cultural couples, and experiences of life in their most tangible expressions, I 
will argue that in particular border setting such as the Sino-Vietnamese border towns, 
the articulation of fantasies, resentment and suspicion come to define mixed 
conjugality in a way that makes the involved individuals constantly negotiate their 
social position and their fragile balance between their past, present and future. 
 Hekou, April 2006 
When I began, my enquiries about mixed couples at the border generated 
many raised eyes-brows and expressions of surprise, “Why? Why was I interested in 
these couples?” As I explained in the introduction, the human trafficking issue 
initially underlay my interest in these personal stories. This biased vision of cross-
border marriages caused me to overlook those couples who I considered to be 
“regular.” To me, these “regular” couples were those who met, engaged themselves in 
an intimate and emotional relationship, and then married, as anywhere else, except 
that here, the spouses came from two different countries. Therefore, when A Bo, a 
young Sichuanese man – whom we met in Chapter 2 – offered to introduce me to his 
best friends, a Sino-Vietnamese couple who were the owners of a trinket shop across 
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the street. I almost declined the offer, thinking that they were unlikely to be the type 
of couple I was interested in getting to know. Still, I had to start somewhere, and 
fortunately my curiosity was sufficiently teased to make this first move into the 
private space of a local mixed couple.  
A beautiful young woman born in 1984, Lien1 had lived in Hekou for two 
years (when we first met in 2006) and apparently cared a lot about her appearance. As 
she talked, she regularly caught glimpses of her face in the mirror behind me to check 
her hairs, her make-up, or her silhouette. Assuming that being a woman myself, I 
would also feel concerned by the way I look, she often interrupted our conversation 
with questions about my clothes, hair colour or aesthetic concerns. Was this a signal 
indicating how embarrassing and unusual my questions were? Although she spoke 
excellent Chinese that allowed her to easily elaborate on any topic of conversation 
and was quite happy to talk about herself, Lien quickly pointed out there was nothing 
special to mention about her relationship with her partner A Long.  
― I have five brothers and sisters. My mother died when I was 12 years old 
and we all moved around a lot with my father. He remarried and we lived in 
Hanoi for a while. Before coming to Hekou, I stayed two years in Lào Cai 
where my father conducted some business. My father speaks Chinese; he lived 
a few years in Beijing. I met A Long in Lào Cai, when he was doing business 
with my father.2 He comes from Zhejiang and has lived seven years in Sichuan 
before coming here. We liked each other and I decided to stay with him. We 
                                                
1 We already met Lien in Chapter 2 when she had already become a brothel manager. 
2 A Long told me that he conducted some business with Lien’s sister and that her father was doing 
business in Hanoi most of the time. 
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are not officially married yet, it’s costly, and we must wait. Our life is rather 
simple. 
Despite such an uninspiring modest statement, Lien’s warmness, our regular 
conversations, some shared meals and shopping-trips over the time eventually brought 
up some thrilling confidences about her life and current familial situation. However, 
the ambiguity of her attitudes towards me, my research interests or even towards 
various people who came to her shop1 slowly made me dubious. I learned how to ask 
her the same questions several times so that I might distinguish any difficulty she had 
in delivering a coherent discourse on various topics such as mixed marriage, Hekou’s 
atmosphere or Vietnamese prostitution. For instance, when asked if she could 
introduce me to some other mixed couples or some Vietnamese women who might 
have had such an experience in the past, Lien simply said that she did not know such 
persons but only heard about them. However, she once took me to a nail salon at the 
Vietnamese market. From the greetings she gave or received on the way, including a 
quick transit through the first floor of the building, it became obvious that she actually 
did have some local acquaintances among the Vietnamese female community, 
including the prostitution network. As we walked by, probably supposing that I had 
noticed the activity considered as ordinary in Hekou, she barely mentioned what was 
going on in the ‘hair salons’ of the building. She simply suggested it by discreet 
comments: “these girls have no choice, this is pitiful” or “it’s quite [sexually] chaotic 
here.” When she spoke, she adopted a pitiful expression, conveying a sense of her 
compassion, yet also her disagreement with the practice by saying that “the girls are 
                                                
1 Lien was selling miscellaneous items ranging from hair slides and cheap jade to low quality bibelots 
and Chinese souvenirs.  
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making a lot of money!” On the ground floor, Lien’s friend A Hua1 owned the ‘nail 
salon.’ But the place was mainly a massage parlour offering services to a Chinese 
male tourist clientele. Very young Vietnamese women were working there. The 
ambiguity of the place – the massage salon located within the Vietnamese market, and 
closely connected with the brothels on the first floor (Grillot 2012) – did not seem to 
affect Lien or prevent her from coming here to chat and have her nails done. 
Lien became an informant whose activities and connections seemed at odds 
with what she pretended her social life to be. I felt she would reveal more about her 
real perspectives later on, but she remained secretive. At first, she appeared to me as a 
“regular” and well-integrated woman, even if slightly ambiguous. My perception of 
her may have remained this way if another informant I came to know elsewhere had 
not offered me a different angle on Lien’s position. 
Thuy2 is a middle-age woman with a strong personality who worked in a shop 
nearby. A Bo is the one who introduced us: “She knows a lot about the question you 
are interested in, you can ask her questions.” Indeed she was well-informed but not 
exactly on the subject I had expected. Thuy was born in Vietnam from a Chinese 
family, originally from Guangdong. Classified under the category of Hoa before 1979, 
Thuy and some of her family members had to flee Lào Cai where they lived and went 
to China. The Hoa were not welcomed anymore in Vietnam and they were 
‘encouraged’ by the government to go back to their ‘motherland.’ At the age of 
                                                
1 Three years later, I went back to the nail salon with Lien and learned that A Hua was also a Chinese 
man’s wife who later agreed to talk about her marriage. Lien just “forgot” to mention it the first time. I 
interpret her cautiousness as a way to protect her network from me, a curious foreigner whom purpose 
was not very clear at first. 
2 I have introduced Thuy earlier in Chapter 3. She is the sister of Mr Yang, the ‘men with two wives.’ 
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twenty, Thuy was thus relocated in a farm in Dali1 (Northwest Yunnan) where she 
married a Chinese man from Indonesia, had a daughter and divorced thirteen years 
later. In 2006, she was living in Hekou as an interpreter2 in a bedding-shop, and as a 
part-time Vietnamese language teacher in her sister’s private school. She was engaged 
in a long-term relationship with her partner, a Vietnamese man whom she first 
introduced as a Hoa from a family originally from Guangxi, like everybody believed 
he was.3 After A Bo left us on the first day we met, she commented: 
― I know A Bo, he stays in the shop down the street. There is a Vietnamese 
woman there, did you meet her? 
― Yes, I did. Her name is Lien, she’s engaged to her Chinese boyfriend A 
Long.  
― Well, that’s what she says. Lien is a former prostitute; she used to work in 
Lào Cai before she met A Long. I know her. You shouldn’t trust too much 
what Vietnamese people say, especially women. If you find them, they will 
                                                
1 During the Hoa exodus from Vietnam, Chinese government offered permanent resettlement to 
overseas Chinese in ‘Overseas Chinese Farms,’ mostly in Guangdong, Guangxi and Yunnan provinces 
(Lam 2000). 
2 A fanyi [translator/interpreter] in these border towns is a person who is able to communicate, even 
imperfectly, in both Chinese and Vietnamese. Many of these persons have received no professional 
training for this, but they are much needed in Chinese shops where Vietnamese customers often come. 
Most of them are Vietnamese who are Hoa (of Chinese origin) or who other Vietnamese who learned 
Chinese at school or by living in China. They usually come and go according to the (informal) salary a 
Chinese boss can offer them. 
3 Thuy explained me later that her husband was a Kinh Vietnamese who did not speak Chinese. 
Apparently, she believed that people would disregard him if they knew he was not ethnically Chinese. 
Vietnamese men’s reputation was controversial and she wanted to avoid gossips. 
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remain silent about their private life, or they will tell you tales, everything you 
want to hear, except the truth. 
Unfortunately, a little drama followed. Ling, one of my Chinese friends 
accompanied me during these very first days in Hekou. Being a writer with a strong 
interest with places on the margins, she was curious about Hekou’s reputation and 
wished to learn more about it. As a Chinese woman who liked to socialize, she also 
helped me the first three days to settle down within the community, pretending we 
were both travelling and making people more at ease with us. Sichuanese herself, 
Ling quickly befriended A Bo whom she could speak with in her native dialect. She 
was present when Thuy made the above statement about Lien. But before returning to 
Sichuan the second day, Ling made the mistake of asking A Bo during a casual 
conversation if it was true that Lien was a former prostitute. A Bo who was a friend of 
Lien and A Long felt very embarrassed. He admitted it was true, although he was very 
angry with Thuy for disclosing this secret so carelessly. Ling left Hekou and two days 
later, I met A Bo who became a little reluctant to talk to me: 
― Even if everybody knows in our street what Lien was doing in her former 
life, no one ever mentions it. I always try my best to protect my friend’s 
reputation, you know? Lien is a nice person, she loves A Long, and she 
understands him despite his strange temper. And he loves and respects her as 
well. We are all human; we need to make a living. I respect them both and 
don’t want to expose them. Ling asked me to take her to the brothels I 
mentioned the other day; she took pictures, which is not much appreciated 
around here. I have a reputation here; she made me feel like I am exposing 
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people. If I knew in the first place what you were looking for, I wouldn’t have 
said anything.1 
I reassured A Bo that Ling and I were both respectful of people’s privacy as 
well and would not disclose any of the information anyone told us. I reiterated that the 
life stories I was collecting would remain hidden in my notebook as long as I was 
staying in Hekou. However, this unfortunate failure of diplomacy jeopardized my 
position in Hekou and started to cause misunderstandings – I noticed A Long and 
Lien’s change of behaviour over the next few days. It took some time for things to get 
back to normal, although people noticed I adopted an unobtrusive attitude. In fact, I 
had no particular interest in the local prostitution business even though people kept 
implicitly mentioning it when conversations concerned local society and economy. 
Yet, in a quite unexpected way, this episode revealed the real risk and challenge of 
doing such research on cross-border affairs: my enquiries were actually exposing 
people’s reputation and threatening the fragile balance of local relationships. One 
wrong step and the implicit – and professional – tact previously taken for granted 
during interactions with locals was in jeopardy. Not only my own position, but also 
that of my informants, could be subject to judgment, stigma and rejection. When A 
Bo stated that “everybody knows but no one mentions it,” I realized that in fact 
everybody knew and still talked about it when the occasion came. All along with 
further interviews and conversations during my several stays in Hekou, these feelings 
                                                
1 I did explain to A Bo that I was interested in meeting mixed couples in order to understand more 
about their experience and write a book about cross-border marriages. But as many of my informants, 
A Bo had a vague understanding of what academic research means and often mistook my position as 
the one of a foreign journalist whose aim was to reveal to the outside the special features of Hekou’s 
society. 
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were confirmed: social representations are a real issue, especially in these border 
towns of recent settlement. When accurate information about someone’s background 
is hard to apprehend, people rely heavily on his/her recent actions, immediate 
reputation and impressions to judge him/her. Later, I will demonstrate how this is 
very much related to the existence, experience and stability of cross-border alliances.  
After a few weeks of fieldwork in Hekou during the spring 2006, it became 
quite clear that I could not escape from the ubiquitous stereotyped views that local 
Chinese and Vietnamese people maintain of one another. In various ways, these views 
inspired their narratives and came to re-orient my own research. Out of the dialogues 
that my new acquaintances and I had, I formulated one core question: To what extent 
are social and cultural representations taken into account in individual decisions to 
engage in cross-border alliances? Initially, I expected public concern, comments, or 
maybe sympathy towards the men and women who had no other option but to get 
involved with each other through a pragmatic marriage without romance, especially in 
cases of coerced marriage. Instead, I met various degrees of contempt, suspicion and a 
general attitude of apathy. I was confronted with unexpected and confounding insights 
from local people, whether on the Chinese or the Vietnamese side of the border, 
adding to an already disturbing setting, and a non-orthodox approach of a ‘non-
existent’ community of informants. Collecting the various expressions of opinions 
made me realise the difficulties that mixed couples, and especially the Vietnamese 
wives, were coping with during the process of becoming part – willingly or not – of a 
moving, proud and exclusive Chinese society. For instance, according to many of my 
Vietnamese female informants, marrying a Chinese migrant sometimes means having 
to cope with his family’s call to return home one day, or with his new projects that 
require moving far into China (something a Vietnamese migrant do not always have 
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the right to do). Becoming part of a Chinese family may also expose a Vietnamese 
bride to explicit displays of contempt, criticism or nationalistic comments when one 
estimates that she comes from a developing country and assumes her to be poor. 
Hence, listening to what is said about mixed marriages within communities and to 
what they involve in terms of acceptance, integration or exclusion helps us to 
comprehend their social position. 
 Social representations 
With social life being typically storied, the construction of an identity narrative is 
itself political action and is part of the distribution of social power in society. In the 
study of state boundaries, it is important to know whose plots or turfs dominate these 
identity narratives, what is excluded or included by them, and how the representations 
of ‘us’ and ‘them’ are produced and reproduced in various social practices, such as 
media, education, and the like (Horstmann & Bradley 2006: 20).  
Horstmann and Bradley suggest that studying a social phenomenon occurring 
in borderlands requires the examination of identity narratives. Here, in the realm of 
conjugality, these narratives become a site to convey popular viewpoints on the 
suspected Other, as well as the role of gender within each society. Social psychology 
and its theory of social representations have provided me with a meaningful frame 
within which I could capture a “structured knowledge” (Wagner & Hayes 2005: 117) 
of the social settings expressed through my informants narratives and comments, the 
behaviours they adopted and those they advised me to learn. Thuy’s words of caution 
to me, “Don’t trust them!” indicated her concerns that I might be cheated in the course 
of my fieldwork, reflecting a widespread and empirically-based opinion: Vietnamese 
are unreliable; they cheat, lie, and are unpredictable. Knowing this was preventing 
confusion and deception.  
Based on an extensive literature on social representations over the last forty 
years, Wagner and Hayes provide a definition of the concept of social representations: 
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The first aspect characterising social representations is the: (a) structured, (b) 
cognitive, affective, evaluative and operative, (c) metaphorical or iconic ‘portrayal’, 
of (d) socially relevant phenomena. These can be ‘events’, ‘stimuli’ or ‘facts’ (e) of 
which individuals are potentially aware and which are (f) shared by other members of 
the social group. This commonality between people represents (g) a fundamental 
element of the social identity of the individual (Wagner & Hayes 2005: 120). 
The findings of my research illustrate this definition. The whole set of local 
communities’ statements on cross-border marriages is primarily based on a structured 
portrayal of these alliances constructed by a recurrent institutionalised discourse 
(propaganda, media reports, official policies). This discourse presents cross-border 
marriages as a local cultural characteristic (cross-border intra-ethnic marriages for 
instance) or a human trafficking issue, according to the targeted public (a). These 
statements are based on personal experiences that affect individual and collective 
values and practices, and the social order each one participates in (b). As the example 
of my interaction with Thuy shows, these narratives do not only constitute a ‘portrayal’ 
but also impose a mediation between an individual and the society (c): Thuy does not 
only explain me ‘facts’, she also expects me to learn from them; to approach my 
interactions with Vietnamese women with caution. In this sense, Vietnamese women 
are more than an active element of the social landscape; they have become an object 
endowed with a certain social meaning that one should be aware of (d). Whether we 
consider the rituals that embody marriage ideology (wedding ceremonies for instance) 
or the individuals who practice its rule de facto, the idea of marriage – especially 
unconventional marriage patterns – stimulates the elaboration of a certain relation 
between the involved partners and the rest of the community (e). This relation 
articulates the public position towards mixed couples through shared comments and 
behaviours (f). These existing social representations are heard in many settings, 
spread by various people coming from various professional and social backgrounds in 
these borderlands; they are predominantly shared, even as they are sometimes 
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contested or discussed among members of communities. Eventually, observations 
validate the idea that:  
[T]hese shared ideas contain both judgemental and action-directing elements, they 
orientate the way members of the group act, both between one another and with 
respect to outsiders. The background knowledge shared by members of the group 
distances it from other competing groups and individuals, who lack the associated 
interpretative schema. The relative uniformity vis-à-vis others lends the group 
member security and identity (Wagner & Hayes 2005: 123).  
The following anecdote provides an example of the formation of social 
discourse on a given reality that each newcomer comes to realize at some point. One 
afternoon, I was observing the border-crossing activities on a sidewalk with Thuy 
when a street-vendor came by to sell my favourite Vietnamese snack: trứng vịt lộn.1 I 
indicated my wish to buy some of the eggs to bring back home. A Hoa interpreter, one 
of Thuy’s fellows who was sitting close by heard me. She suddenly intervened and 
took it upon herself to negotiate the transaction for me, without actually asking my 
opinion. Delighted that I appreciated her snacks, the street-vendor prepared the eggs, 
and charged me what I felt was a reasonable price. Thuy remained silent. The 
interpreter chatted politely with me a moment and then walked away, as did the 
vendor. At this point, Thuy told me that I had overpaid for the eggs. Vietnamese 
customers, she told me, even in Hekou, would generally not pay out so much. This 
incident became an opportunity for her to show me the delicate position of the Hoa in 
these borderlands. 
― You see, this interpreter seems nice to you, she’s doing you a favour. Yet 
this is only an appearance. She acted with no scruples, even though she knows 
me and knows you’re my friend. She told the vendor that you could pay more 
                                                
1 Trứng vịt lộn are fertilized duck embryo, a snack served boiled with fresh basilica leaves, grated 
ginger and lemon sauce. 
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for the eggs, that she could negotiate with you on her behalf. So you paid 
more, without the vendor trying herself to cheat you. This interpreter has 
chosen her side; even here, she sides with the Vietnamese, rather than you, or 
a Chinese customer. She is being hypocritical with you. I’m telling you, you 
cannot trust the Vietnamese! Even the Hoa are on their side. During business 
negotiations, interpreters often help Vietnamese buyers more than their own 
Chinese bosses. I don’t like them for this reason; they are dishonest. 
Thuy pointed out how the Hoa remained in a delicate position such that they 
needed to negotiate carefully within their communities. This was the case whilst they 
were still residents in Vietnam and the ambiguity of their position within the 
community persisted with their current position in Chinese society years after their 
forced relocation, even when they stayed or came back to Vietnam. Many Hoa 
eventually settled in China and decided not to return to Vietnam after the war. But 
some of them, unable to leave in 1978, remained in Vietnam and often suffered from 
discrimination, even violence, among Vietnamese society (Chang 1982; Stern 1985; 
Appendix 4).1 But being in-between individuals – neither completely Chinese nor 
Vietnamese – they nowadays adopt a rather pragmatic attitude on either side of the 
border. However, they never forget how miserable they once were. There seems to be 
no real consensus on which side to choose among those Hoa who do not enjoy the 
advantageous position of the successful traders since the reopening of the border (Hai 
2000). In a borderland economy, women like Thuy or her fellow interpreter belong to 
the economical survivors rather than the investors. Being in an ambivalent position 
                                                
1 Several of my Hoa informants mentioned that after 1978, especially in border towns, most Hoa did 
not dare using Chinese language, going outside their home, endured insults. Some living in Lào Cai 
even saw their houses vandalized or burnt. 
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that challenges their subjectivity, both of them, according to circumstances, may stand 
on Chinese or Vietnamese side during a negotiation, regardless of their employer’s 
identity. When I asked her why she had not intervened in the negotiation on my 
behalf, Thuy told me that she had no choice since she was working in the same field 
as the other interpreter. If she had taken my defence, Vietnamese people would have 
deprecated her, and regarded her as a traitor to the interests of these hard-workers. Her 
silence was preferable. The following days, I did not see the interpreter next door. 
Thuy told me she quarrelled with her about the eggs episode after I left, reproaching 
her dishonesty towards me, and her mean-spirited attitude. 
My own experience aside, many newcomers to Hekou and Dongxing such as 
tourists and migrants feel confused by the complexity of locals’ perceptions of, and 
projections on their Vietnamese neighbours. When one intends to establish oneself in 
town, one needs to adapt to the settled group’s set of beliefs in order to become part of 
the community, a necessary step for starting a business in an unfamiliar setting. In this 
sense, the whole process of taking a new acquaintance for a walk around Hekou or 
Dongxing (cf. Chapter 2) proves to be a way to brief the newcomers and share 
knowledge of facts, objects and phenomena. Such knowledge is perceived as 
fundamental to commencing interactions with the Other as it brings these newcomers 
in contact with the exotic object: the Vietnamese woman. In the specific context of a 
migrating society, this knowledge is also in a state of flux. Wagner and Hayes 
perceive a form of community bound by such knowledge, which forms the social 
identity of individuals. I argue, however, that in the case of borderland societies, 
which are culturally disparate and constantly moving, social representations are 
subject to change according to degrees of interaction and personal involvement 
between individuals. Hence, the knowledge shaped by social representations act more 
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as a temporary bond, an initial set of values that guide those in search of social keys to 
connect with the Other rather than as a fundamental element of social identity. 
 
Stereotypes and derogatory views: “the Others’ nation” 
 The politicized discourse 
The discourse on a subject refers to a language or way of talking that develops, 
through use, a series of conventions and becomes institutionalised through use. The 
discourse defines the socially accepted, mainstream or apparently official version, the 
version that seems obvious or natural. At the same time, this discourse always leaves 
out experiences and points of view that do not fit, silencing difference and producing 
unease in those who do not see themselves included. To understand the concept of 
discourse is to remember that what we say about any given subject is always 
constructed, and there are only partial truths (Agustín 2007: 8-9). 
Agustín’s definition of ‘discourse’ precisely reflects what I also mean when I 
refer to informants’ narratives on the field. Indeed, one repeatedly encounters 
numerous widespread assumptions by border people on their neighbours, whatever 
their status or educational background. For instance, one common statement among 
Chinese people is that “Vietnamese history is short, since the country was a part of 
Chinese empire during a thousand years.” Such statements blatantly neglect to 
acknowledge earlier periods of Vietnamese history, and various elements of 
Vietnamese culture that connect it to a broader Southeast Asian civilization. Instead, 
in Chinese popular discourse it becomes convenient to consider Vietnamese people as 
lacking a genuine culture. Many also assess that “Vietnamese language used Chinese 
characters for long before it later changed under French domination for a transcription 
[quốc ngữ] those colonialists provided them with;” and consequently, “French people 
should naturally all understand the written language since it uses [the Roman] 
alphabet!” Regardless of historical truth and the necessity to distinguish oral and 
written language, this simplistic vision not only suggests that Vietnamese people 
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never had their own language transcript, but it also implies that Vietnam depends on 
what other advanced powers provide them in order to exist. Chinese official history 
also attributes the 1979 border conflict to a deliberate attack from Vietnam. Although 
local people dare to challenge this interpretation based on their own experience and 
personal memories, it remains generally and conveniently adopted by the newcomers, 
who have little interest in hearing an alternative opinion.  
Overall, the idea of the supremacy of Chinese civilization over a small former 
suzerain and economically frustrated neighbour1 shapes the belief that somehow, 
Vietnamese people are asking for revenge, and want their “part of the cake.” In 
contemporary times, this translates as economic co-dependency. However, such a 
discourse, which often takes the form of boasting about Chinese merits and successes 
during group debate sessions – especially in the presence of a foreigner – often 
remains unelaborated, underscoring the empty shell it actually is: a convenient site to 
express blurred opinions that sound like yet another manifestation of current Chinese 
nationalism (Barmé 1995; Cabestan 2005). In this regard, Chan (2005a) and Zhang 
(2011) have already suggested how the entangled but ambiguous relationships 
between Vietnamese and Chinese people in these specific areas provide a prolific 
ground for nationalistic discourse, which mixes resentment with common interests. As 
Chan puts it, “[t]he coherence in the Sino-Vietnam relationship lies in its constant 
oscillation between incoherent extremes; hostility versus amity; appreciation and trust 
versus suspicion and distrust; friendship versus hostility; and cooperation versus 
resistance” (Chan 2005a: 52). Not surprisingly, what Chan heard in Vietnam among 
                                                
1 The dominance of Chinese economy and diplomacy in this region of the world is a source of grief and 
controversy within Vietnamese population, and a constant subject of worry for Hanoi’s government; 
both longing for more autonomy and decision power.  
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Vietnamese people mirrors the exact same type of discourse on the Chinese side of 
the border. In Lào Cai, the words ‘distrust’, ‘suspicious’ and ‘distance’ are commonly 
used to describe a necessary cautiousness when interacting with Chinese (Chan 
2005a: 87-88). Nearby, in rural parts of Lào Cai province, Sarah Turner shows us 
distinct attitudes in upland parts of the areas. In these villages, border trade is also 
very active but Vietnamese people seem very much affected by a frightening image of 
their imposing neighbour (cf. Chapter 2). Meanwhile, Horstmann and Wadley also 
highlight that “… the fluidity and ambiguity of identities is a central feature of 
borderlands” (Horstmann & Wadley 2006: 20). Therefore, given such a historical and 
cultural ground for people’s interactions, the ease with which social representations 
spread is not surprising. However, as I examine in the following paragraph, it is also 
crucial to stress the ideological framework that contemporary history and politics 
provide to the standardization of such visions, especially in China, adding another 
dimension to the Other. 
 The folklorizing discourse: a question of class 
There is an interesting parallel in the way the Chinese migrants recently settled 
in borderlands consider their Vietnamese neighbours, and the way other generations 
of Chinese migrants who emigrated to border regions perceived the ethnic groups they 
came into contact with. Mette Halskov Hansen (2005) has described in detail the 
perceptions of Han migrants to Xinjiang and Yunnan provinces, according to their 
arrival dates in the region. Most of the comments she collected are similar to those 
currently heard among Chinese migrants in Hekou and Dongxing about the 
Vietnamese who belong to their new social landscape. Interestingly, we notice the 
same gap between narratives of those who arrived prior to the reforms era (1979-) and 
those recently settled at the frontier. 
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[H]an immigrants who had come as individual migrants after the 1980s were often 
uninterested in the topic of ethnic relations and minority-majority differences. … 
They made no claims to a special idealistic mission as Han in a minority area, and the 
fact that they had come with the specific and explicit purpose of improving their and 
their families’ economic situation helped to explain their lack of interest in ethnic 
minorities as such. They often judged the minorities on the basis of their own 
personal encounters with landlords, neighbours and shopkeepers…  (Hansen 2005: 
240). 
The relevance of a comparison between Chinese political perspective on its 
own internal ethnic groups and the way borderlanders consider their immediate 
foreign neighbours lies in the fact that, in Hekou and Dongxing cases, Vietnamese 
people are de facto minorities in terms of social, rather than political hierarchy. 
Although they remain foreigners, and only benefit from limited rights in terms of stay 
and access to public services, their daily life, activities and role in border towns makes 
them a constitutive part of local life as much as Chinese citizens. But because they 
come from a poorer country that is believed to be economically dependant on China, 
and that nowadays, the economical lens has come to be the only relevant means of 
establishing social hierarchy, Chinese people do not regard their Vietnamese 
neighbours as equals – this is also true for most other southern border countries such 
as Laos, Burma or Nepal. However, over the last two decades, Vietnamese people not 
only became once again part of the border towns’ social landscape, but they tend to 
outnumber the recently urbanized ethnic minorities – the Zhuang in Dongxing region, 
and the Yao and Miao around Hekou.  
Even though today, Vietnamese migrants/traders/workers can be regarded as a 
de facto minority in Chinese borderlands, the main difference between the early 
Chinese inner migrants to minority areas and those recent economic migrants to 
border towns, lies in their goals: the early migrants came to ‘civilize’ ethnic minorities 
whereas the recent migrant came to benefit from the Vietnamese’s partnership (work 
force, women, resources, economical needs) but generally feel socially and politically 
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disengaged towards them. First of all, economic opportunism has largely replaced 
ideological convictions or feelings of duty, as it does in parts of China populated by 
ethnics groups too. If few traders acknowledge learning from their counterparts while 
training them with more accurate and efficient business methods and strategies 
(according to Chinese practices), most do not bother engaging with such constructive 
exchanges of expertise: “Zhi yao nenggou zheng qian jiu xing le [As long as we can 
make money, it’s fine].” They feel no responsibility in “educating” the Other. 
Secondly, despite proximity, cultural similarity and some shared recent history, 
Chinese consider Vietnamese as foreigners whose affairs are no concern to Chinese 
people, even those who live with them. Although most admit that, in fact, “there are 
no deep differences between Chinese and Vietnamese people in general,” pointing out 
the way they used to share a written language, or the thousand years Vietnam spent 
under Chinese empire’s rules as typical instances, they make a clear difference 
between national/internal and international/external Otherness. However, one can 
distinguish a significant difference between discourses of Otherness in Hekou 
compared to those in Dongxing. Zhuang people – the second large ethnic group in 
Guangxi province after the Han1 – often highlight that the ethnic backgrounds of Kinh 
– the main ethnic group in Vietnam – and Zhuang have affinities, and explain how 
this helps communication and understanding, and reduces the feeling of Otherness: 
“Women dou yiyang/chabuduo! [We are all the same/almost similar]” But if the 
Zhuang see linguistic, cultural and ethnic links with the Vietnamese, a situation that 
positions them as relatively ‘equal’ when facing the dominant Han Chinese, people in 
Hekou generally do not adopt such a discourse. Yunnan is a much more complex 
province and blends a greater number of ethnic groups. Here Han are the majority, 
                                                
1 The administrative name of this province is ‘Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region’. 
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and the presence of ethnic minorities among Hekou’s residents is too modest to 
become significant when it comes to affinities with the Vietnamese. Hence, 
differences between ‘us’ and ‘them’ are more accentuated. 
In her account of Chinese Han settlers’ experiences in minority areas located 
in border regions, Hansen also argues that Han people’s opinion of the ethnic 
communities they happen to live with, is not as condescending as one would expect, 
given the general portrait offered by ideological discourse: ethnic minorities are 
culturally and economically backward, to say the least.1 Evolutionist assertions on 
ethnic hierarchy that position the Han on the higher level of advancement on the scale 
of human civilisation’s progress are still taught at school, still performed in media 
(although depicted in a folklorized form so as to enhance ethnic tourism), and 
discussed among ordinary people who may or may not live among ethnic minorities. 
This seems to have slightly changed for the last decade though. For instance, certain 
manifestations of openness allowed by (somewhat) free debates on the Internet, 
provide a more objective (less stereotyped) vision of ethnic minorities to a large 
public in China.2  
Some Han immigrants were more than willing to talk about their perceptions of local 
non-Han, and quite a few introduced the subject spontaneously. However, the main 
problem was to understand what was actually meant by their statements, and to what 
extent expressions were derived from the immigrants’ long-term encounter with the 
official discourse on ethnic groups in China. What consequences, if any, did these 
expressed views have for the actual relationships between Han immigrants and 
minorities, and to what extent could strong racially discriminatory expressions be 
taken as representative of local ‘Han images of ethnic minorities’? In fact a number 
                                                
1 Recent riots of ethnic and political nature in Xinjiang and Tibet areas for instance have enhance the 
re-emergence of radical popular and official discourses on the human quality of those ethnic groups 
involved in local struggles. 
2 Further research is necessary to assess such changes of the propagandist discourse, mixed with 
popular opinions. 
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of Han immigrants did not talk at all about their concepts of local ethnic minorities, 
or … did so only in neutral or predominantly positive terms. This silence on the topic 
of minorities, or the lack of discriminatory or negative descriptions, was obviously 
much less noticeable than extreme statements which also tend to get the most 
attention in foreigners’ reports about Han images of minorities. But in order to 
understand more about majority-minority relations and especially Han images of 
ethnic minorities, it is relevant to focus on what prompted the pronounced differences 
in various Han immigrants’ ways of expressing their views on Han versus non-Han 
(Hansen 2005: 207). 
As we can infer from Hansen’s account, the main difficulty in collecting Han’s 
views on their ethnic neighbours remains in distinguishing personal views from those 
generally admitted and unquestioned ones inherited from the state’s representations. 
In Hekou and Dongxing as well, it was challenging to guess what were, if any, the 
actual empirical opinions of Chinese residents on their Vietnamese neighbours, and 
what was a convenient politicized discourse delivered to answer my questions. Were 
these questions too sensitive, too inquisitive, or too embarrassing? Was it easier to 
answer in a neutral or positive manner in order to avoid debates or judgments? Or 
were the informants too confused about questions they never had to think about in the 
terms I was formulating them? It often happened that the same person gave me 
contradictory comments on his/her experience with Vietnamese people, according to 
his/her perception of my own impressions, or my degree of acquaintances with local 
Vietnamese people. It sometimes felt that my informants took into account a whole 
range of precaution before they talked, whereas in other cases, they spontaneously 
offered their views, whether they were neutral, positive or negative, regardless of their 
content or relevance. I suggest that here, the carefulness of a Chinese person in 
expressing opinion on Otherness also lays in his/her degree of connection with 
Vietnamese people, but also in this person’s position in the local hierarchy, which 
depends on factors such as generation, origin, economic means or reputation. 
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According to their date of arrival, and the degree of their daily connection with 
ordinary Vietnamese people, Dongxing and Hekou’s dwellers do not have the same 
urge (as the Han described by Hansen) to express their opinions on what they consider 
to be an ordinary feature of their daily social life or a relatively new form of contact 
with an outsider; an Other who may actually have more accurately adjusted to the 
local settings than themselves. In this sense, some Vietnamese people may be 
considered as ‘local’ more readily than lately settled migrants from other parts of 
China who have no close connection with their immediate foreign neighbours and no 
particular familiarity with the local social context. Hence, it is necessary to temper 
this tendency to stereotype ethnic alterity by mentioning the variety of opinions 
among Han migrants in new economic development areas such as Hekou or Dongxing.  
A good illustration of this absence of consensus on the Other is the case of Lao 
Zhou. In his fifties, Lao Zhou arrived in Hekou in the early 2000s, after he failed to 
recover decent economic conditions in his native province Hubei following the loss of 
his position as a cadre in a government work unit (i.e., work security). Well-known in 
Hekou’s main street, people also call him “bald-headed.” With his appearance and his 
almost constant derisive smile, he first reminded me of mafia gangsters in Chinese 
popular movies. But he turned out to be very informative, and became a critical 
informant during our regular conversations.  
— In my hometown, everyone xiagang [lost their work-unit jobs]. The 
unemployment rate is very high; there is not hope. The government gave us 
400 yuan per month as compensation. What can you do with 400 yuan 
nowadays? In the time of Old Mao [Chairman Mao Zedong], things were 
much more organized and efficient than now. Yes, I’m nostalgic of these years. 
Everything is luan [chaotic] in this country. Where I come from, banks are 
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regularly robbed, taxi drivers get killed for cash, and insecurity is everywhere. 
In my former shequ [compound],1 at least one member of each family has 
spent some time in a laogai [labor camp/prison]. This doesn’t prevent them 
from committing new crimes when they go out. They have no hope, job 
market doesn’t want them: too old, too incompetent! 
Lao Zhou usually spends his days in his rented room or on the guest-house’s 
side-walk sipping cups of tea or coffee, emptying packs of cigarettes, sometimes 
interacting with some business fellows. Most of the time, he observes street activity 
with a somehow condescending look, although not necessarily directed at the 
Vietnamese, whom one would expect from a local Chinese businessman. Over the 
years, he has gradually felt lonely and he now admits preferring to avoid too much 
contact with other fellows. 
— Rural people are the only ones who improved their life with the economic 
reforms; they migrated and were given the opportunity to run business. But we 
[urban people] didn’t gain much from all this. I don’t like rural people, suzhi 
hen di [there are of little quality]; I have nothing to share with them, nothing to 
say to them. They are rough and uneducated; they believe they can become 
someone with money! Listen to them when they talk, they are impolite and 
vulgar. We are all waidi ren [outsiders] in Hekou but most of these traders 
                                                
1 Shequ: public housing generally composed of several buildings (often fenced and supervised by a 
guard/caretaker) which usually belonged to a work unit and which concentrated most of its workers in 
a shared space where people used to interact a lot. These spaces are different from the recently built 
compounds where people buy their apartment but come from many different backgrounds and do not 
have a work unit to feel linked to each other. Communication channels and space became limited and 
people learned to live without knowing or questioning their neighbours identity and occupation. 
  263 
come from countryside, we have nothing in common. They believe they are 
even superior to Vietnamese people, they know nothing. There are some very 
rich Vietnamese! And honestly, the situation in their country is not that 
different from that of our villages around. But they are not interested in 
thinking about this. I respect Vietnamese people. I believe they are honest, but 
if you disregard them, then they might deceive you. I don’t judge them 
through the economic lens. 
Lao Zhou's resentment towards his rural Chinese fellows over what they feel 
about their neighbours illustrates the difficulty in describing a unified attitude of 
Chinese towards Vietnamese, despite a general coherent vision. Individual 
backgrounds and histories significantly alter people’s attitudes towards their own 
“Other,” although this is not always perceptible. Lao Zhou feels closer to Vietnamese 
people values and personal behaviour than to his Chinese acquaintances or business 
partners whom he despises for their radically different – according to him – life 
experience and cultural level. Although Lao Zhou, as many other traders then, 
expressed concerns about his business future due to the world economic crisis (end of 
2008), he articulates his general bitterness with criticism and disillusioned comments 
on his Chinese narrow-minded fellows. Then he finds some comfort in nostalgic 
memories of the “good old times” under Mao’s rules, and among his Vietnamese 
friends with whom dialogue seems easier. These same Vietnamese people that 
Chinese migrants associate with backwardness, incompetence in trade and incapacity 
to adjust to modernization and economic changes, “just as Chinese people were 
twenty, even thirty years ago.” In this regard, Lao Zhou’s ambivalent sense of 
belonging echoes the articulation of difference, indifference and familiarity with 
Otherness among the various communities of Han migrants in minority areas (Hansen, 
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2005: 223-224), and where class, gender and economic position on the market are the 
more accurate factors of distinction among local population. 
— Once, I complained about the general treatment that Chinese border guards 
inflict to Vietnamese, women in particular. I witnessed one of them beating a 
woman one morning, so I went to the police to mention the incident and to 
defend her. Since then, many people have heard about me; Vietnamese people 
respect me. I have a lot of friends in Lào Cai. People always complain about 
corruption in the Vietnamese administration, but believe me, Chinese cadres 
are much more corrupted! In Vietnam, they don’t have so many regulations 
but those they have are stricter.  
Lao Zhou indeed has some connections in Lào Cai among Vietnamese and 
Hoa traders. As many of Hekou’s residents, he comes and goes over the bridge that 
separates the two twin cities as he would cross the road. “Let’s go and have a nice 
coffee in Lào Cai!” he would often say to me, assuming that crossing an international 
border was as easy for me as it was for him. For some like Lao Zhou, frontiers are not 
tangible lines between two countries but they do exist between sets of values. 
‘Respect for’ and ‘solidarity with’ stand as core values that distinguish ‘Us’ from the 
‘Other.’ The new diversity of the contemporary urban population of Hekou and 
Dongxing changes the dynamics of perception. It complicates the folklorizing 
discourse on Otherness by adding new layers of distinction: generation, province of 
origin, socio-economic background, education level, etc. Lao Zhou may have the 
tendency to over-stress his sympathy with the Vietnamese as a means of critiquing 
various aspects of Chinese society. And even though he does not consider Vietnamese 
people as his peers, nor does he view his Chinese fellows as much more similar to 
himself. Such a viewpoint, also shared by other long-term residents in border towns, 
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blurs a clearly demarcated line between Chinese and Vietnamese, and reveals a 
confusing ground where rumours flourish. I now turn to further explore the dynamics 
and articulation of stereotypes concerning Vietnamese and Chinese people that spread 
among borderland communities. 
 Interactions between various levels: the origins of stereotypes  
To propagate the spirit of the frontier defence,  
to propel the strategy of showing the great love to the people 
 and strengthening the frontier defence [sic]1 
 
In the conversations and comments collected in Dongxing and Hekou, I have 
identified three levels of discourse where social representations of the Chinese or 
Vietnamese originate, are formulated and spread. The ideological level, where an 
official discourse is diffused according to diplomatic relationships and current 
economic policies (topics: collaboration, exchange, harmonious relations); the level of 
local society where general assumptions are grounded in local communities’ 
experience and key-actors expertise; the individual level that underlies empirical 
approaches and experiences, guided by and grounded in a subjective public 
knowledge. 
The ideological level 
In its own way, the propagandist slogan above gives the tone of the place: a 
gap between an official discourse and practices on the ground. The former “friend-or-
enemy” and “elder-younger” nature of historical link between China and Vietnam still 
underlies the contemporary relationship of their peoples, despites the continuous 
efforts to build a new economically based relationship through its most directed 
                                                
1 Slogan (in both Chinese and English) hung up on the top of the Hekou Entry and Exit Inspection 
Center, October 2008. I deliberately did not correct the English syntax. 
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involved actors: local traders and workers. Here, as is presumingly the case at each 
main border gates of the country, an emphasis on the notion of frontier and defence 
remains. At other times, the ideology of socialist brotherhood may come up in terms 
of strategy.1  But as Zhang points out, “[m]emory at the borderland is full of 
ambiguity; it is in a state of liminality that constantly vacillates between forgetfulness 
and remembrance. People by the border can never forget, nor fully remember, thereby 
dwelling at the edge of reminiscence as they strive forward” (2011: 312). Whatever 
Hekou’s propaganda bureau hoped to express in this slogan did not seem to 
adequately fit the nature of the intense exchange activities that were occurring just 
below these words: a continuous flow of carriages filled with impressive amount of 
goods ready to be exported to the other side of the Red River’s bank. Whether or not 
dialogue at the decision-making level of the two countries was harmonious, what 
counts for local people is the impression their neighbours leave behind them, what 
degree of trust and reliance their behaviours reveal and how they can establish 
sustainable relationships based on empirical exchanges. In this sense, such political 
slogans appear obsolete and very much rooted in some distant political rhetoric that 
does not resonate with Chinese people. 
Local society level 
On a bus from Hanoi to Móng Cái, my assistant Loan and I met a friendly 
dressmaker who invited us to come to her shop, in the old market for fabrics. 
Grabbing the opportunity to make acquaintances in the Vietnamese city, we visited 
her the next day. We were not only hoping to extend our local network, but also 
                                                
1 The recent diplomatic issues between China and Vietnam regarding their long dispute over maritime 
territories render the relationship rather tense and brotherhood has given way to defensive political 
attitudes. 
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hoping to settle a street-base1 and learn more about the perspectives of local women 
on cross-border marriages. While we were happily chatting with her, her good friend 
and shop neighbour Hoa came by and enthusiastically began to enquire about us. The 
middle-aged woman was apparently thrilled at the opportunity to get to know a 
foreigner who was willing to make the effort to communicate in basic Vietnamese, an 
obviously rare opportunity in this remote corner of town. After sharing basic 
information on each other, Hoa invited us to her home. She was very protective of us, 
saying over and over, “You poor girls alone in an unknown city!”  
In an unexpected and very welcome coincidence – a case of serendipity in the 
words of Pieke (2000) – it turned out that Luong, Hoa’s husband, was an expert in 
anti-criminal cooperation programs, involved with Non-Governmental Organisations 
and United Nations agencies to “fight trafficking of women and children.” 
Intriguingly, he was precisely the person I wished to seek out in order to compare 
local accounts on human trafficking with more official and professional perspectives 
on the issue. Yet he also belonged to the cohort of local government officers whom I 
was unlikely to meet formally due to my delicate position in Vietnam.2 Hence, 
accepting Hoa’s invitation was as exciting as it was hazardous, and I became very 
alert. Being scrutinized is very common in Vietnam and even though the way I got to 
know Hoa was apparently very casual, I had no guarantee that this was not, somehow, 
                                                
1 What I refer here as a street-base is a small space in a public place where I could hang out, stay 
endless hours to observe daily social scenery and passively attract new informants, under the 
‘protection’ of a local friend. Ideal street-bases were such shops where clients would restlessly come 
and go and offer chances to chat. 
2 I have met Luong in 2006 during my first fieldwork in Móng Cái, while I was not a PhD candidate 
yet, but only an independent researcher working on a book about cross-border marriages, with a strong 
focus on forced marriages. 
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planned by suspicious observers to determine the nature of my activities and purpose 
in the town. 
After a nice dinner cooked by Luong himself, demonstrating the abilities Hoa 
had previously alluded to in her flattering and loving portrait of her husband, this 
talkative officer provided me with a few pieces of information on the human 
trafficking phenomenon, based on his expertise. The conversation lasted a long time, 
but since I was not supposed to be doing research, I could not conduct a formal 
interview, or take notes from his account, which was peppered with exchanges on 
different local issues. My friend Loan could only translate the main elements of what 
she knew would be of interest for the research. She may have left out Luong’s 
personal ways of narrating stories that could have indicated more about his opinion on 
the subject. Although his arguments and descriptions were very much the same as 
those found in most organizations’ reports on human trafficking – the impact of 
economic conditions and the demography factor featuring as ‘pushing factors’ for 
blind migration for instance – Luong also provided a few additional concrete details 
and some personal viewpoints on what has become of returnees to Vietnam after their 
forced marriage/prostitution experience in China. But what I will hold from his 
account for the purpose of this chapter are his insights on Chinese people, in 
comparison with the perspective of Vietnamese people: 
— Chinese people stand united and it is very hard for Vietnamese women to 
gain some support when needed in China, they do not know who to talk to or 
rely on … Chinese people believe that Vietnamese people are smart but have 
narrow views. Chinese have broader perspectives … Chinese police have 
more direct and efficient methods to deal with human trafficking, but human 
rights are not respected in China. For instance, Chinese police arrests a suspect 
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first and searches for evidence afterward … Chinese people are very 
determined and proud. They are good at planning and implementing programs 
as they were designed … Vietnamese people are rather united within villages 
but not in cities, and when they live abroad, they do not care about each other. 
Vietnamese people have a lot to learn from Chinese. 
Luong was very loquacious and showed a real interest in sharing his views, 
indicating that he probably does this quite often with other people, hence spreading a 
certain gaze on China. At the end of the conversation, Luong had obviously 
understood that it was no coincidence Loan and I both had a strong interest in the 
plight of Vietnamese women in China and that this may have been the reason why we 
were staying in Móng Cái. However, since we met informally through his wife’s 
acquaintance, he was tactful enough not to ask more about our purpose. He simply 
said that it was good that I wished to learn about a place while travelling.1 Offering 
me his perceptions on Chinese and Vietnamese, from the specific lens of his expertise 
on building bridges between the Chinese and Vietnamese, Luong provided me an 
interesting blend of the conventional opinions he needed to express – in front of a 
foreigner – and his own empirical findings about people with whom he worked. As a 
key-actor of international collaboration in the realm of policy implementers, Luong 
cautiously positioned himself at the intersection between views disseminated by 
propaganda on the benefits of economic cooperation with China that encourage 
                                                
1 In 2009, I went back to Móng Cái and met again the couple without any trouble either since Hoa was 
still very enthusiastic about meeting with me. This time, being officially enrolled as a PhD student, I 
could elaborate further on my research purpose. Hoa asked me a few legitimate questions out of 
curiosity but this was more related with the fact that I was spending time on what appeared like an 
investigation instead of cradling my child at home. 
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dialogue, and his personal views of his neighbours, by only describing his colleagues’ 
professional attitude. I contend that his whole cognitive system of beliefs and 
opinions was actually a reflection of what was partly that of his community, and 
partly that of a cooperative behaviour assimilated throughout his working experience 
in anti-trafficking programs.  
The individual experience 
Each person who lives for a certain period of time at the border acquires some 
empirical knowledge of his/her neighbours, through various forms of interaction and 
experience. But it remains difficult to assess how much of this knowledge relies on 
exactitude, and how much is reliant upon the impact of public judgment, or the 
characteristic of a personality or an event. Grounded in and guided by a subjective 
public knowledge, people elaborate their perception of a given social group to support 
a common reality shared by others (Jodelet 1989). When asked what they generally 
thought of their neighbours – the Vietnamese or the Chinese – my ordinary 
informants always offered me very spontaneous answers that contained a large range 
of qualifying terms. Often, an anecdote followed to illustrate the statement and to 
convince me of its relevance. Whoever was present during the conversation often 
commented and added a few elements to emphasise the argument so that there would 
be no doubt about its veracity. When a migrant arrives in one of these border cities 
and listens to everyone’s experience and opinions on his new neighbours, before he 
even has a chance to directly experience any form of exchange with them, he would 
certainly have to acknowledge a certain coherence in people’s opinion, albeit rather 
negative. Such an opinion does not necessarily match the more neutral, economically 
focused image that emerges from media or official discourse.  
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Stereotypes involve the categorization of the Other into a popular discourse 
understood as a direct translation and a social validation of social representations 
(Leyens & Corneille 2001). It is a reductive process that imposes specific views of 
social groups. As McGarty, Spears and Yzerbyt summarize, “stereotypes can only be 
said to have formed when there are interrelations between knowledge about social 
categories and perceptions of those categories. The stereotype should not be 
considered as either the explanation or the thing to be explained, but as the full set of 
constraints between knowledge, perceived equivalence and labelling” (McGarty et al. 
2004: 187). But above all, stereotypes formation is “a dynamic psychological process 
embedded in intergroup relations” (McGarty et al. 2005: 186), where “… the 
members of the dominant group may be keen to stereotype the members of the 
subordinate group in order to perpetuate their privileges. Conversely, the members of 
the subordinate group may be tempted to build a derogatory image of the members of 
the dominant group in order to change the state of affairs. Interestingly, the 
stereotypes in these two situations serve very clear yet contradictory goals” (McGarty 
et al. 2005: 197). In line with these authors, I believe that in the case of Sino-
Vietnamese border cities, stereotypes stand as selective explanations of the complex 
nature of relationship between two social groups, and they impact upon the way 
individuals negotiate their intimate life. 
 
From ‘them’ to ‘her:’ how Chinese perceptions of Vietnamese people 
alter the image of Vietnamese women 
I have illustrated above how official viewpoints, local stories and individual 
experiences fertilize an already rich ground where fixed stereotypes inherited from the 
  272 
past meet moving representations as they emerge from contemporary circumstances. 
These dynamics shape the portrayal of a ‘typical’ Vietnamese woman and a ‘typical’ 
Chinese man that people believe to be accurate. I will now describe how the various 
levels of discourse intertwine and what ‘references’ they thus deliver.  
 Statements on Vietnamese and Chinese people: identifying the 
gendered stereotypes 
Mr Tang is a 60 year-old trader from Yiwu (Zhejiang province) who arrived in 
Hekou with his son in 2007 to start a wholesale business of curtains’ materials. He has 
already visited Vietnam and is not really enthusiastic about it. In late summer 2008, 
on one of those long, hot afternoons he used to spend laying in a bamboo deckchair in 
front of his warehouse, chatting and smoking with his friends, I asked him to give me 
his first impressions of the Vietnamese people he encountered since he arrived in 
Hekou. Mr Tang was quite happy to provide me with his insights, especially on 
male/female relationships, an issue he seemed particularly interested in. 
— Vietnamese men hit their wives publicly! Mei you mianzi [they have no 
face]... In China, we contempt a man if he beats in wife in front of other 
people, but in Vietnam, it’s normal, it’s the way a man shows his authority. In 
Chinese, we have a saying: jia chou bu ke wai yang [don’t wash you dirty 
linen in public]. 
Scholarship on domestic violence in Vietnam (Rydstrøm 2003a, 2003b;  
UNODC 2002; Huong 2010) as well as numerous empirical reports1 support Mr 
                                                
1 Indeed, it is more common to see opposite scenarios in the streets of China. In various occasions, I 
witnessed arguments between men and women in China that often ended in a woman hitting a man, 
while the latest only used insults and self-defence to raise his arguments. This usually attracts a lot of 
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Tang’s insinuation that the line between the domestic and public spheres within which 
Vietnamese husbands may express their disagreement, including through physical 
assaults, is rather flexible in Vietnamese society. Rydstrøm suggests that the 
perpetuation of domestic violence relies on the efforts of Vietnamese women in 
maintaining a calm and cooperative response to their husbands assaults, as the 
implicit rules of domestic life expect from them (Rydstrøm 2003a, 2003b); a situation 
that sees a marital relationship caught in a vicious cycle.  Mr Tang went on: 
— In China, a rich man may avoid working hard and may enjoy idleness, but a 
poor man will be scorned if he tries nothing to bail himself out, and instead 
sends his wife to work to make a living for the family. In Vietnam, it’s 
different, nanren chi ruan fan [men eat soft rice], they don’t mind. 
What is interesting in this comment is the colloquial expression that Mr Tang 
uses to describe the financial reliance of husband on wife. In China, the contemporary 
use of the expression ‘eating soft rice’ is related to sexuality and describes a 
relationship in which a man benefits from a woman’s financial support in exchange of 
his companionship (including sexual activity). This reference to a physical 
relationship considerably pushes further the limits of an expression that is otherwise 
employed – as my informant did here – to describe a man who lives off his female 
partner’s incomes rather than work for a living. Adding a sexual dimension to the 
relationship is common in the numerous stories heard on Vietnamese prostitutes in 
Hekou. According to Chinese residents – including two neighbours who corroborated 
Mr Tang’s assessment that day – lots of these women engage in this activity in order 
                                                                                                                                       
observers who may try to intervene, even though some often look entertained by the scene. Meanwhile, 
in Vietnam, I also witnessed men being mean to women in the streets, even physically abusive, yet saw 
no reacting in favour of the women for the public that rather adopted a neutral profile. 
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to support their husband’s stay in Vietnam, sometimes children, even parents and 
siblings. On the same level, some Chinese (male) partners of Vietnamese madams are 
locally known for doing nothing else but taking advantage of their companion and 
making a living out of the sexual exploitation of young Vietnamese sisters. Whether 
Mr Tang was consciously making a connection between allegations on social realities 
in Hekou and his general viewpoint on regular couples in Vietnam or not, it is 
relevant to note the dimension of intimate life emerging in public discourse as a 
crucial element of the classification of domestic patterns. Hearing Mr Tang, and some 
of his fellows later on the same question, I felt that the general ‘sexual’ atmosphere of 
a city like Hekou allowed such assumptions to become disguised entry points for non-
locals to discuss the issue of cross-border marriages. 
In a similar way, Zhang has also detected how the green Vietnamese army cap 
that many Vietnamese men wear as a daily outfit (especially workers) a national item 
which has symbolized Vietnamese masculinity – as the non-la [conical hat] 
symbolises Vietnamese femininity – is nowadays mocked by some Chinese people in 
Hekou (Zhang & Grillot 2009). In Chinese, the colloquial expression dai lü maozi 
[wearing a green hat] designates men who have been sexually cheated by their wife. 
By extension, talking about “Vietnamese men wearing their green helmet” insinuates 
a condescending judgment on Vietnamese men’s ability to control their wives. It 
questions their masculinity and sexual capacity, and furthermore, implicitly indicates 
that Vietnamese women might be loose women. This prompts me to turn my attention 
on the reputation hold by Vietnamese women, in particular with regard to the 
commodification of their body. 
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 Approaching the Vietnamese women  
In Móng Cái and Dongxing in particular, people seem very well informed on 
cross-border marriages, especially cases of coerced marriages. Whoever I talked too, 
whether a motorcycle taxi driver, a street-seller, a business owner, a housewife or a 
shop employee, it sounded like everyone always had an anecdote to tell, heard about 
“a friend of an acquaintance who knows someone who,” and had personal comments 
to make on the matter. Although a sensitive political issue, forms of intimacy between 
Chinese and Vietnamese is a fertile and active ground for people to illustrate the 
general stereotypes attributed by and to Otherness on either side of the border. Hence, 
the topic is often debated in private conversations, judging by how effortless it was to 
start a conversation and glean a few facts and rumours about cross-border marriages 
whereas meeting these described couples, as stated in Chapter 1, was another story.  
Mr Ruan, a Yao man from Dongxing whom I introduced in Chapter 2, is the 
owner of a Chinese restaurant in Móng Cái since March 2006. His dishes added a 
little variety to the usual local Vietnamese regime (especially after local dinner time), 
and I quickly became familiar with him. Mr Ruan was friendly and very flexible with 
the menu, allowing me to go to the kitchen in the back and choose for myself among 
the available range of vegetables the ones I wished to eat. His cooking skills were 
very basic and his dishes may just have reached the ‘acceptable level’ if it were in 
China, but to me they tasted good. During my several stays in Móng Cái, I thus 
experienced what Chinese people often complain about when mentioning their stay in 
Vietnam: the “lack of variety in Vietnamese local basic food” and the “absence of 
imagination” in the way vegetables are cooked. Indeed, the inability to appreciate 
regular ‘good’ meals disturbs many Chinese and, as a consequence, affects their 
perceptions of Vietnamese customs. A meal cooked without meat, oil and chilli has 
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little chance to get good reviews; and if Vietnamese people cannot cook, what can 
they do properly? As Dikötter informs us – and as Fiskesjö elaborates later (Fiskesjö 
1999) – the role of cooking methods was already a criterion for comparing people 
with the civilized Chinese under the Chinese empire: 
Food was a social signifier. It contributed to the symbolic differentiation between 
social groups and circumscribed cultural identity. Table habits expressed degrees of 
cultural alienation. In most civilizations, the main distinction was between raw and 
cooked food. The transforming power of fire was a symbol of culture (Dikötter 1992: 
9). 
On the first evening we met, Mr Ruan was very pleased to serve a foreign 
customer, and he invited Loan and I to stay after dinner and chat with him over 
endless cups of cheap jasmine tea. As soon as I expressed my interest in Vietnamese 
women’s life, he brought up the guaimai renkou [human trafficking] matter in the 
conversation, as if this were a hot topic in the area. At least, it translated an obvious 
association of ideas between ‘Vietnamese women in China’ and ‘human trafficking’: 
— Many Vietnamese women go to China. Around Fangcheng and 
Dongxing, about 6000 Vietnamese women have been married to Chinese men 
since the 1990s,1 but most of them were sold. This usually happens through 
matchmakers. Once in China, the women can’t leave, they have no papers and 
no money. Their husbands are often poor, old or have physical inabilities; 
tamen zhao bu dao laopo [they can’t find a wife]. Chinese police just let them 
go through, tamen bu guan [they don’t care]. When they have children, the 
couples register them on their father’s hukou. You know, nowadays it costs ten 
thousands yuan to a peasant in Guangxi to get married! That includes the 
wedding banquet, a living place and some furniture.  If he doesn’t have any 
money, a bachelor can borrow, but it’s very expensive. But a Vietnamese wife 
                                                
1 Mr Ruan did not explain where this data came from. 
  277 
costs less and it’s the only way for those who are not ‘normal’ to get married. 
And anyway, there are not enough women in this region, there are 15% of men 
in excess:1 zhong nan qing nü [boys are more important than girls]. People 
think that way. 
Mr Ruan’s statement already said much about the local understanding of 
cross-border marriages. The economic and demographic factors still stand as 
structural, but the importance of bride price and the personal situation of Chinese 
bachelors also weigh in the balance. His knowledge alerted me to locals’ awareness of 
a social issue regarded as an important local concern by Vietnamese and Chinese 
authorities. In 2009, Mr Ruan’s restaurant was still open but he was always too busy 
to talk to me. Had he said it all?  
Descriptions of Vietnamese women rarely sketch a clear or consensual image 
of those who are married to a Chinese partner. Whether based on true facts or 
allegations, general representations of these women nourish the perception of each 
individual, and vice versa. Where do these representations actually come from? The 
circumstances in which these men and women from different backgrounds and with 
different expectations meet each other, and the sort of relationships they establish 
indicate how interactions suffer from environmental bias. The first encounters 
between Chinese men and Vietnamese women may actually occur in any locations of 
border cities, but it might likely happen in one of these active urban spots where 
virtually every newcomer starts a journey: the area surrounding border gates, the busy 
streets where goods are exchanged between traders, the main market places and bus 
                                                
1 Here as well, mister Ruan do not quote any source, as if it was basic knowledge or well-
known/locally-shared data. 
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stations, which are mainly central locations. The contrasting images that these 
encounters leave on newcomers tend to shape an ambiguous experience of the regular 
interactions and personal relationships that may result from this initial encounter. 
When new cross-border ‘traders-to-be’ arrive in Hekou1 for instance, they 
usually already have some acquaintances in the city. They come to kan yixia [have a 
look around] or diaocha [investigate]. In this migration space dedicated to border 
trade, most of them establish their business according to their familiarity with two 
sorts of spheres: the sphere of expertise or business sector, and the sphere of laoxiang 
[fellows from home: same village, city or province]. Hence, besides the necessary 
guidance on the rules of trade that these acquaintances provide them with, newcomers 
are also rapidly introduced to the local social context. Hence, as in most places in 
China, business practices often imply a ritual visit to local entertainment places with 
business partners. In the case of Hekou, that includes restaurant meals, karaoke 
sessions, visits to the border casino and maybe an express visit to Vietnam. This may 
mean a simple daily visit to Lào Cái, a further step up to the local tourist attraction 
Sapa, or even a visit to the capital Hanoi. However, most newcomers soon hear about 
the infamous attraction of Hekou, the Vietnamese market, where they tend to venture 
at some point during their stay. In this place that clearly embodies the presence of the 
Vietnamese population in town, newcomers can taste Vietnamese food, buy exotic 
products (most of the shops are managed by Vietnamese women), and try a massage 
offered by a young Vietnamese woman. Generally, the ultimate entertainment activity 
consists in enjoying sex services provided by a Vietnamese prostitute, whether on the 
spot (in one of the market’s numerous brothels) or in a nearby guesthouse. As 
described in Chapter 2, Vietnamese prostitutes represent an entertaining activity that 
                                                
1 Here, I will focus on the experience of men that I collected. 
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has become a significant tool for local business associates to create familiarity with 
the Other and to build partnership. Indeed, these women also offer a seductive 
representation of, and a promising human perspective on Vietnam. 
Whereas the newcomers enjoy these encounters with their new neighbours, 
they also come to observe in a more specific way the way their fellows organize their 
business in collaboration with their Vietnamese partners. For instance, consumer 
goods wholesalers, a large majority of Chinese traders in Hekou, use Vietnamese 
carriers to transport their goods to Vietnam, whether on the legal or on the smuggling 
path. The majority of these carriers are Vietnamese women whose ability, autonomy 
and efficiency are very much appreciated. Later, during their initial business trips in 
Vietnam, Chinese traders can enjoy the services of local guides. In this field, 
Vietnamese women also dominate the market. Although the position of guide often 
gives them the opportunity to meet future employers or extend their clientele network, 
it also puts them in a delicate position since they may be solicited for other sorts of 
services or become the target of flirting. Still in the field of services, traders often hire 
Vietnamese women (many of them being of Hoa origin) to translate negotiations, 
discussions and transactions with their Vietnamese clients. These women can directly 
work in Chinese shops or they can be employed on a regular basis for business 
meetings and business trips on either side of the border. The in-between/negotiator 
role that they often play, on top of their language ability helps to overcome cultural 
misunderstandings and to establish efficient cooperation and trusting relationships 
between Vietnamese and Chinese people. Being the privileged actors of direct 
interactions between trade associates puts these often young and unmarried women – 
consciously or not – in the representative position of Otherness. Increasing degrees of 
familiarity eventually turn some to potentially intimate Chinese partners when they 
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are available (single). Hence, the longer newcomers spend in Hekou, the more they 
notice the different levels of relationships between local Chinese men and Vietnamese 
women, and the more ‘pictures’ they can create out of their perceptions and 
absorption of local discourse, which in return, is enhanced with new perceptions and 
experiences.  
I have argued elsewhere that representations of Vietnamese women sketch 
them as ‘available bodies’ (Grillot 2012). Vietnamese women embody three identities 
that arise from their activities in borderlands and the personality they express: the 
productive worker, a body full of force and energy that does not complain; the 
fantasized women, an emancipated and exotic body available to fulfil sexual needs; 
and the devoted associate who may turn into the idealized wife and mother, a 
domesticated body that reproduces heirs and serves family according to the 
conventional model of patriarchal conjugality. However, these representations tend to 
contradict each other and generate confusion that is very much perceptible in the 
accounts collected on Vietnamese wives. Because of their ambiguous femininity and 
the suspected position that Vietnamese women embody in the social environment of 
these borderlands, mixed couples generally become the subject of allegations that 
question the authenticity of the relationship, the purpose of the alliance, and their 
conformity to certain values and schemes. 
 Questioning the authenticity and conformity of mixed marriages: ‘the 
deceived,’ ‘the deceivers’ and ‘the ambiguous’ 
Tam (cf. Chapter 3) is an example of how a Vietnamese woman can become a 
source of allegations in the eyes of locals. One of the last circumstances within which 
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I met her illustrates how chaotic some mixed relationships can become and how they 
participate in producing a rather stereotyped popular discourse on a social group. 
Helping her to trace her father’s identity,1 I made a journey to her hometown 
Yên Bái to meet her mother and gather a few needed documents for the bureaucratic 
search. Tam was living in Hekou then. Once in Vietnam, my assistant Loan and I 
managed to find the old woman’s house thanks to the villagers who knew about her 
‘case.’ The house was closed and Tam’s mother was absent. Disappointed, we were 
about to leave when Tam suddenly emerged, riding a motorcycle taxi with a big bag. 
Once we overcame the surprise of meeting each other again in such an unexpected 
way, Tam quickly opened her house (to discover it had been robbed and that the TV 
had disappeared). She invited us to sit on the only available place – the bed – and told 
us what had just happened in a nervous and sad voice: 
— I discovered that my laogong [husband] was cheating on me! I feel so sad 
and angry with him! He has an affair with a Chinese woman; she’s older and 
richer than me. I realized that this man wasn’t doing anything good for me; he 
was using me. For years, he never gave me any money to buy food; I’ve 
always paid for everything at the market! When my mother was visiting me in 
Hekou, he made her sleep on the floor; he had no respect and treated her like a 
useless old woman. He was nice to my son but he never offered him anything. 
Do you remember? He told you, he is working on a construction site, and he 
has a salary! I was doing everything at home. Sometimes he was spending the 
night outside but he never explained me why and where. When I eventually 
                                                
1 Tam asked me to find her Morocco-French father and this led us to a complicated but fascinating 
search for identity that I will relate in another piece of work. 
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learned the truth I threatened I would leave. There was nothing else to hope 
for our relationship. “How dare you!” he told me. He didn’t take me seriously. 
I didn’t lose time, believe me! I woke up early this morning, I took advantage 
of his working hours, and I tidied all my things and called a scavenger. I sold 
all his belonging: the clothes, the kitchen utensils, everything! I used the 
money to pay my way back home.1 
From Tam’s viewpoint, she was ‘deceived’ and she took revenge by 
disappearing with her ex-companion’s possessions. However, one can imagine the 
gossip that ensued when the man returned home. A few weeks later, when I returned 
to Hekou, two people mentioned the split of this couple to me. “Tam’s husband is 
very angry, he’s looking for her everywhere. He may not be able to go to Vietnam 
though.2 He says she deceived him. He’s not a good man but he was good to Tam. 
Did you know she stole everything from him?” said a neighbour. People knew that 
Tam was an ex-prostitute, a woman who had had several companions, and who was 
then living in poverty. She was dishonoured. But the intimate life and tension of the 
couple, which were not flattering for the husband, were partly ignored by 
acquaintances. And the mere fact that she disappeared full-handed could not possibly 
argue for the defence of a Vietnamese woman. Whoever made a mistake or had an 
inadequate attitude, a five year relationship was being reduced in the eye of the public 
to a widespread model of cheating: a nice Chinese man deceived by an unscrupulous 
Vietnamese woman. 
                                                
1 Her way back included the boat pass between Hekou and Lào Cai, then the train ticket between Lào 
Cai and Yên Bái, and the taxi ride to her village. 
2 Tam’s companion did not have the required passport and visa to enter Vietnam as far as Yên Bái, and 
he did not speak Vietnamese. The story does not say if he knew Tam’s address either. 
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In popular accounts of mixed relationships, however, Vietnamese women 
always seem to assume the negative role, or the questionable position in these mixed 
relationships. These women endure public looks and controversy over their choice, 
whatever form it takes. In Lào Cai, the young Chau was engaged to a Chinese trader 
who was still a permanent resident of China.1 Chau’s marriage had become the 
subject of numerous allegations that her family attempted to hide or defend. My 
acquaintance at the time, Binh (Thuy’s sister-in-law, cf. Chapter 3) introduced me to 
her case. However, Binh did not want to take me to Chau’s home. She said it was “bu 
tai fangbian [not very convenient],” a common way to express discomfort in doing 
something socially awkward or unconventional. That my friend preferred to avoid a 
direct introduction indicated that something was unusual about this marriage. 
Preventing outsiders from knowing about it was a clear indicator of social stigma. Yet, 
following my friend’s indication, I managed to find Chau’s family home, close to Lào 
Cai’s train station. She was not home, but this first visit offered an opportunity for me 
to converse with Chau’s parents. At first suspicious but then welcoming, they 
described their daughter’s marital experiences. Probably used to having to justify the 
marriage of his daughter with a Chinese from Jianshui (Yunnan) to the community, 
the account of Chau’s father in particular sounded rather polite and resolutely 
positive. He obviously tried to persuade me of the sincerity and generosity of the 
husband, and of the determination of his daughter. Meanwhile, he insisted on the 
modern education he offered Chau, his own satisfaction with her choice, and her 
acquaintances’ acceptance. In other words, I was facing a happy family and a loving 
                                                
1 Even though Chau never acknowledged it, I learned that her marriage had already been recorded and 
that local Vietnamese administrators interviewed her (for some reasons that remain obscure), thus 
attracting her neighbours’ attention.  
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couple who lived in a tolerant community. Still, Chau’s parents’ testimony struck me 
as a speech intended to persuade me, with recurrent arguments, and hints of advocacy. 
A few days later, Chau returned home and when we asked to meet her, the reception 
was much cooler.1 Her father, distant and obviously embarrassed, tried to discourage 
us by saying that his daughter did not agree to see us. Yet, he politely invited us to sit 
in the lounge while he remained silent: he had said everything there was to say with 
respect to his daughter’s case. Chau glanced at us out of the kitchen and then 
appeared. Once confident of our intentions, she offered her version of her private life. 
— I loved my first husband. I chose him among many other men; I wanted a 
husband who was older than me. He was nine years older, and I was only 
eighteen. Our mothers knew each other. He was an only child, did not work 
and spent his time hanging around. But we all liked him. I was just graduated 
from high school, didn’t have a job yet. We got married and had a daughter. 
But things worsened after our marriage, he started to hit me. I worked hard at 
his family restaurant. He ended leaving me and remarrying another woman. A 
few months later, I have met my Chinese husband. He is 46 years old. He is 
honest, generous and responsible. He accepted my daughter as his own and he 
is good to me. Our neighbours have sympathy for us because I have 
experienced an unsuccessful first marriage, and my parents appreciate him. 
We have decided not to get married; this is better this way. We have a two 
year-old son now. My mother encourages me to go to Jianshui [in Yunnan] to 
live with my husband, but I prefer to stay here. We are building a house here 
in Lào Cai where we can move in next fall. My husband has some business 
relations here, I can solve most of our daily life issues here and I have all my 
                                                
1 It was Thuy’s father who invited us to come back and chat with his daughter. 
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friends around. It’s my home. In China, even though I can speak some 
Chinese, I would not be at ease. I have no friends there. So we stay very 
independent, like when we were business partners. We both experienced a 
divorce and we belong to the same social class. 
My initial suspicions found justification when some intriguing details 
appeared in Chau’s narrative, compared with her father’s. There were obviously 
certain aspects of the relationship that would be preferably ‘disguised’, for the benefit 
of the family’s reputation. Indeed, before I asked her any questions, Chau 
enthusiastically began to tell me of the mutual tolerance of Chinese and Vietnamese 
people nowadays, the similarities of their cultures, and her own independency vis-à-
vis her husband, showing she was an emancipated woman. This elaborate narrative 
made it seem as though Chau often had to answer for her actions to prevent any 
judgmental comments. Once she was done with her story, she relaxed and opted for 
an open-minded discussion. Perhaps she was surprised by the neutrality of my 
questions, and the absence of comments on my behalf. She was certainly encouraged 
by the absence of her father, who grew tired of our chattering and left the room soon 
after she started talking.  
Unlike Tam, Chau could not be blamed for a Chinese man’s loss of face. But 
she could be judged for tarnishing her family’s reputation. Chau’s real situation 
became difficult to clearly assess. She found a compromising Chinese husband, who 
accepted a foreign partner, her daughter and her family. This man provided her with a 
house and the necessary means to make a living in Vietnam. But the couple was not 
married and they had a son together. This remains an unusual profile in both countries 
and Chau did not provide a very convincing explanation as to how it came about. Was 
the man keeping her as a concubine and paying her to remain this way? Was her 
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reluctance to go to China the reason why she preferred to stay independent? Was she 
‘sold’ to a Chinese man to provide for the family needs? In any case, the life choices 
of this couple were confusing enough to maintain a dubious interpretation of cross-
border alliances by Lào Cai’s observers. 
Tam and Chau’s narrative trajectories illustrate how, in the course of time, 
representations of mixed marriages strongly impact the way a community interpret 
any unusual feature or fact that challenge a certain idea of conventionality in the 
realm of conjugality. In contemporary China, leaving a husband on account of 
cheating, or not sharing a household life and still, remaining a couple, are certainly no 
longer the exception. Although living a marital life, and/or have children without 
being formally married also emerge as new patterns of conjugality (cf. Chapter 3) they 
might not be well accepted by families. In these borderlands, they still nourish private 
concerns and social debates. But as far as Vietnamese women and Chinese men are 
concerned, judgmental viewpoints and gossip arise easily and encourage couples to 
adopt a protective social behaviour as a strategy: defensive narrative, disappearing, 
white lies, etc. These couples inherit the ambiguous status of former couples, subject 
to suspicion as well, left on the tracks of the public scene. Hidden thoughts or opened 
discussions suggest that Vietnamese women make use of their body and affection to 
fulfil the needs of Chinese men in order to dispossess them one day; Vietnamese 
women make themselves available to Chinese men without scruples in exchange for 
material security, regardless of their family’s face; Vietnamese women also seduce 
Chinese men and tie their hands with fatherhood in order to secure their own material 
needs, etc. On the other hand, Chinese men are said to enjoy Vietnamese concubines 
at the border in order to benefit from their social network, their company or a nice 
place to stay while conducting their border trade business; Chinese men have 
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Vietnamese women carry their babies as they have no means to get married and raise 
a family with Chinese women, or they wish to have a son when they did not succeed 
in having one with their wives (cf. Chapter 5), and so on. In Chinese observers’ 
comments however, Chinese men often seem to benefit from mitigating 
circumstances whereas depictions of Vietnamese women’s attitudes suggest more 
devious motives. In other words, for commentators, two main figures emerge from 
cross-border marriages cases. The first one, driven by inevitable circumstances, 
makes use of an affective or economical power on a foreign partner that allows 
him/her to establish an illusory but reassuring social position, and to enjoy the result 
of such a pragmatically envisaged union. The second one plots the deception of a 
foreign partner for purely egoistical reasons – that might involve a whole family – 
without the intention of normalizing a relationship planned as temporary in its initial 
form. Not surprisingly, the latter role is often attributed to the female party, the 
‘pretender.’ Although economic determinism is strongly emphasised by many 
informants’ accounts of cross-border marriages, it is still difficult to distinguish how 
central these depicted realities are for individuals’ intimate motives. Economic 
exchanges and compensations certainly have their importance, as they do in most 
matrimonial arrangements in human societies. They may as well be the easiest to 
pinpoint for those individuals and communities whose perceptions are also strongly 
affected by material considerations in every aspect of their daily life. But because 
mixed couples do not easily communicate on their intimate choices, how can one be 
certain that economic determinism was prevalent or immediate when they settled? 
The most intriguing comments from Chinese borderlanders on cross-border 
marriages are those made on the topic of coerced marriages, or cases of allegedly 
human trafficking. Here, short cuts become easy explanations to issues that can be 
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embarrassing for Chinese pride: the female victims of deception become guilty, and 
vulnerable women become dangerous and manipulative. ‘Deception’ here is 
interpreted as a fake label that hides a trick, and vulnerability is a performance 
designed to detract attention from the real motives. For example, I have mentioned in 
Chapter 3 the case of fang gezi [stand someone up], which inspires many stories and 
gossip. Whether based on alleged facts or not, these accounts of Vietnamese women 
who intentionally throw themselves into marital arrangements with Chinese men in 
order to strip them of their possessions before finding another similar deal, have 
become harmful to other Vietnamese women who are seriously engaged in committed 
relationships. Altogether, the different stories described above stretch a rather 
ambiguous perception of Vietnamese women’s intimate position within Chinese 
borderland society, as well as within Vietnamese communities. 
 Gossip among Vietnamese women 
Even among mixed marriages apparently solidly rooted in romance and 
socially accepted, details regarding couples’ privacy eventually leak and inevitably 
arouse suspicion of the authenticity of the relationship, and the intentions of each 
spouse. Nga’s experiences illustrate such a scenario. A proud young Vietnamese 
woman from Haiphong, Nga had lived and worked in Dongxing and Móng Cái for 
several years with her Chinese partner A Liu when I met her in 2006. For a long time, 
Nga has publicly claimed that the formalities required for the registration of her 
marriage were underway. But according to some of her Vietnamese friends – also my 
informants – she continually concealed the actual reason for the delay. Nga, it was 
said, had abandoned a drug addict husband and a child in Vietnam, but had failed to 
file for a divorce. Her friends knew her background, whereas her Chinese 
acquaintances seemed to ignore it, including her partner A Liu. Yet, the couple 
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showed signs of commitment: in 2009, Nga and A Liu became the parents of a little 
boy, and they bought some land in Móng Cái where they were building a house. 
When we last talked, Nga admitted that she was reluctant to leave the border, 
although her husband would prefer to settle in his hometown Nanning – Guangxi’s 
provincial capital. But without an authorization to enter the Chinese territory beyond 
Dongxing (i.e., a regular visa), and without having formalized their union, even 
though they have a child, the couple remained vulnerable. A Liu was often absent for 
business, and Nga shared her time and activities on both sides of the border between 
their home and business. I believe she was hesitant to completely move away from 
her past, conscious of her double moral stigma this would involve: the leaving of her 
secret Vietnamese family1 and her commitment to a Chinese family, both impossible 
to formally secure.  
Familiar with border societies, Nga seemed aware of the confusion that a full 
disclosure of her past could generate in people’s minds, myself included. Even though 
we met many times, Nga chose to give me a simplified and socially acceptable 
narrative of her private situation. One day, she even described the pain of her son’s 
delivery, proclaiming her ignorance about childbirth before experiencing it for the 
first time in China. Was Nga deceiving her Vietnamese husband? Was her Chinese 
husband deceived? Nga and A Liu’s story had yet to provoke controversy within the 
community, but if people learned the details of their situation it would likely stoke 
rumours of Vietnamese women’s ambition and pragmatic interest as well as their 
                                                
1 Living in Móng Cái or even Dongxing allowed her to easily and regularly travel to her hometown 
Haiphong, while settling in Nanning would mean less flexibility.  
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ability to disguise a shameful past.1 This may explain why most of the details on 
Nga’s former life were provided by her friends, themselves in rather unconventional 
situations, and easy subjects of gossip. In his account of how he himself became the 
topic of locals’ idle talk during his time spent in Shanghai, living in a compound with 
his Chinese wife, anthropologist James Farrer argued that “[g]ossip allows 
participants to understand their own situations in a comparative context and gain 
sympathy for the predicaments of others, through which they can begin to revise their 
moral views” (Farrer 2004: 200). 
One after the other, Nga’s friends provided me with details about each other’s 
lives, knowing that I may compare these with the account each of them would give 
me of their story, and eventually piecing together a complete picture of each situation. 
Why such an indirect way of disclosing oneself? These women did not make choices 
solely based on their personal will; they had a responsibility towards their family, 
acquaintances and community: “Bu neng zheyang shuo/zuo, bie ren hui shuo [I cannot 
tell/do this, people may talk].” Their priority was to preserve face in their marriage, 
within which every sign of failure or unusual feature may be discussed by their 
community. Such discussions threatened to jeopardise their efforts to present a 
normative image of their marriage to judgemental eyes. 
In the neighbourhood, a primary use of gossip stories is constructing local standards 
of normalcy around issues of work, money, sex, and marriage. … Gossip constrains 
people’s actions through the threat of censure and laughter, but its multivalence offers 
the possibility of alternative interpretations. The actual meanings individuals attach to 
stories depend on their own circumstances (Farrer 2004: 207, original emphasis). 
Doing everything she could to undermine gossip about her own situation, Li 
(cf. Chapter 1) described her marriage as a happy one, which she enjoyed with her 
                                                
1 I understood that so far, only a very limited number of Nga’s Vietnamese friends knew about her real 
position. 
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loving, caring Chinese husband. Her enthusiasm never failed. But across the four 
years of our friendship, whenever we met, whether during a market expedition, a 
cooking session, or a meeting with her neighbours, Li also slowly disclosed her 
knowledge of local stories and gossips: “Did I tell you about X and Y? You have to 
know what happened.” At first, I interpreted her providing me with such details as 
pure generosity, and a demonstration of her genuine interest in the topic of cross-
border marriages. However, I later realised how these depictions of other people’s 
lives and predicaments served as a springboard for her primary intention: convincing 
me that yes, it was possible that a Vietnamese woman and a Chinese man were 
together for romance, family and happiness. Li’s private trajectory was not exactly 
that of a simple and idealised story (cf. Chapter 5), but she kept emphasising its 
exceptional circumstances compared to those of her ‘unlucky’ acquaintances. By 
constantly comparing her position to “those Vietnamese women who were deceived, 
are deceiving or do not know what they really want,” she hoped to convince not only 
me, but a larger audience whom she became aware of. In her eyes, my own 
understanding of a local phenomenon may change the way people – my colleagues, 
my Chinese acquaintances, my future readers, hence an outsider public – considered 
her own position. 
But, not everyone anticipated public judgment by a convincing and 
demonstrative self-positioning discourse. Within the spectrum of cross-border 
marriages, I found Wang Litao and Xiao Hu, a couple recently established in Hekou 
whom I introduced in Chapter 3. Apparently living a very standardized life and 
experiencing an ordinary love relationship, their marriage still aroused comments 
from the community. While one of his acquaintances suspected Wang Litao of using 
his wife’s network in Vietnam and her language skills to enhance his business, his 
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Vietnamese associate reproached Xiao Hu for behaving more Chinese than she 
already was – due to her mixed blood and her way of life – and for neglecting the 
Vietnamese values attached to women’s role, particularly within the domestic sphere. 
Therefore, we see how no matter what Wang Litao and Xiao Hu did, they both faced 
criticism. When asked his opinion about the reputation of cross-border marriages in 
borderland communities, Wang Litao concluded with a smile: “We don’t care about 
what people say, our real friends understand us, and that’s all we need.” 
In his research on sexual repression during the Chinese Cultural Revolution 
(1966-1976), Zhang elucidates the neglected factors involved in the process of 
positioning oneself in society through conforming to a conventional and controlled 
relationship. Among these factors is the inspiration that unusual unions provide to 
local commentators. Yet, focusing on the image reflected by people’s actions implies 
putting aside the unreachable ‘truth’ hidden behind the efforts made to maintain their 
social face (Zhang 2005: 14). 
At the border community level, people cohabitate with an object, an Other 
who is observable on a daily basis, with whom one communicates, interferes, and 
works, but these activities also occur with its representation. Images, discourse, 
stories, gossip all participate in building an interpretation of this very Other; they 
categorise them, establish their pretend social identity, and confront personal 
narratives. In borderlands, social representations are a process eased by a language 
barrier that gives way to all sorts of misunderstandings as well as misleading 
performances. In such a context, mixed couples face rumours and mistreatment that 
tend to disqualify them from being trustworthy members of a community, a situation 
that leads them to hide their inner yearnings. I will examine in the second part of this 
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chapter how these external representations become negotiable in the realm of 
conjugality. 
 
2 What yearnings and fantasies? Conjugality crisis and the imagined object 
 
No matter how borderlands communities consider Sino-Vietnamese alliances, 
their perceptions mainly translate a general point of view of an Other encountered or 
confronted in daily life. More important is the impact of these perceptions on the 
establishment of mixed relationships, i.e., how it affects the representations that 
partners have of each other when they search for a marriage, during and after their 
experience of it. In the first part of this chapter, I have described the point of view of 
communities on the Other; I will now step away from representations and focus on the 
individual experiences and opinions of the marriageable Other. For instance, despite 
the controversial reputation of Vietnamese women in Chinese borderlands, what 
would motivate a Chinese man to choose one of them as a partner? How does he 
imagine a Vietnamese wife? And what advantage does a Vietnamese woman see in 
engaging in a relationship with a Chinese partner, given the complications this may 
involve for her social position? I will demonstrate the extent to which conjugality 
ideals manage to overcome social discourse, even though couples still struggle to 
position themselves in communities who continue to scrutinise and spread accounts of 
them. 
To do so, I show how these general representations of Chinese and 
Vietnamese people intertwine with spouses’ archetypes in a region where different 
marriage patterns interfere with one another to cope with a conjugality crisis (cf. 
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Chapter 3). I demonstrate how over-heard stories, observed scenarios and intimate 
experiences construct a typical – although controversial –profile of a partner, and how 
this becomes an imagined site where fantasies and yearnings can be expressed. In the 
meantime, I will show how such contradictory images induce those who are in search 
of conjugal alternatives to provide various explanations of their marital choice; these 
narratives revealing how individuals try either to adopt, to overcome, to deny or to 
change such original perceptions.  
 
On loss of values, economic dynamics and disillusion 
Lao He, a widower from Dongdan (Liaoning province, northeast China) 
arrived in Nanxi (a large village near Hekou) in 1999 where he met his current 
Vietnamese partner Tuyet. Separated from her Vietnamese husband, a teacher, she 
migrated to Nanxi in 2000. Lao He is twelve years older than Tuyet. This is what he 
says about his conjugal expectations: 
— Tuyet and I get along well. I don’t need to tell her what to do, like I used to 
with my former wife. When we met, I was very sick. Tuyet took care of me, 
she took me to the hospital. She paid the bills. I know I can rely on her. I am 
quite da nanzi zhuyi zhe [macho], you know: she does housework, cooks 
according to my taste, and I deal with matters pertaining to our social life. Her 
family considers me their son-in-law. 
Lao He’s wife’s area of expertise was not limited to household activities: she 
was allegedly a madam. But Lao He emphasised his vision of his marriage as 
idealized and conventional: his purpose was to deliver his own discourse, what he 
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wanted me to believe and focus on, rather than his actual position. Tuyet’s account1 
portrayed the marriage in less glowing terms: Lao He was still married to his Chinese 
wife when he started his relationship with Tuyet. This caused constant quarrelling 
between Tuyet and Lao He. Further, to make sure he made the right choice and to test 
Tuyet’s sincerity, Lao He investigated her background. Later, his Chinese wife died 
from illness giving him the freedom to ‘remarry.’ The omissions in Lao He’s account 
of his relationships, such as his cheating on his wife, his secret investigations of 
another woman’s life and living off her income – earned from the sexual exploitation 
of other women – actually created a rather unflattering portrait of his masculinity.  
In their review of the phenomenon of international marriage in East and 
Southeast Asia, Jones and Shen notice how men wildly complain that “local women 
are selfish, calculating, consumerist, career oriented, and unwilling to entertain the 
traditional female roles of producing and raising children” (Jones & Shen 2008: 16). 
The authors seem to refer to those men living in countries (i.e., Taiwan, Japan, Korea, 
Singapore) seeking brides in other countries that are supposedly in a more 
disadvantaged position economically (i.e., Vietnam, Cambodia, Philippines) and 
where women are believed to fit in the model they favour. I wish to stress that China’s 
position is relatively ambiguous here since its population is so diverse that it receives 
as well as it sends away brides. Besides, East Asian women might be identified as 
‘traditional’ or ‘emancipated’ according to what sort of men they encounter. 
However, the common point between Korean or Singaporean men and Chinese men 
in search of foreign brides, whether they come from a village or a megalopolis, is that 
they all agree on the challenge that many East Asian women’s emancipation and 
individualism represent for the sustainability of the traditional family they long for. 
                                                
1 I interviewed Tuyet separately. 
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Nowadays in the most developed part of East Asia (i.e., South Korea, Singapore, 
Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan and China), women tend to marry late, to raise less 
children, to privilege their career over family life and to favour urban setting for life, 
although “there are variation within countries, reflecting class, ethnic and rural/urban 
divides” (Jackson, Liu & Woo 2008: 13). Jones and Shen suggest that men in these 
countries tend to hold traditionalist views of women’s roles exist regardless of 
educational levels. I argue that they can also hold these traditionalist views regardless 
of financial means and social position. Ideals in the realm of conjugality have no 
social frontier. 
 The challenging emancipated wife: Chinese women 
As described in the previous chapter, internal migration in China has changed 
the social landscape of Chinese rural areas. If men and women both tend to migrate 
towards cities to work on a temporary basis, a proportion of these women tend to 
marry and stay away while men tend to come back, either for agricultural seasons 
only or definitively to raise their family, take responsibility for their parents’ care or 
simply because it is time to leave the cities, which have become overcrowded with 
new cohorts of competitive young workers. Meanwhile, another phenomenon has 
appeared due to population movements that empty villages of their men. According to 
some commentators, the absence of the male workforce empowers the married 
women who stay behind in villages, waiting for their husband or brothers (or potential 
grooms for the unmarried) to come back: an empowerment in the sense of decision-
making authority, and a sign of the emergence of individualism in opposition to the 
former generations of women who were more entangled with traditional approaches 
of their role within the family circle and the community (Jacka 1997; Liu 2007). 
Nowadays, Chinese women are more likely to decide by themselves whether or not 
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they want to fulfil such conditions. Although workload and other burdens added on 
top of housework and childrearing makes their life harder than before the migration 
trend, women learn to become responsible in field traditionally reserved to men. 
Fifteen years ago, when Chinese women’s rural-urban migration had yet to reach 
current levels, and when unmarried as well as married women tended to remain back 
home due to the lack of work opportunities in urban centres, scholarly interpretations 
of the feminisation of agriculture were uneven as the object of women’s 
responsibilities differed according to regional context, as Jacka noticed in the 1990s: 
It is interesting to note that the identification of women with the family and domestic 
work functions here very differently from the way it functions in other contexts. 
Thus, where demand for agricultural employment cannot be fully satisfied, women's 
domestic responsibilities are used as a legitimation for keeping women off the land. 
Where, on the other hand, a maintenance of labour in agriculture is of more concern, 
women's domestic responsibilities are used as a legitimation for keeping women on 
the land (Jacka 1997: 136). 
 
Updating the debate, Zuo (2004) conducted research in rural Guangxi and 
confirmed the common pattern of rural men out-migrating for paid jobs, leaving work 
in the fields and responsibility for agricultural production to their wives, already 
burdened with other duties. Men return home during farming seasons and sometimes 
less than that. Zuo also explores the intimate interpretation of such upheaval in 
household management. Acknowledging that men generally bring home more cash 
incomes than their wives earn with agriculture, couples “still identified with what was 
traditionally defined as men’s and women’s work with a slight modification. Now 
men’s ‘outside’ role has been redefined to include non-agricultural tasks, whereas 
women’s ‘inside’ role has extended to include agricultural production” (Zuo 2004: 
525). Zuo later revealed that such “discrepancy is seen as the consequence of 
relational exchange based on cultural criteria for evaluating wives’ and husbands’ 
work that differ from those assumed by market exchange models” (Zuo 2004: 527). In 
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the same vein, other authors have recently confirmed that the gender division of 
labour in rural areas has resulted in a significant feminization of agriculture (Zuo 
2004, Huang 2012) and may be the sign of an on-going transformation of 
relationships within communities. Fan sees the dark face of such upheaval in terms of 
the outcomes of marriage for rural women by considering that “to women migrants, 
marriage is disempowering because it requires leaving their wage work and thereby 
decreases their own economic mobility, forcing them to rely on their husbands’ wages 
for improving the household’s well-being (Fan 2004: 201). However, this picture does 
not satisfy other authors who insist on the misunderstanding inherent to this 
‘feminisation of agriculture’ assumption, and they debunk the myth: 
Our analysis – which uses different data sets, different measures and looking at 
different aspects of the problems – fundamentally finds that in China there has been a 
feminization of neither labour nor management in its agriculture. Women take on a 
large part of on-farm work (as well as an increasingly large role in off-farm work), 
but they appear to be putting in no more than half the agricultural labour, their share 
of labour is not increasing and their role in management, while growing a bit, is still 
relatively minor (de Brauw et al. 2008: 348). 
Based on her research findings in a Chinese village (Hubei province), and in 
an attempt to reconcile the discrepancies between various opinions on the matter, 
Huang (2012) argues that due to a demographic transition, Chinese villages “ha[ve] 
experienced a transition from the ‘feminization of agriculture’ (from the last 1970s to 
the late 1990s) to the ‘ageing of the farming population’ (since the late 1990s)” 
(Huang 2012: 29). Hence, Huang also challenges the idea of empowerment of rural 
women by stating that they might “lose bargaining power to their husbands due to 
their bringing in less cash income as a result of being left behind to farm (Huang 2012: 
29).” The debate is still going on between scholars but most of these authors discuss 
the issue of the feminisation of agriculture in China through an economic lens, and 
examine women’s changing status in terms of labour supply, productivity and income. 
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However, my informants from rural areas suggest that the real management of power 
issues occurs within the household. A close examination of the dynamics involved 
with socio-economic changes reveal that women have gained some power at the 
household level, and dare be more demanding towards men than before, particularly 
with regard to the sacrifices they make and the burden of work they carry. However, 
the accuracy of this argument and its extent still needs to be assessed with additional 
qualitative and quantitative data, the provinces of Guangxi and Yunnan in particular. 
As Mr Tang articulated for me, “Chinese women nowadays are not as easy going as 
they used to be.”  
Reviewing women’s position in rural China aimed to show how Chinese 
women have acquired new behaviours, whether in the context of urban migration or in 
the context of feminization of agriculture, that gives them a sense of responsibility 
and control over their activities, albeit to a limited extent. Another proportion of rural 
women continues to suffer from their hard life and low position in the social 
hierarchy, resulting in divorce, abandonment, and suicide for many of them. 1 
Nevertheless, many Chinese men and especially those who have experienced social 
changes over the last decades feel confused by all the challenges encompassed by a 
new gendered balance of power in the social and domestic spheres. And while some 
men accommodate, the nostalgic others take refuge in the foundations of the family 
institution and its female archetype: the housewife. Yet it is precisely in this context 
that the idealized Vietnamese woman appears to be the obvious saviour of a 
patriarchy at risk. 
                                                
1 China’s record of women suicide is the highest in the world (Wu 2010). 
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But before entering the sphere of fantasy with regards to Vietnamese female 
archetypes, it is important to understand what, on the other side of the border, 
challenges unity between Vietnamese men and women to the extent that most 
Vietnamese women (including all my informants) have a low opinion of Vietnamese 
husbands. 
 The unfair husband: Vietnamese men 
Highly educated women like Thanh resisted patriarchal arrangements by avoiding 
marriages with local men. They did not want to “marry down” economically and 
socially—which seemed to be their only choice with local marriages—because they 
believed that marrying local men would only constrain them in domestic roles in a 
male-dominated culture. As Thanh told me, some women would endure the often 
painful stigma of being single and having no children over the oppression they could 
face with dominating husbands. For some of these women, the emergence of a 
transpacific marriage market with Viet Kieu men provided hope for a different kind 
of marriage, one where they thought their overseas husbands would believe in, and 
practice, the ideal of gender equity. These women ventured into the transpacific 
marriage market hoping that their Viet Kieu grooms would work with them to create 
a much less patriarchal relationship, if not an equal one (Thai 2008: 117-118). 
Hung Cam Thai has conducted extensive research within the Việt Kiều  
(overseas Vietnamese) communities in the United States, and especially on couples 
composed by low-range working Việt Kiều men and educated Vietnamese women 
from Southern Vietnam. He reveals how Vietnamese women prospect on the 
international marriage market in the hope of escaping a local marriage pattern they 
believe too oppressive. Becoming the domestic worker of a disrespectful man is not 
what they dream of. Hung Cam Thai explains his informants’ articulation of hopes, 
and their yearnings for respect and gender equity in line with their education level and 
ideal representations of Western conjugality. But I argue that similar ideals move 
even northern women, who are not exposed to Western marriage patterns nor highly 
educated. When they look towards Chinese men, it is also in search of respect. The 
question one needs to explore to explain such similar yearnings is the disillusion that 
all these Vietnamese women, already married or not, feel about marriage with 
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Vietnamese men. What is wrong with these husbands? Kim, the young manager from 
a hotel-bar in Hekou once summarized the issue: 
— My friends and I share the same opinion of men: “Vietnamese for romance, 
Chinese for marriage!” Vietnamese men know how to date with women, they 
offer flowers, gifts, go out with their girlfriends, are attentive and patient. If 
they have money, they buy you flowers, while a Chinese man would spend it 
on a chicken for dinner. My boyfriend was capable of buying a bouquet of 
fresh flowers in Hanoi, taking the train up to Lào Cai, staying up all night to 
avoid damaging them or have them stolen, and then offering them on the 
platform on arrival. I felt embarrassed but excited. Every major holiday, he 
would come to see me and offer me a gift. All do that! … However, 
Vietnamese men are not good husbands. They rely too much on their wives for 
domestic life. After marriage, the romance ends, it is usually disillusion! The 
men play and sleep around while their wives take care for children, cooking, 
household chores, and work: women have a hard time with them. Plus, 
Vietnamese men don’t trust their wife, they are wary, always demanding 
explanations for everything they do.  
Kim’s mother, a massage parlour’s manager in Hekou, ironically commented: 
— Vietnamese are romantic indeed. Or should I say seducer? When they like a 
woman, they know how to talk to her. When they have a wife home, they go 
out and flirt with other women, yes, they are very romantic! Marriage doesn’t 
change them much. Chinese men respect women more. They don’t ask 
question on women’s past even if they suspect something reprehensible. But 
Vietnamese men torment women if they know they had been prostitutes. For 
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example, some poor Vietnamese men can marry ex-prostitutes – those who 
made enough money to have savings – they don’t disregard them, but they will 
always find ways to remind these women who they were, so that themselves 
can act as they want, and their wives can have nothing to complain about. 
Thoa, an educated young interpreter in Hekou evokes her parents: 
— My parents were not happy together. When I was young, I remember my 
father was like a dictator, very fengjian [feudal]. He used to beat my mother a 
lot. She left for Taiwan, then Korea to earn money for our family. She wanted 
to divorce but because my father is a civil servant, a divorce would cost him 
his career, so he refused.  
Hoang is a 55 years old Vietnamese woman who lives in Hekou with her son. 
She commented on Tam’s recent separation from her Chinese companion, a worker 
who cheated on her: 
— A woman needs to be tolerant, she must be understanding, and take on her 
to save her marriage. It’s better to close your eyes, for the family harmony, for 
your children. One can tolerate a man who has a life outside his marriage but a 
woman mustn’t seduce a married man. 
According to Rydstrøm who conducted extensive fieldwork among northern 
Vietnamese families (2003a, 2003b), the problem of domestic violence that has 
become a public issue in recent years should be treated from several angles. First, the 
patrilineal social hierarchy that governs family relations puts women in an inferior 
position while men have the dominant role at home. 
Females learn from an early age that they are expected to act with a well-developed 
‘sense’ (tinh cam) and adjust themselves in accordance with the character of a 
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particular social situation. In practice, this also means that … women frequently 
manifest that they posses a sense for their inferior position within the patrilineal 
hierarchy. If a woman is not capable of demonstrating a sense for how to enact 
herself verbally and bodily, she may encounter the common Vietnamese idea that it is 
a husband’s right to punish his wife. Because of an inferior status, a female is 
expected to comply with the wishes of her husband and to endure if he demonstrates 
anger. Women often emphasized to me that they have to ‘swallow the pill’ (nhin nhuc) 
if their husbands become angry and/or violent (Rydstrøm 2003a: 684). 
According to Taoist cosmology, characters and behaviours of men and women 
respectively are interpreted as the complementary energies ‘hot’ and ‘cold.’ This 
amplifies the belief that when men activate their inner fire – by absorbing alcohol for 
example – the need to externalize this heat can lead to violence that women should 
temper – that is to say endure. 
[A] female is assumed to be flexible in her behavior and actions by possessing a 
highly tuned sense concerning the ways in which she should enact herself in a whole 
range of social situations. Ideas concerning such capacities in females relate to 
expectations of their responsibilities regarding the maintenance of harmony within a 
household. Harmony and happiness must be stimulated by an enduring and cool 
female, who does not create frictions or provoke others. If transferring such social 
expectations to women and their bodies, we find that in cases of domestic violence, a 
woman’s body is converted into a material symbol of a female’s assumed social 
flexibility. Similar to the ways in which a female is thought to be flexible in her 
actions and words, her body is also signified in terms of flexibility whenever she 
finds herself involved in scenes of domestic violence. If a wife does not endure and 
stay cool by adjusting herself, a violent husband might literally want to shape her by 
manipulating her body into an appropriate ‘enduring’ form. Hence, in cases of 
domestic violence, a woman’s body is treated as a physical materiality of plasticity 
that a superior person could sculpt. Such assumptions are echoed in local discussions 
about domestic violence and the ways in which men’s violence may be minimized 
and denied (Rydstrøm 2003a: 690-691). 
Most, if not all my Vietnamese female informants sketched a controversial 
portrait of Vietnamese men that contained all their grief, fear, anger and 
disappointment, showing a certain homogeneous nature of some aspects of 
Vietnamese society, such as gender position within the marriage sphere. Some of 
these women had already been married and divorced, some had been abused, some 
never even dated one, but all were sceptical about the ability of their male compatriots 
to fulfil their needs for respect, love and well-being. “I have been married with him 
for seventeen years two months and four days. He was cheating on me for four years, 
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he had another wife – she was young – and a two years old daughter, so I divorced 
him,” said Chi about her Vietnamese husband. One Vietnamese friend from Hekou 
briefly introduced me to her visiting young sister once: aged 22 years old, the mother 
of an 18 month-old baby had just divorced her husband who was cheating on her. 
Chau from Lào Cai, and Tam from Yên Bái both experienced the same pattern of 
short-time marriage before seeing their Vietnamese husband leave with a younger 
lover, leaving them with a baby to nurse alone. Hang, who left for Poland selling 
smuggled cigarettes after experiencing a sad marriage bitterly commented: 
“Vietnamese men are lazy, they spend all days home, they play or drink, they do 
nothing and send their wife to work and bring some money home. Then, they spend 
the money.” Even men themselves acknowledge this. A street male tea seller in Móng 
Cái highlighted: “The majority of men are not good husbands here. They prefer eating 
rather than working, they gamble and beat their wives. When they’re poor, they spend 
their time at home and quarrel with their wife, and when they’re rich, they look for 
other women, cheat on their wife… and also have disputes with their lovers.” On the 
topic of domestic violence, Luke et al. research findings support the idea that “several 
dimensions of couple status disparities were significantly associated with violence 
after controlling for husbands’ individual characteristics … [and] the view that couple 
inequalities matter – that men who are threatened by their wives’ higher status 
respond with a backlash of violence to assert their dominant position … For a woman, 
having a husband who expresses equitable attitudes is not in itself protective against 
violence; the benefit of having such a husband greatly increases when her own gender 
attitudes are more equitable” (Luke et al. 2007: 22). 
The four specific and recurring complaints among all grievances concerned 
laziness, infidelity, domestic violence and drug use. While the three first issues are 
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often mentioned in Vietnamese couple’s misfortunes (Luke et al. 2007), the drug use 
seems to be much more related with the specific context of northern Vietnam 
(UNODC 2002). My informants all referred to men who chou baifen [smoke white 
powder], which actually included smoking and shooting drugs. One does not have to 
look far to find such a reality among the Vietnamese population. In Lào Cai, I have 
seen drug addicts under the bridges ‘cleaning’ their needles, and in Yên Bái, dozens 
of used syringes littered the sidewalk gutters around the bus station. Observing traces 
of drug use has become so easy that it reveals how widespread this ‘social evil’ is in 
these northern territories. Factors such as high level of unemployment and easy 
availability go some way to explaining this phenomenon (Pettus 2003). Drugs are 
relatively cheap and easily found. A dose of heroin costs around 20,000 to 30,000 
đong (UNODC 2002), a price that two officers involved in the struggle against drug 
traffic in Móng Cái confirmed in a private conversation.1  
Before exploring further some of these crucial issues in the next chapter, I 
wish to stress how marital life has become a non-attractive prospect for many 
Vietnamese women of this region, especially those who are yet to marry. Recent 
scholarship on post-reform social context in Vietnam assesses that the domestic 
sphere has seen little improvement regarding gender equality in household 
management and couples’ relationship (Goodkind 1995; Long et al. 2000; Drummond 
& Rydstrøm 2004c; Werner 2009). This is due to either a more competitive market 
and a higher risk of being economically pressured or discriminated – a scenario that 
overlooks many peasants and workers – or else to increasing social inequality that 
gives rise to wealthier individuals who exercise their new economic power over 
                                                
1 In 2006, this amount of money represented the price of one noodle soup (with meat) in an average 
Vietnamese restaurant. 
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women, through their position as wife or mistress. Hence, the frustrations Vietnamese 
men experience due to their position in a volatile social hierarchy, or the challenge 
they perceive in women’s increasing role as breadwinners, seem to provide some men 
with a new imperative for asserting their authority. Hence, even the youngest 
generations of Vietnamese women have witnessed examples of failed marriages and 
dramatic issues that involve bad behaviours of men in their role of husband. 
Disillusioned before they even try to find a suitable match, Vietnamese women are 
more likely attracted by other options for conjugal life. And the man next door seems 
to fulfil their expectations, or so they believe. 
 
On tradition, respect and gender equality 
 The idealised wife: Vietnamese women 
Earlier in this chapter, I showed how nowadays in rural China, men and 
women share power on production and decision-making. This has a significant impact 
on how men feel in the realm of conjugality. Most of them find ways to cope with the 
societal changes that have impacted their intimate life through women’s behaviours, 
expectations and demands. But for those who live in borderlands, a comparative 
perspective afforded by cultural differences with their neighbours affords them an 
alternative evaluation of their situation; they are able to imagine alternative solutions 
to the shift in the gendered balance of power in the household.  
A Wei, a young man from Sichuan who lives with his Vietnamese girlfriend in 
Hekou told me about his daily life with her: 
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— We love each other a lot. She’s very nice to me. In the evening, when I 
come home, she warms some water and washes my feet. When I need to relax, 
she goes out and buys me some drinks and cigarettes. A Chinese woman 
would not do that, she would rather ask me to quit and criticize me for having 
bad habits. Well, I had one Chinese wife before, so I know. 
Mr Wu, the owner of a hotel in Hekou described his relationship with his 
Vietnamese wife putting into perspective Chinese women’s behaviour: 
— My wife and I have a good relationship; let’s say I am 90% satisfied. We 
do argue a lot though; we have different opinions. But we have yuanfen [fate] 
together. She is my first love; I didn’t have any relationship with a Chinese 
woman before her. Chinese women always kaikou [stick one’s oar in], and I 
don’t like that. My wife and I talk business at home to avoid arguing in front 
of other people, but in general she follows my advice. A Chinese woman 
would interfere with everything, and it’s tiring. Vietnamese women don’t 
dingzui [answer back/reply defiantly]. 
Mr Xu is a 45 years-old owner of a market restaurant in Hekou. He is a native 
of China’s northeast region, a place in which dumplings are famous in Chinese 
gastronomy. He added: 
— In my hometown, Chinese women drink, smoke and gamble a lot. I was 
married two years to my Chinese wife, she was a middle-school teacher, we 
were schoolmates. But we didn’t get along during our marriage, we divorced 
soon after our daughter was born – she’s seventeen years old now. My 
Vietnamese wife is different [26 years old]. She helps me a lot and she is not 
afraid of chi ku [eat bitterness/bear hardship]. Even when we were in financial 
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difficulties, she stayed with me. She takes care of our home, our daughter, and 
cook if I have friends over for dinner. She doesn’t have many friends here 
though. But she integrated well. 
Vietnamese women embody high values that are perceived as fading and 
jeopardised by Chinese women’s emancipation and social crisis. An explanation may 
lay in a distinction that informants hardly manage to articulate clearly but one that still 
emerges from their regular comments. Vietnamese women may not be fully trusted in 
the sense of their individuality and agency, but they ‘structurally’ carry, by virtue of 
their education and the cultural environment wherein they grew up, a set of conjugal 
values that Chinese men greatly appreciate. And this is exactly what is seducing about 
them: they fulfil some needs, and even if the risk that this might be temporary exists, 
at least disillusion does not come from the structural. A man knows – or thinks he 
knows – what to expect with/from a Vietnamese wife while he is not sure, in these 
times of social change and uncertainty, what a Chinese woman will request from him. 
And this is a crucial concern: social pressure on Chinese men is enormous and, as 
they often complain, women’s demands add even more stress to the situation. Mr 
Tang gives an example: 
— If a man does not earn enough money in China, his wife will despise him, 
even publicly. Being good isn’t enough, neither is providing the basic needs; 
you have to do more than that. It’s exhausting. 
Hung Cam Thai argued that when Việt Kiều men return to Vietnam to search 
for suitable wives, they actually restored their masculinity (2008); this is especially 
true for those who experienced downward mobility by becoming low wage 
immigrants in Western countries. In China, women challenge masculinity by claiming 
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the right to discuss men’s economic status, a field that constitutes a large part of male 
identity. In this sense, I argue that Chinese men who marry Vietnamese women tread 
a conjugal pathway similar to Việt Kiều’s transnational marriages. These matches 
allow them to achieve a sense of masculinity that has come to be threatened by 
significant improvements on the way to Chinese women emancipation.  
Friedman (2006) has demonstrated how fantasy and idealization of certain 
categories of women, may be imbued with ambiguity. For example, the discourse on 
Vietnamese women’s resilience – a highly emphasised feature – echoes Friedman’s 
depiction of the Huidong women (Hui’an county, Fujian province, Eastern China), 
another female community subject to contradictory representations in China: 
Representations showing Huidong women engaged in feats of heavy labor have 
become as constitutive of ‘Hui’an woman’ as portrayals that focus on their exotic 
dress … Despite the widespread post-Mao disdain for physical labor, the 
hardworking Huidong woman clearly has her own kind of appeal. Popular sayings 
reinforce Huidong women’s widely proclaimed ability to work hard and endure 
suffering. The oft-repeated phrase ‘industrious, simple, frugal’ transforms women’s 
impressive physical strength into a model of the virtuous Confucian wife or daughter 
who subsumes her own desires in devotion to her family’s welfare (Friedman 2006: 
211). 
I have described elsewhere how Chinese male discourse on Vietnamese 
women varies according to the place they see these women, and the activity they are 
engaged in (Grillot 2012). A woman is hen shou danshi hen you li [skinny but strong] 
when she carries heavy work in the street, while she’s miaotiao he wenrou [thin and 
tender] when she seduces a customer in a brothel. In the first case, she is covered with 
a set of working clothes that hide every part of her body while in the second case, she 
wears as little as decency allows in a public space, suggesting or showing her 
attractive attributes. Sometimes distant and busy, sometimes intimate and lascivious, 
she is active in order to achieve her task or to please a man. In this case, male 
perceptions reflect how, in their imagination, Vietnamese women embody the 
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transgression of gender roles: females capable of carrying out harsh labour better than 
males themselves, while being devoted to men/husbands in conventional terms, i.e., 
better than (Chinese) women.  
In Chinese rural society, although women are proving their physical strength 
by handling hard agricultural work, popular beliefs still stress that men are 
biologically predisposed to take charge of physical task thus remaining indispensable: 
force is biologically determined (Jacka 1997; Liu 2007). We remember how Mr Tang 
– earlier in this chapter – described Chinese women versus Vietnamese women in 
terms of working ability. According to him and his male friends who participated in 
our conversation, Chinese women would never be able to handle the demanding 
efforts that goods transportation requires from Vietnamese workers in Hekou for 
instance. They argued that Chinese women (in general, but their familiarity with semi-
urban setting influenced their perspective) had changed to the extent of refusing to 
work physically, that they were becoming lazy, and were leaving the load of physical 
work to men. They enlightened these assertions by explaining that indeed, men’s duty 
was to handle hard work, suggesting that Vietnamese men were lacking responsibility 
by asking their women to replace them. In the eyes of Chinese men, as suggested by 
the terms they used to describe Vietnamese women, the physical resilience refers to 
the productive aspect of their body (Grillot 2012). 
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Figure 12: In Hekou, Vietnamese women carry Chinese goods towards the customs gate 
(Grillot, 2009). 
In Chinese men’s construction of difference, as I mentioned earlier, the 
appreciation of Vietnamese women’s work ability is biased by their own perception of 
physical work: hard work is what men would normally do. Carrying heavily loaded 
bikes, pushing enormous amount of goods on non-motorized trailers or pulling 
customers on pedicabs is something that qualifies Vietnamese women as tough, and 
hence worthy of respect (cf. Figure 12). But housework or childrearing, whatever 
effort this requires, does not count as quantifiable and valuable work. Hence, what 
they see in Vietnamese women is a body able to relieve them of workload without 
threatening their masculinity because the female duties remain their ‘natural’ 
responsibilities. What an ideal combination! However, physical resilience and 
working ability are not the only criteria of difference that Chinese men in borderlands 
have learned to appreciate in Vietnamese women. As in the case of Huidong women, 
or that of many ethnic minorities’ representation in China, good physical condition or 
shape encompasses a sexual dimension:  
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The conditional nature of Huidong women’s Han identity becomes even more 
apparent when we compare two types of images: those in which the sensuality and 
eroticism that characterize portrayals of official minority women find their way into 
depictions of ‘the Hui’an woman’ and those that seeks to de-exoticize ‘the Hui’an 
woman’ by emphasizing her remarkable physical strength and labor abilities. These 
modes of representation at once edge ‘the Hui’an woman’ into the category of ethnic 
minority and struggle to recuperate her definitive Han status (Friedman 2006: 208). 
Vietnamese women’s strength and sensuality are also closely linked, and their 
physical aesthetic features benefit from consensual opinion. Vietnamese women 
possess some of the most sought-after attributes according to East Asian beauty 
rating; they are always portrayed as beautiful, like the adjectives above indicate. 
Field Chinese English 
Work/skills chiku bear hardships 
 laodong do labor 
 qinlao  hard-working 
 nenggan capable 
 jianchi perseverant 
 xianhui virtuous 
Physical attributes nianqing young 
 piaoliang beautiful 
 da yanjing big eyes 
 bai pifu white/light skin 
 xi yao slim waist 
Personality wenrou tender/respectful 
 hui zhaogu ren can take care of others 
 yang nanren support men 
 hen huasuan good deal (to have a Vietnamese 
wife) 
 you yuyan nengli language skills 
 xinxian fresh/exotic 
 jiang ganqing romantic/care about feelings 
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 zunzhong zhangbei respectful of elders 
 da ge zhaohu tells other (when a Vietnamese wife 
goes out for instance)/not secretive 
 ting hua obedient 
 limao polite 
 bu pian laogong faithful 
 
Table 1: A few characteristics of Vietnamese wives in the eyes of Chinese people 
As the above table1 shows, a Vietnamese woman, as wife, combines the 
qualities of the archetypal traditional Chinese wife complemented with a few exotic 
and pleasant physical elements that enhance her appeal. Moreover, besides the highly 
rated physical resilience and attributes of Vietnamese women, there are also various 
aspects of their personalities that are seen as favourable by Chinese men, although 
some are also constantly questioned. Experience and personalities explain the 
diversity of viewpoints. But social representations also go some way to explaining 
these viewpoints. These are expressed through attitudes and through language. The 
Chinese word wenrou provides a good example. Whether Vietnamese female or 
Chinese male, most of my informants used this word to describe the most specific 
quality of Vietnamese women. Knowing that wenrou literally meant tender, I first 
thought that my informants meant that Vietnamese women displayed affection in a 
more physically expressive way as compared to Chinese women. But even if I did 
observe a significant difference between Vietnamese and Chinese women in their 
expressions of maternal love for their children – the first tended to be more tactile 
                                                
1 This table synthesises two tables previously published on the vocabulary used in media as well as in 
popular discourse (Grillot 2010: 272, 278). Additional fieldworks findings proved the distinction to be 
pointless since the two sets of words are now equally employed in the Chinese description of 
Vietnamese women. 
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than the second – I did not notice the same particularity between couples (at least not 
in public). I did not understand the point my informants were trying to convey. One 
client at Lien’s brothel attempted to clarify this for me: “Yuenan mei [Vietnamese 
young women] know how to please a man, they are more simple and honest too, 
almost pure. They don’t cheat; if they agree on doing something they don’t change 
their mind later, they respect clients and they work seriously. With Chinese xiaojie 
[prostitute], I feel pressured, I don’t relax the same way.” Mister Su, the fisherman 
from Shanxin (cf. Chapter 3) was the more explicit: “Vietnamese women are tender 
with men, they know how to talk to us. My wife never calls me my name, or says 
‘you’, she calls me ‘anh’, it’s very respectful.” Terms of address in Vietnamese 
language embed the elder-younger hierarchy inherent to Southeast Asian societies, 
including Yunnan and Guangxi (Condominas 1983). In Chinese, especially in 
Southern China, the terms of address laogong and laopo replace the neutral ni [you] 
to indicate a proper kin relationship and respect, but also, as my informants interpret 
their usage, to simply designate respectively husband and wife as in ‘darling’ in 
English. In Vietnamese however, the terms of address anh and em both mean elder 
brother/husband and younger sister/wife. Simply said, a wife addresses her husband 
with the same respect she would with her elder brother, and any other man of the 
same approximate age, which puts her in the inferior but devoted position of a young 
sister. Translated in the context of Chinese society where men feel less respected and 
more pressured by their wives, such expressions have the power to reassure these hurt 
males of their dominant position, and to flatter their masculinity: they feel needed but 
respected. As Chan has noted, based on her observation in Lào Cai, “[c]oming to the 
borderlands to find women of a lesser status provides a space for sustaining gender 
superiority for the Chinese men who feel frustrated at home for losing their 
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dominance (Chan 2005a: 218). Wenrou is not showing how Vietnamese women may 
be tender in a physical way, it simply implies they are respectful of men and authority, 
and it shows their devotion. Surprisingly, such an ideal portrait seems far from the 
unflattering reputation that general discourse spread on the real Vietnamese women. 
In Hekou, Mr Hu, the card player whose Vietnamese wife left after years of marital 
life, bitterly comments: “Those nongcun ren [peasants] and waidi ren [men from 
other provinces] don’t know, they believe that Vietnamese women are such and 
such… This is partly true, they’re hard-working, but nowadays, women all have goals, 
they do nothing for free, they have no feelings.” But generally, if Chinese men 
perceive Vietnamese women, in particular in their role as wife, as strong, courageous, 
responsible but also flexible – which is not a new representation – it may be grounded 
in a unique cultural background as Thai Thi Ngoc Du suggests here:  
[T]hroughout its history, the Vietnamese people had to wage many struggles for 
independence. This particular situation has strengthened the role of women who have 
both participated actively in these struggles and replaced men in production activities 
and daily life. Thus, the combination of Confucian education and the tradition of 
struggle for independence has contributed forging an identity of Vietnamese women 
that combines resignation and self-sacrifice to struggle, courage and yearning for 
justice and equality (Du 2000: 410, translation by thesis author). 
In a contemporary Chinese society that sees divorce rates reach unprecedented 
levels, Chinese men – in particular those who have already gone through a marriage 
breakdown – tend to look forward marrying women who are expected to cope with 
difficulties, and sacrifice their well-being whatever the cost. In an essay entitled 
‘Faithful, heroic, resourceful’, as Vietnamese women are described in the Vietnamese 
official discourse, Gammeltoft stressed how “women often stay in violent and 
unhappy marriages with the hardships of their daily lives in order to protect their 
children and maintain domestic peace” (Gammeltoft 2001: 274). So when Vietnamese 
women adopt another behaviour, and do not meet the standards of endurance expected 
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of them, they are regarded as lacking resilience, as becoming weak and irresponsible 
women. These expectations are known in China, and this knowledge leads Chinese 
people to expect a similar attitude from their Vietnamese partners. When they do not 
act as sacrificing women and devoted mothers, when they seemingly abandon their 
offspring once their purpose is fulfilled, their reputation is stained once again. Maybe 
such divergence from a conventional model comes from those Vietnamese women 
who do find satisfaction in entertaining Chinese men’s interpretation of their identity. 
However, as will be discussed in the last chapter, the productive function of the body 
and the compliant nature of the archetypal wife also evoke the physical and social 
reproductive function of marriage, and may give rise to further implications for these 
Sino-Vietnamese couples. 
 The incarnation of responsible masculinity: Chinese men 
I once asked Kim why she accepted her Chinese husband’s proposal. She 
replied, insisting on her previous statement: “If you want to find a good match you 
need to think about how serious and reliable is a man. To me, Chinese men can do 
that better than Vietnamese men.”  
The search for the ideal partner overseas is not confined to men. While men are 
looking for ‘traditional wives’ abroad, some women are also looking for ‘modern 
husbands’ from afar … Men from wealthier countries are often imaged by some 
women from less developed countries to be more sophisticated, civilized, romantic, 
and open-minded than local ones (Jones & Shen 2008: 16). 
Women like Kim may benefit from direct observations of Chinese society if 
they live in close proximity to Chinese communities, have acquaintances among 
Chinese people or even a family background that validates social representations of 
the archetypal Chinese husband. But for those Vietnamese women who used to live 
far from the border, with little opportunity to pass by any Chinese man, the range of 
perceptions may be very narrow and biased. A popular way to vicariously experience 
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romance and conjugality in Chinese society is by watching soap operas regularly 
scheduled on Vietnamese television programs, just as romance novels do for Chinese 
migrant women in their pre-marital age (Ma & Cheng 2005). These dramas, as well as 
their South Korean counterpart, are widely followed in Vietnamese households to the 
extent that every evening, in each corner of the country, it is possible to hear the echo 
of all television sets and passively follow the stories of foreign couples on screen 
while wandering in the streets. On an anecdotal note, I was forced to reschedule an 
interview of one informant twice because she was so absorbed by one of these 
programs – and the television was so loud – that she could not pay attention to my 
repeated questions. Given the random evening entertainment activities in Vietnamese 
villages and small towns for women, television has become a central window to the 
outside world, even though this world may be right on the other side of the nearby 
river. Fictional depictions of couples’ lives in China attract Vietnamese women 
because they generally portray a luxurious way of life in urban settings, strong female 
personalities and ambitious men that stimulate their imagination. Maintaining that 
Vietnamese women migrate to China in search of an ideal Chinese partner because of 
soap operas would be overestimating the influence of media and popular culture on 
individual’s agency (Abu-Lughod 2005). However, a few informants did mention 
their strong interest for these programs and described their first impressions of China 
in relation to what they had previously seen on television. Television plays a 
significant role in the elaboration of fantasy about romance, modernity and Chinese 
men, as well as directing interactions with “those who live/lived there.” When 
recalling how they imagined their future Chinese husbands before meeting them, a 
few informants told me, “I had a friend/sister who was married to a Chinese man; he 
was good to her.” Social face sometimes encourages the performance of happiness or 
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at least satisfaction with marriage for women who visit their communities in Vietnam 
after they become engaged to Chinese men in China. These performances not only 
activate fantasies of Chinese husbands, but they also motivate some female fellows to 
join them on the marriage market, animated by altruistic intentions or financial 
prospects. Finally, for those who regularly encounter Chinese people in their living or 
working spaces, observations and confrontation also stimulate expectations.  
Gammeltoft stresses that in the eyes of Vietnamese women, “the greatest 
difference between women and men is women’s higher sense of responsibility for 
their families. Men are generally known to be much more carefree and relaxed (vo tu) 
than women” (Gammeltoft 2001: 273). And the general impression they have of 
Chinese men is how far they carry the burden of family responsibilities – especially 
economical – leaving women free to deal with domestic matters. Hence, many women 
trust that Chinese husbands will fulfil their role by being hard workers, concerned 
about their family’s well-being and evenly sharing daily life tasks together with their 
wife. Two significant examples from my discussions with Vietnamese women 
illustrate the expectations surrounding a Chinese husband’s involvement in household 
and family life. The first is their relation with the kitchen: the space as well as the 
activities. One evening, Nhung was setting dinner on the table while explaining: 
— Su Yong taught me how to cook Chinese food, and I am doing my best to 
improve my abilities. I don’t mind. Vietnamese men never enter a house’s 
kitchen; it’s not their place; only women are active there. And they never cook 
either. They don’t know how to cook, and they would not want to cook; they 
would lose face in front of their family and acquaintances. But Chinese men 
are different, they know and they enjoy cooking. Su Yong makes dinner when 
I am busy. But he’s quite lazy, he has got used to see me doing it now. 
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Household chores, cooking and childrearing are domains customarily reserved 
for females in Vietnam and the thought of sharing these tasks with a husband is a 
thrilling motivation for many Vietnamese women. Fatherhood is the other crucial 
factor in determining whether or not a man is a good husband. As some of my 
informants’ experience attested earlier, many failed marriages in Vietnam end with an 
escaping husband and a lonely young mother who can only rely on her own family for 
help raising her baby. The subject was regularly discussed among my Vietnamese and 
Chinese informants as a criterion for ‘responsible men.’ Yang Li, a lawyer in Hekou 
often offered me her insights on various aspects of cross-marriages in the area: 
— A Chinese man would not abandon his child; it’s a question of 
responsibility. He will always find a way to provide for his well-being, even 
though he has separated from the mother. In many of these Sino-Vietnamese 
couples, women are replaceable, men do not care so much about their status or 
the project they may build together. But when a child is born, a Chinese father 
manages to register him/her on his hukou. 
Even though Yang Li may be overrating Chinese men for their sense of 
familial responsibility in general, it is true that in the life stories I have collected, the 
arrival of a child into a mixed couple’s life, whether it was intentional or not, changed 
the dimension of the relationship by settling it.1  
                                                
1 Only two cases of coerced unions in Dongxing demonstrated a child was not necessarily helping 
marital bond, but there were exceptional: Van’s husband abandoned her and their son (cf. Chapter 1) 
while Xuan  (cf. Chapter 3) raised her two boys under the abusive when not indifferent eyes of her 
cheating companion. 
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But I believe that the way Vietnamese women articulate their relationship with 
Chinese men reveals their inner expectations of a marriage. Whereas several women 
who were quite satisfied with their companion said “Wo ai ta/wo teng ta [I love 
him],” rare were those frankly saying “ta ai wo [he loves me].” Instead they would 
rather use the expression “ta dui wo hao [he’s good to me],” often adding “ta bu da 
wo, ye bu ma wo [he does not beat me, he does not insult me].” This way of 
emphasising what a husband is not doing reveals an imagination or awareness of what 
he could have done within the norm. The fact that a husband is ‘good’ to his wife 
(whatever this term really encompasses for each person) already satisfies the 
expectations of many Vietnamese women. Articulating couples’ emotions or feelings, 
and defining a marital bond in such a way exposes how conjugality’s picture has 
already been altered in these women’s imagination and lives, given their previous 
experience in Vietnam. Because for many Vietnamese women, domestic abuse is so 
embedded in the meaning of marital relationship, the opposite perspective looks like 
an ideal deal, a fantasy. Therefore, ‘love’ is not the word they find relevant to use. 
“He’s good to me,” is already an improvement, a satisfactory situation, and an 
achievement in itself. So, when a husband cooks, takes care of children, and works, 
what more could one ask for? When her TV set was eventually turned off, Ngoc, the 
owner of a massage parlour depicted her husband A Peng: 
— When I met him in 2000, A Peng was alone, he had had no girlfriend for 
nine years, since he broke up with his first love, and he just lost his father. I 
was working in a massage salon on the first floor [of the Vietnamese market], 
a real one, I spent my days washing customers’ hair and give them massages. 
My boss introduced us. A Peng was nice to me. He dated me for one year. He 
was born in 1970 and me in 1983, so he’s older but it doesn’t matter. We 
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stayed together three years and got married in 2003. We organized a little 
banquet with my family in Vietnam and then a big one with both families in 
China. He’s very compassionate, and very understanding, because I have 
many flaws, and I make a lot of mistakes. Sometimes when I tell him: If 
you’re not satisfied with me, go, take everything with you, I want nothing.” 
He doesn’t leave, he always forgives me. I love him, he’s a good man. He says 
I am his only and last wife. 
Ironically, Kim told me that she had happened to hit her Chinese husband 
during some disputes. When she complained to her mother about her husband’s 
misconduct, and reported her tough way of responding, she replied: “If you were in 
Vietnam, you could never do such a thing, you’re lucky!” Reviewing the ‘push 
factors’ driving Asian women to seek out international marriages in the 1990s, 
Constable establishes that: 
[These women’s] interest was tied at least in part by a desire to be married, and to 
achieve marital subjectivity, since remaining single was looked down upon. Their 
non-material reasons included a desire for love and compatibility, and a desire to 
meet a man who would treat them as equals. Such reasons were not necessarily 
conceived of as separate from economic or material considerations (Constable 2006: 
8). 
In the eyes of Vietnamese women, if Chinese men are better husbands than 
Vietnamese men, Chinese women are luckier. Consequently, they wish to enjoy the 
same sense of emancipation. Even though scholarship on Chinese society has assessed 
how the post-Maoist era has seen a significant deterioration of Chinese women’s 
situations in many field (Attané 2005), from a comparative perspective, which is the 
one Vietnamese people hold on this matter, women’s position in China is certainly 
better than in Vietnam and sufficient to enhance their imagination (cf. Chapter 5). 
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Conclusion: “Daodi shei jiang ganqing [finally, who cares about feeling]?” 
People form stereotypes to make sense of the world they live in. The things that they 
tend to make sense of are relations between groups that they encounter, interact with 
and are dependent on. Perceivers are intent on producing these understandings 
because they need this knowledge to understand the world and to take and coordinate 
action. In forming these stereotypes people bring two key sorts of resources to bear. 
The first includes naïve (or everyday) theories about the groups, which might take the 
form of expectations of coherence within, or difference between the groups, or beliefs 
about the naturalness and essential qualities of the categories that underlie the groups, 
or beliefs about the collective (group qualities or social organization that underpins 
the group). The second kind of resource that the perceivers bring involves their 
perceptions of members of the categories that enable judgements of similarities and 
differences (McGarty, Spears & Yzerbyt 2004: 198).  
Understanding the evolution of border societies and cross-border relationships 
between people requires drawing attention to perceptions, an important aspect rarely 
mentioned in academic work on the region. In this chapter, I have explored the 
various sources that inform each group of people about the other, and from which 
they choose the most accurate elements that gradually form their own opinion. This 
enlightens how two spheres of experiences of the Other (as an adopted and ‘cooked’1 
Other or as a tolerated and close-by Other) intertwine and affect each side of one 
mixed border society. Here, community members tend to maintain some doubts and 
adopt a warning behaviour, whereas the Sino-Vietnamese couples choose indifference 
or attempt to change the stereotypes by constantly proving, justifying, and performing 
the reality of their conjugal experience, not so much in order to enhance their 
communities’ tolerance, but in order to gain their social recognition and support from 
their community (or at least to avoid rejection). 
This chapter also touched upon the discord between personal narratives and 
popular discourses, both heard in domestic and public space, among women or men, 
                                                
1 I use this term in reference to the way ‘barbarian’ populations – such as the Miao – who submitted to 
the emperor’s rules and assimilated Han culture to a certain degree were designated under the empire 
of China (Dikötter 1992; Fiskesjö 1999).  
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on either side of the border. Vietnamese women are most often subjects of concern in 
social representations. Two figures of Vietnamese women cohabit in borderland 
localities. They are conflicting and affect those who have to carry them no matter 
what their personal background and situation may be: the submitted/devoted wife of 
Chinese men’s ideal confronts the dominant/opportunistic foreign woman of local 
construction of difference. Living close to Otherness exacerbates contrasts and 
enhances imagination, whether in a positive or in a negative way, leading to 
contradictory and controversial comments. In an attempt to conclude this thorny issue 
of social representation and their impact on people’s feeling, I will leave the last 
words to some of my informants, words that reveal only more contradictions. 
Yang Li, Chinese lawyer in Hekou: “Vietnamese people are not sentimental, 
they care about interest, so I don’t want to interact with them.”  
Diep, Vietnamese shop-owner in Hekou: “Chinese people don’t care about 
feelings, they care about money, nothing else matters.” 
Luong, police officer in Móng Cái: “When you are sincere and honest with 
Chinese people, they treat you well, and they can be really nice. But if you are 
dishonest or try to swindle them, they are unforgiving, they punish you with no 
mercy.” 
Lao Zhou, a Chinese trader in Hekou concludes: “I find Vietnamese people 
honest. I don’t believe what other people say here. In my opinion, when you respect 
Vietnamese people, they will act accordingly. But if you disregard them, they will 
deceive you.” 
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In most conversations on the topic of cross-border alliances, Vietnamese and 
Chinese informants discussed widespread stories and empirical knowledge to 
determine who – between Chinese or Vietnamese people – pay the most attention to 
feelings. For some, Vietnamese people were heartless and pragmatic gold-diggers. 
For others, Chinese people were driven by personal ambition and contempt for the 
inferior Other. These two different expressions insist on the similar role played by 
new socio-economic conditions in the upheaval of two neighboured societies; two 
different approaches both using Vietnamese female bodies to reach their goal. Hence, 
despite an ambiguous local context wherein people all suspect each other’s ambitions, 
it is important to consider how newcomers and fantasies interact with one other in 
prospective searches for alliances. Chinese men categorise Chinese and Vietnamese 
women according to variation in their affective, productive and treatment abilities. In 
search of equal treatment in marriage, Vietnamese women imagine that a Chinese 
husband can be nothing but a better option than marrying a Vietnamese fellow. The 
description of one party in comparison with the other encompasses the idea that one 
choice is preferable to another because it means degrees of satisfaction over degrees 
of frustration. Research findings in Sino-Vietnamese borderlands have sketched a 
‘cartography of aspiration’ that drives Vietnamese women towards the dream of 
emancipation while Chinese men search for a fading ideal of traditional values and 
conjugal patterns. All are moved by a common aspiration for respect in the realm of 
marriage, and the need for support in a society in which tremendous changes compel 
men and women to meet arising expectations regarding their present and future. In 
this context, marriage appears more as a shelter rather than a mere social obligation.  
What strategies will men and women implement, what tactics will they 
improvise to accommodate the realities they encounter on their journey? How do the 
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longings of individuals eventually confront the experience of a relationship with an 
Other? How do marital partners navigate between compromise, loss and performance 
to maintain their relationship, as well as their credibility and face in a dubious social 
environment? These questions will be discussed in the next chapter of this thesis. 
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Chapter 5 
The voice of the invisible: the tactics to exist 
 
Introduction 
Borderlands are marginalized yet strategic, inviolate yet continually violated, 
forgotten yet significant … Because they defy categorization, borderlands have been 
seen as sites of resistance, as sources of alternatives to the status quo, as places where 
a modus vivendi that redefines the social order can be devised (Coutin 2003: 171). 
The social changes that are transforming marriage patterns and conjugality 
practices in Vietnamese and Chinese societies lead us to examine what these 
upheavals mean at the fringes, among those who encounter difficulties adapting to a 
new environment. In existing studies of Sino-Vietnamese marriages, factors others 
than demographic imbalance or economic disparities often remain unexplored, even 
when they are preceded, supported or followed by sincere romance. Exploring 
individual cases leads us to consider other reasons why some men and women may 
become attracted to one another – not necessarily in a physical or emotional sense, but 
in a strategic manner, or matched into arranged marriages – with or without their 
consent – i.e., hence improving their initial social position. 
In the last chapter, I discussed how the nature of Sino-Vietnamese cross-
border marriages is changing compared to the historical antecedent, and are presently 
increasing in visibility, if not in number. I argued that this pattern occurs in spite of 
the stereotypes that constitute a heavy burden on couples. In fact, this trend is largely 
shaped by socio-cultural constraints that marginalise the growing fringes of both 
borderland societies. In Chapter 2, I showed how borderlands become the shores of 
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social castaways, especially in terms of economic position. I will now go on to 
demonstrate how cross-border marriages actually ‘unite’ people who are socially 
ostracized, i.e., individuals who share a liminal existence, and provide them either 
with refuge from a previous predicament, or with a necessary impetus to regain a 
sense of personal dignity and social recognition. 
In the first part of this chapter, I demonstrate how the Vietnamese women 
involved in cross-border marriages with China emerge from a community of women 
at the fringes: those who experience difficulties in coping with their social and 
familial stigma, and decide to challenge their position by transgressing rules in the 
realm of conjugality. In the second part of the chapter, my analysis draws on the 
concept of agency to illustrate how these women, as well as their Chinese partners, 
explore possibilities of changing their ‘fate.’ They engage in various strategies and 
tactics such as contracting alliances in order to regain missing bonds with society, and 
emancipating themselves from a discriminatory situation. I conclude by questioning 
whether by contracting such intimate alliances they achieve these goals. 
 
1 Focus on the fringes of society: the unmarriageable 
In Chapters 3 and 4, I discussed how certain groups of men in China endure 
the upheavals of a changing society in terms of demography and migration, finding 
themselves disadvantaged in the marriage market. Those in economically modest 
circumstances, along with older men, struggle to find a wife. Structural determinative 
socio-economic factors also shape the way Vietnamese women comply with the 
conditions within which they experience conjugality. Some endure their plight as 
wives, or decide to skirt the local marriage market and contemplate other ways to 
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exist as a woman. In the first section of this chapter, I propose to focus on the position 
of Vietnamese women to illustrate how marginality emerges from the transgression of 
social expectations in the realm of conjugality. 
 
Predicament in the structural order of things 
 On law, family and love: Women in Vietnam 
In this section, I introduce the concept of the emotional condition of women in 
Vietnam by providing some historical background of its evolution within the 
framework of conjugality. I assess how, for some women, this can provide an impetus 
to pursue their own individual goals, even as they risk being marginalized in the 
process. 
Until the mid-twentieth century, marriage in Vietnam resulted from a parental 
consultation. A bride did not really have a say in choosing her life partner. 
Compatibility was assessed in relation to social status, economic status, numerology 
(date of birth of the fiancé). Even the reputation of parents was carefully considered 
before an alliance was settled (Bich 1999). The revolutionary years (1954-1975) that 
marked the transition between the end of colonial rule and the seizure of power by the 
communists changed all that by expanding the traditional role of women. Women’s 
role in the domestic sphere was transformed as they assumed a more committed and 
decisive role in armed conflict. In 1959, under the leadership of Hô Chi Minh, The 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam promulgated a new “Law on Marriage and Family” 
designed to eradicate a feudal system that was incompatible with the new vision of 
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society proposed by the communist party.1 The communist party promoted equality 
between men and women, who now shared equal responsibility for kinship decisions, 
which came under state rule. For the first time, love became the legal basis of 
marriage, the result of a voluntary union between two people. The new position of 
women, required by law, advocated their emancipation from the traditional patriarchal 
family (Minh 2000). However, in the early 1980s, social services investigations 
conducted among Vietnamese families found these findings confounding. High rates 
of divorce initiated by women, early marriage, and adultery resulted in revisions to 
the law on marriage in 1986 (Phinney, 2008a). An amendment in 2000 attests to the 
new mentality of conjugality in contemporary Vietnamese society: unmarried couples 
and single mothers were the direct beneficiaries.  
At the same time, there is often a gap between the law and popular practices 
on marriage, and much depends on time, place, couples and their families. With the 
increasing prevalence of love marriages in Vietnam, arranged marriages and parental 
involvement in decision-making have faded considerably such that they often simply 
represent an advisory character (Minh 2000). Social norms have undergone changes 
over the last twenty years, and most young people have their say in their union and 
suffer less stress dictated by the interests of family or state agenda (Phuong 2007). 
Nowadays, occupational prestige and material considerations such as possessions and 
income matter more than an individual’s political career, social class of origin, socio-
geographical origin (rural or urban) and education. 
                                                
1 The new law enforced minimum age, freely consented marriage, monogamy, equality between 
spouses, and advocacy of women and children. 
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Even though the Vietnamese family may be described as a “sanctified reality” 
(Phuong 2004), it remains the object of widespread representations such as the 
Confucian model where the patriarch holds power over his submissive wife and 
obedient children to maintain a harmonious entity. One needs to moderate the fixity of 
such representations by including considerations of the subjectivity of conjugal 
affection, voluntary participation of each member in family welfare, or various 
spiritual and political influences. Realities attest to a real diversity among families 
whose lives confirm how the influence of Confucianism has lessened in Vietnamese 
society (Phuong 2004; Du 2000).  
Popular discourse in Vietnam establishes that marriage is the union of two 
persons destined to share their lives. Like in China, affection between the couple is 
said to settle with time, whereas the birth of children is considered the cement of 
families, the goal of unions, and the link between spouses. However in the recent 
history of the country, the role and the expression of love in Vietnamese marriages 
has been uneven. The notion of romanticism and individual love only appeared in 
Vietnamese poetry in the 1930s,1  under the influence of the French Romantic 
movement that was evidenced in Vietnamese literary education under the French 
colonial system. These writings, although initiated by those of urban and educated 
classes, had a considerable impact on the representation of love and the couple, which 
preceded the revolutionary period of the country. They managed to publicize the 
debate over the legitimacy of marriage without love. Then in the 1950s, patriotic 
feeling triumphed in both the artistic and individual expression of love. Again the ‘I’ 
slipped away to make way for the collective ‘we.’ Revolutionary leaders intended to 
                                                
1 The literary movement Thơ mới (1930-1945) or ‘New poetry’ tended to assert individual sensitivity, 
thus going against the forms of poetry influenced by classical Chinese literature. 
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divert young people from romantic love in favour of patriotic love to generate a 
common dynamic that could free the country from the French, and then later, the 
Americans. Once the Communist Party was in power, revolutionary socialist love 
became the official and dominant form of love until the 1980s. The state governed 
individual feelings by deciding ‘who was a good match for who,’ a judgment based 
mainly on political criteria. In endorsing or objecting to relationships leading to 
marriage, the state intervene within the family to mediate the emotional life of 
individuals, who in turn pledged to serve the construction of the harmonious society. 
As with marital arrangements in the Confucian tradition, in the socialist model of 
marriage advocated by the state, “love took a backseat to duty and responsibility – 
this time reframed in service to the revolution” (Phinney 2008a: 337). The advent of 
Đổi Mới (1986) reignited a focus on individual feelings and responsible subjects as 
the foundation of an ideal society and a successful nation (Phinney 2008a). At the end 
of the 1980s, a new social order regarding conjugality appeared. This model continues 
to underlie current expectations of marital life, the ‘Happy Family’ is “… orderly, has 
an adequate income, stable conjugal relations, and two children whose parents 
educate them properly” (Phinney 2008a: 348). In urban and rural areas of Vietnam, 
marriage has become the centre of a discourse on love inherited from these different 
stages of adaptation to modern life. 
Inherent in the evolution of the institution of marriage in Vietnam is the 
transformation of society in terms of economic development, geographic mobility and 
the adjustment to a new global order that provides fertile ground for new aspirations. 
With family being the cement of Vietnamese society, one would question whether in 
the realm of conjugality such changes have enhanced women’s emancipation with 
regard to equal treatment in the society, as initially claimed in the political agenda,. 
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Hy Van Luong argues that behind the ideal picture of a household based on love and 
equality, a complex reality borne of new social and economic conditions has emerged 
in the last two decades: 
[V]ietnamese data on gender relations in the era of economic reforms and 
globalization do not support the hypothesis, rooted in modernization theory, that 
gender equality will increase with modernization. Neither do they support a Marxist 
theoretical framework that sees gender inequality as rooted in the feudal and capitalist 
modes of production: gender inequality in Vietnam persisted even at the height of 
socialist reforms … Vietnamese women’s significant role in the economy do not 
necessarily lead to a restructuring of gender relations to their advantages … [T]he 
currently available Vietnamese findings suggest that the socioculturally and 
historically embedded definition of gender relations may be as powerful as the 
political economic framework in reproducing and potentially transforming gender 
relations in Vietnam (Luong 2003: 220-221).  
By refocusing their activities on domestic life and children rearing, the state 
has gone some way to reactivating the role traditionally assigned to women. 
Meanwhile, it does not ease their task since women also have to contribute to the 
family economical life, that is to say, to perform work outside to complement that of 
their husband. In the words of Hy Van Luong (2003: 221), “Vietnamese women’s 
significant roles in the economy do not necessarily lead to a restructuring of gender 
relations to their advantages.” Starting in the post independence era, roughly around 
the same time as modern China aimed to establish a new society under Marxist and 
Maoist precepts guidance (the first years of the 1950s), the Vietnamese state policies 
regarding the family aimed to improve women’s status within the society as well as 
within the domestic realm. But forty years later after a major political change and 
ideological guidance in both countries (respectively 1949 for China and 1954 for 
Vietnam), the results of social reforms under socialism reveal some discrepancies. In 
China, although things still vary considerably between urban and rural areas, the 
social position of women, as more recognized productive actors and decision-makers 
both in and outside the domestic sphere, has improved significantly (Hershatter 2004). 
However, Vietnamese society fails to demonstrate sustainable and positive structural 
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changes in their position (Werner & Bélanger 2002; Werner 2009). These differences 
have created an obvious gap between the two countries that lead observers of each 
side of the frontier to comment harshly on the plight of Vietnamese women within 
their communities. 
As a result, and as far as conjugality is concerned, such conditions have also 
created a potential source of growing dissatisfaction among Vietnamese women, 
especially in rural areas where life has not improved as fast as in the cities. Migration 
and what it brings in terms of serendipity, as I will argue in the next chapter, provide 
some of these women with more opportunities to improve their personal life. The 
recurring pressure on gender relations in Vietnamese society encourage the 
marginalisation of those women who cannot bear their position, or the high demands 
imposed on them. The circumstances that send them to the fringes of their society are 
the subject of the following section. 
 
 On infertility, spinsterhood, widowhood, and education: the 
‘unavoidable mishap’  
The first section of this chapter aimed to outline the social transformation of 
Vietnamese society that has structurally affected the life and choices of most women 
in this study. For some of them, this has resulted in establishing their conjugal life in 
China. Before addressing the crucial question of circumstantial factors in the decision-
making process of these unions, I will allude briefly to other elements that play a 
significant role in the creation of social fringes in Vietnam, among which many 
candidates to migration for marriage may be found. I refer to these elements as 
‘unavoidable mishaps,’ because they are related to physical conditions, uncontrollable 
life events, and their unpredictable social consequences, In a way, they are also the 
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result of structural causes in that they are validated by certain mentalities and social 
practices. I already mentioned that in Vietnam, and particularly in northern rural 
areas, marriage age is, in practice, set at a very young age for women, i.e., before 
women are 22 years old. Past this age, a woman is considered too old and sees her 
opportunities for marriage narrowing. But, “[r]estrained by the traditional mindset and 
afraid of criticism, Vietnamese girls are often tentative in seeking a mate,” explains 
Lê Thi (2008: 26). Those who do not find a match in time, due to reserve and various 
other causes such as unattractiveness, sickness, poor reputation, poverty and so on, 
may easily follow the uneasy pathway of spinsterhood. 
Never married childless women must find social networks other than marriage that 
provide social and financial support that will sustain them once their parents are 
deceased (Pashigian 2009: 40). 
Here, Pashigian evokes the plight of infertility, a circumstance which places 
Vietnamese women in a difficult position to remain married. A case study from my 
ethnographic fieldwork illustrates the challenge that infertility poses for Vietnamese 
women.  Duong, a woman from Hải Dương, married a man her father imposed her 
when she was 20 years old. In the space of less than two years, she endured one 
miscarriage after another, able to conceive but unable to hold on a pregnancy. 
Impatient, her husband cheated on her and shortly abandoned her at the age of 22. 
Over the following nine years, she dedicated her time and energy to agricultural work, 
refusing the advances of men, and remaining single, until someone took her to China. 
Two decades after having renounced men, she found peace in a marriage with an old 
teacher – 29 years her elder – in a village near Dongxing and conceived again at the 
age of 44. This time however, she decided to abort.  
Among the numerous factors that may prevent a woman from being 
marriageable in Vietnam, age, physical inability to produce a child, the very raison 
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d’être of a marriage, widowhood, and education level, were those constantly 
mentioned in my informants’ narratives. Education is deemed as important for girls as 
boys. But when a girl becomes too educated compared to the cohort of available men 
around her, this too becomes a problem. Hung Cam Thai (2008) explored this issue 
among highly educated southern Vietnamese women who struggle to find a partner 
because men do not cope well with being less educated than their wife. In rural 
northern provinces, the difference might be between a graduation from primary school 
and one from middle school, but it would still be regarded as inappropriate for a bride 
to be more educated than her groom. Amongst my informants, Li graduated from high 
school and learned several languages by herself and is inclined to study, Thoa (cf. 
Appendix 5) was about to graduate from the Foreign Language Department of Hanoi 
University, A Mei (cf. Chapter 3) learned medicine after middle school, and Thanh 
studied accounting in a Chinese university. For all of these women, education made it 
difficult to find local spouses.1 The cases I have described, enlightened by their 
historical precedents and their current social context, refute the idea that Vietnamese 
women who marry in China, whether on a voluntary or on a coerced basis, are 
                                                
1 Interestingly, in the ostracism of single women in contemporary Vietnamese society and in Chinese 
borderlands communities, one finds the reminiscent flavour of the life-frame in which disadvantaged 
European women used to live under French Indochinese social system: “Professional competence did 
not protect single European women from marginalization. They were held in contempt along with 
European prostitutes, on the basis of similar objections. White prostitutes undermined prestige, while 
professional women needed protection. Both fell outside the colonial space to which European women 
were assigned: custodians of family welfare and respectability and dedicated and willing subordinates 
to and supporters of men. These norms were so rigorous precisely because European family life and 
bourgeois respectability were conceived as the cultural bases for imperial patriotism and a racial 
survival (Stoler 2002: 61).” 
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economically disadvantaged, young or uneducated women. Everything is a question 
of dimension and relativity. 
In sum, decades after the Vietnamese revolution and the prospect of women’s 
emancipation, policies still fail to accommodate the realities of social face. Marriage 
prevails as a necessary step of life, and a component of social recognition. Thus, 
shame falls on unmarried women and their families. Not finding a husband, whatever 
the reason, is deemed a social failure that leads to stigmatization, especially in rural 
areas where women have few opportunities to demonstrate their personal strengths in 
domains outside of marriage. Women’s talents articulated in marriage, family and 
domestic life are what give them an adult life. Movement away from this model and 
framework is marginalizing oneself. 
[B]eing single in our country is not yet considered a person’s free choice, especially 
with regard to women. Families and communities still see a single women as a ‘worry 
and concern’ to her relatives and friends. They often act as go-between to help single 
women succeed in finding a good husband and having children, as for many other 
women (Thi 2008: 73). 
Lê Thi’s analysis of single women’s plight in contemporary Vietnam supports 
the idea that the personal status of a woman defines her position in the community no 
matter what she is capable of, what she may have achieved, and how she shows her 
honesty (Thi 2008). A woman is expected to fulfil her contribution to the nation 
through being a wife and a mother as well as a daughter. These roles are seen as 
pivotal to the harmony and welfare of her community by perpetuating duties of 
womanhood in the footsteps of her elders. If one of these social functions is missed, it 
questions her female identity and her ability to become a responsible person. 
Structural predicament inevitably shape Vietnamese women’s ability to place 
themselves advantageously on the marriage market, in terms or timeframe, social 
hierarchy and natural attributes. However, as will be discussed in the following 
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section, personal circumstances play the main role in the process of marginalisation of 
‘potentially but unrealistically’ marriageable women in Vietnam. And when, at some 
point, such circumstances become negotiable, these candidates to conjugal happiness 
attest their endeavour to challenge the social power order. 
 
The plight of Kiêu 
A floating fern minds not the swift, strong stream — 
destined to drift, it drifts no matter where. 
But how, alone and lost on strangers’ soil, 
shall I fight cold and hunger with bare hands?” 
(Du 1983: 105) 
Kiêu is the heroin of Kim Vân Kiêu (Du 1983), the most famous epic poem in 
Vietnam (although based on a Chinese story), written in the early nineteenth century. 
It recounts the unfortunate life of a young, talented, virtuous and beautiful woman. In 
love with her fiancé to whom she is promised, Kiêu agrees to marry another man to 
save her father from debt. The man, the accomplice of a brothel madam, sells her to 
prostitution. And year after year, she endures her destiny, carried from ordeal to 
predicament, between lust, renouncement, spiritual life and eventually love, to which 
she gives only her spirit. Kiêu’s story is taught in school and spread within popular 
culture and symbolize both the plight of virtuous women and the burden of destiny. In 
this sense, it resonates potently with the narrative of Kiêu’s unfortunate sisters who 
dwell in today’s Sino-Vietnamese borderlands, and bears a striking similarity to their 
thoroughly moving accounts. Besides determinative factors shared by all women in 
contemporary Vietnam, the causes of many women’s unmarried status are bountiful 
and diverse, and like Kiêu, often lie in personal circumstances and stigmatizing 
misfortunes. I propose to describe below some of the most informative examples of 
this. 
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 Stigma: How a physical detail betrays a family background 
It is not surprising to learn that those women who have physical imperfections, 
or handicaps, those who are poorly educated or lack working skills are unlikely to 
find a husband easily. This is true in many societies. But in Vietnam, stigmatisation 
goes beyond this. Physical stigma, for instance, may reveal a problematic background. 
The term stigma and its synonyms conceal a double perspective: does the stigmatized 
individual assume his differentness is known about already or is evident on the spot, 
or does he assume it is neither known about by those present nor immediately 
perceivable by them? In the first case one deals with the plight of the discredited, in 
the second with that of the discreditable. This is an important difference, even though 
a particular stigmatized individual is likely to have experience with both situations 
(Goffman 1986: 4). 
One evening in Hekou, Tam invited me over for a dinner in the modest room 
she then shared with her Chinese partner (cf. Appendix 6). While observing her 
combing her hair, I noticed it had an unusual curl for a Vietnamese woman. She did 
not see it as pretty. The detail escaped my attention earlier because Tam used to pull 
her hair back as straight as possible and maintain it this way with hairspray and a tight 
ponytail: “I don’t like my hair, my face already displays my physical difference to 
Vietnamese.” Hair was the only external part of her body she could actually try to 
change. Tam carried a family background that stigmatized her. Her physical features 
had always attracted sarcastic and rude comments throughout her and her mother’s 
lives. Tam was the only informant whose body literally displayed her stigma, and who 
suffered from it to the extent that it changed her life. The daughter of a Vietnamese 
woman and a Moroccan man, Tam’s face showed significant features of her Northern 
African-Asian mixed-blood legacy. She was called ‘Tam tay’ [Tam the foreigner] 
since her childhood in Yên Bái; but, being a mixed-blood person was more than 
merely embedded in her identity, it was her identity. Prejudice and discrimination 
were part of Tam’s life and left her prone to people’s deception and exploitation. In 
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her adult life, her physical stigma became responsible for two contradictory positions. 
Considered as non-marriageable in her community for the blame her face reflected, 
Tam was an easy target for deception. She was sold to a villager in China by an 
acquaintance (cf. Appendix 6). When she returned, she managed to marry a 
Vietnamese man; but the husband soon cheated on her and his family encouraged him 
to leave Tam because of her reputation. However, when Tam ended up in prostitution, 
her physical features made her special: she became a long-time partner for some 
clients who appreciated her for being different. Later, she started a new life with a 
Chinese worker, and despite the limited comfort he offered her, she stayed with him, 
aware that she could hardly find a better match due to her stigma and her 
controversial past. But in the end the man cheated on her and Tam left him after five 
years of common-law marriage.  
Tam endured rather extreme consequences of stigmatisation along her life, but 
even a woman like Li shared with her similar problems, despite a seemingly more 
fortunate trajectory over the years. Li also has issues with her hair. During most of my 
stays in Dongxing, Li has been my good friend, as well as my devoted interpreter (cf. 
Chapters 1 and 3). She was also my favourite informant, providing me with infinite 
details on the Dongxing environment, the Vietnamese community and life-stories of 
Vietnamese women involved in cross-border marriage. I thought I had explored most 
of her experience in this matter since Li loved to talk about her marital relationship. 
However, even three years after I first met her, she continued to gradually disclose 
details about her family background and her own insights. When I first met her in 
2006, Li always wore her hair in a high ponytail of thick black hair that looked 
permed. By 2009, she had cut it shorter and had it straightened, following – so I 
thought – the current fashion all over China among young women. She explained her 
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choice to me but I did not think of it as relevant, and simply forgot about it. Unlike 
Tam, nothing special about Li’s face warned me of her origin until one day when Li 
mentioned her aesthetic taste in a casual conversation. 
— I can’t stand my frizzy hair. It’s hard to comb. I never permed it: it’s 
natural. Now, I have it regularly straightened because I don’t want people to 
notice that I have unusual hair. 
— What do you mean? 
— From what I know, a French soldier raped my great grandmother when she 
was young. She fell pregnant, so my grandfather, my father and myself all 
have frizzy hair. People have often called us ‘bastard children.’ Luckily, she 
was able to get married, and she had other children who are normal. But when 
my brothers and sisters and myself were kids, people used to laugh at our hair, 
as they made fun of our Chinese slanting eyes [Li is half Hoa; Vietnamese 
eyes are believed to be bigger than Chinese]. I was not like other children. I 
believe that’s why in 2001, when I reached 20 years old, my father and a 
friend of his arranged a marriage for me. This friend was a Huaqiao who had 
left Vietnam for the USA and he had a son there. The son was a 27 year-old 
[born in 1974] and quite rich. But I refused this arrangement, I didn’t love him 
and I felt I was being cheated. So the fiancé’s father asked me to become his 
goddaughter: “I have three sons but no daughter, I would like to have one. 
You can just sign a fake marriage certificate and come with me to the USA.” I 
refused and escaped home for a month, enough time for the ‘Americans’ to 
leave. I resented my parents so much for trying to marry me out this way. “But 
he is Chinese and he is rich!” my mother said to me. The fiancé had tried to 
convince me that he was in love with me but I answered that he couldn’t buy 
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me with dollars. So now, you can understand why my parents were not happy 
either about my marriage with A Linh! 
Biographic and academic literature on the plight of mixed-blood children in 
Vietnam is abundant. Accounts of children born during the French colonial era and 
those born out of relationships between American soldiers and Vietnamese women 
during the Vietnam War – the Bụi đời [street children/dust of life] – all inform the 
stigmatisation that they, as children then adults, have endured in Vietnamese society 
(Firpo 2007, 2010; Delanoé 2002; Yarborough 2005) ever since. In Vietnamese 
people’s eyes, they all embody the war sequels (rapes), the shame of a nation (war 
prostitution and alliance with the ‘enemy’), and because they carry their stigma down 
through several generations, their access to local marriage markets is rather limited. 
Tam or Li’s hair and features embody a controversial history that renders them 
‘problematic’ enough for their parents and community to find alternative match 
choices, or to let them choose their own fate without interfering when a privileged 
solution was turned down. Tam – the ‘discredited’ (in Goffman’s words 1986) – was 
once sold to China before marrying a disreputable man, whereas Li – the 
‘discreditable’ – chose to marry a poor Zhuang man in China, rather than form a 
union with a rich and compromising Vietnamese man overseas. 
 Reputation: the invisible stigma 
Even though similarly discriminating, ‘invisible’ family stigma, as Kim’s case 
attests (cf. Appendix 4), also stands as a subtler yet recurrent element in many 
Vietnamese wives’ backgrounds. When I first met Yao, Kim’s mother, she was a 
masseuse in a professional massage salon owned by her ‘sister’ (her relative, an elder) 
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in Hekou. The two middle-aged women were both practicing medical massage1 and 
my friend Qiuxia (cf. Chapter 1) was one of their regular clients. Yao recalled how 
harsh the 1978-1979 period was for Hoa people who fled Vietnam, how complicated 
Sino-Vietnamese relationships have become since, especially for her generation. 
When she understood the topic and purpose of my research, and was reassured of my 
position,2 she said: 
— Go meet my daughter! She works in the big hotel near the border gate. 
She’s married to a Chinese man. Go there and ask for Kim, everybody knows 
her. But don’t tell her I told you to go there. There’s no need for her to know 
that. Just enjoy a coffee there: she can make good Vietnamese coffee. She 
likes to talk, she will tell you about her marriage for sure. 
After my first visit to Kim, I return to Yao to thank her for introducing me to 
her daughter. She elaborated for me how her background related to Kim’s choice:  
— I separated from my husband because of my ethnic origin.3 I am Hoa but he 
is only mixed-blood. After 1978, he could stay in Vietnam while I had to hide, 
and then flee and leave my children behind. Men are strong, they can cope 
with discrimination, but women can’t. Now, my two sons are married in 
Vietnam. Kim dated some Vietnamese boyfriends before, but I always 
discouraged her from dating them: “You are Hoa, it would be more secure if 
you married a Chinese man.” 
                                                
1 Yao’s relative graduated from a medical school in Kunming and taught Yao the skills and knowledge 
of proper Chinese massages. 
2  Like many other local informants, Yao was afraid of journalists who would unscrupulously 
investigate Hekou’s activities or disclose people’s private lives, as had apparently happened previously. 
3 Yao’s parents originated from Yunnan and Guangdong provinces in China. 
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The circumstances in which I met Kim (cf. Appendix 4) revealed a constant 
and untold form of stigma surrounding individuals involved in cross-border 
marriages. In 2008 and early 2009, Yao spent most of her mornings resting from the 
late evening massage sessions which she, along with her elder ‘sister,’ had to do to 
satisfy their local clientele. Then, she used to spend hours in the card/mah-jong 
playing room next door until their afternoon session began. She was rarely absent 
from these two main spaces of her life. But in July 2009, I could not find her 
anymore. The massage place was still open but neither she nor her ‘sister’ were 
working there. Their regular assistant simply mentioned that the ‘sister’ had returned 
to Kunming, her hometown. It was only by coincidence that I found Yao during a 
walk through an unfamiliar alley of Hekou’s Vietnamese market. She had opened one 
of the four massage parlours on the ground floor where young Vietnamese women 
gave (non-professional) massage treats to Chinese visitors. By October 2010, Yao had 
vanished again. Her immediate neighbour (Ngoc, cf. Chapter 5) told me that Yao had 
sold her massage salon, but no one was able to give me any information on where she 
had gone. Yao was a gambling addict, and often relied on her daughter to pay her 
debt. Kim mentioned to me that this issue with her mother remained unresolved, and 
was a persistent source of tension in their relationship.  
The fact that Yao continued to urge Kim to marry a Chinese man reveals how 
insecure and feared she remained regarding her identity. History had taught her what 
being Chinese in Vietnam meant in sensitive political times,1 and her advice to her 
                                                
1 Once again, the recent events that occurred around the recurring issue of Parcel Islands that divides 
Vietnam and China on a political level for decades (June 2011: public protests; April 2012: diplomatic 
crisis) showed how nationally sensitive groups in Vietnam designate Chinese/Hoa people as their 
favourite target, making their community the site for their grievances.  
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daughter reflects this concern. Yao, who refer to herself as nanmin [refugee] and said 
she has remained in this position,1 seemed to be one of these itinerant individuals who 
were constantly seeking stability in life; stuck between their resentment about their 
experience in Vietnam in 1978, followed by an insecure, stigmatized existence in 
China, and their navigation within a new and changing environment (cf. Appendix 4). 
Hekou’s current society mixes a majority of migrants born or arrived long 
after the 1978-1979 events. Most do not feel concerned by these historical issues. As 
is the case with many issues that challenge people’s nationalistic embrace in China, 
such topics may be discussed over dinner tables, but rarely does it impact their daily 
professional or personal interactions with Vietnamese people. Business has become 
more important than politics in contemporary China. But Hoa, Việt Kiều and refugees 
may still feel these highly political issues as disturbing matters that with the potential 
to open old wounds and place them in jeopardy. 
In Yao’s case, gambling, surviving in an uncomfortable social position, and 
relying on children who have acquired their own legitimate position might be one way 
to sustain her own life, but her stigma also alters Kim’s reputation. It is worth 
                                                
1 Nanqiao [Chinese refugees] was the exact term used to designate the ethnically Chinese refugees 
from Vietnam in 1978-1979. They were granted such status over their ethnic belonging. China received 
them, and when its government accessed to the UN Convention of Refugees (1951) and associated 
protocol (1967) in 1982, it received funds from the UNHCR to improve the living conditions of the 
refugees who arrived and settled since 1978. However, this specific management was conditioned by 
the ethnic origin of the refugees, and the legal status of nanmin [refugee] still does not exist in China, 
due to an unclear interpretation of the convention, as the issue of Chinese policy toward refugees from 
North Korea has revealed since 1997 (Lam 2000; Freeman & Thompson 2009; Cohen 2010; Permanent 
Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations Office at Geneva and Other 
International Organizations in Switzerland 2004). 
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wondering why Yao asked me not to mention her name to Kim. Did that indicate her 
concern for Kim’s privacy, or Yao’s desire to clear her daughter from any relation to 
her own plight? Considering Kim’s patience with her mother’s gambling addiction in 
the face of Yao’s repeated failures, this preservation of anonymity may articulate a 
form of maternal love from a mother whose position prevents her from offering much 
beside troubles. Yao introducing me to her daughter in a direct manner would have 
been the equivalent of supporting a public enquiry on a “Vietnamese wife of a 
Chinese husband,” and Yao did not want to be the one who, again, ‘brings troubles.’ 
As addressed in my discussion of methodological issues (cf. Chapter 1), most 
of my informants, and particularly those who acquainted me with mixed couples, 
were concerned about cautiousness and anonymity. In many cases, they avoided 
direct interaction to relevant individuals, merely offering me descriptions and 
addresses as clues for my investigation. Couples, in return, often took for granted the 
fact that I somehow heard about them from anonymous acquaintances, requiring 
creativity on my part in order to avoid saying who had made the connection. If some 
were curious about their identification process, most tacitly accepted the fact that they 
were the subjects of conversation, hence preserving the ‘informers’ from being 
blamed for their indiscretion. 
Furthermore, the story of Kim’s family is an example of the complexity of the 
social context in which cross-border alliances are embedded at the Sino-Vietnamese 
border. Even though Kim’s marriage appears ‘normal’ in the sense that she presents it 
as the result of romance, it also appears obvious that given her family background, she 
would have had issues finding a suitable partner in Vietnam according to local 
standards. In both Chinese and Vietnamese societies, being marriageable requires 
maintaining a social face, and a respectable reputation. But Kim’s parents were 
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segregated during the 1978 anti-Hoa movement, then they divorced, and her father 
had a child out of wedlock, and her mother had no legal position. So one does not 
have to look far into each spouse’s past to realize how marginalized these particular 
families are, due to division, migration, conflicting identities, nonexistence, and 
failures’ stains. If some members of the Hoa community managed to improve their 
social status by playing an active role in the economic development of the region, 
many remain left out from the regained recognition of their former economic 
influence. Often they remain underestimated, unemployed and court suspicion 
regarding their ambiguous role of intermediaries. 
 Misconduct: self-exclusion 
In Vietnamese society, parents educate their children according to moral 
principles that emphasise the respect of elders’ authority and wisdom. When a 
daughter acts without complying with such principles, she is seen as wilful and might 
expose herself to various forms of sanctions, including expulsion from her family and 
her community. Dung committed the mistake to let her romance rather than her 
family’s advices guide her first steps in adult life: 
— I was born in 1977 in Thanh Hóa in a family of seven children – six girls 
and one boy. At 17, I had a boyfriend, we loved each other but our parents 
were opposed to our marriage. My family was too poor and not well thought 
of. When I ended up seven months pregnant, my fiancé and I decided to flee to 
Saigon. We stayed there a month. It worked and I was expecting the birth. But 
I couldn’t stand the pressure that my fiancé’s family put on me from far away 
so I went back to Thanh Hóa to give birth. My fiancé came to visit me the day 
before I gave birth to a son. He wrote me a beautiful letter from Saigon. But 
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our two mothers were constantly quarrelling, throwing the blame for our 
situation on one another, and successively accusing one of us for seducing the 
other to force a marriage. I was so ashamed. My family was losing face and 
my fiancé’s family denied the paternity of my baby. At 18 [in 1994], I left 
with my son – he was seven months old. I spent a few days with a friend and 
her husband but they put me to sleep by drugging me. I found myself at the 
gate of China: they sold me to Lạng Sơn to a trafficker for 2000 yuan. The 
man made me cross the border and then gave me away to a Vietnamese 
woman for 3000 yuan. It was her who finally sold me to my husband for 5000 
yuan, with my baby. She knew his family. She threatened to sell my child if I 
didn’t accept this marriage. My husband had to borrow this money, he was 
poor and childless – his first wife had left him. 
Dung’s experience is an example of how behavioural misconduct may lead to 
exclusion. At a young age she engaged in an emotional and physical relationship with 
a fiancé whom her parents did not approve of, thus challenging their authorities. She 
did not demonstrate filial piety, nor did she act according to the conventional 
procedure of a marriage: negotiation, exchange of gift and marriage celebration. 
Dung’s emancipation from the established rules in regard to marriage practices, her 
escape from home as a tactic to avoid blame and responsibility, the birth of her child 
out of wedlock and her fiancé’s abandonment were all too heavy a shame for her 
family – and in-laws – to forgive. In this case, the only solution was to leave, an 
opportunity her ‘friends’ (opportunely for the family?) provided. Li, by refusing the 
marriage that her parents arranged for her with a Việt Kiều, demonstrated how 
independent-minded she was. But after choosing her own life, Li excluded herself 
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from the local marriage market, and from her family support in that matter. Mai (cf. 
Chapter 3) also refused a match her father had arranged for her: 
— I am the eldest of four children, and I was fifteen when my father, who was 
alcoholic, decided to marry me to a young man from my village without my 
consent. He was only sixteen years old. Our fathers were friends, and made a 
deal. Neither the boy nor our mothers agreed, but on an auspicious day, the 
boy's father brought to my family a chicken that they sacrificed, and money 
that my father spent on alcohol quickly. I refused to accept the gifts, but he 
didn’t care. This family was rich. As I refused to submit, I found myself at an 
impasse: either I gave in, or I worked to reimburse the bride price. Since I was 
already out of school because our family was too poor, I started to do business 
to repay my debt. Time passed, the boy who treated me as if I were his bride 
was waiting for me to decide. Meanwhile, I dated a boyfriend. I guess the boy 
was jealous, he began to stop me from flirting with my boyfriend. In fact, the 
boy was waiting for me to grow old so I would finally give in to the 
impossibility of marrying elsewhere. I managed to reimburse the bride price, 
but the boy’s family refused it, and gave back the money to my father who 
spent it again on alcohol. My situation was hopeless. At 21 years of age, I left 
with a friend [cf. Chapter 3]. Until today, both the boy and my boyfriend are 
still single. 
 
Both Dung and Mai paid for their misconduct and lack of respect towards their 
family’s decision when they found themselves trapped in China, both due to a friend’s 
plot. Defying their families’ authorities prompted these families to sully their personal 
reputations by presenting them as non-submissive. This reputation then became their 
  350 
stigma and led them to China where they married, even though this was not their 
original wish. But both women’s accounts also raise the question of affective pressure 
and sexual harassment, which in Vietnamese society, is also a factor in exclusion. In 
discussing how sexual harassment serves as a reason for discrimination of women 
among Vietnamese communities, Khuat Thu Hong explains that “[Vietnamese 
women] consider it a problem with no real solution because it is thoroughly ingrained 
behaviour, supported by traditional notions that condone male sexual activity but 
seriously condemn women for any sexual activity outside marriage, even when she 
has been victimized” (2004: 133). In her research on rape in Vietnam, Nguyen Thu 
Huong explains how the disclosure of rape becomes a stigma attached to the victim’s 
family. Recovering the family’s honour generally demands that they negotiate with 
the perpetrator rather than denouncing him, to skirt public confrontation, and to save 
face for both parties. Such attitudes thus imply that the women involved in the 
unfortunate encounters are partly responsible. According to my informants’ accounts, 
returnees from china after an experience of deception that led them either to 
prostitution or to coerced marriage, rarely expect support or empathy from their 
family or community. Somehow, they may also have encountered a form of rape. 
Even worse, the rape took place in a foreign environment, providing the grounds for 
further allegation and suspicions as to the reality of the claimed harm. Many returnees 
(whether they escaped, were saved or repatriated) are blamed for their foolishness, or 
their lack of responsibility. In this sense, their testimonies resonate with the rapees 
whose coping strategies were the subject of Nguyen Thu Huong’s research. 
By relocating the rapee elsewhere through migration even for a definite period, the 
family attempts to help her recover from the ordeal in a new environment with the 
help of kin members or acquaintances. It is also an effort to relieve social pressure on 
the family members who stay behind now that the object of shame is removed – a sort 
of ‘out of sight, out of mind’ solution (Huong 2011: 222).  
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Similarly, migration appears as a recurrent coping strategy for stigmatised 
women in Vietnam. In this way, they seek to avoid gossip and deal with dire 
emotional predicaments. Then only, the stigma attached to ‘bad fate’ becomes 
bearable for the family while the victims of deception followed by suspicion, start a 
new journey. Back from China where she accepted her life as a Chinese peasant’s 
wife, Yen (cf. Appendix 2) was sent away from her home to her sister’s distant 
family, and quickly matched with a local husband. Escaped from a coerced marriage 
in China, Tam (cf. Appendix 6) was mocked in her hometown, and decided to return 
to China to protect her mother from gossip. Also accepting her coerced marriage in 
China, Mai (cf. Chapter 3) visited her family home after establishing a trusting 
relationship with her in-laws… only to discover that her own mother, rather than 
alerting authorities and searching for her, chose to believe a fortune-teller who had the 
“vision of Mai naked and dead on a road,” burned her daughter’s clothes and identity 
card, and set an altar to mourn Mai. These three examples demonstrate that whatever 
the emotional journey and intentions of a woman who ‘vanished’ from her 
community, her return causes far more harm to her family than it does to relieve the 
woman of despair. Such circumstances account for the stigma attached to some 
women who in the end, may have no other option than finding a desired match within 
a pool of potential Chinese men who, as a matter of fact, would not be directly 
affected by the reputation of their Vietnamese companion back home. Disappearing a 
second time also liberates women’s families from social pressure.  
Each of these examples demonstrates how women’s lives may drift in 
uncertain ways, either as a consequence of their yearnings, their resistance or the fact 
that their project challenges socially acceptable standards of gender relations and 
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familial expectations. In this sense, they also illustrate Link and Phelan’s (2003) 
definition of stigma, proposed in their review of the use of the concept: 
We chose to define stigma in the convergence of interrelated components. Thus 
stigma exists when elements of labelling, stereotyping, separation, status loss, and 
discrimination occur together in a power situation than allows them. This is definition 
that we derived, not one that exists in some independent existential way (Link & 
Phelan 2001: 377). 
 
From the particular to the general: Individuals on the margins 
In the first part of this chapter, I conveyed the idea that stigmatization of 
individual women in Vietnamese society in particular, constitutes an overt example of 
how personal circumstances that grow out of an already disadvantaged social 
environment with regard to gender equality of treatment, encourage some individuals 
to pursue an alternative pathway to conjugality (cf. Chapter 3). Through various 
examples, I have demonstrated how stigmatization premised on predetermined 
components, misfortunes and life events in one’s homeland becomes a cogent 
explanation for the need to migrate and experiment life elsewhere. This ‘elsewhere’ 
may not only provide anonymity and a site to ‘discharge’ burdens of a previous life, 
but such a place may also offer the conditions for a new start in life, released from 
social disapproval and criticism. 
Indeed, it is not just any person in China and Vietnam who gets married at the 
border. And among those who do, it is not just any individual who makes such a 
choice, what little choice there may be. To a certain extent, most of these marriage 
candidates are people who position themselves on the margins of society (due to their 
ideas, their life choices or their ambitions) or who found themselves relegated to a 
marginal position by virtue of their background or actions. They are the ‘leftovers’ of 
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the marriage market. They have experienced personal failure, disillusion, domestic 
violence, divorce, or single motherhood. They may also have disabilities, an illness, 
or carry some form of stigma. They may be infertile, carry debt, or be too old to make 
them a desirable candidate for marriage. They may even have criminal record, be 
engaged in illicit activities, have a bad reputation, or be an ex-prostitute. Any of these 
circumstances may force them to contemplate marriage, where possible, with a person 
who either accepts such a background or else ignores it. They are people who are 
already excluded, or who face social exclusion in a way or another. What is striking in 
the various profiles of cross-border marriages is the common ground of liminality. 
Therefore, even if someone has economic means, and even if he/she lives in a social 
environment that is not suffering from marriage squeeze, this does not necessarily 
mean that they will easily find a potential mate to satisfy a desire to raise a family 
together. As bachelors in Chinese rural areas tend to search within the 
‘unmarriageable’ or ‘unwanted’ pool of women (widows and divorcees), people at the 
border find possible marital arrangements with other outcasts, their ‘second-rank 
fellows.’ This is what I will call a ‘choice by default,’ a concept which I now turn to 
elaborate in the last part of this chapter. 
 
2 Between fate and resistance 
Her tears, like pearls, kept rolling down Kiêu’s cheeks— 
foreboding brewed and stirred within her soul: 
“I’ve had an ample share of life’s foul dust, 
and now this swamp of mud proves twice as vile. 
Will fortune never let its victims so 
but in its snares and toils hold fast a rose? 
I sinned in some past life and have to pay: 
I’ll pay as flowers must fade and jade must break.” 
(Du 1983: 91) 
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Nearly all my Vietnamese female informants portrayed their life and that of 
Vietnamese women in general with one term: khó – in Vietnamese – or xingku – in 
Chinese – which means ‘harsh/bitter/difficult.’ From their perspective, this single 
word defines the essence of a woman’s life: the word commonly appeared as an 
introduction or as a conclusion or their narrative, along with a sigh or a smile. The 
echoes of Kiêu’s story still resonate. But, in real life, one needs to avoid portraying 
stigmatized people as passive and helpless victims of an imposed burden, and to 
consider closely the various ways they articulate their existence and plight, but also 
how they exercise their agency in various acts of resistance: 
We can see that people in stigmatized groups actively use available resources to resist 
the stigmatizing tendencies of the more powerful group and that, to the extent that 
they do, it is inappropriate to portray them as passive recipients of stigma. At the 
same time, to the extent that power differences exist, resistance cannot fully 
overcome constraint. The amount of stigma that people experience will be profoundly 
shaped by the relative power of the stigmatized and the stigmatizer (Link & Phelan 
2001: 378). 
 
In light of those observations, I propose in the second part of this chapter to 
examine the various ways that people who were left on the fringes of their societies 
manage to work around their position, to set their stigma to the side and to regain 
social recognition despite their initial perceived weakness. I will describe how those 
disadvantaged components of their subjectivities and existence did not prevent them 
from pursuing social survival and, to this end, engage with cross-border marriage as 
the key moment of a new life, whether it was an intentional strategy for escaping 
stigma or not. This will lead me to observe what parts agency and strategy play in 
setting up a new social situation. Eventually, I will convey the idea that despite 
personal efforts to integrate within a community, and regardless of the extent of 
success in that endeavour, the issue of individuals’ social nonexistence remains. This 
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problematic status informs the precariousness of cross-border marriages that could be 
otherwise deemed as a way to sublimate various personal frustrations. 
 
Mi zhu cheng fan [the rice is already cooked/what’s done is done] 
[T]he victim-agent dichotomy falls short of providing us with a useful framework for 
understanding the lives, choices, experiences, and difficulties faced by migrant 
women. [C]oercion, force, and agency are extremely hard to gauge or measure, and 
… they also vary through time, making it impossible to label all migrant women 
(maids, sex workers, correspondence brides) as trafficked, or to suggest … they are 
ever outside of a system of power and inequality (Constable 2006: 20-21). 
As Constable suggests, it takes close attention to individuals’ life narratives to 
unravel the way specific, individual circumstances interact with structural conditions 
that would easily define their trajectory within a clear framework. Amongst my 
informants, some had left their country, their hometown, by coercion or deception, but 
agreed on staying where they ended: a choice driven by pragmatism. Others, in 
contrast, may have chosen to leave their home to experience something new and were 
then forced by circumstances to remain where they arrived. The whole process of 
building a life out of a given socio-economical ground once again blurs the dichotomy 
between agent and passive (or trafficked) migrant. I propose to call the choice 
emerging from the interstices the ‘choice by default.’  
 Destiny versus tactic: improvising an alliance 
The Vietnamese women who confided in me their life stories and marriage 
experiences almost never mentioned any spiritual belief as a source of relief in times 
of trouble. When I deliberately asked if they were worshipping any deities or if they 
believed in a religion, most denied having any specific belief. I once accompanied 
Thao (cf. Chapter 2) to a local shrine in Móng Cái vicinity, and I also attended the 
little ceremony that Thoa (cf. Appendix 5) asked to hold in a small temple around Lào 
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Cai. But none of them were able to articulate their belief except with awkward smiles 
and light comments such as “it’s nothing,” “I want to see if my fate will change,” “I 
want to express my gratefulness [for this or that],” or even hints of irony towards 
themselves: “it’s just superstition, you know.” But amongst my informants, there was 
a strong consensus on the articulation of their inner perspectives on life. It emerged 
through a repeated expression: “Zhe shi wo de ming [this is my fate/destiny],” when it 
described something rather unfortunate. In the case of a fortunate encounter with a 
lover or a husband, the expression changed into “Zhe shi yuanfen [this is predestined 
affinity].” A short review on the concept of fate/destiny in this region is necessary to 
measure what exactly these narratives of Vietnamese women’s lives allude to. 
Reviewing the history of the religious revival in pre-revolutionary Vietnam, and its 
link with the contemporary strong re-emergence of spirit worship and popular 
religiosity in the Mekong Delta and borderlands, Taylor illuminates such beliefs by 
providing the historical ground that sustains the current beliefs in Vietnam: 
Women’s reliance on spirits was described as a function of their lack of self-belief 
and susceptibility to trickery. Spirit worship and feminine religiosity went hand in 
hand as practices that needed to be purged if the country was to advance into 
modernity. This set of views illustrates that in early-twentieth-century urban Vietnam, 
modernity was associated with notions of self-reliance and faith in one’s own efforts 
(sức mình) In the early twentieth century the ‘self-strengthening’ movement among 
the literati was an important vehicle for the introduction of ideas that it was thought 
would aid the modernizing of society … Science and the ‘new learning’ encouraged 
people to believe in themselves rather than in the power of obscure forces. Presented 
as such, progress (tiến bộ) was a movement toward inclinations that were often 
gendered male in the Vietnamese cultural context (Taylor 2004a: 34-35). 
Drawing upon his findings on goddess worship in southern Vietnam, Taylor 
also underlines the cultural bond with Chinese practices:  
Goddess beliefs are also widely seen as a cultural model introduced by the ethnic 
Chinese, who, notwithstanding their acknowledged business prowess, are often 
faulted by Vietnamese intellectuals as characteristically predisposed to ‘superstition.’ 
Alternatively, some argue that goddess beliefs find a hold among those lacking a 
solid education, whose ignorance leads them mistakenly to believe that spiritual 
forces guide their destiny. People such as market vendors and migrant workers in the 
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commercial service sector, who lack equitable access to the centralized educational 
system, are likely to be influenced by such beliefs. Either way the propitiation of 
goddesses fails the culture test, either as influenced by non-Vietnamese culture or as 
indicating lack of exposure to a modern scientific cultural outlook (Taylor 2004: 17). 
To Harrell, the belief in fate was originally used to secure the elite’s position 
in China: it was a “sophisticated ideology of oppression, a way to make the peasants 
think they could do nothing about their wretched lot, a device for making a humanly 
constructed system (and a cruel one at that) appear to the gullible peasantry to be 
nothing less than the order of nature” (1987: 91-92). However, he later raises a flag by 
emphasising that “[T]he popularity of fate-figurers underlines the error of assuming 
that belief in fate has something to do with a resigned, passive fatalism” (1987: 97). 
Drawing upon his research findings among Taiwanese entrepreneurial villagers in the 
1970s, Harrell proposed this conception of fate in Chinese culture: 
How they view it, in the end, depends on how they use it. Casually, it is nothing but a 
description of someone's existence, comfortable or uncomfortable. Theoretically, it is 
a kind of predetermination according to the harmony or disharmony of cosmic forces, 
something that is both immutable and predictable by an expert who knows the code. 
But practically, it is more than anything a kind of post-hoc rationalization, a catchall 
explanation when others fail, a way of acknowledging that even the most moral and 
diligent human beings cannot necessarily guarantee their own success in life. In this 
sense, ming or mia really does mean ‘life.’ (Harrell 1987: 101) 
Drawing upon the perspectives of Confucianism and Buddhism, Young 
encapsulate the influence of belief in destiny in social relationships in the Vietnamese 
context by stating that:  
[a] fate peculiar to each individual dominates that person's life. It prevails over social 
norms; it intrudes into family relationships; it makes or breaks friendships … Innate 
individual character, so dispositive of communal realities, rests within each person 
separately. Society is the sum total of individual accretions; individuals do not take 
their purpose and their coherence from the social order but from fate itself” (1998: 
147-148).  
In response to the issue of negative social representations of Vietnamese 
people in Chinese eyes (cf. Chapter 4), Young then provides a cogent link between 
fate and a recurrent stereotype that Lao He, one of my male informants (cf. Chapter 4), 
  358 
revealed when he said, “Vietnamese people are egoists, they don’t care about others. 
They are centred upon their family and don’t care about the community. And even 
among one same family, they don’t help each other as we Chinese people do. I 
witnessed this in my wife’s family. They don’t value solidarity.” 
The scheme of destiny places individuals in isolation, driven by forces beyond their 
control. People cannot be assumed to be reliable, for they may not have the ability to 
control what they do. A defensive wariness is the best stance for interpersonal 
relations among Vietnamese. There is little that bonds one Vietnamese to another 
(Young 1998: 153-154) 
 
Without suggesting that destiny constitutes the universal explanation for an 
individual’s plight, and the ‘excuse’ for all social behaviours, this example still 
underscores the complex interplay between perspectives. My informants' explanations 
of their own and other people's trajectories showed no evidence upon which I could 
draw to offer a clear delineation between a Vietnamese and a Chinese definition of 
‘destiny’ or ‘fate’, whether one consider the philosophical concept or the popular 
understanding of such a signifier. However, my Vietnamese informants invoked this 
explanation more often than Chinese ones.  
If we consider that Chinese philosophy and Buddhism have both defined East 
Asian culture and Vietnam in particular, the understanding of the notion of ming 
[destiny, fate] should be quite similar for a Chinese and a Vietnamese speaker. One 
could finds roots of this conception even earlier, as Raphals exposes in her essay on 
the semantic fields of meaning of the Chinese term ming based on pre-Buddhist texts: 
At the level of individual agency, a conscious agent is apt to consider the ‘fate’ she is ‘given’ 
in life and ask what can be changed and what is unalterable. In this sense, the concept of fate 
can provide a way to categorize or discriminate what can and cannot be changed (Raphals 
2005: 72). 
By comparing the notion of fate in ancient Greece and China, the author 
emphasises that 
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Pre-Buddhist Chinese accounts combine acceptance of fate with strong anti-fatalism and well-
developed notions of strategy of maneuvering room within its decrees… Change and 
resilience are the order of the day and open to human strategy and ingenuity (Raphals 2005: 
102). 
Following this notion and highlighting it in a contemporary context, Lupke 
adds that 
[a]lthough the status of ming in modern China has changed, the way in which it is understood 
and referenced is still closely linked to traditional, classical usages: ming is one’s ‘lot’ and 
one’s ‘life’… ming is also, ironically, a sort of ‘life-giving force’… (Lupke 2005: 297)  
I suggest that, at least in this region and among individuals whose regular 
migrations expose them to additional external and uncontrollable factors of 
disturbances, the belief in destiny supports the articulation of vicissitudes of one’s 
life, including the consequences of risk-takings behaviours. Slote summarises the state 
of mind resulting from the strong conviction reflected in my Vietnamese informants’ 
sighs or smiles:  
What is unique about the Vietnamese is the nature of their beliefs, the power that is 
assigned to the forces that govern their destiny, the panoply of elements that combine 
to determine fate, and the high degree to which these external forces are internalized 
within the conscious and unconscious life of the Vietnamese people. The 
consequence is that the Vietnamese to a great, although far from an absolute extent 
experience themselves as being in the hands of a destiny that is determined by forces 
beyond their command (1998: 320). 
 
Nevertheless, on the fringes of society, and because of and despite the plight 
inflicted by destiny, some women find ways to resist such forces and move away from 
their pathway. Destiny as a sole framework fails to explain why some women accept 
their predicament but others challenge it. As several of the life-stories I have 
translated here and in the appendices demonstrate, there are sequences of life 
attributed to destiny, and others interpreted as tactical moves (de Certeau 1984) very 
much at odds with a supposed passivity. It is the ability of each individual to make 
use of certain situations that allow some control over the course of their existence, 
even though the extent of such a move might be limited. I have showed earlier (cf. 
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Chapter 4) how borderland residents perceived many Vietnamese women’s settlement 
in Chinese communities as the implementation of migration strategies through 
available means (their body and/or their working skills). However, empirical data 
prove that most of the time, the arrival, the stay and the departure from China, as well 
as the decision to get married to a Chinese man, are the result of on-the-spot decisions 
rather than carefully planned arrangements.  
 But in the case of cross-border marriage, Chinese men also may act out of 
given circumstances that for a particular reason would urge them to grasp an 
opportunity that could change their own fate. A De, the man from Dongxing who 
adopted one of the six daughters of an acquaintance (cf. Chapter 3) told me about his 
second marriage:  
— I have been married to my Chinese wife for fourteen years. But she had a 
bad temper; even my father couldn’t stand her. After the divorce, women often 
approached me: I have fields of sugar cane, this catches women’s eyes. I’ve 
always been wary and I always refused, even Vietnamese women. One day, a 
friend in Dongxing introduced me to a 24 year-old woman who had just 
arrived from Vietnam, and was going to end up in prostitution. “Try her, if she 
suits you, keep her, you’ll remunerate me later.” I told the woman: “If I suit 
you and if you agree to take care of my daughter [9 year-old], you can stay, 
otherwise you're free to go.” She stayed and it has been eight years. We have 
two sons, an eight and a one year-old. Later, I paid my friend who was only an 
intermediary. 
 
Neither A De nor Duong’s husband (cf. earlier in this chapter) intended to 
remarry after their divorce. Still, they both found a life-partner because of a chance 
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encounter with two Vietnamese women in difficulty – but not in demand. Yen, Mai 
and Van escaped brothels relying on their tears, their threats to commit suicide or 
their friends, i.e., their ‘weapons of the weak’ (Scott 1987) to impose their will and 
swing a position of powerlessness in their ‘favour,’ change the course of their lives, 
and win a measure of power over their destinies. And, as Nyíri puts it, it is precisely 
the act of migration that allows the “ability to manipulate cultural constructs of distant 
places to gain the privilege of different behaviour” (2002: 307). Schein argues, based 
on a study of cross-border and international marriages of Hmong/Miao people, that 
such marriages have the potential to emancipate couples from obligations among 
affines, and are more conjugal-centred (2005). Herein emerges the core idea of 
agency among migrants, an essential element that Vietnamese women confront in the 
context of their own migration.  
[V]ietnamese women were not simply passive agents in the context of conflicting 
structural pressures on gender relations in the 1990s … I would suggest that women’s 
heavy leaning toward Buddhism with its concept of karma and infinite cycle of 
miseries was also a reaction to the problems that they faced in the Vietnamese 
sociocultural and economic systems (Luong 2003: 220). 
Hy Van Luong also questions the idea that migration that allows a marriage 
‘outside,’ or a marriage that allows for migration, conveys a form of resistance to 
Vietnamese social transformations after the Đổi Mới [‘Renovation,’ i.e., Vietnam’s 
free market economic reforms in the 1980s].  Following these authors, I would like to 
elaborate on and illustrate this argument. 
 On emancipation from kinship, community and state’s control 
Given the predicament of those Vietnamese women who do not fit into the 
framework of well-established gender roles in their own society, it is not surprising 
that singles (Thi 2008), but also divorcées and widows, meet tremendous challenges 
in establishing a long-term position within their communities. The alcoholism, drug 
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addiction, abuse or infidelity of a husband might attract community empathy for a 
wife; yet the general social attitude towards women in such circumstances is that they 
should find any possible ways to cope with domestic and intimate problems. So when 
some women decide, out of exhaustion, suffering or despair, to leave their marriage, 
their household, and even their children to escape an unbearable position, they are 
failing in the eyes of their community. As soon as they step out of their family, 
exclusion threatens them and they need, for the sake of dignity, social face and well-
being, to leave their surrounding and to attempt starting another life elsewhere, under 
an anonymous identity, where they can endeavour to transform themselves from 
failures to success. 
[I]t is still mainly women who encounter difficulties after divorce, not least in facing 
public opinion. Though more and more women initiate divorce, a divorced woman is 
still seen in the eyes of many people as immoral, even though a divorced man is 
acceptable … This means that the double standard hare also works in favour of men. 
Divorced women even have to face difficulties in remarriage (Pham Van Bich 1999: 
165). 
Several scholars (Bélanger & Hong 2001; Minh 2000; Phuong 2007) stressed 
the role that parents have played in the marriage decisions of their children all through 
the modern history of Vietnam. In a comprehensive study of the evolution of 
conjugality in the northern part of Vietnam throughout the past century, Pham Van 
Bich thus concludes that parents are now only playing a double role of ‘significant 
other’ (consulted on the choice of a fiancé) and the ‘crucial payers’ in their children’s 
marriage (1999: 166), rather than the absolute decision-makers of previous historical 
eras. But a clear account of the role that parents play in the case of a second marriage 
in Vietnam is still missing. Literature on the topic is scarce for the region but with the 
increasing rate of divorce in both Chinese and Vietnamese societies, this merits 
further discussion. What happens to the divorcées regarding a second-marriage? What 
is the logic by which divorcées contract another marriage? On the Chinese front, 
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demographers have examined the link between remarriage and the marriage squeeze 
in China: unable to find available brides amongst the pool of young single women, 
bachelors tend to search for a spouse from the initially stigmatized pool of divorcées 
and widows. But demographers fail to mention family and individual practices in the 
matter, except that the main purpose for unions (first or second) remains the 
production of an heir (Jiang, Attané, Li & Feldman 2007). Such a gap in the literature 
on this issue may reveal an absence of clear kinship rules on the matter of second 
marriages in Vietnamese families. Indeed, rules exist on divorce itself, or on 
widowhood, while re-marriage, especially that of women, seems left out. But this may 
also signify that once a first marriage ends, which is still a form of dishonour for the 
families and individuals involved, the stigma is so severe that it does not really matter 
what a daughter who failed to keep her first family united would become afterwards. 
Reviewing the marriage market in Vietnam after the Vietnam War, Daniel Goodkind 
mentions this issue and alludes to possible implications for the women at the core of 
my research: 
Although the surplus of women at the younger age groups has receded recently, the 
cohort of women that entered the marriage market throughout the late 1970s and the 
early 1980s has been severely disadvantaged relative to men. Researchers have noted 
the implications for delayed marriage, entering and remaining in a marriage with an 
undesirable or abusive partner, an almost nil chance of remarriage in the case of 
marital disruption, and an increase in out-of-wedlock childbearing, all of which 
constitute major problems for a society in which marriage is universally expected. 
Men, conversely, have been better able to cycle through the marriage market owing 
not only to the surplus of women but also to more permissive social norms regarding 
remarriage (Goodkind 1995: 348-349). 
In their 1995 study of marriage and remarriage patterns among the Asian 
communities in the USA, Aguirre, Saenz and Hwang argue that remarriage is 
associated with greater exogamy because mate selection norms only exist for first 
marriage, but also, and this supports my argument here, “the hypothesized relation 
between remarriage and intermarriage may be the effect of personality patterns; 
  364 
persons who break marriage norms in one area of their lives, such as divorcing their 
spouses and entering remarriage, are probably more likely to break other marriage 
norms such as marrying outside their ethnic and racial groups” (1995: 208). The 
recent findings on cross-border marriages in Asia confirm the high proportion of 
remarriage among these international couples (Yang & Lu 2010). Applying this 
explanation to current changing Chinese and Vietnamese societies illuminates the life 
experience and decision-making of my informants. Those previously married in 
Vietnam were left at the fringes of their communities due to the stigma associated 
with divorce and the social ‘misconduct’ that I described earlier in terms of marital 
rules.1 Drawing upon Aguirre, Saenz and Hwang’s (1995) findings, I suggest that 
once their social and moral capital was lost, exogamy through remarriage in China 
could not damage Vietnamese women’s reputation more that it was already damaged. 
A sense of liberation from social norms of conjugality emerges in their narratives. 
However, the pathway is uneven. Various authors (Drummond 2004; Gammeltoft 
1999; Pettus 2003; Phinney 2008b; Lê Thi 2008; Phan Van Bich 1999) emphasised 
the ostracism that these women endure due to the strong belief that women should 
always compromise in family conflicts and overcome their fear in the household 
realm. For those who leave, an uncertain future arises. The burden of loneliness, 
added to an altered sense of what it means to be a woman, might easily lead them to 
suffer from lack of self-confidence and lack of trust in what life might still bring to 
them. While some women chose to keep a low profile and survive in their society 
despite their fate – by ignoring social contempt or by migrating – others chose to 
adopt new behaviour. Amongst my informants, Chi (cf. Appendix 7) chose to follow 
                                                
1 Women’s right to divorce and widows’ right to remarry was only granted after the proclamation of 
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (Malarney 1996). 
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the advice of a matchmaker and marry a Chinese man to secure her needs in her old 
age, and Nguyet (cf. Appendix 1) accepted a life in China to fulfil her needs for 
affection after a life of familial conflict. Many of the women who disclosed their 
personal trajectories recounted the life they once had and often described it as the real 
‘push factor’ that led them into a new society which may be more tolerant of people’s 
pasts. These cases argue against the economic motivation often attributed to these 
cross-border marriages by analysts and demand recognition of the intimate aspirations 
and ideals of emancipation and respect that these women have. According to Pham 
Van Bich’s classification (Bich 1999), Chi and Nguyet belong to a generation that did 
not see marriage as the concretization of a romance but as a necessary bond between 
individuals in order to produce children and provide the country with a labour force, 
and saw self-sacrifice as a duty and personal feelings as a luxury (Yan 2003; Zhang 
2005). One might have the impression that they have made a marital choice out of 
some opportunities that they did not intentionally look for. Yet Chi and Nguyet’s 
move towards the idea of an alternative form of conjugality reveals a significant 
emphasis on affection and care as a form of intimate healing that helped them to 
eventually overcome the negative circumstances that led them to this second start in 
life. Discussing this impetus towards liberation, in the sense that building a family 
does not necessarily mean bowing to parents and public opinion, Goodkind (2007), 
Thi (2008) and Phinney (2005) all described the phenomenon of women ‘asking for a 
child’ as the expression of ostracised women’s determination, and as a form of 
resistance. 
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 The child issue: asking for a child versus yearning for an heir 
When Chinese borderland residents discuss the issue of Sino-Vietnamese 
marriages, the question of children often emerges as a very sensitive point. An affair 
between a man and a woman that ends as a result of the cheating of one or the other 
partner does not have a significant impact on society and does not offend community 
sentiment. It is only a private matter than may become a topic of discussion and 
gossip. But a family interacts with society to a greater extent than a couple, and the 
connection it creates implies a larger number of persons. In contemporary China, a 
child has become, more than ever in modern history, the object of extreme care and 
concern because of the One-Child Policy. The precious ‘little emperor’ has also 
become the object of tremendous expectations in terms of his/her future 
responsibilities towards his/her family (Chicharro 2010). Chinese families need 
children, who are expected to support their parents in their old age. Bachelors yearn 
for wives who can produce an heir. And when brides eventually enter families, it is 
their reproductive functions that are most scrutinized. Having said that, the issue 
emerges when the center of the family – the Chinese son – also becomes the object of 
negotiations and blackmailing between his parents. That Chinese men seek a fertile 
woman and future mother from amongst a pool of available Vietnamese women is not 
surprising, even though the marriage they contract with the mother may also be 
grounded in affection and stable conjugal life. When these men request that the child 
stays in China when their mother returns to Vietnam for a visit, it reflects their anxiety 
about their security and their wellbeing. But such precaution is also a response to 
stories and rumours about women who take away their offspring and vanish, leaving 
their Chinese husbands in despair. One may give some credence to these stories if one 
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ever heard about single Vietnamese women and the xin con [‘ask for a child’] 
phenomenon that Phinney describes in her work. Instead of considering Vietnamese 
women through the lens of the reproductive dimension of femininity (Drummond 
2004), Phinney examines the emotional life of lonely women and their intimate 
yearning for maternity. Regardless of social normative behaviour, some Vietnamese 
women excluded from the marriage/remarriage market found a way to satisfy their 
need for company, affection, love and support by rearing a child alone, out of the 
normative structure of a family. They may find a lover and get pregnant, or 
intentionally ask a man whose various attributes they appreciate to inseminate them, 
or even go to the hospital to receive anonymous insemination (Phinney 2005). 
Whether the donor is aware or not of the consequences, be he single or married, the 
strategy of such mothers-to-be is clearly to raise their own child and fulfil something 
missing in their life by properly becoming a woman, if not in the eyes of their 
community, at least in their own viewpoint. In doing so, they refuse men’s 
involvement in their own life, they challenge social norms around family structure, 
and act according to their will rather than social rules. When Vietnamese women 
living near Chinese borderlands are aware of the availability of potential genitors for 
their child in China, it may be an easy option to contemplate. Even though I have no 
empirical data to confirm the impact of the ‘asking for a child’ phenomenon in China, 
several elements corroborate such a theory. First of all, the Marriage Law in Vietnam 
supports single women and guarantees a legal status to children born out of wedlock, 
which is not the case with the Chinese Marriage Law where recognition is contingent 
on their payment of a fine. Further, some informants’ comments on their mixed child 
reveal that maternity for them is clearly more important than conjugal life. If their 
relationship with their current Chinese husband was jeopardised, they claim they 
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would not hesitate to go back to Vietnam with their child. Also, I quoted earlier some 
Chinese men in Hekou who blamed their former Vietnamese wives for having 
vanished with their children (cf. Chapter 5). But from their perspective, these 
Vietnamese mothers were ‘stealing their child’ rather than asking, and this is precisely 
what hurts Chinese men. In these cases, not only their feelings are hurt but also their 
pride and their masculinity, and to a larger extent that of their families and 
communities. Stories of these men who were allegedly deceived and deprived of their 
child and heir enhance the general suspicion of Vietnamese women in China (cf. 
Chapter 5). Based on these anxious and conflicting perspectives on children born out 
of unregistered – thus vulnerable – marriages, parents often negotiate their position.  
Questions related to registration on one parent’s hukou, schooling, provision of care 
by in-laws, or language learning, all elements that ease but also orient an individual’s 
social existence, also translate parental strategies for the future. Data suggest a clear 
tendency to register a second child on his father’s hukou if the family has the means to 
pay the fine and/or if the child is a boy. However, registration on the mother’s 
Vietnamese hukou is considered when the father already has a Chinese (non-divorced) 
family (i.e., when his relationship with a Vietnamese partner is polygamous), or if he 
already has reached the number of children he can legally have. Nonetheless, mixed 
children are the symbolic site for parents to articulate their prospects for the future 
and their way of coping with social nonexistence (Luo & Long 2008). 
 
Nonexistence  
According to the latest research on international marriage migration in Asia, 
government policies are not encouraging this trend: “Bolstered by negative 
stereotypes, deep-seated suspicion of women migrants from less-developed countries 
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ensures that some state policies, especially concerning naturalization, serve to deter 
international marriage migration” (Kim 2010: 726-727). As far as Chinese authorities 
are concerned, a dilemma exists. They try to control and regulate migration, deter 
registration, and scrutinize reproduction (cf. Xuan: Chapter 3, and Chi: Appendix 7). 
But because cross-border marriages temporarily serve traders’ interest or solve social 
problems (such as a lack of marriageable women), officials tend to tolerate these 
marriages, particularly when those in charge of implementing policies are members of 
the community and feel sympathetic towards families in despair, a situation that 
frequently occurs in rural settings where officials are more closely connected to their 
communities than in urban settings.  
In the meantime, though, tolerance creates resentment amongst those who 
conform to normative patterns of family structure, and who must cope with 
restrictions on reproduction. Hence, those Sino-Vietnamese couples that do not 
comply with the law, despite apparent integration in the community, enter a space that 
Coutin calls ‘nonexistent’ (2003).  
 Space of nonexistence 
The undocumented are denied legal rights, social services, and full personhood, and 
can be detained and deported if apprehended by immigration authorities. […] And 
yet, clearly, regardless of their legal status, migrants do exist in that they live, work, 
go to school, play, have parties, ride buses, and so forth (Coutin 2003: 173). 
The mere existence of a child as the ‘natural’ outcome of marital alliances 
reopens the debate of legal legitimacy of Sino-Vietnamese couples who, for the most 
part, encounter difficulties in registering their relationship. Indeed, if many couples 
tend not to bother complying with formal administrative procedures to register a 
marriage while they are still with no child, the occurrence of a pregnancy (cf. Chapter 
3) and then a child generally impels the couple to find a way to secure their child’s 
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present and future, be it in Vietnam or China (Luo & Long 2008). To assess how 
families negotiate their social position, I will build on Coutin’s innovative concept of 
‘spaces of nonexistence,’ i.e., spaces of invisibility, exclusion, repression, 
exploitation, and violence.1  This concept appears relevant to explaining the liminal 
state of many Sino-Vietnamese families in the social spaces of borderlands because, 
similar to the situation of illegal Central Americans migrants entering and then living 
in the USA, Vietnamese women and their Chinese husbands are living a ‘normal life’ 
albeit an illegal one. But the idea of nonexistence also reflects the fact that in many 
cases, regardless of legal recognition, nonexistence is also a social status. The concept 
of nonexistence conveys the idea that groups of people are excluded from public life 
and recognition because of their legal status, even when they apparently live just like 
others in their community. Mai (cf. Chapter 3) recalls one anecdote that happened to 
her: 
— In 1990, after I weaned my first son, my husband and I had sex again, and I 
fell pregnant very fast. I had decided to go back to Vietnam to see my family. I 
left my son in the village where we lived and my husband accompanied me to 
the border in Dongxing. We took a bus. We both carried some cash with us. 
When we reached Nasuo [a checkpoint on the way to Dongxing] someone 
found out that I was Vietnamese, was going back, had money and didn’t know 
my way. The person denounced me. The bianfang [border defense] officer 
took all my money because, of course, I didn’t have any ID. My husband gave 
me his money and I returned to Vietnam for a few days … In eighteen years in 
                                                
1  Coutin’s article on nonexistence (2003) inspired a workshop entitled “Studying Spaces of 
Nonexistence: Methodological Concerns” that was held at Murdoch University (Perth, Australia) in 
March 2010. 
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China, my identity has only been checked once at home [in the village]. I 
asked to normalise my status but the immigration officer refused to legalise 
my marriage. He threatened to repatriate me to Vietnam because I didn’t 
comply with the migration law. So I asked him: “You don’t want to legalise? 
Do you want to raise my children? If you send me back, there will be two 
more Chinese orphans in China. Do you want Chinese children to live with no 
mother to take care of them? If you send me back I will come back for them.” 
He eventually let me go and that was it. What could he respond to my 
argument?  
Mai’s negotiation for her residential rights is an overt example of the tactics 
migrant women may use when they confront Chinese authorities. Indeed, Mai could 
have gone back to Vietnam, like many other migrants do so to satisfy the agents of 
state power, and then return to China in a few hours’ time to recover her daily life. 
Several Chinese residents in Hekou and Dongxing also explained how, when political 
tensions impose a more severe enforcement of border control, Vietnamese people 
with illegal status all cross the border back to their native land, waiting for thing to 
return to ‘normal’, their own ‘normality’ being exactly situated in this nonexistent 
position: 
On a day-to-day basis, their illegality may be irrelevant to most of their activities, 
only becoming an issue in certain contexts, such as when changing jobs, applying for 
college, or encountering an immigration official. The undocumented thus move in 
and out of existence. Much of the time they are undifferentiated from those around 
them, but suddenly, when legal reality is superimposed on daily life, they are once 
more in a space of nonexistence. The borders between existence and nonexistence 
nonetheless remain fuzzy and permeable (Coutin 2003: 186). 
The line between registered unions and common-law marriage may not find an 
overt embodiment and remain blurry in practice, just as trying to classify which 
circumstances reflect the most genuine intimate engagement between two partners in 
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cases of marriage, alliance, cohabitation, prostitution, or partnership is somehow 
meaningless when all occupy common liminal ground. The ambiguous content such 
terms encompass reflects how the notion of legality, as a living reality, has lost most 
of its significance in borderlands. 
But, as Coutin reminds us, “the physical and social presence of illegal aliens 
may be more important than their legal nonexistence given that illicit travellers create 
transnational communities and develop underground economies and exchanges, such 
as remittances that migrants send ‘home’ to their families” (Coutin 2003: 194). This 
counts as a valid explanation for Chinese local authorities’ uneven treatment of the 
activities of Vietnamese migrants in China. In the economic sphere, they benefit from 
no protection and generally request little surveillance, but Vietnamese migrants 
participate in the local economy by extending business network and providing 
Chinese traders new market prospects beyond the Chinese border (Grillot in press). 
 Coping with liminal ground: manipulating the interstices of the law 
The ‘women of no nationality,’ as some Chinese scholars have labelled 
Vietnamese women, cannot expect China to grant them with the right to live in China 
(Li, Luo & Long 2007). They cannot rely on asylum policies either, because China 
does not legally recognize the status of refugee1 – a position that Vietnamese women 
themselves do not refer to – but rather considers them as illegal economic migrants. 
Therefore, whether or not they chose to migrate to and remain in China, they cannot 
                                                
1 “In China, UNHCR continues to advocate for the enactment and implementation of national asylum 
legislation in line with the Refugee Convention and has confirmed its readiness to assist the 
Government in this area” (available from: http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e487cd6&submit=GO, consulted on June 28th, 2012). 
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claim the right of residency and face the risk of being deported back to Vietnam. 
Their situation also differs from that of Central Americans in the U.S. in the sense that 
Vietnamese women in China do not really complain or try to seek help. Due to the 
political regime of their host country, they understand that they cannot do so and as a 
consequence, they do not resist Chinese policy and they remain in the shadows of the 
borderlands, trying to remain inconspicuous. In Guangxi, a research team under the 
supervision of Zhou Jianxin (2002) has conducted some investigations in a few border 
villages in the late 2000s. In the tradition of Chinese anthropology, most of this 
research was applied anthropology and aimed to address issues of concern for the 
Chinese government (be it central or local). Based on their findings, they provided 
recommendations to local policy-makers. In the case of Sino-Vietnamese cross-border 
marriages, these recommendations reflect the real problems that such families 
represent: marriage registration, access to Chinese citizenship, permanent residence 
rights, children identity and citizenship, right to education. But while the marriages 
are presented as the consequences of Chinese economic reforms and opening-up, and 
friendly policies towards neighbouring countries, they are also set out as being 
disadvantageous for China itself rather than for migrants. Hence, the researchers 
recommended that the state takes new measures in the legal system with the aim of 
easing border entry management, social security and family planning (Luo & Long 
2007). 
The problematic status of these couples, but more particularly those 
Vietnamese women in China, labelled as victims of trafficking or illegal migrants, 
represents a threat to the Chinese nation-state, these Chinese scholars argued. In that 
sense, these migrants’ position may be compared to that of the refugees whom Malkki 
described in her account of Hutu refugee camps in Tanzanian borderlands.  
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It is striking how often the abundant literature claiming refugees as its object of study 
locates “the problem” not first in the political oppression or violence that produces 
massive territorial displacements of people, but within the bodies and minds of people 
classified as refugees. This interiorization – making it appear that there are specific 
empirical features or personal traits that render this or that person recognizable as a 
refugee – is related to another aspect of the literature: the universalization of the 
figure of “the refugee.” “The refugee” has come to be an almost generic, ideal-typical 
figure – so that it is not uncommon to see references to “the refugee,” “the refugee 
experience,” “refugee psychology,” and so on (Malkki 1995: 8). 
In the same way, the Chinese categorization ‘feifa yimin’ [illegal migrant] or 
‘guaimai renkou’ [trafficked people] has also become a stereotyped figure of the 
social landscape of the borderlands. Drawing upon Mary Douglas’s notion of 
cleanliness (1966), Turner states that 
transitional beings are particularly polluting, since they are neither one thing nor 
another; or may be both; or neither here nor there; or may even be nowhere (in terms 
of recognized cultural topography), and are at the very least “betwixt and between” 
all the recognized fixed points in space-time of structural classification … liminal 
personae nearly always and everywhere are regarding as polluting to those who have 
never been, so to speak, “inoculated” against them, though having been themselves 
initiated into the same state (Turner 1967: 97, original emphasis). 
Turner’s articulation of the concept of liminality is particularly illuminating 
for conceptualizing Vietnamese women and Chinese men engaged in cross-border 
marriages. If we only consider that the majority of cases are non-registered – hence 
rather vulnerable and non-recognized – unions, and if we recall the popular discourses 
that circulate around those couples, we can relate their position to that of liminal 
individuals. They stand between the status of single and spouse, i.e., a status that 
generates comments, suspicion, and worry from local people, while it triggers scrutiny 
and sometimes intervention from Chinese and Vietnamese authorities. By 
representing an abnormality in the realm of migration, conjugality, and social welfare, 
these marriages threaten normality and are conceptually polluting by changing 
marriage practices and thus affecting social morality at the local level. Vietnamese 
women may steal Chinese money, Chinese husbands of other women, provide 
alluring spaces where Chinese men can satisfy their needs, and so on. They also 
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reproduce children who become a burden to Chinese society since their status is 
associated with that of hei haizi [black children/nonexistent children], but also create 
inequality and generate animosity amongst communities. In short, these couples 
threaten social stability.  
The main issue here is that so far, there is little opportunity for many cross-
border families to leave such a liminal state. Hence, remaining in liminal space 
generates, over the long-term, the existence of a social fringes, i.e., people who live a 
‘nonexistence’ for an unlimited period of time, under vulnerable conditions that lead 
them to adopt tactics to respond to the changing environment that potentially 
jeopardises their insecure position. In the terms of Turner, on a metaphorical level, a 
liminal person is ‘invisible’: 
The symbolism attached to and surrounding the liminal persona is complex and 
bizarre … The structural “invisibility” of liminal personae has a twofold character. 
They are at once no longer classified and not yet classified (Turner 1967: 96, original 
emphasis). 
Translated into the context of borderlands, this means that couples and 
families are generally neither legally nor socially recognized as such, hence not 
labelled or classified under the category of ‘marriage.’ But the obstacles they 
encounter at various levels to become ‘properly married’ are so serious that most 
individuals cannot find their way out of the allegedly temporary state of liminality. 
Coutin states that “[t]he space of legal nonexistence occupied by unauthorized 
immigrants is therefore another dimension of a previously entered space of social 
nonexistence” (Coutin 2003: 184). Indeed, many men and women who sought social 
recognition by finding a mate and switched from being bachelors, single, divorcées, 
ex-convicts, ex-prostitutes, elderly, or any other sort of social outcast position to that 
of the normative ‘married person’ may actually enter other realms of marginality. 
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This is, as I addressed earlier, due to the continuing social stigmatization attached to 
mixed marriages, but this is also directly related to their administrative status that 
deprives them of the advantages of citizenship. Caught between a ‘before-life’ from 
which they intend to emancipate themselves and an ‘after-life’ that can only be 
partially achieved in terms of social position, those couples find themselves in a 
nonexistent position, in a liminal space that provides them with the condition needed 
for resistance: in case of problems, they can leave, cross the border, return to their 
hometown, become visible in their own space, reconnect with a ‘before-life,’ or 
indefinitely remain on the fringes of either society. 
Zhang is a middle-age businessman in Hekou. He manages his brother’s hotel 
while his wife manages two brothels: 
— I originally come from Guangxi and I arrived in Hekou in 1990. I met my 
wife in 1995 and we have been living together since. We only got married in 
2004. My hukou was in Guangxi, and she could not go there to get married 
with me. So we waited until we could buy an apartment in Hekou, then 
transfer my hukou here1. Then, it was possible to do the formalities. We had 
our son in 1999. But theoretically, we couldn’t have a second child. We paid 
to buy a hukou for her in Guangxi (using personal connections). She has never 
been there but she is considered a Chinese woman from Guangxi now. This 
means that she must comply with the One-Child Policy as I do. However, we 
do have a second child now. We had to pay 3000 yuan to register the first one 
                                                
1 The hukou’s policies and practices started to change from the late 1990s for investors: in 1998, they 
were allowed to acquire the hukou of the city they invested in. The implementation if this policy in 
small cities such as Hekou extended this right to those who, among other conditions, purchased 
housing (Nyíri 2010). 
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on my hukou. In 1999, my wife was still officially Vietnamese and we were 
not married, so our first child was considered born out of wedlock. According 
to what we have been told, we would have to pay 78,000 yuan now to register 
the second. This time, the fine is for being born out-of-plan.1 
A Min (cf. Chapter 2) also provides the tip he employed to thread his way 
through the family planning policies (the ‘fake adoption tip’ widely used among 
ordinary Chinese couples):  
— My wife and I have lived in Hekou for four years. She had just arrived in 
China four years ago when I moved here from Hunan. I am 30 years old and 
she is 22. We have a six months baby-boy [born in March 2008]. We are not 
registered. Before, I was working on the casino boat2 and I’ve been arrested 
and fined. For this reason I can’t have a passport. I’ve registered my son on 
my younger brother’s hukou. He has a rural hukou that allows him to have two 
children. He already has a daughter. My son is officially his second child. 
These are only two examples of how families manage to get around the legal 
requirements in terms of family planning, registration of marriage and birth. Many 
informants mentioned how difficult it has become without enough money to buy a 
property. It seems that a few years ago, it was possible to virtually buy a hukou from 
                                                
1 According to the – regularly amended – One-Child Policy, couples must apply for a permit if they 
want to have a second child (assuming that they are eligible for it). In addition, they have to wait five 
years between the two births. If they do not comply with all the requests, their newborn is considered 
‘out-of-plan’ (Skalla 2005). 
2 For a few years, an illegal but tolerated casino operated on a boat tied on the Chinese bank of the Red 
River. 
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whichever place one intended to establish residency status.1 Apparently, the law has 
changed on this particular point and it is not possible anymore. Nowadays, the 
practice for most people who wish to move their hukou from their native location to 
their new living place (in the context of permanent migration) is to buy a property that 
allows one to obtain a new hukou. This eases much of the formalities linked to family, 
and allows border people, for instance, to arrange marriage registration easily when 
they do not have the financial means to travel all over China to get a stamp or an 
appointment with an official. 
In Hekou, many men who live with a Vietnamese partner are recent migrants 
who do not necessarily intend to spend a life time in Hekou and do not wish to move 
their hukou there while they may have a more convenient access to other sorts of 
formalities in their hometown and thus prefer not to lose this benefit for the sake of 
registering a marriage. Therefore, many couples remain unregistered. However, as A 
Min and Zhang’s cases attest, dealing with these policies is unavoidable for all when a 
child is born. The decisions made at this stage of a relationship say a lot about gender 
imbalance as well as about the prospects each couple imagines for their future. In 
many cases, when the child is a girl, couples tend to register her in Vietnam, while 
boys are more likely to be registered in China. Men tend to be more committed to 
securing their child’s status when they have boys. A registration in China means that a 
father can have greater control over the choice related to his child: school, health, etc. 
If a child is registered in Vietnam, the responsibility for the child falls on his mother, 
while the father is excluded from any official role. This complex position in which 
mixed couples are put when facing their responsibilities as parents also reveals the 
                                                
1 I was not able to obtain consistent, reliable information on this policy and more precisely on its 
implementation in migration locations such as border towns. 
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level of trust and the importance of family pressure on the couple to secure a child’s 
future, whether in China or in Vietnam. As Jiang, one Chinese informant officially 
married to his Vietnamese wife, puts it, “registering a marriage is also a responsibility 
towards spouses’ parents, the expression of filial piety: it makes both family relieved 
from worries, it’s respecting them.” 
However, as in the 1970s when dating was not allowed in Chinese schools and 
universities, authorities have a very delicate role to play – apart from repression – 
when dealing with these relationships after the fact: 
Therefore there would be a tension between the administrators’ human sympathy 
toward any possible separation and the room available for them to accommodate 
these ‘special’ requests (Zhang 2005: 8). 
To avoid this, in the case of dating at school, authorities would rather reinforce 
their power and prevent such dating from happening. But in village life and cross-
border marriages, authorities do not play the prevention card, but rather adopt a 
compassionate and compromising attitude towards mixed couples. In Wanwei, the 
Jing village near Dongxing, local officers register the presence of Vietnamese wives, 
but they still do not provide them with a permanent residence card or even counselling 
on international marriage procedures. 
Behind some administrators’ rigidity in stopping any dating as a disruption to the 
moral, ideological and structural order was, surprisingly, a concern about being put in 
a position where they would have to bangda yuanyang [beat apart ‘the couple of 
mandarin ducks,’ a metaphor for an affectionate couple], an immoral thing to do 
according to many local folk tradition (Zhang 2005: 9). 
Like de facto student couples, the existence of Sino-Vietnamese couples is a 
reality that put local authorities in an awkward moral position, particularly when the 
latest are represented by local empathic officers who comprehend why such 
phenomenon exists. Therefore in villages such as Wanwei, authorities vacillate 
between two possible behaviours: denouncing the illegality of Vietnamese women 
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and ruining local families’ life and hope, or tolerating them, regardless of central 
regulations, and adopting a flexible attitude to allow mixed couples and families to 
remain united, under various conditions negotiated between parties: payment of 
bribes, keeping a low profile in the community, close surveillance. But, as I 
mentioned earlier, local administrators know perfectly well the concerns of their 
fellows, who are sometimes relatives, schoolmates, friends or acquaintances, and such 
dilemmas occur within a complex web of social networks, where one who is 
representing law and authorities must choose between going against central 
regulations or against his own network of social connections. It is an awkward 
position to negotiate, which leads to all sorts of compromises and an uneven status 
quo. 
In sum, to avoid inviting the Chinese state into their private life, some couples 
explore various ways of manipulating the interstices of law and regulations to obtain 
or maintain a status: fake ID, fake marriage certificate, foreign hukou registration, 
adoption, and so on. But on the Vietnamese side, things seem more difficult to 
arrange. Finally, for those Vietnamese women who do not have the possibility of 
regularly returning to Vietnam and updating their administrative status, their 
marginalisation increases. Not only can they not obtain a marriage certificate hence a 
regular residence card in China, but they also lose their rights in Vietnam. 
For those who left their community without registration of temporary absence, their 
names were erased from the permanent registration book. When they return home, 
these women experienced difficulties in the registration process to re-obtain their 
rights as citizens (Quy 2000: 14). 
 
This position jeopardises their mere existence as (any) citizen and thus 
deprives them from citizenship rights anywhere, leaving them in a state of profound 
vulnerability, and enhancing their survival skills. But for them, finding a social 
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existence in a space of legal nonexistence is certainly one of their most difficult 
challenges, as the next informant’s story will describe. 
 Ostracism prevailing over the endeavour to integrate  
A storm of fury burst upon her head: 
“But you’re one of those vagabonds past all shame! 
This wench is no good, decent woman, no! 
She must have fled her man! A hen that prowls the fields! 
You hemmed and hawed and could not clear yourself. 
I’ve bought you soul and body — you’re my slave, 
and yet such airs and graces you display! 
Where are you lasses who enforce my law? 
Teach her a lesson — deal her thirty strokes!”  
(Du, 1983: 90-91) 
 
 
Thoa is a charming young lady from Hanoi to whom my well-connected 
Hekou’s friend Qiuxia introduced me one summer night (cf. Appendix 5). Her fiancé 
Li Fan, with whom she works, is a Chinese man who sells Tibetan medicine. Thoa, 
Qiuxia and I met at the usual refreshment stall on the riverside where Qiuxia loves to 
go after dinner to meet up with her local acquaintances and where she likes to show 
up with interesting and influential people. After a few polite exchanges, it appeared to 
me that Thoa put considerable efforts in the way she talked, behaved with Qiuxia, 
reacted to me, and in the extremely enthusiastic and flattering portrait Qiuxia made of 
her. She was acting more Chinese than Chinese themselves in her politeness, elegant 
manner and modest attitude. This very first evening, Thoa suggested I accompany her 
the next morning to one of Lào Cai’s temples for some praying. I could not decline 
this opportunity to learn about a young Vietnamese woman’s belief and since she 
obviously trusted me enough to disclose her personality to such extent, I immediately 
accepted. Early the next day, Thoa and I crossed the border and jumped on a xe-om 
[Vietnamese moto-taxi] on the other side of the bridge to reach a small temple a little 
outside of Lào Cai city. Her cousin whom she first introduced as her didi [younger 
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brother in Chinese] joined us bringing along some offerings for the ceremony’s 
master. While I quietly sat in a corner of the room, I observed this man carrying on a 
somehow obscure private ceremony in front of Thoa and her cousin, involving what 
looked like a magic trick and the impressive insertion of a huge needle through the 
master’s cheeks without signs of bleeding. At the end of the ceremony, Thoa gave me 
a few 500 đong bills to keep for good luck or to give away if it could help people. 
This was an entry point to a subsequent conversation about remittances, debt and 
gratitude to those to whom she felt beholden: her cousin, friends who helped, and the 
spirits. “I asked for this ritual to thank the spirits and to bring me good luck,” Thoa 
confessed. For reasons she did not explain, she mentioned paying her cousin’s tuition 
fees in Vietnam and giving free Chinese language lessons to the children of ‘people 
who were nice to me,’ raising the issue of indebtedness so embedded in Vietnamese 
social relations (Lainez 2012, Barslund & Tarp 2008).   
Intrigued by her performative behaviour at these various occasions, including 
a dinner with her husband and his business colleagues, I asked Thoa, after numerous 
unfruitful attempts, to tell me more about her relationship to her husband and his 
circle of friends and colleagues. As a statement to introduce what was going to follow, 
Thoa started her narrative by a saying which I am not sure if it was Chinese, 
Vietnamese or if it emerged from her own imagination: “A child sees love and 
marriage between adults as a beautiful drawing. An adult has to draw it himself.” 
Thoa puts aside her relationship to her husband to emphasise her busy life and to 
show her ability to be independent, organized and determined. Her daily routine starts 
with an hour of Yoga training and an hour of dance,1 followed by a day of work at Li 
                                                
1 The next day, Thoa took me to the place she teaches Yoga and where she takes lessons of Latin 
dance. I did not expect to find such a setting in Hekou and this was an illustration of the degree of 
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Fan’s medicine business, before her class in Chinese language in Lào Cai: “Two more 
years and I’ll graduate!” We went on walking in the quiet streets of Hekou when I 
told her how impressive her schedule sounds like. After a pause, tears appeared in 
Thoa’s eyes and she managed to say: “You don’t know what I went through…” 
Sensing that our conversation was reaching a sensitive point, I tried to orientate it 
towards more positive aspects. Thoa articulated a personal position that I had 
observed on numerous occasions among Vietnamese women, whether I could actually 
see its implementation during social interaction or I could deduce it from the 
descriptions of their relationships with the Chinese communities in which they lived. 
Thoa forces the respect she deserves by adopting a firm position when confronting 
gossip and stories that the disclosure of her identity triggers in social conversation. 
But, perhaps assuming that she needed to justify her position, or to prove her sincerity 
to an outsider like me, Thoa continued her narrative by providing me with the short 
life-story of a duplicitous Vietnamese female that was meant to illustrate that this was 
what she was not, and to put an end to allegations about her honesty. She did it the 
same way she had done earlier during the dinner. The natural way she included these 
accounts in her conversation appeared, to me, as a form of unconscious need for 
comparisons or a discourse technique she uses during any conversation related to her 
position as a ‘Vietnamese women in Chinese society.’ 
Thoa sometimes manages to conceal her Vietnamese identity (as does Li in 
Dongxing) and she experiences what it feels to be integrated in a group that maintains 
such ambivalent attitudes towards the Vietnamese community. But she also 
experiences from the inside how these representations are spread and shared with 
                                                                                                                                       
integration some Vietnamese women can reach through their involvement with community life and 
social activities. 
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newcomers, and whose social interactions they influence. Thoa may not be a 
stereotypical marginalized individual if one simply socialises with her. She is healthy, 
young, beautiful, educated and smart. But in Vietnamese society, at this point, she is 
challenging the norms. She is too educated, she comes from a broken family, she is 
too old and unmarried, and she has other expectations than being what her gender has 
prepared her to be: a housewife and a mother. And even when she said she dreamt of 
being one – she suggested “with Li Fan” (her husband) – this translates a yearning for 
‘peaceful normality’ rather than a lack of personal ambition, of personality, or an 
obedient response to her feminine fate, as she was taught since her childhood 
(Rydstrøm 2004). However, Thoa’s feelings demonstrate how, despite appearance, 
integration of Vietnamese women into Chinese society through marriage remains 
limited, as long as local negative representations circulate. Several other informants’ 
narratives similarly articulate a sense of disillusionment behind a face of satisfaction, 
but they also share a common reality: they know that the range of alternative options 
is narrow, and remain convinced that at least they escaped or avoided a worse 
scenario in Vietnam. Women’s choices to live, study, and work in China with a 
divorced Chinese man need to accommodate an impossible return, and an uncertain 
and limited possibility to integrate within their host society. 
 Anecdotal exploitation of nonexistence at the intimate level: the rented 
womb 
And yet, the difficult position in which some Vietnamese women remain in 
these Sino-Vietnamese borderlands attracts abuse from some local individuals, abuses 
that go much farther than forced marriage or prostitution in regard to commodification 
of their bodies. Li told me this story once when I asked her to elaborate on rumours 
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that she mentioned once about surrogate mothers.1 After I insisted, she eventually 
shared the story of a women she had worked with in the past, when she was a 
kindergarten teacher in Móng Cái. 
— Nhan worked as the kindergarten cook, that’s how I know her and can 
assure you that such things do happen around here. Nhan was in her early 
forties then and the mother of four children in Vietnam: three daughters and 
one son. This is what she told me. Her Vietnamese husband was a drug addict. 
With him, they once made a lot of money selling drugs but the police 
eventually caught him. So Nhan became a single mother when her youngest 
child was less than a year old. The people they were dealing with for drugs 
took everything from them, the house, the money, and the drugs. So she tried 
to come to Móng Cái to find someone who had money to take care of her and 
her children, and she ended in prostitution, until she met a Chinese family who 
offered her some money to give birth to their child. She had already broken 
social rules, so she accepted. Meanwhile, her eldest child took care of the 
younger in Vietnam. Nhan was locked in the family’s house in a room upstairs 
during her pregnancy.2 The wife was faking her own pregnancy until the birth. 
Then, they took the baby to the hospital where they obtained a birth certificate. 
They took care of her and they gave her the money as agreed. But she was 
                                                
1 This topic recently reached the headlines in Vietnam with the case of several women found in 
Thailand (http://tuoitrenews.vn/cmlink/tuoitrenews/society/vn-surrogate-moms-paid-5-500-for-each-
baby-1.22750). 
2 Li explained later that the baby was conceived through sexual intercourse between A X and the 
Chinese husband of the couple. Thus, she was the biological mother and no medical procedure had 
been involved. 
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ambitious, and she wanted the husband and the child! Eventually she got 
nothing, no husband, no child, and no money. She went back to prostitution. 
When I met her she was back in Vietnam working in the kindergarten. She 
could speak baihua (Guangxi’s dialect) like me, and she had learned it from 
the days she was doing drug smuggling with her husband. 
A De and Xiao Fang, both my informants in Móng Cái, later confirmed to me 
that surrogacy cases occur in and around Móng Cái. However, A De stressed that 
even though surrogacy is still legally banned, it was a widespread phenomenon in 
internal China as well (involving Chinese people only). According to him, Móng Cái 
simply provides prospective family with potentially more available women in need of 
financial support, hence more likely to comply with cheap arrangements and poor 
pregnancy conditions than elsewhere. Xiao Fang mentioned the case of a woman who 
was paid 50,000 yuan to give birth to a couple’s child: she did it and simply left after 
the delivery. Another one had an affair with a soldier and fell pregnant. She gave birth 
to a daughter. A go-between proposed this baby for adoption to Xiao Fang and her 
husband since they had trouble having a child. They were both considering the offer 
seriously when I last met her. It is difficult to define whether such scenarios might be 
labelled as adoption, child trafficking, surrogacy or simply personal arrangements, but 
since each case also generates contradictory interpretations from the informants, I will 
simply leave it here and call for more research on the topic (Pashigian 2009; Lainez 
2011a, 2011b). My purpose here was to point out a specific form of abuse of the 
situation of marginality in which some women in Vietnam find themselves trapped. 
The case that Li recalls not only illustrates the extent of the commoditization of some 
women who make themselves available to ‘womb purchasers’, it also offers insight 
into what also motivates those candidates beyond the financial benefit they may gain. 
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Even though I am interpreting a second-hand story that certainly lacks all details and 
subtleties, Nhan obviously made it clear to her confident that she was offering her 
womb in exchange for a relationship. Money was not enough. She was sacrificing 
herself for the sake of her own emotional needs and the security of her children’s 
future. This may have represented the ultimate step she could make, at her age, to 
attempt to get out of the difficult social and personal circumstances in which she 
found herself.  
The contemporary manifestation of second wives is further complicated by the matter 
of surrogacy. Relationships that might constitute surrogacy in contemporary Vietnam 
are surrounded by ambiguity. Possible surrogate relationships include a surrogate 
who undergoes IVF to produce a child for a recipient couple (now illegal); a woman 
who is impregnated by a man under an arrangement in which he hopes to claim the 
resulting child for himself and his wife; adultery associated with producing an heir; 
and polygamy, also known as the phenomenon of taking second wives [vợ hai] 
(Pashigian 2009: 51) 
Then how far are the above cases from that of a Chinese men who is buying a 
wife who can bear and raise his child, or the case of a Vietnamese woman who is 
asking a Chinese man for a child (whether she discloses her purpose or not) and then 
flees with the baby? How does the economy confront the emotional and security need 
of these men and women who may see a child as a way to create a family, a structure 
– even unstable – on which they can rely? What role do moral values play here?  
[T]he occurrence of extortion cases points to the challenges brought about by 
increased social interaction among strangers in public spaces … Moral values and 
behavioural patterns seem to lag behind the fast-changing economy and social 
structure. Dealing with strangers poses an urgent challenge for every Chinese 
individual, regardless of his or her moral orientation. For those who are still deeply 
embedded in particularistic and contextual morality, the immediate challenges 
include the cultivation of social trust beyond one’s personal networks and the 
acceptance of some universal moral values that apply to both related and unrelated 
people … The market-driven modernization project not only brings in a new kind of 
universal ethics but the ideology of individualism that posts new threats to many 
forms of sociality and collective morality. The pursuit of self-interest and individual 
gratification in certain circumstances can lead to extreme egocentric and antisocial 
behaviour (Yan 2009: 21). 
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This leads us back to the question of daode [social morality] (cf. Chapter 1), 
and what constitutes norms in that matter, a discussion with which Yan, drawing on 
other scholars’ approach and his own findings, has recently engaged by investigating 
changing human behaviours in the ‘increasingly risky society’ (2009: 21) China has 
become (Jeffreys 2006; Zheng 2009; Farrer 2002). For the last two decades, the 
socialist morality still praised and promoted in Chinese ideological discourse as a 
condition to social stability (Sigley 2006) is being constantly challenged by various 
social phenomena and personal actions beyond the government’s control. Nowadays, 
some Chinese assess that their society is coping with what they call a ‘morality crisis’: 
it emerges in everyday discourse at each level of experience as an expression of 
worry, an explanation to many deviant behaviours, and it is constantly exacerbated in 
mass media’s reports. Many Chinese articulate their confusion in a nostalgic discourse 
referring to their past social life. For those over fifty years old who experienced the 
Mao era, “the nostalgic experience achieves a moral critique of the dilemmas of 
Chinese modernity [which] are directly manifest in the conflict between increasing 
material wealth and the weakening of concern for morality… the past becomes a 
source of moral challenge against the changing cultural terrain of contemporary 
Chinese life” (Yang 2003: 287). The younger who were raised and even born after 
Maoism – most of my informants – emphasise the contrast between Chinese current 
society and the 1980s – i.e. the period extending from the launch of the economic 
reforms (1979) and Deng Xiaoping’s speech (Shenzhen, 1992) that boosted them. 
Most accounts reflect how various forms of solidarity amongst people compensated 
the hardship on the economic level and the ramping corruption already palpable at the 
government level that all were facing at the time. But while they complain about the 
recent changes, these Chinese also recognize how difficult it has become to totally 
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avoid personal participation in the alterations of moral values of their transforming 
society: people pay bribes, exploit each other, and comply with various malfunctions 
of their environment because they reached the point where they believe having no 
other choice to satisfy their needs, to assert their rights, or to achieve their personal 
project. These inner conflicts reflects how confused Chinese people are when making 
decisions today compared to an era “offered simple answers to complex questions: 
direct collective action over painful individual decisions, reliance on the state rather 
than a grinding struggle for the self, national pride as opposed to self-doubt” (Barmé 
1999: 321). 
Ci Jiwei calls such morality crisis a “crisis of the moral self, a crisis of moral 
willingness or moral agency” (Ci 2009: 24). According to Ci, it results from a 
breakdown of reciprocation among people, and the absence of what he calls the 
‘identification condition’ since “[i]t is through identification with moral authority and 
moral exemplars that ordinary agents, in a moral culture like China’s, acquire an 
understanding of norms and the motivation to act in accordance with them” (Ci 2009: 
23-34). Articulating this collective perception among Chinese intellectuals of a moral 
crisis – or a moral predicament (Liu 2004) – in Chinese society, which my research 
findings inform, Ci Jiwei summarises: 
[B]y moral crisis I refer to a state of affairs in which large numbers of people fail to 
comply with more or less acceptable rules of social co-existence and cooperation 
rather than a state of affairs in which large numbers of people pursue legally and 
morally permissible but arguably less than admirable conceptions of the good. Given 
this notion of a moral crisis, it is not surprising that the moral crisis in post-Mao 
China is at the same time a crisis of social order (Ci 2009: 20). 
It is in this particular context, whether it is called ‘immoral’ or ‘chaotic’ in 
public discourse, that the exploitation of an unknown woman’s body for the mere 
purpose of reproduction appears, in the realm of intimacy and conjugality, as one of 
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the latest outcomes of the destabilizing of social morality, rapidly overwhelmed by 
financial power. 
 
Conclusion: Getting out or sinking in marginality? 
In this last chapter, I have discussed the way personal projects generate the 
impulse to cross a social and physical border, and challenge a predetermined social 
position. I also endeavoured to sketch out how the idea of social identity lies beyond 
the articulation of a wide range of intimate yearning and resistance in the form of 
actions. What is at play in the dynamics of these cross-border alliances is the 
normativity that every individual has a right to seek for his or her own wellbeing, 
regardless of his or her past trajectory. Despite the representations of each other that 
limit the possibility of existing openly in the community and in the state’s eyes, the 
core question is not located in national identity and what it conveys. Marrying across 
a border is not about conveying or adopting Chinese or Vietnamese identity, it is not 
about embodying the archetype of an imagined and idealized conjugal figure, but it 
may be simply about a yearning to be part of a couple, part of a normative structure, a 
conventional pattern of family in societies which are strongly structured by the entity 
of marriage, a life milestone. But not entirely achieving the passage between 
singlehood and marriage, these people remain marginalized and hence ‘nonexistent,’ a 
barely sustainable position. Therefore, for these Chinese men and Vietnamese 
women, it is the social identity that marriage provides, specifically that of ‘spouse,’ 
that allows them to interact with the rest of the society and hopefully gain access to 
social recognition, i.e., to exist as a member of society rather than an outcast. And this 
depends on the form each couple actually takes, or shows, or performs. 
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By creating a ‘site’ governed by different rules, the state of marginality, 
especially embedded in a physical space of liminality, allows the transgression of 
rules, an absence of limits on people’s actions, and life flexibility. But this position is 
at odds with the sought-after normality. From this perspective, we can either deem 
cross-border marriages as a possible way to overcome a socially disadvantaged 
position, or on the contrary an uneven and exposed pathway to further sink into a 
nonexistent position on the fringes of society. And for migrating Vietnamese women, 
this can signify switching from being an outcast in Vietnam to becoming a subaltern 
in China. 
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Conclusion 
We must not only consider dominant ideologies but also consistently 
implicate interactions between people so as to better understand how actual 
experiences reshape knowledge (Lyttleton 1994: 276).  
My initial interest in Sino-Vietnamese cross-border marriages emerged from 
various – although mostly non-academic – readings on the topic of human trafficking 
in the Great Mekong Sub-Region. I noticed how most reports tended to classify 
people and activities in fixed categories, which did not seem to reflect locals’ 
viewpoint on the matter. Smuggled people easily became ‘human trafficking victims,’ 
targeted groups were ‘women and children,’ social network resemble ‘criminal 
organization’ and activities could only read as ‘prostitution, forced labour and coerced 
marriages,’ When cross-border marriages were the core topic, the focus was on  
‘naïve and poor women’ and unscrupulous ‘disadvantaged bachelors.’ These 
categories also used endlessly in other social and cultural contexts, merged into the 
same pigeonhole, a variety of situations, and interpreted them through a rather narrow 
lens. This piqued my curiosity because such perspective would force me to make a 
choice and decide whether these marriages were the result of human trafficking or 
were the outcomes of encounters shaped by economic and demographical 
determinism. But such a picture draws upon the use of established categories on a 
number of individuals who appear anonymous through the statistics, regardless of 
their personal background, cultural roots or socio-economical position. Hence 
Chinese and Vietnamese men, women and children are labelled as vulnerable, venal, 
poor, handicapped, naïve, un-educated, single, and so on. In the eyes of many 
anthropologists, these categories blur the picture more than they illuminate it 
(Molland 2011; Peters 2003). 
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Out of curiosity and frustration with the existing literature, I aimed to further 
explore the topic and conduct research on mixed couples in border towns. This led me 
to question the relevance of the discourses of human trafficking and economic 
determinism to describe the specificities of patterns in human interaction at the Sino-
Vietnamese border. While trying to understand whether or not such frameworks were 
valid at the local level, I identified another discourse that describes the cross-border 
marriages. While both discourses try to capture genuine relationships as well as more 
obscure and complex forms of pragmatic interactions, the empirical experiences were 
missing from depictions. During my fieldwork and in analysing the data, my purpose 
was to articulate the reality underneath different layers of external discourses by 
confronting them with individuals’ narratives. 
Following Bu Wei’s call for an ‘insider’s perspective’ (2006) to relativise our 
perception of alliance patterns, I rendered men’s and women’s voices in a way that 
allows us to re-articulate the link between migration and marriage, or yearnings and 
pragmatism. Above all, I described the personalities, the trajectories and the prospects 
of the anonymous embedded in statistics. By focusing on life-story narratives and 
social discourse, I reflected upon borderlanders’ explanations of the how and the why 
of cross-border marriages, eclectic and sometimes contradictory though their 
viewpoints may sometimes appear. 
The main challenges and the main outcomes of this research was highlighting 
the common ground of very diverse profiles of couples, of individuals, and of 
communities, in order to propose a broader perspective on the phenomenon of cross-
border marriages, while still preserving a perspective on individual experiences and 
agency. In that regard, a focus on narratives revealed both ostracism and frustrated 
expectations in conjugality, offered an interesting insight of couples often deemed as 
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the result of contextual or personal drama. Based on the combination/merging of 
various perspectives, I will now briefly summarize the research findings. 
 
Research findings 
In engaging in this research I also expected to deepen my perspective on 
cross-border marriages but also to consider what these stories ultimately say about the 
current conditions of Chinese kinship, family values, and social disparities, as well as 
the relationship between two populations linked by an ambivalent history made of 
conflicts, political brotherhood, cultural sharing and economical dependency, 
constantly challenged/undermined by trust issues. 
The first major question I elaborated is how borderlands, the site of 
geographical margins by definition, also act as the site of various informal practices. 
This includes marginal practices of individuals on the fringes, whether their position 
is the result of predetermined conditions or post-exposure to an Other. Physical and 
metaphorical layers intertwined to render a complex picture of cross-border marriages 
as a component of border towns’ social landscape. In this context, I argue that the act 
of migrating, particularly migrating to these surroundings allows individuals – 
Vietnamese women and Chinese men – to leave the plight of the ‘discredited’ (i.e. 
already stigmatized), for that of the ‘discreditable’ (i.e., vulnerable but not necessarily 
subjected to discriminating stereotypes) and maybe one day the ‘un-discreditable’ 
(Goffman 1986). 
My argument is articulated through four main chapters that each underlines 
one specific aspect of cross-border marriages in a Sino-Vietnamese setting. Chapter 1 
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elaborated on the conditions of a research project on a sensitive matter orientated my 
initial interest towards unexplored aspects of it, i.e., the reflections and controversies 
they generate in borderland communities. Chapter 2 described the particulars of a 
setting in which practices shaped social interactions and constitute an inspiring 
ground for those in search for alternative way to live, grow, increase position and 
wealth, or to drop social principles and act impulsively. But in this environment, 
cross-border marriages also embody the recurrent sensitivity of Chinese and 
Vietnamese relationship by translating the ambiguity of their historical experience 
through individual bodies and subjectivities. Chapter 3 focused on life stories and 
used them as a prolific material to propose different ways of identification of conjugal 
practices in borderlands. The various patterns of marriage illuminate transgressions in 
regard with conventional conjugality. Chapter 4 highlighted how the public’s social 
representations, encapsulated by a stereotyping popular discourse, interact with 
individuals’ intimate expectations on marriage, ideal partners and hosting society. 
Chapter 5 finally examines how the combination of a liminal position and the agency 
of men and women shape their quest for social recognition. It suggests how the main 
purpose of these specific cross-border marriages is about yearning to be part of a 
normative structure and gain the social recognition entailed in the status of marriage, 
and despite persistent administrative obstacles. In a border setting shaped by trade 
exchanges, characterized by the permeability of physical frontiers, the intensity of 
migration flux, and absorption of new sets of values, the search for unchanging 
conjugal ideals – the archetypal traditional wife and the responsible protective 
husband – remains a great factor shaping the encounter between unsatisfied people. In 
this context, I demonstrated how Chinese and Vietnamese people use unconventional 
patterns of alliances to cope with new socio-economic conditions that weakens their 
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communities – social balance, organization and functioning – as well as their personal 
lives, and how mixed marriage can then be interpreted as a means of emancipation 
(for women) and as an exit from a marginalized social position (for both women and 
men). 
 
Discussion and broader perspectives 
In sum, this research abandoned the conventional explanation for a social 
phenomenon, and it unveiled another interpretation of it by deconstructing its 
image/representation. Restoring a tangible reality to the obscuring portrait of cross-
border intimacy entailed in academic discourses on human trafficking was made 
possible by analysing and juxtaposing community perspectives and individual 
experiences. Furthermore, this research’s findings inform current scholarly 
discussions on various aspects of the recent socio-economic upheavals in East Asia, 
particularly in China and Vietnam, for the last three decades. It reveals how such new 
living conditions particularly affects the margins of society, and how those people 
finding it difficult to adjust to a challenging, pressuring and often excluding 
environment, may find refuge in alternative forms of socialisation. These issues are 
refracted in changing practices in the realm of conjugality, on which cross-border 
alliances located in borderlands sketch a significant picture. Cross-border marriages 
inform us on social changes in general and on their consequences concealed in 
individuals’ yearnings and communities’ behaviours.  
I first stress the major outcomes of socio-economic transformations in both 
China and Vietnam, i.e., massive rural-urban migration. Social mobility encourages 
spatial redistribution of population that disrupts local social hierarchies and lead to 
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un-anticipated outcomes in communities: fierce competition for the new market 
economy benefits, gender empowerment in rural areas, regional economic disparities, 
and a demographic ‘marriage squeeze.’ By training the spotlight on a remote section 
of the Chinese and Vietnamese map, I bring the discussion back to the local level and 
the specificities of regional context. Examining the impact of migration in Hanoi or 
Shanghai does not resonate the same way as it does in a border town, the exact 
symbol of what migration is accomplishing. Chinese megalopolis would not undergo 
their current development without the workforce of rural migrants. But smaller towns 
like Hekou in China or Móng Cái in Vietnam (respectively the two most developed 
cities among my four field sites) would not emerge as crucial communication, trade 
and human exchanges nodes in the region if not for migration. A large portion of the 
new population in these border towns come from slightly more advantaged rural areas 
or from cities that do not provide them with enough opportunities to enhance their 
socio-economic position. All these migrants are actively engaged in participating in 
the economic development zone, generally for their own benefit. But, as one 
informant put it, they would not go if not for some specific advantages. Among them, 
the repositioning on social hierarchies emerges as a main benefit driving migration. 
Lao Zhou (cf. Chapter 4) once stressed:  
— These nongmin [rurals] are nothing at home; they have no culture, no skills, 
and they find no satisfaction. Here, they believe they have power, just because 
they have money and dominate Vietnamese people; but they just found people 
who are lower than themselves. Look at their behaviour, here they forget who 
they are, they forget that they are nothing more in their homeland. 
Interactions with an Other participate in enhancing ordinary people status and 
establishing their economic power. This takes place in an environment dedicated to 
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border trade that shaped relationships between neighbours, in a country where an 
individuals’ social position is measured by the extent of one’s influence and control 
over people. Many portraits of cross-border couples here indicate that when the 
private realm of conjugality is associated with such modes of exchange, men put their 
position at risk. They may benefit greatly from an association with a foreign and 
exploitable Other, but they may as well lose the precious capital of social face, 
creating a constant dilemma at the individual level as well as the community level: 
i.e., a community who maintains a set of representations meant to warn individuals of 
the danger of crossing a specific frontier: that of the intimate. 
In this work, I also highlight the difficulties that particular categories of people 
find in adjusting to the conditions brought about by tremendous social upheavals 
through the last three decades, which leave them on the fringes of society and create 
pools of outcasts. Hence this research follows on from the burgeoning scholarship on 
marginality in China (Cheung et al. 2009; Wu & Webster 2010, Zhang et al. 2007). 
On either side of the Sino-Vietnamese border, the example of rural bachelors, social 
losers, men choosing alternative forms of conjugality, as well as stigmatized women 
such as divorcées, highly educated, or single spinsters, i.e., the outcasts of the 
marriage pool, raise the questions of the treatment of social minorities in China. There 
is a great deal of scholarship on social minorities in East Asian countries, although 
most of this literature tends to concentrate on ethnic minorities, on class minorities, 
such as exploited migrant workers, impoverished peasantry, laid-off workers, and 
even cultural minorities such as artists. When gender issues are evoked, the debate 
centres on the inequality of treatment toward women in the course of socio-economic 
changes, leaving men’s condition out of the picture. But those groups who are more 
difficult to identity since they spread through many categories of a whole population, 
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meaning that for the most part, those invisible on the fringes of society have yet to be 
discussed in academic literature. This research on marginal and marginalized 
practices in conjugality located at the border only represents one example of what 
studies of the fringes could offer. China and Vietnam are (too) rapidly transforming in 
unprecedented ways and impose their power on the regional and the global sphere. 
Our understanding of their societies cannot afford to leave on a side those people 
whose actions make a difference by challenging such an emerging force. The 
viewpoint that sees a threat in the anticipated millions of Chinese bachelors in the 
Asian region (Ross 2010) might be a fairly radical position, but it nevertheless points 
out the necessity of taking into account those social groups who, for various reasons, 
do not fully participate in the mainstream impetus for modernity and enjoy the social 
and political rights of some of their peers. 
Finally, the findings illustrate significant changes to the principles that govern 
social interaction, revealing how the post-reform era’s socio-economical upheavals 
have damaged the solidarity that re-emerged in China after the devastating Cultural 
Revolution (1966-1976), and that used to bond Chinese population throughout the 
1980s. Many of the Chinese who, as adult, observed social change since the 
implementation of the economic reforms (1979-) and maintain a critical viewpoint on 
these, may look back with nostalgia on this epoch. They believe that values such as 
morality, honesty, trust, generosity, hospitality or filial piety, being significant of the 
post-Maoist period, are in danger now that another set of values driven by pragmatism 
and materialism dominates family and social life (Yan 2009). “Daochu dou luan 
[chaos is everywhere,]” often commented street observer Lao Zhou. I have detailed in 
this research the transgression of many social principles and norms through the 
practices of cross-border marriages. It illustrates a major issue that many emerging 
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countries encounter during their socio-economic transition, i.e., sustaining amongst 
their population the respect of fundamental principles of morality, and ethics as a 
fundamental principle to govern society. The lack of social and political concern 
toward the plight of Vietnamese women in borderlands not only reflects public 
attitude toward the Other, the foreigner, but an absence of empathy, individualistic 
behaviour, and the value of pragmatism over solidarity in general. It is believed, as 
Yan demonstrated in his account on good Samaritans (2009), acting out of empathy 
now brings trouble. In China, the powerful social reactions (both in terms of 
indifference and scandalized position) triggered by every social incident show the 
populace’s concern, deep consternation and inability to cope with sudden 
metamorphosis in people’s attitude toward each other. Here, the sole example of 
China’s transformation of social values inform on the dramatic outcomes of 
inefficiently monitored social changes of emerging developing countries. I believe 
that such upheavals in the realm of principles and social values deserve more attention 
than it has received so far. 
It is now time to put all my field notes back into their box, not without a hint 
of regret for not being able to offer a space to all those men and women who confided 
their stories and feelings in me. I put to rest dozens of moving moments and 
interesting details about daily-life, conjugal relationships, and fascinating life 
trajectories that remain in those pages. But I achieve the writing of this dissertation 
being confident that later, I will eventually do justice to any undisclosed data by 
exploring further relevant connections that emerged too late from literature on 
additional related topics. There were many ways to approach the realm of conjugality, 
and focusing on one specific angle inevitably leaves many questions unaddressed. The 
analysis of household life, children’s perspectives, communication, love, intimacy, 
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and remittances for instance, all of which are missing in the framework of this thesis, 
await further, promising explorations. The choice to examine questions of perceptions 
and status of these marriages deemed as meaningful ‘site’ instead of lively experience 
emerged from fieldwork serendipity, and I hope that this research, as it turned, has 
contributed to original approaches of social marginalisation.  
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Appendix – A few life story narratives 
 
Appendix 1. Nguyet: A life of turbulence 
— My name is Nguyet, I am 55 years old and I come from Haiphong. When 
the American war occurred, I was married and I went to fight as well as my husband. 
But a year after our marriage, he died in Cambodia and left me a widow and the 
mother of our son. Eight years later, my family managed to arrange a marriage for me 
with a man in the district of Cam Duong, in Lào Cai province. “Even poor, even ugly, 
he’s still a husband,” I was told.1 He was a Tay2 man. Life was hard then, we were 
very poor, and I suffered a lot. We had nothing to wear, and we had no blankets. 
Sometimes people would offer clothes. We did not have much to eat either. When I 
had my periods, I used old pieces of clothes. My husband was always drunk and very 
violent. One day, he even burnt our house in front of our children and me. He was 
abusing me a lot and when I refused to satisfy him, he used to beat and I was often 
injured, on the face or the nose. Once, he wanted to have sex just a few days after a 
child delivery. I got a disease that necessitated surgery. We were married fifteen 
years: I gave birth to three children – two boys and one girl – and I underwent twelve 
abortions in the local dispensary. All my children have had bronchitis, and one son 
even died from pneumonia. We remained very poor almost fifteen years, leaving an 
auto-subsistence life, until a gold mine was discovered in Lào Cai. Then we could 
work there and make some money. [She cries] I was wounded many times and one 
                                                
1 This details stands as an example of the vulnerability and the ostracism that hangs over women who 
fought for the National Liberation Front, became war widows and whose sacrifice their country has 
slowly forgotten (Taylor 1999). 
2 The Tay ethnic group is partly established in Lào Cai province. 
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time, my husband hit my head very badly. This time, his family encouraged me to 
escape from him to save my life and those of my children. Even his family had to 
endure his violence, everyone was afraid of him. They gave me some money, I took 
my older son with me [the one Nguyet had from her first marriage], left the son I had 
with him and I left. I was one month pregnant of our daughter. I had decided to keep 
the baby because my uterus was already so damaged, I didn’t want to undergo another 
abortion. It was not an easy journey home. I had no money. I had to work all the way, 
stopping for a temporary job, like cutting sugar cane, then go on, then stop again. It 
took several months to return to Haiphong. I gave birth to my daughter after I arrived 
but I didn’t manage to start a new life in Haiphong.  
[When you were in Lào Cai, why did you wait fifteen years of torment before 
escaping your marriage?]  
— There were my children, and wo de ming bu hao [I have a bad destiny], so 
yao ren [I have to endure].  
[Why did you leave your son1 in the village when you left?] 
— I couldn’t take him with me when I left, I didn’t have enough money. And 
he was also his father’s son after all, I thought that when my husband would die, there 
would always be someone to shaoxiang [to burn incense] for him.2 Today, my 
husband is dead, our son is living well there – he’s married – and the local 
government offered him a compensation for our land that they took for the gold mine. 
                                                
1 The surviving son of this marriage with her Tay husband. 
2 This son, being the eldest of this couple, could carry on the ancestor worship of his father’s lineage. 
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Once in Haiphong, someone offered me a job in Hong Kong, so I took a boat, 
but I ended in a camp for illegal migrants there. I spent a year there until I was 
released after an interview and sent back to Haiphong with a small capital [7 millions 
đong/3500 yuan]. So I invested it in a fresh fruits’ business. My elder brother gave me 
a piece of his land and my other siblings gave me some money so I could build a 
house. My daughter once fainted when she was five years old. She was diagnosed 
with a brain disease. She was cured for free because we were a poor family. My 
children went to school quite late and were sponsored by a program to help poor 
families. I started to frequent Móng Cái and Dongxing to stock up with fresh Chinese 
fruits. I then settled in Móng Cái where I lived in a small boarding house with other 
people. I sold fruits during three years, until 1998. 
[At this point, Nguyet provided me with two different versions of her meeting 
with her Chinese husband. In her initial account, Nguyet explained that she had met 
her husband in Dongxing in the waiting room of a hospital in 1998. She was there to 
receive some treatments for gynaecologic troubles, consequences of her numerous 
abortions. He took care of her, brought her food during her hospitalization, and he 
even paid for her treatment. They got along well, so he proposed to take her to his 
home, with her children and live with him. In the second account, mentioning again 
the way she met her Chinese husband, Nguyet said it was in 1996, while she was 
having difficulties in Vietnam, a Vietnamese woman deceived her by offering some 
work in China. She followed her, accompanied by one of her child. Once the border 
crossed, she was sold to a Chinese man. At first, she refused the marriage, but then 
she got used to it. Hence, the exact circumstances of Nguyet’s initial encounter with 
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her Chinese husband remains uncertain, and it is unclear whether she agreed on the 
marriage or not.]1 
When I met my laogong, he was still single at 48 years old – I was 46. He’s 
from Guangdong province. He asked me why I was alone and he felt touched by my 
story, ta kelian wo [he pitied me]. He was nice with my children. They have lived 
with us until they were grown up, then they returned to Vietnam. My elder son is now 
married and has a child. My daughter is also married but her husband has just been 
murdered in Fangcheng.2 You know, my laogong also had a hard time. He was the 
illegitimate child of his family. When his mother got married she got already pregnant 
by a lover. So my laogong’s brothers and sisters all despise him. He bought several 
Vietnamese wives but he’s too honest and they all cheated him and left. But we didn’t 
meet that way. I stayed eight years in his hometown until I came back in Dongxing 
two months ago [2006]. He worked in construction sites where he dealt with cement. 
There, I took care of the field, reared pigs and poultry, and so on. But my stepmother 
didn’t like me: she often insulted and mistreated me. I was happy with my laogong 
                                                
1 This is assuming that the husband she mentioned the first time was the same as the one she mentioned 
later. 
2 While I was staying in Dongxing, I first heard from a friend that Nguyet’s son-in-law had just been 
assassinated in Fangcheng city where he was living. The rumor said he was murdered because he was 
not paying his tax. Nguyet’s daughter had just arrived in town to stay with her mother. When I met 
Nguyet the next time, she told me that her son-in-law was actually in prison where he was beaten to 
death by the inmates’ hei shehui [mafia]. In Chinese prison, inmates are submitted to various informal 
rules including all sorts of rackets by cell’s chief – laoda [chief]. Those who do not comply are often 
beaten, punished, and humiliated, sometimes until death (Human Rights Watch 2010). The drama that 
the family was experiencing prevented another meeting with Nguyet. Two years later, when I returned 
to Dongxing, she was no longer seen around town/the place, she had vanished. 
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but I couldn’t stand his family’s treatment anymore. So I decided to come here 
[Dongxing] and dagong [work]. My laogong stayed in Guangdong. His brother and 
his wife live in Dongxing as well but they want to get rid of me too. Here, I live with 
some family acquaintances. I would like to go back to Guangdong. We have a house 
there. When we call each other on the phone, we cry. He is nice with me: he takes 
care of my health and my wellbeing. He respects me, and never insults or beats me, 
you know? 
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Appendix 2. Yen: Forced to leave Vietnam, and forced to go back. 
— It was in 1999. I was 21 years old and I was working in a garment factory 
in Thái Bình since I left secondary school. I wanted to visit my sister who lived in Lào 
Cai because she gave birth to her second boy. I had to take a train and commute [to] 
Hanoi. I travelled with my younger aunt who was 29 years old. While we were 
waiting for our next train in Hanoi station, a man in his thirties asked us … what time 
the train for Lào Cai would leave. We answered and he offered some plums to thank 
us. It was nice of him. But the plums were drugged. I only remember that I could walk 
but I had no reaction. I simply followed him, like my aunt did too. We took a taxi 
from Hanoi to Lạng Sơn. I also remember a ferry to cross a river. I ‘woke up’ in 
China, about a hundred kilometres from the border. This man was living in Nanning; 
his father was Chinese and his mother Vietnamese. My aunt and I stayed two weeks at 
his place with his Vietnamese wife and two sons. They were professional brokers. 
The man threatened us, [and] said he would beat us if we yelled. His Vietnamese wife 
tried to entertain us, she even took us out for some walks. But she had no money 
because her husband was keeping it. She was his accomplice, and she didn’t try to 
help us. This was their business. Then a Vietnamese madam took us to Dongxing. 
There were seven or eight Vietnamese girls at her place, aged from fourteen to thirty. 
A Vietnamese man who pretended to work for a company had approached the 
fourteen year-old girl; but, he raped her in a hotel in Hanoi before taking her to 
Dongxing. The madam just tried to reassure us, and we were a group, so we felt less 
frightened. We knew we would be sold for marriage. We stayed there two more 
weeks. I contemplated suicide but I thought about my family and I didn’t do it. 
However, I threatened to commit suicide and I think I was convincing because when I 
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asked the madam to allow me to choose my husband myself, she accepted. Three men 
came to see me, and I refused all of them. Then I accepted the fourth one because he 
looked nicer.1 One night, six members of his family came to take me to their home by 
motorbike. We travelled a long distance by night so I could not remember the road. 
The first nights in his home, my husband did not abuse me. He talked to me. 
He understood I was afraid. Instead, he waited patiently until I agreed to spend the 
night beside him. He did not ask me to work either; he was nice and bought me some 
clothes. I developed feelings for him. After seven months, I was able to communicate 
in baihua. My husband was nice, I didn’t have to work, and he never yelled at me. I 
stayed two and a half years in the village. I got pregnant and had a boy. A month after 
his birth, I wrote a letter to my family. But the letter came back. Then, I wrote another 
one, with pictures, and we started to communicate, even by phone. I missed my 
family and I asked to go back to Vietnam to visit them. My husband’s family agreed 
and gave me some traditional medicine as a gift to my parents and I left, without my 
son. But once in Vietnam, my family persuaded me to stay, to not return to China. 
They said it was too risky, that I could not speak Chinese properly, and that I could be 
sold again. Actually I had come back to Vietnam with three other Vietnamese women 
and a trafficker, and this frightened my mother. My family hid my husband’s calls, 
they would not let me speak to him. They convinced me to stay a month in Vietnam 
and to think about my situation before making a decision. So, I went to Lào Cai to see 
my sister and [to] take my mind off things. I was sad; I missed my son so much, he 
was only two years old when I left him. My sister took me out, made me meet people, 
and I met my current husband. At first, I did not like him, but he was compassionate 
and nice with me. He let me look at my Chinese husband and son’s pictures when I 
                                                
1 Yen learned from her in-laws that she was sold 10,000 yuan. 
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felt depressed. Four months later, we had developed some feelings and we got 
married. That was fate. We now have a son. My husband reassured me a lot and 
today, I found peace with myself because for a long time I felt guilty to have 
abandoned my Chinese son. Several times, I tried to call him but I lacked courage at 
the last minute. Sometimes I missed my Chinese husband too. I felt so sorry to leave 
him alone with our little boy. I still feel sad but it is better to leave the past behind. 
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Appendix 3. Zhao: Married on the Other’s side 
— I was born in the Year of the Horse [in 1954] in Kunming where I lived 
until 1959. My father died in 1960 and my mother had to work as a housekeeper to 
feed my brother and I. I was raised the hard way. 
I am 55 years old now [2008]. I have spent nine years in Vietnam, from 1998 
to 2007, in Yên Bái and later in Phú Thọ provinces. My current wife is actually my 
second wife, because the first one died in a car accident in China in 1992. I’m a 
widower. My mother-in-law sold our house, and now I own nothing. In Hekou my 
wife and I rent the place where we live. Currently we save our money for the marriage 
formalities. We manage to save 1000 yuan a month, including 700 yuan from my taxi 
business.  
My son was born in 1988 and he was only four years old when his mother 
died. When I came to Hekou, I met a prostitute and I followed her to Vietnam with 
my son. But she was hitting him, so I left her. Then, someone introduced me to 
another woman there. But we often argued, especially with her father. She left for 
Hanoi and it ended our relationship. I saw her once again at the funeral of her father, 
years later. We didn’t talk to each other.  
In Vietnam my son could go to school so now he understands both languages. 
He used to say he was Vietnamese. My first Vietnamese wife [the prostitute] managed 
to register him at school and made it possible for him to have an education in 
Vietnam. 
Then in 2002, I met my current wife. She was taking care of the pigs at her 
elder brother’s house. When I was in Vietnam, someone denounced me to the 
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authorities after I had a fight with my ex-wife [the Vietnamese prostitute]. I had to 
return back to China and do the paperwork so I could re-enter Vietnam legally. Now I 
have a passport issued in Kunming. You know, in Vietnam, people still denounce 
each other. Before being caught I used to say I was Vietnamese and I took care of 
pigs, corn fields, like my wife, I had a peasant life. But who knows what she was 
doing before that? We have been together for six years already. She was born in 1966, 
she’s 43 years old. My wife and I are getting along well. I came back to China a little 
earlier than my wife, in 2006 so I could prepare our life here before she also move.  
She came in 2007. We work as caretakers for an insurance company in Hekou. 
And I have my taxi business too. My wife is quite lazy. She was not married when we 
met and her family agreed on our marriage. An uncle introduced us. We went out for 
four or five months before holding the wedding ceremony. I told her: “I have a son, 
don’t hit him, or at least don’t do it with a bench!” She was still living at her parents 
then. I don’t know much about her past. She has a good temper, doesn’t like to talk. 
She goes to the market and buys groceries because I don’t have time for this. She 
works well for others but not so much at home. [He smiles] She’s not so good at 
house chores! I have always talked in Chinese to my son, so my wife learnt Chinese 
that way. There are more migrants married to Vietnamese women than local Hekou’s 
people. My wife got used to the life here. People don’t comment much on us, they’re 
used to this [mixed couples]: it’s common now. My wife and I go back to Vietnam 
once a year for the New Year. Our relationship is yiban [fine]. But I have a bad 
temper. We often argue. I can be rough sometimes. But I’m honest. During the 1970s, 
I was a coolie, and I’ve done all sorts of work. Now, I’m too old for this. I am just 
working as a moto-taxi driver. The motorbike belongs to my son. 
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In Vietnam, I have a house in Yên Bái, which is occupied by my mother-in-
law at the moment. If I don’t have much money after getting old, I will spend my 
retirement there. My wife has friends in Hekou but if I decide to leave, she will leave 
with me.  
When my son was 15 years old, he started working in Lào Cai, then he learned 
how to drive and he became an electric bus driver at 18 [Hekou’s main public 
transport mean]. He’s 20 now and works for this company. He still lives with us, but 
he doesn’t care where he will live later. 
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Appendix 4. Kim: A life back and forth between Lào Cai and Hekou 
— You want to know my family history? It was not a happy family. My 
mother is Hoa.1 She was 18 years old when she was forced to marry my father2 in 
early 1978. He was 20, was very capable, had money, even seven motorbikes! He 
liked my mother so she had no choice. In November that year, my elder brother was 
born and just after that, my mother, her brother and her parents had to leave Vietnam 
and come to China. But she had to leave my baby-brother behind with my 
grandfather. My mother told me that she didn’t want to leave him; she was so hesitant 
that she waited and waited until the very last boat took people to China.3 Her family 
left but she didn’t get on board after all, because my father didn’t want her to leave 
and he beat her. He kept her at home until they could flee together to Yên Bái, which 
was more secure than Lào Cai at that time. In 1980, my second brother was born and 
in 1982 my family moved back to Lào Cai province and stayed in the town of Phô Lu. 
I was born in 1983. My father worked in the ‘highway work-unit’ but he started to 
make some business with Hanoi. It was forbidden at that time. My mother worked in 
the market sewing jackets. My elder brother was always outside and my second 
brother used to take care of me. In 1986, my mother … started some petty trade as 
well. She was selling little dogs to Chinese people in Hekou. Later, because she was 
regularly going to Saigon for her business, she brought my brothers and I with her to 
China and left us with our maternal grandparents who were living in Hekou. That 
                                                
1 This woman, and her mother and father, are ethnic Chinese, identified as Hoa in Vietnam. 
2 This man’s mother was born in China (Chinese) where she was once married and had a child. She 
went to Vietnam to work, and there she met a new husband, a Vietnamese man. Hence, Kim’s father 
was recognized as ethnic Vietnamese. 
3 The Hoa (Chinese from Vietnam) were evicted from Vietnam around 1978-1979. 
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same year, my father disappeared. In fact, he followed another woman. But, he 
reappeared a few years later. Then, my mother brought him back my two brothers 
while I stayed in Hekou with my grandparents and my uncle. When it was time for me 
to go to school in 1989, my mother sent me back to Vietnam and I stayed with some 
of her relatives. I remember that my father sometimes came to see me while my 
mother was away in China, I liked that, and it was fun. But, my mother was always 
afraid that he would kidnap me and she finally took me back to China. I actually spent 
my school years between China and Vietnam until 1994 when my father did kidnap 
me. [After that] I stayed with him, his new wife and their daughter. When my mother 
found me, she asked me whether or not I wanted to stay. I said I wanted to be in 
Vietnam, so she agreed. But, because she didn’t trust my father’s new wife, she didn’t 
want me to stay with them. So, I stayed at my paternal grandmother’s home until she 
died in 1996. Then, I went back to my father until I eventually became independent 
and started to work in 1999. I recently learned that my father had a baby with the 
woman he followed in the first place [who is different from the one he married later]. 
So I have an ‘extra’ little brother in Vietnam. My father told me that he found his son 
18 years after he was born. He is now financially helping him and his mother. My 
father’s second wife also had another daughter from a previous marriage. So you see, 
we are a complex family!  
Before living with my husband Lufei, I lived with my mother in Hekou. My 
mother also remarried. The man used to beat her because she would gamble and lose 
her money, then borrow again and lose again. So she divorced him and lived with me. 
Lufei takes care of my family. He once cleared her debt and found her a place to live. 
He has a good heart, and this is why I married him. 
I have lived in Hekou permanently for five years now [in 2008]. Before 
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knowing me, Lufei didn’t have much. He didn’t have a secure job and his parents 
were modest retired persons. If I wanted to follow another man now, that would not 
be too hard because I have already ‘married down’ by marrying Lufei. I couldn’t bear 
it if he went looking for another woman. I sacrificed everything to be with him. I have 
had other opportunities to get married before. On our wedding day, he cried … 
thanking me for taking him as a husband. He had everything to benefit from by 
marrying me. I don’t know why I married him – we simply had fun together. I refused 
to marry my Hanoi boyfriend, and I even turned away a fiancé from Beijing who was 
‘rich,’ as my mother would say… I met Lufei when I was a guide. We were 
colleagues. I was a guide for eight years until one day I found myself old and decided 
to get married. Between 2000 and 2003 I had not seen Lufei until I saw him one day 
by chance in Hekou. We began to see each other privately, but we never really had a 
romantic dating period – to put it nicely – we were always surrounded [by] many 
friends, eating and playing mah-jong all together. It would have been different in 
Vietnam.  
[Slowly, Kim started to give me different insights into her husband] 
Lufei and I … lived together for five years in a dormitory before we got 
married, that was before we managed this hotel coffee shop. We used to rely on mah-
jong for a living. Lufei is very good at this game but he also likes to drink and he can 
get really mad sometimes. I … felt very tired of his anger first. I even attempted 
suicide several times, you know? When he’s drunk, he says harsh words, and he 
breaks things… When I met him, his girlfriend had just dumped him and he didn’t 
trust women anymore. He didn’t want to get married because he was persuaded that 
women are only interested in money. He was very sad. I often think that he would die 
alone if I left him, and since it’s only when he’s drunk that he acts badly, I always 
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come back to him. I accept him like he is. I actually got married to avoid small talk. In 
China, people don’t care, but living together as a couple is not well thought of in 
Vietnam. We wanted to wait for Lufei to save some money before we got married. 
We married twice, once in Vietnam and once in China [Kim explained in detail each 
step of the wedding rituals, including the crossing of the river]. We wanted a wedding 
ceremony according to tradition. In Vietnam, the more complicated it is, the better 
considered you are. If you make it casual, you are disregarded. Parents usually want a 
high bride price, but it must not be too high, otherwise it looks like the bride [has 
been] sold. We did not want to be associated with those mixed couples you can find in 
the Vietnamese market. And for Vietnamese people, the way we got married was the 
best way to do it [so we would be] recognized.  
Now my main concern is my mother. She was so indebted because of 
gambling that she could not even be part of my marriage. She fled to Qiujin [Yunnan] 
because she was bankrupt. Later, I … cleared her debt once again but she continues to 
play, so we had a big fight lately. 
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Appendix 5. Thoa: The perfect wife 
— I come from an unhappy family. My father was very violent and he used to 
hit my mother. She left to Taiwan, then South Korea to work and make a living for 
our family. I have a younger brother. At school I was good at sciences. My 
grandfather was a scientist and I wanted to follow his path, but I failed the entry 
examination of the University of Sciences in Hanoi. Although, I passed the 
examination for the Foreign languages department. That’s how I have learned English 
and Japanese for three years. Later, when I came to Lào Cai I started to learn Chinese. 
I met my husband four years ago. We work in the same company. We sell Tibetan 
medicine to Vietnamese people. It’s authorized1 and real medicine. For that matter I 
have to take examinations about knowledge on Tibet because part of my work is to 
explain to customers where this medicine comes from.  
I dream about becoming a housewife and recover my English language level. I 
would also like to open a school of Vietnamese language for Chinese people in 
Hekou.2  
[About her husband Li Fan] 
He nian jing [prays]3 everyday because he is grateful to have found me when 
his affairs were going bad. He is a very pragmatic man. He does not speak 
                                                
1 Authorized by the Chinese sanitary services. Thoa specifies the origin of the product since all sorts of 
fake goods circulates within the border’s informal trade channels. Earlier in Dongxing, Xiao Fan gave 
an insight of this fruitful business she was temporarily involved with as a translator. 
2 Such private school already exists in the city. 
3 Li Fan is a Buddhist. 
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Vietnamese. I believe when cross-border marriages are based on love, Chinese man 
make more effort to learn Vietnamese. 
In the past, Li Fan has been married to his childhood friend. It didn’t work out. 
They divorced when their daughter was three years old. Now, she is eleven. Li Fan 
and I met in 2003, soon after he left them. Two years later I was working in his 
company. We were just friends until we started our relationship in 2007. Today we 
are still unsure about getting married. Our main problem concerns the place where we 
want to live together. Li Fan doesn’t like Hekou, it’s far from Kunming where live his 
ex-wife and his daughter. And I don’t like Kunming’s climate, and the city is too far 
from Vietnam. We could both make concession out of love but there would always 
remain a gap between us. You know, we intended to buy an apartment in Hekou but 
he decided to buy two in Kunming instead… Li Fan blames me for being too 
idealistic.  
[What do you think of him?] 
Li Fan is a lazy man: he doesn’t help me with house chores. He leaves his 
dirty clothes everywhere. Before his wife used to do everything and he got used to it. 
Sometimes, I’m annoyed and I shout at him, I get angry but he stays unsupportive. So 
I’ve decided to let it go, nobody is perfect, I won’t change him now! 
[How is your relationship with Li Fan’s family?] 
Oh, his mother likes me a lot because I have changed her son. Now he talks 
more than before, he articulates better his own feelings. He takes better care of his 
daughter whom he used to neglect. His ex-wife is also someone nice but they could 
not get along well and they were not happy as a couple. 
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[What about Li Fan’s network of friends and colleagues?] 
Chinese people are hen keqi [very polite] with me, but when they realize who I 
am, and when they call me Yuenan mei nü [pretty Vietnamese girl/women] to address 
me, I become very sensitive. They may not mean it but I can see a change in their 
attitude towards me. Even though they remain polite, they see me differently. I remain 
the same with them.1  
Hekou’s people disregard Vietnamese people for two reasons: prostitutes and 
some dishonest business partners, even though there are good individuals among them. 
I try to change this image by always remaining neutral and serious. At first some 
people do not realize that I am Vietnamese but when I need to disclose my origins, 
especially when we meet officials, I can see a change of attitude. I feel very nanshou 
[uncomfortable] with this contempt.  
[sighing] You have no idea of what I went through to get here. My strength 
comes from my mother, she suffered a lot and she supports me. At first, when people 
saw me returning from China wearing nice new clothes, they used to say that I was 
prostituting myself, that I loved money and was sleeping with Chinese laoban [bosses] 
to obtain this. Meanwhile in China, people believed I was staying with these men by 
self-interest. But then, they observed my behaviour and they changed their mind, 
tamen bu guan le [they don’t care anymore]. Chinese don’t think further than that. But 
in both places, I have long been the subject of gossip; everybody was watching me. I 
had to get over it. In Vietnam, people spread the fact that Li Fan had a wife and a 
daughter in Kunming and that I was his mistress. Even today, some people continue to 
                                                
1 This recalls Thoa’s behaviour during the diner and even during our first meeting with Qiuxia. 
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believe this. I don’t know where my strength comes from, really. Yes, my mother. But 
love? I am happy with him, but… It was not easy. 
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Appendix 6. Tam: Facing a stigma 
— I left school after I failed the high school examination.  I started to sell 
vegetables at the market and take care of the house. I was bored in Yên Bái.1 My 
family was poor, my stepfather was alcoholic and I wanted to go elsewhere. Two 
friends were selling tofu at the market,2 and they … suggested following them to 
China to find a job. We left on the quiet, crossed the border at Lào Cai and spent a 
few days in Hekou. Then a man took us to Xinjie, a Giay3 village in a mountain about 
80 kilometres from Hekou. The two friends escaped with the man and I found myself 
alone. I was 20 years old [in 1991]. The man who bought me cultivated manioc and 
corn with his family. He was 27 years old [and] healthy. I did not understand why and 
how much he bought me [for]. There weren’t any other Vietnamese in the village. I 
couldn’t speak Chinese and I panicked, [fearing] no one would defend me. My 
mother-in-law and sisters-in-law were nice with me: they did not ask me to work at 
the beginning. But, I had to sleep with my husband during one month and twenty-five 
days. He raped me the first week until I accepted him and submitted. I did not fall 
pregnant. I told the family I wanted to go home. In Vietnam, my mother was worried 
and she told the police, but because she didn’t have any money to offer, they didn’t do 
anything about my disappearing. One day, my husband was away and the family let 
me go. I crossed a river, and I managed to take a bus to Hekou thanks to people who 
bought me a ticket (I was crying). Once in Hekou, a Vietnamese man I knew helped 
                                                
1 Yên Bái, a northern province on the south of Lào Cai province in Vietnam. 
2 Tam only knew these women for one month and found out later that they were deliberately deceiving 
young women to sell them to China. They regularly changed their living place and approached their 
victims by selling tofu in the markets. 
3 The Giay are a minority ethnic group. 
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me to cross the border with another Vietnamese woman. When we arrived in Lào Cai, 
we took a train to Yên Bái. I arrived in the middle of the night and my mother 
welcomed me. I told her what had happened …  
Later, I got married with a Vietnamese man and we had a boy. My husband 
was nice but he became unfaithful to me. He took drugs with his lover, a prostitute, 
and felt very sick. He died a year later from a lung disease. Who would want a woman 
who had been sold in China, then became a widow in Vietnam? There was no hope 
for me in Yên Bái. I returned to China and settled in Hekou. I tried to find a proper 
job, but it was not easy. I had several boyfriends, Chinese businessmen who said they 
would take care of me. I did prostitute myself, what choice did I have? I tried to return 
to Vietnam but people kept talking about me, and I didn’t want my mother and my 
son to suffer from gossip. Staying in China was easier. Then I met my laogong.  He’s 
a worker, he’s not rich but we get along. It’s been five years now. My mother takes 
care of my son in Vietnam and we visit each other sometimes. During the day, I help 
my Vietnamese friends selling their drinks here. I also do recycling, but I know this is 
temporary.1 
(Tam’s narrative continues in sections included in Chapter 4 and 5) 
                                                
1 A few months later, Tam’s trajectory took her to Vietnam once again, where she now works as a maid 
for a stable, foreign employer in Hanoi (personal communication, January 2012). 
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Appendix 7. Chi: For the old days 
— I came from a poor family. We were five children, an elder brother and 
sister, a younger brother and sister. I am the third child. My father served in the army 
6 years during the Vietnam War, [so] we didn’t have much to eat at home. I was 
married in Vietnam. I still have two children there who live with their father. I left my 
Vietnamese husband in 2001 after having been married to him 17 years 2 months and 
4 days. He was cheating on me for 4 years with a woman in her thirties. They already 
had a 2 year old daughter together when I found out. Anyway, it took a year to get the 
divorce papers done and until today I haven’t received the half part of the house1 that 
my ex-husband owes me. He lives in it with his new wife and daughter! After the 
divorce, I went to Taiwan to work for three years. 
My daughter is 13 years old now and she lives alone in the house I … built 
after I returned from Taiwan, near Hanoi. On the land I bought, there is also a rice 
field. My mother takes care of it. My son is 22 years old and works in Hanoi. He has 
lived with his father since we separated; his house is just ten minutes walk away. He 
often comes to see his sister who doesn’t want to meet her father [because] she 
doesn’t like him. Yes, we thought I couldn’t have children anymore. But, I fell 
pregnant with my daughter nine years after my son.  
My Chinese laogong is 51 years old and comes from a village around Maguan 
[near Hekou]. You need to walk an hour to reach the place! He was also previously 
married and has two daughters. He was beating his wife because he wanted a son and 
she did not want any more children. She left for Guangxi where her sister is living and 
                                                
1 Chi talks about the house where the family used to live in before the divorce. 
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she remarried. She then had three more children, all boys! My laogong did not want 
to remarry because he was afraid that a second wife would abuse his daughters. But 
you know, he is the eldest of three boys in his family and all of them had girls. He 
needed to have a boy. He came to work to Hekou when his two daughters were old 
enough [and didn’t need] him. One is working in Beijing, and the other one lives with 
her boyfriend. My laogong wanted to find a life partner for his old [age]. First, he 
found a young woman who agreed to be with him but she was gambling at mah-jong 
and always asked for money. So he let her [go]. You know, he drives a motorcycle to 
transport goods in Hekou. He had this colleague who was married to a Vietnamese 
wife. That’s how we met.  
After I returned from Taiwan, I engaged in small trade between Lào Cai and 
Hekou. I was selling flowers in the Yuenan gai [the Vietnamese street, the local idiom 
used to designate the Vietnamese market). This is where I met the matchmaker. Since 
2001 [presumably the year she returned from Taiwan], some men had approached me 
but I always declined their offers. I would say: “Wo hen nimen [I hate you all]!” I 
didn’t trust men anymore, I wanted to live alone, I was happy as I was. The 
matchmaker was also selling flowers. She started to talk to me about marriage, and 
tried to convince me that it was important for me to remarry. She was saying: “Think 
about the old days, your son stays with your husband, your daughter will soon take 
care of her in-laws, you won’t be able to take care of yourself …” She introduced me 
to a first man, but he was zang [unclean]. The second one was looking for a wife he 
could bring back to Shanghai. He even agreed to give me some money for my 
daughter, but I didn’t want to go that far.1 By the way, the matchmaker was a pian ren 
[a cheat]. You know what? When the man from Shanghai was interested in me, she 
                                                
1 Hekou is located about 2,700 kilometres from Shanghai. 
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suggested keeping the money for my daughter while I would follow him to Shanghai, 
and give it back when I would return to Hekou!1 So then she introduced me to my 
laogong [husband], who I first found a little benben [foolish]. He promised 2000 yuan 
for my daughter and 500 yuan for the matchmaker. After two weeks, wo jia gei ta le 
[I married him]. I don’t know, I think I became fond of him. Then, since the 
matchmaker and him were acquaintances, he negotiated and only gave her 200 yuan 
as a symbolic contribution, but nothing to me. He said he had no money at the 
moment, and that he would give me some later. “Manman lai [take it easy],” he said. I 
once asked him for 1000 yuan, pretending I had to buy wholesale flowers, but I spent 
the money on my daughter. When I told him afterward, he accepted to consider this as 
his contribution to our marriage. 
[On her newborn] 
My laogong and I have been together for two years now. We didn’t know each 
other very well before we married, and our relationship is yiban [so-so]. After two 
months with him, I fell pregnant. I went to Lào Cai to abort without telling him. When 
I came back, I confessed. He was so angry: “You are crazy,” “I want a boy,” “You 
killed my child!” and so on… The following months, I fell pregnant again. This time, 
unsure, I asked around. My family in-law treats me well. I have visited them several 
times, but I wouldn’t live there! They advised me to keep the baby. In Vietnam, my 
family members were divided. They advised me to give birth to the baby and give it 
to my brother if it was a girl, and to keep it if it was a boy. Both [of] the Vietnamese 
                                                
1 Being an illegal migrant, Chi did not have a bank account in China. Unless she kept the money in 
cash with her during her travel (this is considered unsafe), she had no way of saving it until she could 
return to Vietnam, change it into Vietnamese dong (Vietnamese currency) on the black market and 
eventually bring it back to her daughter in Vietnam. 
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ultrasounds1 confirmed it was a boy. But then, we had to talk about the delivery.2  My 
family-in-law said: “Give birth at home. You have experience, your mother-in-law 
can be your midwife.”  But you know, I am not that young and I was afraid of dying if 
there were complications. My laogong suggested I had to decide by myself. 
Eventually I delivered in Hekou’s hospital, after the labour was induced, and we had 
to pay more than a thousand yuan. But it went well. People offered us a stroller and 
some clothes. My laogong wanted a son in the past but he didn’t expect to have a 
child now. He is 51 years old, you know, it just happened. It cost us 17,000 yuan to 
register him on his hukou,3 mei banfa [there was no escape]. 
 [She described the room where we were chatting] 
After we married, I moved to the place where he was living with his younger 
sister. It was small though, so we moved into this room last week, for the child. His 
mother came from Maguan and took our space in his sister’s place; actually, she’s 
waiting for us to be settled so that she can also move in with us. I am sleeping with 
our baby on the large bed that we just bought [a double mattress put on the floor], 
while my laogong sleeps on the small wooden bed you’re sitting on now. Later, his 
                                                
1 In China, to avoid discriminative abortion, it is not permitted to reveal the sex of a baby during 
ultrasound examinations. In Vietnam, there is no restriction. 
2 Delivery at a hospital can prove quite expensive for a rural family, especially one that has no welfare 
cover. In addition, the baby was to be born out of wedlock and out of the allowed quota (the laogong 
already had two children), which sometimes implies having to pay a fine before a birth certificate will 
be issued. 
3 This amount, which differs according to locality, is officially called shehui fuyang fei [social support] 
and is imposed as a form of amendment one has to pay when registering a child born out of wedlock on 
one of his/her parent’s household registration (hukou) booklet. In this case, the amount was quite 
considerable when one takes into account the average local income for a rural household. 
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mother will sleep on a similar bed. When we arrived here, there was no door to 
separate us from the next room occupied by another family. So we all agreed on 
building one out of wood boards. It’s temporary, you know. The water is outside, in 
the courtyard. This place is supposed to serve as an office. [She sighs] The main 
door’s lock is broken. I have asked my laogong to change it. He said “manman lai [be 
patient]” so … I just have to stay home so no one will try to enter. I get bored here. I 
can go nowhere, so my friends come to visit me. I know a lot of people, but I don’t 
have many real friends.  
[On her laogong] 
He never expresses his feelings. Anyway, wo yijing jia gei ta le [I have 
already married him]. He’s a highlander,1 but he’s not that bad. When I was 4-5 
months pregnant, he asked me not to work but to stay at home [she recalls her 
decision to marry him, smiling]. I don’t know what was the matter with me when I 
agreed. Wo teng ta [I was fond of him]! But he’s very xiaoqi [stingy]. That … 
disappoints me. He has money but he is reluctant to spend it.  He [has] never bought 
me any clothes! [She pouts]. Do you see our TV? His daughter from Beijing bought it 
for us, with the DVD player. But him, he just wanted a second-hand TV! I bought 
everything for us – the bed, the fridge, and the bicycle. He just provided the drinking 
fountain and the electric fan. We really possess the minimum. Do we quarrel? Oh yes 
we do! He once blamed me for spending 200 yuan too easily. But, at first he [said], 
“My money is your money!” I feel very disappointed by his stinginess. He once said, 
                                                
1  In China, as in Vietnam, highlanders are believed to be more primitive than their lowland 
counterparts. This is especially true regarding members of ethnic groups living in the mountains of this 
region. But, stereotyping can extend to other rural populations, irrespective of ethnic group. Here, Chi 
specifies that her husband was Han Chinese. 
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“you can leave if you want, but leave the baby, I’ll take care of him.” I answered, “I 
have carried this baby, it wasn’t easy, I suffered to deliver it, I can’t leave it with you. 
I want nothing else but him. I’m taking him!” But he can also be flexible. I cook 
Vietnamese food, and he eats whatever I make, he just adds some chilli, that’s all.1 
[On her perspective of the marriage and its future] 
I feel [insecure] about the future. I have asked my laogong several times to 
come with me to visit my family, but he refuses. He hasn’t got any passport yet. Now 
he agrees but I don’t want [him to go] anymore. Both our families have met our son 
anyway. I wished I could return to Vietnam to take care of my daughter. She is still 
young, but I have this son here … [so it] is difficult. He’s the most important thing 
now. If one day, things are not going well anymore, I can return to Vietnam. I have a 
field, a house, my daughter there, and I can work too. Here, I have nothing. I didn’t 
expect to have a child, but once I became pregnant and he knew it, he wanted it.2 
 
                                                
1 The general tendency among Chinese men married to Vietnamese women is to teach their wives how 
to cook Chinese food, since most Chinese do not appreciate Vietnamese cuisine. Chi’s husband is 
among the exceptions because he agrees to eat Vietnamese food, albeit adding the unavoidable Yunnan 
chilli. 
2 Here, Chi moderates her first statement. Was she afraid I would gain the impression that he was a 
man who had a specific purpose for marrying her? 
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